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Summary 1
Summary
Emotional distress (symptoms of depression and anxiety) and emotional
disorders are commonly experienced following stroke and negatively influence
recovery and survival rates. Past research suggests that depressive symptoms are
not directly related to lesion location and are only weakly related to actual
functional and social losses. Patients' own subjective beliefs have been under-
researched. This thesis was developed using cognitive theory, past research on
emotional adaptation to emotional disability and observations from piloting. The
main study aimed to investigate distress and a set of beliefs about 'stroke' and
'its effects', and to longitudinally test associations between specific beliefs and
distress, taking into account relevant background variables. Supplementary
studies aimed to explore emotional distress and disorder and relevant beliefs.
A consecutive series of 89 patients, without severe cognitive or
communication impairment, were interviewed one month (baseline) after
admission to a stroke unit and 81 were interviewed again at nine months
(follow-up).
In the main study, distress was measured using global Hospital Anxiety and
Depression scale scores. Specific beliefs about 'stroke' and 'its effects'
investigated were: Attributions (Casual controllability, 'Why me?', 'Found
meaning?'); Negative self-evaluations (Acceptance of disability, Negative
identity change, Shame); Beliefs in recovery and recurrence (Recovery locus
of control, Confidence in recovery, Recurrence fear). Background variables
measured were: Demographics, Stroke severity, Disability, Pre-stroke
depression, Social support and Life events.
The first supplementary study used the structured clinical interview (SCID) for
DSMIV to assess depressive disorder (major or minor) and common anxiety
disorders (generalised anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, post
traumatic stress disorder) and, additionally, as a means for exploring relevant
beliefs. The second supplementary study involved further qualitative
Summarv
2 Summary
interviews with sixty participants at baseline to explore their own experiences
and main concerns.
Associations were found between distress and most belief variables at
baseline, follow-up and across time. Backward linear regression analyses for
distress were used to study belief variables taking background variables into
account. At baseline and follow-up these analyses supported the statistical
significance of associations between distress and negative self-evaluative
beliefs and recurrence fear. Across time, a role for causal controllability and
acceptance of disability was supported. However, these results also
highlighted the pervasive influence of a pre-stroke history of depression and of
initial distress levels across time.
The SCID interview identified that many patients met criteria for depressive
disorder (33% at one and 30% at nine months) or anxiety disorder (35% at one
and 33% at nine months) but also yielded information regarding specific
stroke-related beliefs relevant to distress versus adaptation. The qualitative
interviews provided insight into patients' idiosyncratic concerns. This
extended the main findings, for example by illustrating the varied nature of
recurrence fear beliefs and highlighting individuals' needs to give as well as
receive social support.
This study provides qualified support for cognitive theory of distress
following stroke by demonstrating associations between distress and beliefs
concerning 'stroke' and 'its effects' in the short- and longer-term aftermath of
stroke. Over and above measures of disability, a personal sense of being
unable to accept reduced capability, which some went so far to describe as
'uselessness', was related to higher levels of distress and disorder. Fear of
recurrent stroke was common. Belief in the controllability of risk factors
tended to be low; however a greater initial sense of causal controllability
appeared protective against distress across time. These results have
implications for the development of interventions to address the high
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1.1 Forward
'You can of course treat the medical side of the illness, but if you fail to address the
emotional or psychological side, you will never cure more than fifty percent of the
afflicted person...'
p.39, McCrum (2000)
Robert McCrum, who is literary editor of the Observer, made this statement in a
British Medical Journal article. Its' credibility rests with his own personal
experience of a severe stroke aged only forty-two years. In this chapter the nature of
emotional distress and disorder following stroke will be considered. The importance
of addressing the emotional side of stroke, in terms of prevalence and negative
impact of emotional disorder will be presented.
Competing theories and evidence for understanding emotional distress and disorder
following stroke will be considered. The role of cognition in distress, in particular
Beck's cognitive theory, and its applicability to our understanding of emotional
distress following stroke will be introduced. Finally, a rationale for an in-depth
study of beliefs related to emotional distress following stroke will be presented.
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1.2: Stroke
Stroke is a rapid onset of signs of brain disturbance such as loss of bodily function,
speech or vision, lasting at least twenty-four hours, caused by blood vessel disease
(Samuels, 1994).
Stroke is very common. A new stroke occurs every five minutes in the UK (S.A.,
2003). Approximately one in four men and one in five women aged forty-five will
have a stroke by eighty-five (Wolfe et al., 1996). Older people are at increased risk.
Of 130 000 new individuals who have a stroke in the UK each year, 117 000 are
fifty-five years or older (SA, 2003). Current predictions suggest the older
population will double in size by 2050 (Katon, 2003). Therefore we can expect the
incidence of stroke to multiply.
Stroke is currently the third most common cause of death in Scotland, the UK and
the US (SIGN, 2002; Wolfe et al., 1996; American Heart Association, 2002).
Approximately one in five strokes result in death within a month (SIGN, 2002) and
one in three within a year (Wescott, 2000). Nonetheless, long-term survival rates
have significantly improved. A thirty percent decrease in mortality at two years
amongst twenty-eight day survivors was reported for 1980 to 1990 (McGovern et
al., 1993, inEbrahim, 1999).
Stroke survivors outnumber the annual rate of new stroke patients almost five fold
(SIGN, 2002). For those who survive, the quality of that survival gains importance.
Unfortunately, stroke survivors are not guaranteed a good recovery and
approximately half will remain disabled a year later (Wescott; 2000). Stroke is now
the most common cause of adult disability in the UK and US (Wolfe et al., 1996;
American Heart Association, 2003). This research refers only to basic functional
physical disability. Emotional distress is one of the various other unseen difficulties
experienced in the aftermath of stroke (Anderson, 1992).
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1.3: The constructs of emotional distress and disorder
1.3i: Emotional distress, symptoms and disorder
There are many different shades and hues of emotional distress: worry, fear, anxiety,
panic, sadness, hopelessness, and depression. It is commonly accepted that
emotional distress exists as a continuum, and terms such as distress, negative affect
or neurosis refer in a non-specific way to the high end of the spectrum (Kendler and
Jablensky, 2003). Distress may be described in terms of types of symptoms:
cognitive (for example, worthlessness), physiological/somatic (for example, fatigue),
or behavioural (for example, agitation), symptoms as well as more affective
symptoms such as worry or low mood. Distress can also be described categorically
in terms of emotional disorders.
Emotional disorders are essentially syndromes defined by number, type and duration
of symptoms, and are intended to identify severe cases that warrant clinical
attention. Criteria for emotional disorders are described in classification systems
such as 'The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for the American Psychiatric
Association' (DSMIV; APA, 1994, that will be referred to as DSMIV from now on).
As these systems developed, there was a movement towards the division of
symptoms of distress into separate depressive or anxiety disorders (please see
Chapter 8, section 8.3 for description of major depression, minor depression,
generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and other more specific anxiety disorders).
DSMIV criteria are described as:
'current formulations of evolving knowledge... They do not encompass, however, all
conditions for which people may be treated or that may be appropriate topics for
research efforts.'
p.xi, APA (1994)
There are two ongoing debates fuelled by diverse research with relevance to this
thesis. The first questions the splitting between anxiety and depression symptoms as
the classification systems of disorders develops. The second questions the different
advantages of using the continuum construct or the disorders construct to study
emotional distress.
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1.3U: Overlap between depression and anxiety symptoms and disorders
Accumulating research findings question the separation of general anxiety and
depression symptoms into distinct disorders. The testing and reformulation of
criteria for different disorders has improved the reliability with which they may be
diagnosed (Riskind et ah, 1987; Brown et ah, 1994). However, general anxiety and
depressive disorders have much in common: very high rates of co-morbidity, clinical
instability between the two states, lack of specific drug responses, even similar
genetic profiles (Andrews et al., 1990; Brown et al., 1994; Kendell and Jablensky,
2003; Liebowitz et ah, 1990; Riskind et ah, 1987; Strarakaki and Vargo, 1986).
Experts and research addressing emotional distress in primary care and general
hospitals have particularly questioned the relevance of criteria for specific
depressive and anxiety disorders amongst these patients. In reviewing the literature,
Mayou and Hawton (1986) suggest that this nomenclature is relevant to an important
minority of patients. However, undifferentiated symptoms of distress not captured
by anxiety or depressive disorder criteria are commonly found amongst medical
patients. These symptoms are often moderate but sometimes are of high severity
and associated with social dysfunction (Clark and Streer, 1996; Liebowitz et ah,
1990; Mayou and Hawton, 1986; Sensky, 1986; Zinbarg et ah, 1994). This
understanding is reflected in the manner in which distress tends to be measured as a
continuum amongst medical patients to avoid 'floor effects' (Creed, 1988;
Herrmann, 1997).
Co-morbidity rates between general anxiety and depression amongst older adults
may be particularly high. For example, in the Guys/Age Concern study, ninety-one
percent of older participants meeting criteria for GAD had depressive symptoms
(Lindesay et ah, 1989). It has been suggested that anxiety and depression may
particularly blur in elderly patients owing to a general attenuation of symptoms
(Roth, 1988, quoted in Kay, 1988). A study of symptoms of distress in older general
practice patients supports this idea (Good et ah, 1987). They found anxiety
explained more of the variance in scores than depression but there was also
significant overlap between the two factors. When the data was subjected to cluster
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analysis, a large normal cluster was followed by a cluster that the authors described
as 'anxious and mildly depressed'.
In contrast to the development of thinking about the apparent overlap between
anxiety and depression symptoms and disorders discussed, the bulk of past
emotional research in stroke refers only to depression. This term has been used
'rather loosely' to refer to a high level of distress or, more specifically, to depressive
disorder (House, 1987).
An exception was a study that explored the severity and type of a range of symptoms
amongst three diagnostic groups of stroke patients ('not depressed', 'minor
depression' or 'major depression') and in-patients from a psychiatric hospital ward
with major depression (Gainotti et al.,1999). They suggest that hallmark depressive
symptoms amongst the stroke patients with major or minor depression tended to be
less severe than amongst the patients hospitalised for depressive disorder. More
anxious symptoms were as severe amongst the stroke patients with minor depression
and more severe amongst those with major depression. This study supports a picture
of overlapping anxious and depressive symptoms amongst stroke patients who meet
criteria for depressive disorder.
The few studies that have assessed generalised anxiety disorder amongst stroke
patients have found rates of high co-morbidity with depressive disorder (please see
Table 1.1). Fedoroff et al. (1991) found higher levels of general anxiety symptoms
among stroke patients with major depression, than among spinal cord injury or
myocardial infarction patients with major depression. In contrast, Lipsey et al.
(1986) report a 'strikingly similar' profile of depressive symptom type and severity
in a study that compared patients with major depression from stroke rehabilitation
wards to patients with major depression from a psychiatric hospital ward. However,
they did not look at anxiety symptoms.
Experienced clinical researchers have begun to describe concerning emotional states
amongst their stroke patients as typically 'sub-clinical mood states' (Reich, 2002)
and well characterised by the concept of 'distress' (Lincoln, 2003). Johnston (1991)
has highlighted the neglect of anxiety research following stroke. House (1996) has
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criticised the tendency for stroke researchers to refer to 'post-stroke depression, or
PSD' as creating an idea of something 'special' about depression following stroke.
These criticisms coincide with the preceding discussion that has highlighted the
overlapping nature of anxiety and depressive disorder and the prevalence of
moderate levels of both anxiety and depression symptoms amongst older adults,
primary care patients, general hospital samples and stroke patients.
1.3iii: Different advantages ofthe continuum and disorders constructsfor the study
ofemotional distress following stroke
The preceding discussion of opinion and evidence converges to suggest that the
continuum construct of distress is a conceptually appropriate subject of study
amongst stroke patients. By studying a continuum, moderately severe as well as
severe symptoms are studied. By investigating both types of symptoms, the past
neglect of anxiety symptoms in stroke research can be avoided without rejecting the
importance of depression. The continuum of distress also has statistical advantages
with relatively small samples (please see Chapter 7 for discussion).
Kendell and Jablensky (2003) have defended the clinical utility of emotional
disorders construct. Clinicians seek to divide normal from disordered experience
even if it is at the point of an arbitrary boundary. Research that looks at specific
disorders can provide information about sub-groups of patients at the high end of the
spectrum of the multifaceted continuum of distress. For example, community
studies of anxiety amongst older adults have found 'a strikingly rare' prevalence of
panic disorder (Kay. 1988) but yet a high prevalence of agoraphobia (without panic)
often of late onset (Flint, 1994). Although these reviewers concluded that DSM
anxiety disorder criteria did not capture the high prevalence of moderately severe
anxious symptoms in this population, these specific findings may still have useful
clinical implications.
Ideally, research would utilise both the continuum and disorders constructs. For the
reasons described, a continuous measure of distress has been chosen as the main
subject of study in this thesis. Flowever, for reasons discussed here, criteria for
common emotional disorders were also applied and developed into a supplementary
study (please see Chapter 8).
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1.4: Prevalence of emotional disorder and distress following stroke and
discussion of variation
1.4i: Prevalence ofemotional disorderfollowing stroke
A number of reviews have now combined results from the large number of studies
of depression prevalence following stroke (Robinson, 2003; Spencer et ah, 1997;
Whyte and Mulsant, 2002). On balance these studies suggests a high prevalence of
depression but a marked variability in results across studies. Whyte and Mulsant
considered only results for major depression assessed using DSM criteria (fourteen
studies) and found rates to vary between 5% and 37% across studies conducted
between two weeks and two years following stroke. Spencer et al. (1997)
considered studies that used either cut-off points on rating scales or DSM criteria for
minor or major depression with samples of at least fifty patients that accounted for
past psychiatric history (nineteen studies). They found a 3% to 68% depression
prevalence rate across all studies. The rates for just DSM major depression varied
between 3% and 40%, and the rate for just DSM minor depression varied between
10% and 40%.
Robinson's (2003) review is the largest (thirty studies) and includes small studies
that have used rating scales or DSM criteria for minor or major depression. Across
four community studies, the rate of depression ranged from 23% to 44%, giving an
average of 32%. Across eighteen acute or rehabilitation hospital sample studies, the
rate of depression ranged from 21% to 72%, giving an average of 36%. Across eight
out-patient sample studies, the rate of depression ranged from 16% to 33%, giving
an average of 33%. Higher prevalence rates may be expected amongst hospital
samples compared to community samples due to higher stroke severity and disability
levels. This difference emerged in a comparison of depressive disorder assessed by
DSMIII or DSMIII-R criteria. The pooled frequency for hospital sample studies was
19% for major and 19% for minor depression, whereas the pooled frequency for
community studies was 14% for major and 9% for minor depression.
Available studies of the prevalence of generalised anxiety disorder have produced
mixed results summarised in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Prevalence studies of generalised anxiety disorder following stroke
Investigators Patient population Criteria General anxiety
disorder rates in
percentages
House et al. (1991)
Sharpe et al. (1990)
Burvill et al. (1995)
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1: House et al. (1991) used a hierarchical approach (so patients with depression were excluded from
the diagnosis of GAD). The other authors used a non-hierarchical approach (so figures in the left
column refer to overall percentage of patients meeting criteria for GAD regardless of depression
status)
2: Some authors indicated overlap between GAD and depression by reporting percentages of patients
who met criteria for both.
3: The DSMIII-R criteria that specifies a 6-month duration of uncontrollable worry for GAD was
discounted. They assumed that the DSMIII-R criteria of a further six of eighteen anxiety symptoms
could be equated to three out of nine anxiety symptoms identified by the present state exam (PSE;
Wing et al., 1974) structured interview schedule they used.
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Community studies appear to have found low rates of GAD, whereas high rates are
reported by hospital sample studies. Comorbidity between GAD and depression is
high, which will have reduced rates in studies using the hierarchical diagnostic
approach. Also, studies reporting higher rates have used more lenient criteria.
House et al. (1991) actually found that worry was commonly reported and Sharpe et
al. (1991) found similar levels of anxiety and depression symptoms. In addition,
Gillespie (1997) found high levels of anxious symptoms amongst one in four
discharged stroke patients.
A fairly consistent pattern of high rates of agoraphobia but very low rates of panic
disorder or other specific phobias tends to be reported by the few relevant studies
available. Burvill et al. (1995) report that seventeen percent of their community
sample met DSMIII-R criteria for agoraphobia at four months. House et al. (1991)
found symptoms of situational anxiety were common during the first year following
stroke. They report only a 2% to 3% rate of agoraphobia, but point out a higher rate
would have been found if a non-hierarchical diagnostic approach had been used.
Astrom (1996) reports that fears of going out alone were common but states that
'these fears were often realistic' and decided not to regard them as phobic. In
contrast, Burvill et al. (1995) suggest their agoraphobic patients' fears were
'invariably...out of proportion' to what may be expected in view of their disability
levels.
Recently (for example, Shalev et al., 1993), there has been a growth of interest in
post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) amongst medical patients. A third of
subarachnoid haemorrhage patients referred to clinical neuropsychology for anxiety
problems were found to meet DSMIII-R criteria for PTSD (Berry, 1998). More
relevant to this thesis, Sembi et al. (1998) report that ten percent of a mixed group of
stroke in-patients and out-patients met criteria for PTSD according to criteria
developed by Blake et al. (1992). However, Sampson et al. (2003) recently
compared PTSD symptoms amongst hospitalised stroke and non-stroke patients
(many of whom had been admitted for a fall) using two different scales. They found
no statistically significant differences in PTSD symptoms between stroke patients,
non-stroke patients who had fallen and other non-stroke patients.
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Longitudinal studies suggest that the prevalence of depression may decrease to about
twenty percent, from between three to seven years follow-up (Astrom et al., 1993;
Dam et al., 2001; Sharpe et al., 1990). Results so far suggest the prevalence of
general anxiety disorder may decrease but remains fairly high in the long term
(please see Table 1.1). Burvill et al. (1995) found agoraphobia to resolve in half of
patients after the first year. This is consistent with Sharpe et al. (1990) who found
an 8% rate of agoraphobia in a community sample three to five years following
stroke.
Small studies (Dam, 2001; Folstein, 1977; Sampson et al., 2003) and
epidemiological studies (Burvill et al., 1995; Wells et al., 1988; Penninx et al., 2003)
that have attempted to assess the prevalence of depression amongst stroke patients
relative to other populations, such as healthy older adults or those with other
disabling conditions, have produced mixed results, and mixed conclusions by
reviewers. For example, Robinson (2003) suggests that depression appears to be far
commoner amongst stroke patients than amongst the general population. Burvill et
al. (1995) conclude that high rates of depression tend to be found amongst disabled
populations in general, not just stroke patients. There are many methodological
issues concerning comparison across depression studies that will be discussed in
section 1.4ii, and also issues with the definition and measurement of disability
(Bond et al., 1998) that confound the appraisal of the prevalence of emotional
disorder following stroke relative to other populations.
1.4U: Variation in prevalence estimates ofemotional distress and disorder
following stroke
The variation in prevalence rates for emotional disorders following stroke may be
partly attributable to differences across samples regarding factors commonly
associated with emotional disorder (please see section 1.6iii). Spencer et al. (1997)
have drawn attention to the inconsistent assessment and reporting of potentially
confounding patient attributes, in particular a past history of an emotional disorder.
It is possible that somatic symptoms of distress may be confounded with stroke
itself, and their inclusion in emotional distress and disorder assessments may
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account for some variability in prevalence rates (Hibbard et al., 1993; Spencer et al.,
1997). The use of somatic symptoms to assess distress in medical patients has been
much questioned with mixed research findings (see for example, Clark et al., 1983,
1989). Self-report and clinician rated somatic symptoms were less associated with
depression diagnosis than non-somatic items in one stroke study (Stein et al., 1996).
However, Fedoroff et al. (1997) found that the exclusion ofDSMIV somatic items in
the diagnostic process only produced minor differences in the number of hospital
stroke patients found to met criteria for depressive disorder.
Compared to other medical populations, the assessment of emotional symptoms in
stroke patients can be complicated by aphasia (impairment in the comprehension and
expression of language) amongst approximately a third of patients (SIGN, 2002;
Spencer et al., 1997) or by cognitive impairment in approximately one third of
stroke patients (Tatemichi et al., 1994) ranging from memory, perception and
attention deficits to executive functions (BPS, 2003). Sometimes it is unclear
whether patients with aphasia have been excluded from studies (Carson et al., 2000)
or what severity of aphasia or cognitive impairment merited exclusion (Spencer et
al., 1997). Methods such as clinicians' observation of behaviour or visual analogue
scales have been used as alternatives to language based enquiry into patients'
experience of symptoms in some studies, but these appear to perform poorly in
practice (House et al., 1989). The inconsistent exclusion or inclusion of patients
with severe language or cognitive impairment across studies, and the problematic
assessment of symptoms in these patients may account for some of the variability in
current prevalence estimates. Unfortunately, the inconsistent reporting of patient
attributes on these dimensions makes this possibility difficult to assess.
Other possible sequelae of stroke: emotionalism (loss of emotional control often
with increased frequency of crying or even laughing) aprosody (deficits in the
rhythm or tone of emotional expression) emotional agnosognosia (lack of awareness
of emotional states) may mask or mimic the symptoms of distress (House et al.,
1989; Spencer et al., 1996). It has been suggested that these issues may confound
the assessment of emotional distress and disorder in stroke patients and account for
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some variability in prevalence estimates (Black, 1993; Spencer et al., 1997; Gordon
et al; 1997; Hibbard et al., 1993).
Various authors have highlighted that continuous measures of distress are designed
to measure the severity of disorder, not the disorder itself. A cut-off point on a
questionnaire should not be seen as interchangeable with a diagnosis made by
structured interviews and diagnostic criteria (Fechner-Bates et al., 1994; House et
al., 1989; Schramke et al.,1998; Spencer et al., 1997). Studies that have compared
scores on continuous measures to diagnoses of emotional disorder assessed by
structured interview and diagnostic criteria report different rates of sensitivity and
specificity between scales, and with different cut-off points (House et al., 1991;
O'Rourke et al., 1998; Schramke et al., 1998; Schubert et al., 1992). This may well
partially explain the variation in prevalence estimates (23% to 48%) across studies
that have used a cut-off point on a scale as an indication of depression (Robinson,
2003). However, a similar level of variation in depressive disorder prevalence rates
(23% to 47%) across studies that have used DSMII or DSMIII-R criteria and the
PSE structured interview is apparent in the same review (Robinson, 2003).
Appreciation of the discussed methodological issues contributed to the development
of inclusion/exclusion criteria (please see Chapter 5, section 5.4) the choice of
measures (please see Chapter 6, section 6.3 and Chapter 8, section 8.3) and issues
explored within the structured clinical interview study (please see Chapter 8, section
8.2).
Some of the variability in prevalence estimates of emotional distress and disorder in
stroke studies may reflect real differences rather than methodological limitations.
Lower rates of distress and disorder amongst community as opposed to hospital
samples, and amongst long-term as opposed to acute stage survivors, may be
meaningfully expected because of lower levels of disability (please see section
1.6iii) and the discussed results tend to support this pattern. Also, prevalence studies
have been conducted across different countries with different health care systems.
Patients treated in specialist stroke units rather than general medical wards in the UK
have better functional outcomes (Langhorne et al., 1997) and the possibility that this
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may associate with distress is plausible (please see section 1.5). A trial of ongoing
rehabilitation support in the year following discharge in Sweden actually found
statistically significant lower levels of depressive symptoms amongst those receiving
additional rehabilitation therapy (Kotial et al., 1999).
On balance, depressive symptoms and disorder appears to be often encountered
following stroke. Preliminary evidence suggests that similarly high levels of anxiety
symptoms and disorders may be experienced. Given the high prevalence of stroke
itself, it is important to consider the impact of emotional distress and disorder on
subsequent outcomes.
1.5: The impact of emotional disorders and distress following stroke
Often studies have found a positive association between depression or anxiety and
functional disability (please see section 1.6iii). More relevant to this discussion,
statistically significantly less functional improvement at both one and two year
follow-ups was found amongst initially depressed patients despite controlling for
initial disability levels (Parikh et al., 1990). Subsequent studies have replicated, or
partially replicated these findings (Gillen et al., 2001; Herrmann, 1998; Kotila, 1999;
Morris et al., 1992; Pohjasvaara et al., 2001; Shimoda and Robinson, 1998) although
there have been exceptions (van de Weg et al., 1999). Also, a failure to recover may
exacerbate depression making the relationship reciprocal (Astrom et al., 1993;
Kotila et al., 1999; Pohjasvaara et al., 2001). On balance, an initially depressed
reaction seems to negatively impact stroke patients' prospects of long-term
functional and social recovery.
Preliminary evidence suggests that negative emotional reactions to stroke may even
influence patients' long-term survival. After adjusting for social and physical
factors, minor or major depressive disorder in the acute aftermath of stroke was
found to increase mortality rates by seven-fold at fifteen months and by three-fold at
ten years (Morris et al., 1993). In a larger study, self-reported distress, but not major
depression, assessed at one month, independently associated with one and two year
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mortality rates (House et al., 2001). Self-reported distress assessed at six months did
not predict mortality at three years in a similarly designed study. However,
self-reported hopeless and fatalistic attitudes did (Lewis et al., 2001). On balance,
there does seem to be a relationship between poor emotional health and mortality
following stroke although the exact nature of the relationship is unclear.
(please see House et al., 2001 and Lewis et al., 2001 for further discussion and
theories regarding the mechanisms involved).
The affects of negative emotional reactions to stroke are likely to extend beyond the
lives of patients. Plausibly patients who are depressed or anxious will be stressful to
care for and there is some evidence that patients' and carers' emotional states are
related (Wade et al., 1986). Depression following stroke may also engender greater
costs to society mediated by increased needs for care (Kotila et al., 1999). For
example, depression has been associated with length of hospital stays even when
functional recovery was controlled for (Ebrahim et al., 1987).
Emotional well-being in itself is essential to overall quality of life. Mood has been
identified as a dominant theme within qualitative studies that have sought to
understand stroke patients' own perspectives (Murray et al., 2003). Health status
utilities research also suggests that stroke patients themselves rate their emotional
health highly (Bosworth et al., 2000). Even with adjustments for physical and social
factors, depressed patients were found to be more willing to trade statistically
significantly more hypothetical years of life to gain an improved state of health for
the rest of their lives, than non-depressed patients.
In conclusion, these findings suggest that emotional distress impacts negatively on
stroke patients and their families' lives. The discussed findings underlie the
importance of seeking greater understanding of the origins of emotional distress and
disorder associated with stroke.
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1.6: Competing theories and evidence for emotional distress and disorder
following stroke
1.6i: Commonsense understanding ofemotional distress following stroke
There is a commonly held assumption that, as a natural 'understandable' reaction to
the physical losses involved with stroke, emotional distress is inevitable and
untreatable (Robinson and Chait, 1985). Authors of varied persuasions have chosen
to question this commonsense position. Reich (1996) suggests 'ageist stereotypes'
may operate in such assumptions. Laidlaw et al. (2003) highlight the
'understandability phenomenon'. Distressed reactions can be too easily accepted as
inevitable amongst the elderly or those with acquired disability simply because they
seem intuitively reasonable.
Depression is not absolutely always a consequence of stroke (Laidlaw et al., 2003;
Kneebone and Dunmore, 2000). The ability of many people to elude emotional
disorder following stroke contradicts commonsense assumptions. This opens the
field up to the study of individual differences in emotional response to stroke.
1.6U: The lesion location hypothesisfor depressionfollowing stroke
In complete contrast to the commonsense view that emotional distress is a natural
psychological reaction to stroke, Robinson, and colleagues (Parikh et al., 1990;
Robinson et al., 1984, 2000) suggested a direct biological aetiology. Having
observed lateralised behavioural disturbances in experimentally brain injured rats
(Robinson, 1979; Robinson and Coyle, 1980) stroke lesions located in the left
hemisphere of the human brain were hypothesised to directly cause the specific
syndrome of depression.
A large number of studies have tested this hypothesis. A recent systematic literature
review identified 117, although many included duplicate data (Carson et al., 2000).
Their meta-analysis of thirty-five suitable studies found that results supporting an
association between depression and right hemisphere stroke lesions were actually as
common as studies supporting an association with left hemisphere lesions. Other
studies reported no association between side of brain damage and depression.
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Reviewers have highlighted methodological limitations within the body of lesion
location research, including duplicate publications and small unrepresentative
samples (Carson et ah, 2000; Bhogul et ah, 2004; Singh et ah, 1998; House, 1996).
In addition, they have questioned the theoretical meaningfulness of these studies in
terms of human brain structure and function vis-a-vis the brains of rats and
affordances of scanning analyses (Carson, 2003; Johnston, 1991; Singh et ah, 1998).
House (1996) has criticised the use of the term 'post-stroke depression' (PSD) for
giving some kind of credence to the idea of a special type of depression in stroke.
He points out that depression amongst other medically ill populations has been
viewed as reactive. Whyte and Mulsant (2002) have pointed out that DSMIV has
even condoned the lesion location hypothesis with specific reference to it as a
'plausible etiological factor' (page 167, APA, 1994).
The lesion location hypothesis for depression following stroke is not supported by
the world literature (Carson et ah, 2000). It does actually reflect only one current
biological theory that may inform understanding of the phenomenon of emotional
disorder following stroke (Whyte and Mulsant, 2002). With hindsight, a
disproportionate amount of attention has been given to the lesion location hypothesis
for depression (Spencer et ah, 1995) which has helped create the 'overemphasis' on
depression in stroke research (Anderson, 1991). He has also voiced concern that
other aetiological factors (disability, lesion size, cognitive impairment and social
functioning) have been paid relatively less attention.
l.6iii: Disability, background and socialfactors and associations with depression
and anxietyfollowing stroke
As discussed previously (please see section 1.5) associations between depression
and disability have often been studied and these variables may be reciprocally
related across time. Whyte and Mulsant (2002) have recently reviewed cross-
sectional and follow-up studies together, and found that only a slim majority (ten out
of sixteen) report a statistically significant association between depression and
functional disability. The findings of two studies of GAD conflict: statistically
significant associations with disability were found at regular intervals between three
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months and three years by Astrom et al. (1993) but not at regular intervals between
three months and two years by Castillo et al. (1993, 1995). Restriction in the range
of disability levels likely to be found in small samples of hospitalised patients may
explain the lack of association with emotional distress in many stroke studies
(Johnston, 1991).
It is widely acknowledged that emotional disorder tends to associate with certain
'background' variables: age (please see section 1.3) gender (Bebbington, 1999)
economic status (Stansfeld, 2003) life events (for example, Brugha et al., 1985) and
previous history of emotional disorder (Coyne et al., 1999). Dennis et al. (2000)
have reviewed relatively large cohort stroke studies that have included demographic
variables. All eight of these studies tested associations between higher levels of
depressive symptoms and increasing age, and three actually found this relationship
was statistically significant in multivariate analyses. Female gender was statistically
significantly associated with higher levels of depression symptoms in four of eight
studies, but this relationship was only maintained in two multivariate analyses. Only
two studies identified by Dennis et al. (2000) tested association between social
economic status and depression: a statistically significant association between lower
status and depression was found by Andersen et al. (1995) but not by Burvill et al.
(1995).
I have only been able to identify three studies of pre-stroke life events. House et al.,
1990) alone used a well-recognised approach for assessing life events, but did not
report association with emotional outcome. Both Andersen et al. (1995) and Bush
(1999) report a statistically significant univariate association between life events
reported for the six month pre-stroke period and depression at one year and six
month follow-up respectively. Eleven studies have been found that have addressed
pre-stroke history of emotional disorder or specifically of depressive disorder. At
face value, a slim majority of studies (six) report a statistically significant
association between pre-stroke history of depression or any emotional disorder and
depression following stroke (Andersen et al., 1995; Eastwood et al., 1989; Herrman
et al., 1998; Kotila et al., 1999; Morris et al., 1992; Schwartz et al., 1993). However
five studies do not (Astrom et al., 1993; Dam et al., 1989; Fedoroff et al., 1991;
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Sharpe et al., 1994; Starkstein et al., 1989). Some of the inconsistency in these
results may be accounted for by inconsistency with which pre-stroke history of
emotional disorder has been defined and assessed (Spencer et al., 1997).
The World Health Organisation (WHO, 1980, 2001) highlights the importance of
social participation and integration as well as functional disability as an aim of
rehabilitation. Twelve relevant studies of social integration have been identified,
and mixed results have been found. Simply living alone rather than with someone
does not appear strongly related to depression. It was found to have statistically
significant association with depression in two studies (Astrom et al., 1993; Anderson
et al., 1995) but not in five others (Dennis et al., 2000; Ebrahim et al., 1987; Feibel
and Springer, 1982; Kotila et al., 1998; Robinson and Price, 1982). Decreased
contact with wider social groups (friends, neighbours, friends) may be more
relevant. It was found to statistically significantly associate with major depression
and GAD (Astrom et al., 1993, 1996) at various intervals over three years, and with
depression and anxiety symptoms at six months (Bond et al., 1998). However,
Costillo et al. (1993, 1995) did not find an association between a combined measure
of social ties and social functioning and GAD.
A more subjective perspective on social support has rarely been addressed.
However, lacking a 'confiding relationship' was found to statistically significantly
associate with depressive disorder in a univariate but not a multivariate analysis at
long-term follow-up (Sharpe et al., 1994). Friedland and McColl (1987) found
statistically significant associations between eight types of perceived social support
and symptoms of depression. However, the size of these associations tended to be
small.
Eight studies that have addressed social participation in some way have been
identified. Statistically significant univariate associations between social activity
and depressive disorder or symptoms have been reported (Andersen et al., 1995;
Angeleri et al., 1993; Burvill et al., 1995; Feibel and Springer, 1982; House et al.,
2001; O'Rourke, 1996; Sharpe et al., 1994; Wade et al., 1987). However, the
relative importance of this relationship appears unclear. Feibel and Springer (1982)
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and Wade et al. (1987) report results that support a stronger relationship between
depression and social activities rather than functional disability, however House et
al. (2001) and Sharpe et al. (1994) found the reverse. O'Rourke (1996) highlights
that the 'social' content of measures of activities that have been used (for example,
housework, shopping, gardening) are often of doubtful face validity. She actually
found a larger association between emotional distress and a measure of social
adjustment, and suggests this may be because it captures a subjective perspective of
patients' social needs.
The evidence reviewed here suggests that depression and, to a lesser extent, anxiety
amongst stroke survivors may be partially understood in terms of background and
social factors as well as functional disability following stroke. However, Wade et al.
(1987) concluded that none of these factors 'account for much of the depression
seen'. House (1996) suggests that relationships between emotion and 'social'
factors have often been assumed as 'self-evidently understandable' in stroke
research. The importance of theory in the dialectic of science has been reiterated
with particular reference to psychological variables (NIMH, 2003; MRC, 2000) and
as an essential pre-requisite to the development of psychological interventions
(Salkovkis, 2002). The use of psychological cognitive theory may further our
understanding of the experience of stroke survivors. Research relevant to this
perspective in stroke will be reviewed in Chapter 2. The next section will introduce
the development and applicability of cognitive theory.
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1.7: Cognitive theory of emotional distress and its applicability to stroke
The Stoics believed:
'Men are disturbed not by things but by the views they take of them'
(Epictetus, p. 16 in Blackburn et ah, 1990)
Kant further emphasised subjective experience. He proposed that things-in-
themselves cannot be known but are interpreted through prior knowledge. These
philosophies reflect the essence of cognitive theories (Blackburn et ah, 1990) now
considered to 'vanguard' psychological approaches to emotion (Dobson and Segal,
1992).
The cognitive paradigm has become dominant through converging influences
(Blackburn et ah, 1990). This represents a major shift from radical behaviourism in
academia and from psychoanalytic clinical practice (Shaw and Segal, 1988).
Developmental psychology, notably Piaget's theory, used mental processing and
mental structures (schemata) to explain the growth of intellectual ability through
childhood. Paradoxically, computing science helped influence the study of human
perception and memory as active information-seeking processes and cognitive
science emerged (Weishaar, 1993). Eventually, cognitive reformulations were
added to behaviourist theory to explain individual differences, for example
emotional response to non-contingency (Abrahmson et ah,1978). Pioneers of social-
cognitive-behavioural science, most notably Bandura (1969) for example, through
modelling experiments and therapeutic techniques, helped develop cognitive
academic-clinical alliances (Blackburn and Davidson, 1990; Mahoney and Gabriel,
1987; Dobson and Segal, 1992).
There is now not so much a cognitive theory as many different cognitive theories
and therapies for emotion (please see Mahoney and Tyler, 1987). The preceding
philosophy, influences and aspects of many other theories (examples being Arnold,
1960; Ellis, 1962; Freud, 1939; Horney, 1950; Lazarus, 1984; Miechenbaum, 1977;
Mahoney, 1974, all quoted in Beck, 1976 or Beck, 1987) are acknowledged and
incorporated into Beck's (1976, 1987) cognitive theory of emotion (Beck, 1988;
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Weishaar, 1993). A clinician and also a collaborative researcher, Beck has done
much to forward his conviction that cognition should be assigned primacy in our
understanding of emotional disorders (Weishaar; 1993).
Beck's theory is currently the most well-recognised approach to understanding
relationships between subjective beliefs and emotional distress. Also, cognitive
therapy is the most dominant and empirically supported psychological therapy
(Salkovskis, 1996). Cognitive therapy involves active, collaborative, directive
behavioural and cognitive techniques: formulation, pleasant event scheduling,
Socratic questioning, dysfunctional belief monitoring, challenging and reformulation
(JS Beck, 1995). Its plausibility in facilitating emotional adjustment to stroke
inspired the original application for my studentship. Beck's theory will be briefly
introduced as a popular example of the cognitive model.
Beck's theory can be understood by consideration of meaning, structure and process.
He conceptualises anxious beliefs as representing meanings of threat, and anxiety
disorders as dominated by fearful beliefs. Depressive beliefs involve meanings of
loss relating predominantly to the self, and to self-in-relation to one's view of the
world and future ('The cognitive triad'). Empirically support has been found for:
'.. .the claim that depressed people rate themselves, their prospects for the future,
and their fitness for meeting life's demands more negatively...'
Haaga et al. (1991).
Structurally, beliefs are organised into levels of increasing stability, increasing depth
of consciousness and decreasing accessibility. Superficial voluntary thoughts are
easily accessible, but more important to distress are what Beck termed 'Negative
automatic thoughts'. These thoughts are often repetitive, usually out of awareness,
but accessible when affect is high. They can then be difficult to suppress; for
example, a physically dependent stroke patient may think 'He shouldn't have to do
this for me'. Deeper still is the intermediary level of a persons assumptions and
values. These may be accessed through therapy, when affect is very high, and may
reveal themselves as conditional beliefs ('If.. .then' statements). For example, a
stroke patient may think 'If I don't improve, I'll be a burden'. Negative schemas or
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networks of stable, rigid 'core beliefs' are considered to exist deep in consciousness;
they may be regarded as a potently distilled version of early negative self-
evaluations. These require the most affect for access, but may be inferred through
dominant themes amongst other beliefs, or through therapeutic techniques (Laidlaw
et al., 2003). For example, a stroke patient may have the core belief 'I am a
burden'.
Beck's theory is dynamic in that deeper beliefs 'drive' the more surface level beliefs
through negative thinking processes. Anxiety involves catastrophising or
overestimating probability and severity of threat, and underestimating resources to
deal with it. (Beck and Clark, 1988). Thinking biased towards depression involves
negative generalisations, selective abstraction of negative information, arbitrary
interference, dichotomous thinking and 'should' imperatives (Beck, 1976; 1987; J.S.
Beck, 1995).
In earlier accounts negative thinking processes were described as erroneous,
primitive or unrealistic (Beck, 1976). There has been a lot of philosophical
controversy and research about whether distressed individuals' thinking is
unrealistic (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Coyne and Gotlib, 1983; Mahoney and
Gabriel, 1987) and/or the perspective that depressed people actually do face more
negative circumstances (Brown and Harris, 1978; Oatley and Bolton, 1983; Power,
1987). This issue is particularly relevant to those facing the negative circumstances
of chronic medical illness (Moorey, 1996). It therefore seems more appropriate to
simply consider a continuum of negative through to positive thinking. This
acknowledges and accepts negative circumstances as having relevance but also
highlights the manner in which negative thinking can produce a further bias towards
negative belief.
Many cognitive theories imply a causal pathway between cognition and emotion
(Dobson and Segal, 1992). However, Beck (1987) specifically does not argue that
negative beliefs cause the onset of emotional disorder. The theory has been
developed to incorporate reciprocal interactions between biological, environmental
and behavioural systems. For example, an environmental event, or a biological
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stressor or vulnerability may trigger a disorder. Beck does suggest that activated
negative schemas are believed to contribute to the maintenance and build-up of a
depressive episode. The primacy of cognition and yet the non-causal nature of
Beck's theory makes it accommodating to exploratory pioneering investigation.
This is ideal for this early stage of research into cognition in distress following
stroke.
Cognitive theory is flexible and so considered broadly applicable to the
circumstances of distressed stroke patients. Recently, Laidlaw et al. (2003) have
developed the applicability of the cognitive model to older populations and stroke
patients using the current International Classification of Functioning model (WHO,
2001). 'Excess disability' is a key concept in this formulation, and captures the way
in which negatively biased thinking and beliefs may engender decreased
participation in addition to physical impairment. Research from other cognitive
perspectives that specifically addresses emotional adjustment to illness, disability
and ageing is also considered relevant. Therefore this will be considered in
combination with the central meanings outlined by Beck in the development of
hypotheses (please see Chapter 2).
It is relevant to consider boundaries for what, as a relatively pioneering piece of
research, this thesis could aim to address. I decided that it was important to consider
possible negative thinking processes further in the development of the hypotheses
because of their theoretical importance and as reference for interpretation of the
results (please see Chapter 2, particularly section 2.3ii). However, due to practical
constraints (for example a lack of relevant measures) I decided not to try explicitly
to measure negative thinking processes. Some authors propose that qualitative
interviews capture 'process' in individuals' experience (Bendz, 2000; Clarke, 2003;
Hafsteindottir and Grypdonck, 1997; Hilton, 2002). However, I did not expect the
qualitative strand of this study to fully explore the range of thinking biases proposed
by cognitive theory (please see Chapter 8). However, this aspect of the study
allowed for the possibility that some insights regarding negative thinking processes
as well as negative meanings may be gained.
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As outlined in more detail later (please see chapter 3), the aim of this thesis will be
to measure and explore negative subjective meanings of stroke and its effects, and to
test their associations with distress. As regards the depth and structure of cognition,
clinical opinion is that numerous sessions are required to gain access to many
clients' underlying assumptions, values and eventually core beliefs (J.S. Beck,
1995). The low accessibility of deeper cognitive structures suggests that they will
not be amenable to measurement using conventional questionnaire techniques,
which will form the main part of this work (please see chapters 4-9). However, the
central meanings, or depressed and anxious themes of Beck's theory do seem to be
captured using questionnaires (Clark and Steer, 1996). It is probably right to regard
bodies of survey research, for example self-esteem studies (please see section 2.3i),
as tapping more surface level voluntary and automatic cognitions (Dobson and
Segal, 1992). This position will be reflected by use of the term 'beliefs' in this
thesis.
Chapter 1: Emotional distress and disorderfollowing stroke
28 Introduction
1.8: Summary and rationale for the present study of beliefs related to
emotional distress following stroke
The prevalence of stroke and related disability is high and set to increase. A
considerable literature addressing emotional outcome now exists. Various factors
complicate the assessment of emotional outcome in stroke. Nonetheless, the weight
of the evidence suggests a high prevalence of negative emotional outcomes. There
are good grounds for studying distress (both anxious and depressive symptoms)
amongst stroke survivors.
It is important to increase our understanding of emotional distress following stroke
because it impacts negatively on survivors' well-being, functioning and survival.
Evidence for a specific organic cause for depression following stroke is weak.
Psychosocial research in stroke has not been strongly theory driven. The role of
patients' own subjective beliefs has not been considered in the literature as reviewed
in this chapter.
Cognitive theory provides a broad and sophisticated model from which to study the
relationship between beliefs and distress. As yet there is little research that has
applied cognitive theory specifically to the study of distress amongst stroke patients.
Knowledge of stroke-specific negative beliefs and their associations with distress
may prove useful to the specific implementation of cognitive behavioural
interventions and related outcome measures. To build a preliminary framework
from which to conduct this study, some piloting work was done and a widened
search of the medical and disability literature conducted. Based on this work, a
literature review of beliefs with potential relevance to distress following stroke will
be presented in Chapter 2.
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2.1: Forward
Preliminary ideas were gained from relevant literature in combination with piloting
(please see chapter 6) and other sources. These involved meetings with my
supervisors and other local CBT therapists experienced with stroke or older adults,
observation of some CBT therapy sessions, observation of stroke team meetings and
allied health professional therapy sessions and volunteering at an aphasia support
group. This experience convinced me of the usefulness of combining open-ended
investigation with a more structured approach (please see method chapters 4,8 and 9
for further explanation)
The key observation from piloting was the difference between 'Stroke' and 'Its
effects'. Frequent comments suggested that the condition following stroke was not
perceived as an illness, for example:
"I had an illness which caused a disability. The illness has passed and I've been left
with the aftermath."
A 52yr male.
Generally 'Stroke' tended to be described as a brief initial sudden event, or illness,
often as involving damage to the brain. In contrast, terms used to describe present
predicaments were 'the aftermath', 'disability', 'the left-overs', or 'its effects'.
'Illness' was never used in reference to residual effects of stroke. Even severely
disabled participants commented categorically that they did not 'feel ill'.
The main domains of ideas formed focused less on 'Stroke' and more on the readily
apparent relevance of 'Its effects' (please see Figure 2.1). These ideas were
developed using the available stroke specific literature, and supplemented with
cancer and cardiac literature (for 'stroke' beliefs) and acquired disability and ageing
literature (for 'its effects' beliefs). Concepts from a range of cognitive theories were
adopted. Nonetheless, an emphasis on negative beliefs about the self, self-in-
relation to the world and future, and meanings of threat compatible with Beck's
theory of distress was maintained in the development of hypotheses. This will be
discussed in further detail in section 2.5.
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2.2: Attributions for the event 'stroke' and 'its effects'
2.2.i: Attributions and control
A key characteristic of stroke is that it is uncontrolled. It can happen quite suddenly,
without warning and patients often report it came 'Out of the blue'. Emotional
reactions to sudden events with negative consequences have been widely studied in
psychology. Two central constructs that have been examined are causal attributions
and control (for example; Kelley, 1971; Abramson et al., 1978; Taylor, 1983; Petrie
and Weinman, 1997). When challenged by inopportune events individuals are
considered to ask:
'Why?'.
The nature of the attributions they make and the implications of these assumptions
for individuals' perceptions of control over their circumstances has produced a
complex set of theory and results to review.
2.2.iii: Attributions per se and emotional adjustment
Attributional theory and theories of cognitive adaptation suggest that in usual
circumstances, healthy individuals tend to assume a certain sense of control in the
world (Kelley, 1971; Taylor, 1983, Thompson et al., 1989). Kelley's (1971)
attributional theory proposed that, like scientists, lay people are motivated to
rationalise why events occur. His conceptualisation of lay perceivers further
specified them as 'applied scientists', therefore with a tendency to bias their causal
analyses towards factors perceived as being controllable. Kelley's theory has been
interpreted as a hypothesis that simply making causal attributions will positively
associate with emotional adjustment (Michela and Wood; 1986; Taylor, 1983).
Research with medical populations has not always supported this position (Michela
and Wood, 1986). For example, ninety-five percent of breast cancer patients were
found to identify a cause (Taylor et al., 1984). Scores on a composite measure of
emotional adjustment were not significantly higher amongst patients who had
identified a cause, and it was concluded that simply making causal attributions was
unimportant to adjustment. However, as so few women had failed to identify a
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cause, the data lacked statistical variance.
Two relevant small studies with stroke patients were available for review. Forty
patients, nine months following stroke, were asked:
'Have you found a cause for your stroke?'
Thompson (1991)
Sixty percent reported they had, and a just statistically significant association was
found with adjustment. The measure of adjustment was a composite of a self-report
depression scale plus a 'Meaningfulness of life' scale. Therefore, caution is
required in interpreting this result as an indication of an independent association
between having made a causal attribution and depression.
Larner and Sampson (2000) found only thirty-eight percent of twenty-one
rehabilitation ward stroke patients, identified a cause. Patients, with high levels of
depression according to a cut-off on a scale, were less likely to report a cause.
Generalisability is limited as the sample was small and only rehabilitation patients.
However, this small available evidence does seem to support a role for causal
attributions and emotional adjustment to stroke.
In contrast to the proportion of participants who reported causal attributions in these
studies, most patients do report some idea about the cause of their stroke in clinical
practice (Tinson, 1999, personal communication). It may be that these studies used
too superficial questioning to access attributions which were not well formed or
confidently held. This may have confounded results with other factors such as
assertiveness or deference to medical opinion. In Taylor et al.'s (1984) study in
which nearly all breast cancer patients identified a cause, the line of questioning was
more probing:
'.. .most people have some hunch or theory about why they have it. I wonder if you
would mind sharing your hunch or hunches with me...'
p.492, Taylor (1984)
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If most patients do hold causal attributions, the question moves on to consideration
of the specific type of attributions and associated beliefs in control and the
association of these with emotional distress.
Note on terminology
Beliefs in control over stroke recovery will be examined in section 2,4i. However,
the interest in control here is in relation to causal explanations (perceived risk
factors) for illness.
2.2Hi: Objective consideration ofriskfactors and their controllability
Types of risk factors and their objective modifiability will be considered to elucidate
how sources of information may shape stroke patients' beliefs. Firstly, behavioural
risk factors (smoking, diet, exercise) are implicated in stroke and considered
objectively subject to modification by individuals. They are:
'Risk factors which you can do something about yourself
(p,4, CHSS, 1998)
However, although there is objective potential for self-determination, the evidence
suggests that awareness of behavioural causes in insufficient to motivate actual
change (Ebrahim and Davey-Smith, 1997) perhaps because change is difficult.
Certainly smoking is considered addictive (Irvin and Brandon, 2000) and relapse
appears normative following personal attempts to tackle obesity (Garner and
Wooley, 1991).
In contrast, established medical opinion is dismissive of other psychological or
social risk factors for stroke, for example:
'Stress is not a cause of stroke'
(p, 5, CHSS, 1998)
However, there is emerging evidence suggesting that depression (Kennedy et ah,
2001, Larson et ah, 2001; Ohira et ah, 2001) and distress (May et ah, 2002) are
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implicated as causal factors.
Whether or not other psychological or social risk factors are considered objectively
modifiable is also a moot point. 'Stress', for example, is a construct with a whole
theory and research base of its own, and its modifiability tends to be considered
more in terms of perceived rather than objective personal and environmental
resources (Lazarus, 1991). In contrast, 'Overwork', for example, could be seen as
objectively modifiable, depending on personal circumstances (for example, the
opportunity for early retirement).
'Unmodifiable' medical factors such as ageing, genetics and ethnic minority are, less
controversially:
'.. .factors which can not be changed'
(p,21,CHSS, 1998)
However, stroke is becoming a condition in which medical treatment is able to play
a role in reducing risk from modifiable medical risk factors such as blood pressure,
cholesterol and diabetes (Byington et al., 1999; Dyken, 2001). Control of these is
largely considered to be things:
'...your doctor can do something about'
(p,4, CHSS, 1998)
Stroke patients are not lone attributors. Health promotion campaigns and the
popular media exist prior to one having a stroke (Weinman and Petrie, 1997). In our
culture it is hard not to know that behaviour (smoking, diet and exercise) influences
health (Blair et al.,1999) and indeed:
'Someone's life: Your own, Think about it'
(Health Education Board for Scotland, 1999).
Furthermore, following stroke, it is recommended that health professionals reinforce
these messages (SIGN, 2002).
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2.2.iv: A past researchfocus on 'Self' versus 'Other' blame attributions for illness
and emotional adjustment
An oft-quoted study of spinal cord injury patients investigated coping and
attributions of'self versus 'other' blame (Janoff-Bulman and Wortman, 1977).
Blame seems to be an appropriate subject with these patients who may have been
injured during leisure activities or in contrast been shot at, injured at work or as a
passenger in a car. Regardless of objective blameworthiness, worse coping
(operationalised as nurse and social worker ratings) associated with 'other' rather
than 'self blame. This contrasts with the attributional theory in which attributing
negative outcomes to oneself is considered depressive (Peterson and Seligman,
1984). The authors explain their results in view of the finite nature of spinal cord
injury impairment. Blaming others was considered to involve 'victims' in an
unproductive resentful cycle, but self-blame to allow resolution with the past and
therefore better future adaptation (Janoff-Bulman, 1979).
Often inspired by this study, 'self versus 'other' blame became the main research
focus regarding illness attributions and emotional adjustment. However, a review by
Michela and Wood (1986) suggests that no association between distress and self
blame has been found in cancer (for example, Taylor et al., 1984) or myocardial
infarction research (for example, Plotkin-Israel,1984, in Michela and Wood, 1986).
In stroke, self-blame neither associated with adjustment (Thompson, 1991) nor
depression (Larner and Sampson, 2000).
Michela and Wood (1986) identified two breast cancer studies that found blaming
another to be emotionally maladaptive (Taylor et ah, 1984; Timko and Janoff-
Bulman, 1985). However, they point out that most studies were unable actually to
statistically test associations between emotional adjustment and 'other' blame
because it was so rarely endorsed. In Larner and Sampson's (2000) study, all stroke
patients disagreed with an 'other' blame statement. Agreement with the same
statement was rare in Thompson's (1991) study, and an association with adjustment
was not found.
Compared to the particular case of spinal cord injuries, there is simply not a direct
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intuitive relevancy of blaming another person, or globally blaming oneself, for the
sudden onset of stroke or other illnesses. Therefore, with hindsight it is unsurprising
that empirical work has not supported an association between blame attributions and
emotional adjustment.
2.2.v: Lay experience and illness attributions
More recent research in the illness representations paradigm has used open methods
or wide-ranging checklists to assess attributions and a comprehensive model of
causal attributions portraying everyday lay beliefs has been developed. Emotional
outcomes have been studied much less than behavioural outcomes (Marteau and
Senior, 1997). However, this literature provides a useful background to
understanding the types of causal attributions for illness that lay people actually do
make.
Many of the attributions reported by cardiac patients do actually reflect recognised
medical and behavioural risk factors (family history, blood pressure, smoking, lack
of exercise). However, more emotional or social causal beliefs (stress, overwork,
family problems) are also found (French et al., 2001; Petrie and Weinman, 1997)
even after educational sessions emphasising behavioural risk factors (Fielding,
1987). Lay representations tend to be multi-factorial (Marteau and Senior, 1997;
Petrie and Weinman, 1997). For example, Myocardial infarction (MI) patients were
found to make approximately three causal attributions (Fielding, 1987).
Patients' knowledge and sources of illness knowledge (for example, patient
education) appear relevant to attributional choices. Knowledge has even been
referred to as 'informational control' (Skinner, 1996). However, as she argues, it is
questionable whether knowledge alone can guarantee a subjective sense of control.
Certainly, in stroke a systematic review found that information only improved
patients' knowledge but not their mood (Foster et al., 2004).
As causal knowledge may be gained only after the event it is does highlight the need
to distinguish between retrospective and prospective perceived control (Skinner,
1996). From now on reference to perceptions of control may be specifically
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regarded as prospective beliefs in control.
2.2vi: Types oflay illness attributions and distress
It has been suggested that behavioural attributions may be most emotionally
adaptive, particularly in comparison to psychological attributions (which are
sometimes referred to as 'characterlogical' in this context (Janoff-Bulman,1979,
Timko and Janoff-Bulman, 1985) via the mediation of control. For example,
Michela and Wood (1986) suggest that a patient who attributes his heart attack to
smoking may be 'very reassured' by the decision to quit, but a patient who attributes
his heart attack to nervousness, is likely to regard this as a personality trait beyond
the exertion of control.
However, research has generally failed to support the proposition that behavioural
attributions are especially emotionally adaptive or that psychological attributions are
particularly maladaptive. Cervical cancer patients who made personality attributions
were no more distressed than patients who made behavioural attributions (Gotay,
1981, in Michela and Wood, 1986; Malcerne, 1995). A composite measure of
attributions including personality and worry was actually found to negatively
correlate with anxiety following MI (Michela, 1981, in Michela and Wood, 1986).
Affleck et al. (1987) found no relationship between type of attribution (behavioural,
psychological or medical) and emotional adjustment to rheumatoid arthritis.
Overall, type of attribution per se, does not seem to associate with distress.
2.2vii: Lay illness attributions control perceptions and distress
At the extreme end of the spectrum lay perceptions and objective evidence regarding
uncontrollability seem to concur. With myocardial infarction (MI) patients, Fielding
(1987) found causal controllability scores of zero were reported for: 'family history'
and 'age'. However, more variation in perceived control regarding behavioural,
psychological, or other medical risk factors may be expected and may mediate lay
attributions and distress.
Fielding (1987) found that of all risk factors reported behavioural attributions
(smoking, overweight, diet, lack of exercise, lifestyle) produced the highest
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controllability ratings. They were rated as significantly more controllable than
modifiable medical factors (atheroma/cholesterol, other illness) which were in turn
rated as more controllable than psychological factors (overwork, worry, stress,
frustration/anger). Unfortunately, as Fielding (1987) suggested, health
professionals' opinions during three sessions of patient education may have
influenced reports of control behavioural factors. It seems especially suspect that
the highest control perceptions were for smoking. Also, unfortunately, emotional
distress was not assessed in this study.
One breast cancer study assessed perceived control and emotional distress in relation
to attributions. Characterlogical versus behavioural attributions were considered
(Timko and Janoff Bulman,1985). Neither type of attribution was found to directly
associate with distress. However, the proposed mediation of control perceptions was
supported. Once a complex pathway of different perceived control beliefs
(retrospective control, prospective control, perceived recurrence control combined
with perceived mastectomy success, general perceived invulnerability to cancer) was
taken into account, an inverse association between behavioural attributions and
depression emerged.
The evidence reviewed suggests that apart from unmodifiable medical factors,
perceived control does not associate with the type of attribution per se. However, it
may well mediate between attributions and emotional distress. It has been suggested
that a research focus that emphasises perceived control related to lay attributions for
illness may be especially fruitful in understanding emotional adaptation to cancer or
heart disease where:
'The possibility of recurrence looms large'
Michela and Wood (1986).
I would add that this is also the case in stroke.
It should be pointed out that there are many aspects that may mediate or moderate
overall perceptions of control and any relationship with emotional outcomes
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(Bandura, 1993; Skinner, 1996). For example, beliefs regarding the relative
importance of risk factors ('potency', Fielding, 1987) belief in the utility of tackling
a risk factor, for example, quitting smoking ('outcome efficacy', Bandura, 1989) and
confidence in being able to do so ('self-efficacy', Bandura, 1989). Another issue
concerns the perceived agent of control (Skinner, 1996). 'Self-as-agent' can
straightforwardly provide a sense of 'being in' control, but also 'others-as-agents'
may provide a sense that 'things are under' control (Antonovsky, 1979; Olsson et
al., 2003). Independent and equally strong associations with emotional adjustment
were actually found for both 'vicarious' and 'personal' control amongst breast
cancer patients (Taylor; 1984). Stroke patients may gain a sense of control through
medical treatments and practice (for example, reassurance that blood pressure has
decreased at a check-up) as well as from their own actions.
2.2.ix: Summary and notes on developing a hypothesisfor causal controllability
'Causal controllability' refers to perceived prospective control (regardless of the
perceived agent of control) over perceived causes of stroke. Causal attributions for
illness research provided the greatest wealth of theory and evidence to review, but a
relationship between specific types of attributions and emotional adjustment has not
been found. However, the proposition that causal controllability may mediate
between causal attributions and distress has initial support, and concurs with the
emphasis on control in Kelley's original attributional theory.
A focus on causal controllability seems particularly relevant to emotional adjustment
to stroke due to the possibility of recurrence. The assessment of causal
controllability necessarily involves a preliminary assessment of causal attributions.
The preceding considerations of past research and information provision processes
suggest that an open but probing approach to the assessment of causal attributions is
to be recommended.
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2.2.x: Selective incidence ('Why me? )
The title of Maria St Denys' (1998) personal testimony to coping admirably with
stroke is poetically incongruous:
'Stroke of fate'
she suggests that the idea of fate is negatively symbolic and something voiced in
cliches by those people with 'doubts and fears'. The perception that one is one of
those who luck or fate failed to protect, but selected for stroke, may indeed be
distressing.
Lerner (1965, 1980) suggests that in usual circumstances people assume good is
justly rewarded and bad duly punished. His theory is supported by experimental
research using students. For example, they regarded a student who had won a
lottery as hardworking and deserving, but derogated another they saw subjected to
uncontrollable shocks. It is as if their erroneous judgements were driven by the need
to preserve their own views of their interaction with the world as just and fair.
Ordinarily, healthy people may perceive themselves as invulnerable to illness
(Abramson, 1988). Given modern health campaign messages, even qualitative
research has highlighted 'The Prevention paradox' whereby health risks are
recognised as a statistical group phenomenon, but the observation that many 'at risk'
individuals do not become ill is often made (Wiles, 1995). Healthy people who
chose to focus on the latter may hold optimistically biased assumptions ofjustice in
relation to their own illness vulnerability.
Individuals, who may have assumed that the world will treat them justly, under the
illusion that they may be spared the development of illness, may be vulnerable to
cognitive dissonance if actually faced with stroke and its effects. Thompson (1991)
applied 'Just world' theory to the attributional beliefs of individuals who had
actually experienced stroke. She hypothesised that, while assumptions of control in
the world are likely to set in motion the question of'Why?', assumptions ofjustice
may lead to the question:
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'Why me?'
She considered that assumptions of a just world may be shattered by the experience
of sudden disability, this is often referred to as 'selective incidence', as if one feels
selected by fate for misfortune (Abramson, 1988). This perspective has also been
voiced by Turnquist et al. (1988) and corresponds well with Beck's description of a
hostile view of one's position in the world. In these terms 'Why me?' would be
expected to associate with distress.
Just over half of stroke patients reported having asked 'Why me?' and a moderately
high association between the frequency with which this was asked and adjustment
supports the selective incidence hypothesis (Thompson, 1991). A similar
proportion were found to ask 'Why me?' by Larner and Sampson (2000) and a
similarly sized correlation with depression was found; however, this was not
statistically significant, possibly due to sample size (twenty-one participants). A
relationship between distress and 'Why me?' has also been found three weeks after
spinal cord injury (Silver and Wortman, 1983, in Michela and Wood, 1986) and at a
longer follow-up (van der Bout et al., 1988).
Recognition that misfortune is often arbitrary ('threat-resistant life schemas') may
enable cognitive adaptation to negative events (Thompson and Janigan, 1988). This
may increase with age, as people become aware of their greater vulnerability to
illness (Abramson, 1988; Weinman and Petrie, 1997). By middle-age, adults often
report possible ill health as a prime fear and by late adulthood, maintaining
'relatively good health' tends to be a prime hope (Hooker 1999). Therefore
awareness of vulnerability clearly does not stop older adults caring deeply about
their health. However, it may protect them to some extent from 'Why me?'
dilemmas following stroke.
For the reverse of the preceding reasons, younger individuals may struggle
cognitively to come to terms with stroke. Personal accounts of younger stroke
survivors suggest this may be the case. Kathleen Molloy, Scottish representative of
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'Different strokes', entitled her personal account of a stroke aged fifty years 'Why
me?' (Molloy, 2004). Robin Cant, a lecturer on disability, who lived a relatively
healthy lifestyle before his stroke in middle age, described his feelings of injustice
as:
'.. .if I had been some kind of negative lottery winner, Why me? After all, the world
is full of middle-aged men who smoke heavily and waddle around with great beer
bellies. How is it they seem to get away with it?'
Cant, p 300, 1997
2.2.xi: Summary and notes on developing a hypothesisfor 'Why me?'
A small but consistent literature supports the importance of examining the
relationship between 'Why me?' attributions and emotional distress following
stroke. There is interest in re-establishing study of selective incidence in health
psychology generally (Senior, 2002, personal communication). By addressing a
sense of injustice, study of'Why me?' adds a dimension aligned to the concept of a
negative worldview. Finally, although specific hypotheses regarding possible
arbitration of selective incidence, by factors such as age were not developed, it is
acknowledged that they may influence any general relationship between 'Why me?'
attributions and distress.
2.2xii: Finding positive meaning
Early chapters of Kirk Douglas's book on his personal experience of stroke reflect
severe distress, even suicidal ideation and contradict the title:
'My Stroke of Luck'
Douglas, 2002
However, through re-evaluating the importance of loved ones, recognition of past
selfishness, acting as a stroke survivor in 'Diamonds' and charitable work, he goes
on to achieve a sense of finally having found positive meaning in adversity:
'We all want happiness. I've learned we achieve happiness when we seek the
happiness and well-being of others.'
p,194, Douglas, 2002
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Theories of cognitive adaptation suggest that the search for a 'silver lining' in an
otherwise negative event may well be a fairly ubiquitous endeavour. As well as
beliefs injustice, in usual circumstance people are considered to hold benign
assumptions of meaning or purpose in the world (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983;
Taylor, 1983; Thompson, 1985). In order to be able to make a positive attribution of
meaningfulness, people are considered to cognitively reinterpret events, through
comparisons with others even more unfortunate, or through a refocusing on positive
aspects of their lives (Thompson, 1985).
The search for positive meaning amongst medical populations has been most
substantially investigated for cancer, particularly breast cancer. For example,
'A remarkable ability to construe personal benefit from potential tragedy'
Taylor (1983)
was found amongst breast cancer patients, two years post-onset, in which fifty
percent reported only positive changes in their lives and only seventeen percent
reported negative ones. Positive meanings in cancer range from the personal (joy in
the small pleasures in life, discovery of new talents, healthier lifestyles,
consideration that it could be worse) the interpersonal (greater appreciation of
others, improvements in family closeness, compassion for others) to the spiritual
(LaFortune Fredette, 1995; Taylor et al.,1984; O'Connor et al., 1990; Zemore et al.,
1990). Seventy-seven percent of members of an amputees golf club reported
something positive had happened as a result of their amputation, while fifty-five
percent reported 'feeling lucky' (Dunn and Dutko, 1993, in Dunn, 1994). Quite
profound meanings, often of a strong religious nature, have also been reported by
spinal cord injury patients (Janoff-Bulman and Wortman, 1977).
Various classes of positive meanings were reported by half the stroke patients in
Thompson's (1991) study: a greater appreciation of life, the ability to slow down,
compassion for others and appreciation of family and friends. A moderate-sized
association between having found meaning and the adjustment measure was found.
However, as this measure was a composite of a self-report depression scale plus a
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'Meaningfulness of life' scale (including meaning and purpose items) it can only be
taken as tentatively supportive of a relationship between having found meaning and
emotional distress. Only three of the twenty-one stroke patients in Larner and
Sampson's (2000) study reported having found meaning following stroke, which
precluded testing an association with depression.
Age differences may partly explain these conflicting findings. Larner and Sampsons
(2000) participants were generally older than Thompson's (1991) who also found a
significant association between younger age and having found meaning. She
suggests this may be because younger patients have more opportunity to pursue
alternative plans and goals. However, disability will surely limit opportunities for
stroke patients regardless of age. It may be that younger people have a greater
emotional need to search for compensatory meaning in their experience. In contrast,
older people may have a greater sense of positive meaning in life stemming from
past achievements and so feel less need to begin searching for more after stroke.
A review of autobiographical memory research tentatively supports this position
(Fitzgerald, 1999). On the one hand, older adults have been found not to 'live in the
past' because, as for younger adults, recent years predominate when memory is
probed. Nevertheless, memories from early adulthood (known as 'the bump') rather
than from any other period appear to remain as salient or 'flash bulb' memories.
This is considered to support the importance of this period of life for people's
lifetime psychological development. Fitzgerald (1992) found older adults with
depression to report less 'bump' memories than non-depressed others. Fitzgerald
(1999) suggests that 'bump' memories in older adulthood may possibly provide
some ongoing sense of having had a meaningful life.
Thompson (1991) also found that reports of having found meaning were also
associated with less severe disability. Therefore, particularly negative circumstances
may well limit the extent to which people are likely to derive meaning. A meta¬
analysis of positive re-evaluation following a wide range of negative events other
than illness did not show an association with distress (Penley et al., 2002). Indeed in
very bleak circumstance, people have been found to report a sense of
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meaninglessness (Lehman et al., 1987).
2.2xiii: Summary and notes on developing a hypothesisfor 'Found meaning?'
The cancer literature suggests that positive meaning is often found despite the
adversity of this illness. The small stroke literature is inconsistent, but tentatively
supports this possibility. Elsewhere, it has been suggested that empirical testing of
cognitive theory of distress should examine differences in positive as well as
negative beliefs (Haaga et al., 1991). Other psychologists and psychiatrists have
begun to emphasise the potential in studying positive psychological adaptation
generally (Gillham and Seligman, 1999) in medical populations (DHP, 2004) and
amongst stroke patients (Johnston, 1991). Study of positive beliefs amongst those
faced with the negative changes stroke brings to their world appears to be an apt
subject.
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2.3: Negative self evaluations
2.3i: Introduction to self, identity, self-esteem in distress, and identity resiliency in
normal ageing
Self-beliefs occupy a central place in a wide range of psychological theories, leading
to many inter-related terms (Beck, 1987; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Higgins, 1987;
Markus and Nurius, 1986; Pervin, 1993). 'The self, or 'self concept' has been
described as:
'The totality of the person's thought and feelings with reference to himself
(p. ix, Rosenberg, 1979)
These range from quite factual ('a wife') to more abstract personality domains
('caring'). Features of self will vary in their accessibility and relate to
environmental contexts such as work, family, friends (Cantor and Kihlstrom; 1987).
There is a general consensus that the self develops through socialisation (Pervin,
1993) and the early self is often described in Cooley's (1902) terms as 'a looking
glass self (quoted in Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Early adulthood is seen as a time by
which individuals will have a well-established sense of'inner sameness' (Erikson,
1968) or 'Core constructs' (Kelly, 1955) or 'identity' (Atchley, 1989). This includes
a moral and motivational perspective, considered integral across situations, and of
relatively high personal value (Atchley, 1989; McAdams, 1991). This is reflected in
open-ended research in which the 'me I know' is often described in terms of life
themes 'I've always been honest' (Whitbourne, 1986). The abstract quality of
developed selfhood is reflected in adults' ready ability to respond to trait adjective
self-concept scales (Rosenberg, 1979).
Self-esteem may be viewed in a static way as self-evaluation in mainly positive
'high', or less positive, Tow' terms (Baumeister, 1993). Associations between this
static view of low self-esteem and depressive symptoms tend to be high (Shaver and
Brennan, 1991) and this is commonly recognised (Baumeister, 1993).
'Worthlessness' is included as one of the additional symptoms within diagnostic
criteria for depressive disorder (APA, 1994) although it is important to recognise
that not all depressed people will have very low self-esteem (Blaine and Crocker,
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1993).
Self-esteem may also be viewed in dynamic evolving terms. William James (1890,
cited in Atchley, 1989) actually described it as a function of perceptions of success
regarding one's ideal expectations of self and his successors have also emphasised
the 'ideal', 'should' or 'potential' aspects of self-esteem (Erikson,1968; Heider,
1958; Horney, 1945; Kelly, 1955; Rodgers, 1961; Stack Sullivan, 1953, cited in
Pervin, 1993 or Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Higgins (1987) specifically elaborates on
possible dynamics between identity, self-evaluations, and affect. He proposes that
the perception of accessible discrepancies between 'present' versus 'ideal' or
'ought' self-beliefs represent ongoing fluctuations in self-esteem that are affectively
involving: the greater the discrepancy, the greater the discomfort.
In normal circumstances, there appears to be no tendency for self-esteem to decline
throughout life (Baltes, 1991), suggesting that adult identity appears remarkably
'resilient' to change (Atchley, 1989; Brandstater, 1999). This may be partly
achieved by the ongoing active processes of assimilation and accommodation. For
example Baltes (1991) suggests older adults may use mnemonic techniques to
compensate for declining memory and Brandstater (1999) that they may attribute
memory failure to temporary situational constraints. In addition the ageing identity
may 'immunise' itself against perceived discrepancies and loss of esteem. This may
be by adopting more lenient standards for performance, or by making downward
comparisons to negative stereotypes of old age (Brandstater, 1999), and also by
retaining 'having been' status in the present, such as occupational identity (Atchley,
1989).
The theories discussed provide a dynamic overview of identity as a comprehensive
thinking, feeling and acting cognitive resource, from associations between
discrepancies and distress, and yet the tendency for a continuous sense of identity.
However, the non-normative adult experience has not been addressed by general
self-theories (Becker, 1993). The effects of stroke may be viewed as circumstances
that test accommodative processes and provide chronically accessible self-
discrepancies in certain domains. Individual differences in the degree to which
identity is ultimately challenged may help understand variation in distress levels
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following stroke. Two theories, both developed from qualitative studies and yet
with different emphases on identity change versus maintenance or adaptation will be
introduced next.
2.3H: 'Biography-body-self-conception' theory and 'Acceptance ofdisability
theory' and their relevance to stroke
'the body is the medium by which conceptions of self are formed'
Corbin and Strauss, pi55, 1987
This is the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (1945 cited in Corbin and Strauss, 1987)
that has been applied to the issue of identity amongst chronically ill patients. In
relation to this thesis, Corbin and Strauss' (1987) theory serves only as background
to identity change research, in particular to published qualitative studies that share
this philosophical stance (please see section 2.3 v)
Corbin and Strauss (1987) see identity as subjective and dynamic (as having
'biographical time'). However, they place a particularly strong emphasis on what
they view as a mainly unconscious 'very special' relationship between 'body' and
identity ('body' being 'capacity for action' and 'body image'). In contrast to the
broad cognitive perspective, the main thrust of this theory narrows identity down to
physical and functional attributes and abilities. They actually propose that
'biography, body and self conception' exist in such a 'tightly bound relationship'
that it is akin to a chain.
They frame the consequences of chronic illness for 'identity' through this chain in
dramatic terms. Perceptions of a 'failed', 'useless' or 'unfamiliar' body are asserted
to cause biographical disruption and profound levels of'identity disintegration', as
the following quotes illustrate:
'When chronic illness strikes, there follows to some degree a perception of body
failure...ability...appearance...functioning physiologically...Such perceptions hit at
the very core of a person's being' p.250
'illness brings about a failed body.. .the foundations of existence are shaken' p252
'body failure .. .can erode or even smash conceptions of self p257
Chapter 2: Beliefs in 'stroke' and 'its effects
Introduction 51
The theory does allow for some variation in the extent of identity loss, for example
by objective illness severity. Also, it allows for identity 'reconstitution', the
processes of which are similar to, if less comprehensive or cognitive to 'acceptance
of disability theory' processes described below.
In relation to this study, perceived 'body'/'body failure' can be seen as relevant to
identity change because real physical losses are common following stroke.
However, when contrasted against broader cognitive conceptualisations of identity,
it is clear that other potentially defining domains of identity (intelligence,
friendliness, patience) are neglected in Corbin and Strauss's account. The broader
cognitive view of identity is preferred because it simultaneously provides the means
from which to study domains of identity that may be maintained and so widens the
opportunity for gaining understanding of individual differences. This is considered
important in view of the weakness of associations between objective stroke-related
functional loss and distress.
A broader view of identity is reflected in Dembo et al.'s (1956) 'Acceptance of
disability theory', developed through a particularly comprehensive qualitative piece
work investigating 177 injured war veterans' most 'essential' emotional problems.
They describe a subjective focus on physical dysfunction as a common initial
reaction, understandable through 'the perceptual factor of contrast', but not the only
reaction. Acquired disabilities are conceived as 'value losses' and acceptance is
conceived as an active process of 'value-change'. Acceptance is specifically not
about 'resignation' to loss, nor about 'preference' for disabilities that may still be
regarded as 'limiting' (Wright, 1983). It is in essence a theory about 'conditions
facilitating acceptance of one's disability as non-devaluating' (p. 159, Wright, 1983)
The theory actually outlines the following four interactive psychological value
change processes that aid an individuals' pathway to 'acceptance'.
The mourning state, in which losses dominate perception, may be overcome by
'Enlargement of the scope of values'. 'Dormant values' such as pride, may be
activated. Remaining aspects of life believed to 'really matter' (such as those
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discussed in section 2.2xii) may be rediscovered. Self-worth may be undermined by
a focus on physical appearance and aptitude. However, 'Subordination of physique
relative to other values' appreciation of positive personality characteristics
('kindness', 'wisdom') or of personal effort can counter this. Generalising from
disabilities to core personal evaluation ('spread') is considered unhelpful. However,
learning to mentally distinguish functional losses and personal evaluation can
achieve 'Containment of the effects of disability'. Intertwined with this process is
that of 'Transforming comparative values into asset values'. Low acceptance
involves 'ought injunctions' (beliefs about what one should be) compared with non-
disabled peers or previous non-disabled states. Acceptance is facilitated once lost
abilities become viewed like possessions, tools or assets: in other words as
'.. .a good thing to have if you have it, but not de-valuating if you don't'.
(pi83, Wright, 1983)
Someone able to accept his disability and evaluate himself positively in this way
said:
'I am a long way from being worthless. I am still a good man without the leg'
(p. 39, Dembo et al., 1956)
The value change processes outlined by Dembo et al. (1956) are similar to
previously considered processes of accommodation and assimilation involved in
identity maintenance in normal ageing. Parallels can also be drawn between their
account and more recent cognitive theories of distress. For example, devalued self-
perception resulting from generalisations and 'ought injunctions' concurs with
unhelpful thinking processes outlined in Beck's theory (J.S. Beck, 1995).
Unfortunately, recent reviews illustrate that subsequent research has inadequately
addressed the value change processes outlined by acceptance of disability theory
(Keany and Glueckauf, 1993; Mpofu and Houston, 1998). Disabled men's
evaluations of everyday life situation scenarios were rated for reflecting an ability to
appreciate other disabled people as a whole (to make asset rather than comparative
judgements) and those judged to be better copers performed better (Butts and
Shontz, 1962, quoted in Wriight, 1983). However, this does not necessarily mean
that they will be so self-accepting (Keany and Glueckauf, 1993). An even more
indirect approach has been to actually assess able-bodied subjects' attitudes. For
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example, secretaries were assumed to value physique less than air-hostesses and the
finding that they were more favourable to disabled persons is assumed to support
'subordination of physique relative to other values' in disability acceptance (English
and Orberle, 1971, cited in Keany and Glueckauf, 1993); please see the latter for
further studies and critique).
Linkowski (1971) developed the 'acceptance of disability' scale and his factor
analysis suggests that it assesses global acceptance of disability beliefs. The
research discussed in the following section has used this scale and so is essentially
measuring global acceptance, not value change (Keany and Glueckauf, 1993; Mpofu
and Houston, 1998). In relation to this thesis the full theory has been described
mainly as theoretical background, and as reference for future discussion. As
discussed previously, the main intention of this thesis is to describe beliefs rather
than those thinking processes from which they developed. In this context, whether
stroke patients report being more or less globally able to accept themselves despite
their disability is an issue of interest.
2.3iii: Acceptance ofdisability research relevant to stroke
Available studies addressing global acceptance of disability beliefs support its
relevance to distress amongst those with acquired visible and unseen disability. A
high inverse association was found between acceptance of disability and trait anxiety
amongst young rehabilitation clients who had been severely physically disabled for
an average of two years with various orthopaedic impairments (Boone et al., 1978).
More recently, Simpson (2001) found an inverse association between distress and
acceptance beliefs amongst adults with a range of acquired disabilities, but mainly
the 'unseen' disability of deafness. They also found significantly lower acceptance
amongst those particular participants considered in need of counselling.
A review by Moore (1998) suggests that acceptance of disability has more
commonly been studied in relation to global self-esteem and that strong and positive
associations between these variables have been found amongst diverse disabled
populations: students with physical disability, deaf adolescents, teenagers with oral
clefts and African Americans with various disabilities.
Moore (1998) conducted a particularly large study of 1,266 individuals from a U.S.
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vocational rehabilitation register (most had unseen disabilities: mental illness,
learning disability, sensory impairment or chemical dependency; the minority had
severe physical disability such as spinal cord injury). Acceptance of disability was
found to associate highly with global self-esteem, and modestly with disability onset
(suggesting less acceptance for acquired versus congenital onset). These
associations remained significant even once other variables (emotional support and
demographics) were controlled for. Given that global self-esteem is generally
highly associated with emotional distress, this study may be tentatively interpreted
as lending proxy support to the idea that beliefs regarding the unacceptability of
acquired disability may be negatively emotionally involving.
As far as I am aware, acceptance of disability has not yet been specifically studied
amongst stroke patients. However, there has been a very recent rapid increase in
qualitative stroke studies. A systematic literature review from 1963 onwards
identified twenty-three studies relevant to community service needs: twelve
published since 1999, and all but two others in the decade before (Murray et al.,
2003). None have been inspired by cognitive theory or refer specifically to
acceptance of disability. However, some studies identified by Murray et al. (2003)
and others from my own searches for studies addressing patients' subjective
experience do provide information relevant to disability acceptance.
A devastating account of rehabilitation stroke patients interviewed up to fifteen
times over a year is provided by Burton (2000). They are all reported to feel 'unable
to accept' new circumstances and to feel 'stuck in a cage'. Also, he reported that
even once re-gained 'activities previously enjoyed no longer appeared to give them
pleasure' (p307, Burton, 2000) which is a key symptom of depression (APA, 1994).
Given that the sample was ofjust six patients, generalisability is limited. Also
emotional state was not actually assessed. However, these stroke patients certainly
seemed unable to accept disability and it seems plausible they were emotionally
distressed.
In contrast, a couple of studies suggest that with time some patients may be able to
accept and gain reappreciation positive aspects of themselves and their lives,
particularly Pilkington (1999). Accepting participants reported appreciation of
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personally important relationships and less active pursuits. For example, a
contractor appeared able to 'accept it' by shifting his values from money and work
to his previously 'taken for granted' good and healthy family and wife. Other
studies have highlighted the use of practical 'active and creative' strategies, such as
using a diary to compensate for poor memory (Pound et al., 1999, please see for
further examples).
Dembo et al. (1956) proposed that acceptance is facilitated once lost abilities
become viewed like possessions, separate from essential personal qualities. A
number of qualitative studies assert an 'objectification' of body parts (Becker, 1993;
Bendz, 2000; Doolittle, 1992; Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). However, this is only
interpreted as a beneficial self-evaluative coping strategy by Bendz (2000). In
contrast, this process is emphasised as a deeply negative experience by the other
authors (please see section 2.4v for further discussion).
2.3iv: Summary and notes for developing a hypothesis for acceptance ofdisability
As discussed, quantitative studies of functional and social loss in relation to distress
following stroke have produced weak results (please see section 1.6iii). However,
my preliminary impression was that valued losses appeared highly relevant to self-
esteem and distress (please see Figure 2.1). Cognitive theory would suggest that it is
important to consider subjective appraisals and personal meanings of such losses.
Whether or not stroke patients are able to accept disability provides one such
subjective perspective.
Associations between acceptance of disability and emotional distress and global
self-esteem supports its relevance to emotional adaptation and acquired disability in
general. Although not the intention of previous qualitative stroke studies, the
preceding review provides preliminary support to the relevance of being able or
unable to accept limitations of stroke in relation to self-evaluations and possibly
distress.
2.3v: Negative identity change research relevant to stroke
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Most qualitative studies (Doswell et al., 2000; Becker, 1993; Bendz, 2000; Burton,
2000, Doolittle, 1992; Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Pound et al., 1998) report a tendency
for stroke survivors to make negative 'present' versus 'pre-stroke' comparisons.
Qualitative studies have often interpreted patients' reported 'pre-stroke' versus
'present' perceptions as indicative of negative identity change.
Some qualitative studies assert a universal 'existential' negative identity change,
relating to perceived changes in body function following stroke. Doolittle (1992)
describes stroke patients as experiencing brain and body in 'total opposition' and as
'suspended in a passive objectified body'(pl22). Becker (1993) more specifically
draws association between these body perceptions, identity and distress amongst a
hundred rehabilitation patients during the first year following stroke.
'Profound changes to both body and mind led stroke victims to question whether
their old selves existed... All completely self-absorbed...stroke was the only salient
feature of life, a funnel through which all self-perception was drawn...All persons
demonstrated anger and despair at the changes they saw in their bodies.. .profound
disruption to self-concept...All respondents indicated they did not measure up to
their own standards for normality.' pi52 - 154
A similarly universal and existential experience of a 'separate precarious and
perplexing' body is emphasised and related to negative feelings in Ellis-Hill et al.'s
(2000) analysis of eight high-functioning stroke patients discharged to their own
homes.
These accounts refer to the 'biography-body-self-conception' theory introduced in
section 2.3ii. A couple of the patient quotes in these studies do somewhat support
the assertion of profound identity disruption through perceived bodily dysfunction,
for example:
'Em not normal lets face it - nobody wants to be a cripple'
pl54, Becker (1993)
However, others suggest only the latter (for example 'My leg is not as strong as it
used to be' or 'My handwriting is not as good as it was' p. 154, Becker, 1993) and
are not convincing portrayals of the former. Some quotes actually suggest a lack of
distinction between self-evaluation and perceived disability rather than the asserted
perceptions of'mind-body-split':
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'I was completely useless, used to have to get carried to the toilet...
p728, Ellis-Hill et al. (2000).
This theoretical perspective is also explicitly referred to or strongly echoed within
other studies, particularly in concluding comments (Bendz, 2000; Clarke, 2003;
Grant, 1996; Secrest and Thomas, 1999). However, these and other studies also
highlight some more personal and interpersonal negative self-evaluations following
stroke, particularly in results sections.
Independence, particularly regarding 'simple' things is related to feelings of
frustration and helplessness (Nilsson et al., 1997; Pilkington, 1999; Pound et al.,
1998). Personal high standards were linked to dissatisfaction with performance, for
example one man wanted to walk Tike a soldier' (Pound et al., 1998).
Pilkington (1999) drew an association between negative emotion and a change in a
sense of being 'relied on' to 'helpless'. Similarly, another study highlights
perceived negative change in terms of 'giver' to 'receiver', with the following
example:
'What's happened to me is that I can't help anymore.. .1 can't bake a cake for a
birthday'
p 511, Doswell et al., 2000
A sense of emptiness or sadness was related to 'not being of use' in daily work like
woodwork or farming maintenance in rural Sweden (Nilsson et al., 1997). Doswell
et al. (2000) highlighted that a few participants simultaneously described feeling
depressed and that they had become 'a burden' to their families.
Clarke (2003) related different reactions to the relative value of pre-stroke physical
ability. A man who described himself as 'Active with a capital A' prior to stroke
now described feeling 'trapped'. In contrast, an equally physically impaired woman
described herself as 'lucky' in relation to her ongoing pleasant relationships with
people and daughters' happy marriages. Secrest and Thomas (1999) suggest a
tension between continuity and discontinuity in their participants' sense of self.
One study actually reports that some participants actually felt they 'hadn't changed'
(Pilkington, 1999). Although, not the authors observation, a few quotes from a
study of older female stroke patients suggests a similar position. One describes
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being 'not bothered' by it and another said 'I never did hurt from the stroke' (p.24,
Hilton, 2002). Plausibly patients with this sort of attitude may have had relatively
lenient standards and expectations for functioning in older age pre-stroke, which in
Brandstater's (1999) terms may 'immunise' against negative self-evaluation in the
face of loss.
Overall, most qualitative stroke research has tended to be aligned to the theory
introduced in section 2.3ii that defines identity by perceptions of 'body'. This
allegiance is reflected in assertions of universal profound negative identity change
related to bodily dysfunction following stroke in some studies. Nevertheless, a
wider and more varied perspective regarding the nature of different individuals'
identity change and maintenance following stroke has emerged from some studies.
Some stroke patients appear to see themselves more negatively following stroke in
more abstract personal and interpersonal ways (less independent, less useful or
helpful to others) while others may essentially see themselves as unchanged. These
findings support variation amongst a broad range of negative self-evaluative beliefs
relevant to perceived stroke related change. However, studies have generally not
specifically attempted to seek understanding of variation in emotional distress in
relation to observed variations in negative identity change.
One quantitative study supports an association between negative self-evaluation
relevant to the effects of stroke and distress. Partridge (1985) developed ten
constructs (for example, active-inactive, independent-not independent) from semi-
structured interviews specifically addressing rehabilitation patients' beliefs
regarding ways they had changed following stroke. These constructs were then used
to obtain the patients' ratings of themselves for both 'before' and 'now'. Highly
statistically significant moderate associations were found between 'before' ratings
and depressive symptoms, and 'now' ratings and depressive symptoms. However,
differences between 'before' and 'now' ratings were not calculated or studied in
relation to emotional outcome in this study.
More, recently Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) used a semantic differential scale to assess
change in 'before' versus 'now' self-ratings on a broader range of constructs
amongst twenty-six high functioning stroke patients. The results support variation
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in negative identity change versus maintenance. Certain mean 'before' versus 'now'
changes (interest, capable, independent) were statistically significant at the p<.001
level, other changes (in control, satisfied and active) were statistically significant at
the p<.05 level. Other change scores (for example, patient, relaxed, attractive) were
not statistically significant, and friendly and hopeful ratings reflected perceived
maintenance. Mean 'now' calm ratings were very slightly, but not statistically
higher than 'before' ratings, which actually suggests the possibility of positive
identity change in this domain. Overall, statistically significant overall negative
identity change was found at both one-month and six-months following stroke.
In a different analysis using the same data, Ellis-Hill (1998) reported that overall
negative identity change was moderately and statistically significantly associated
with anxious and depressive symptoms at one month, and highly and statistically
significantly at six months and one year. Associations between negative identity
change and distress remained statistically significant even once actual disability, and
social activities were controlled for.
2.3iv: Summary and notes for developing a hypothesis for negative identity change
As discussed previously (please see section 2.3i) cognitive theories of self-esteem
tend to view it in dynamic interplay between how individuals see themselves and
how they would ideally like, or think they ought to be. Stroke brings about
unwelcome chronic limitations, and the evidence suggests that stroke patients tend
to compare themselves negatively to their pre-stroke selves. Despite the allegiance
of most qualitative research to a non-cognitive perspective, qualitative and
quantitative evidence supports potential for negative identity change in a broad
range of domains. The small quantitative evidence base suggests that stroke patients
are able to rate their perceptions of change in themselves in abstract terms following
stroke. Only one small study has specifically studied associations between this
perceived negative identity change and emotional distress, but it offers preliminary
support to the affective relevance of this type of negative belief following stroke.
2.3v: Shame
Self-theorists tend to suggest that the 'looking glass self of childhood continues
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'more or less' through adulthood (Rosenberg, 1979). Taking the 'other's'
perspectives is considered germane to social interaction (Mead, in Rosenberg, 1979)
and public behaviour appears to be internalised more than private behaviour (Tice,
1992). So, as adults we continue to imagine and care what others think. However,
the extent to which individuals attend to the observer perspective varies along a
continuum of public to private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et ah, 1975; Fiske and
Taylor, 1991). In turn, how much the observer perspective is valued and contributes
to overall self-esteem may vary (Leary et ah, 1998).
The effects of stroke, like other disability, may result in actual negative societal and
social responses, referred to as 'stigma' or 'enacted stigma' (Goffman, 1963).
However, any such actions must be perceived in order to be distressing (Kent,
1999). Patients who view the effects of stroke as negative in society's eyes,
particularly those who tend to fear or value others' evaluations, may be embarrassed
about their disability even without any experience of actual stigma.
Authors who address negative social perceptions use various terms: 'felt' or
'perceived stigma' (the belief that one has experienced discrimination, (Kent, 1999)
'social fear' (recognised as a symptom of social phobia involving fear that 'one may
act in a way that will be humiliating or embarrassing', APA, 1994) and 'shame' (the
belief that real or imagined others evaluate one negatively, Goss et al., 1994). This
suggests that social fear is more relevant to anxiety and the future, shame to
depression and the past or present. In practice, this distinction blurs; for example,
socially phobic patients' descriptions of past social experiences tends to be negative
and biased towards the observer perspective (Wells et ah, 1998). Arguably social
fear and shame are both relevant to this study of emotional distress, but I will favour
the term shame because I feel it resonates better with disabled patients' descriptions.
General or disease-specific shame measures have been associated with distress
amongst patients with skin disease and facial disfigurement. Objective disease
severity did not associate with depression or anxiety symptoms amongst patients
with psoriasis (red heavily scaled skin plaque disease). However, a
psoriasis-specific shame measure did, particularly with the depressive symptoms
(Richards, 2000). In contrast (Leary et ah, 1998) found that emotional well-being
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did not associate with psoriasis specific shame although it did with general fear of
negative evaluation. A moderate association between vitiligo-specific shame and
distress was found amongst patients with this patchy skin depigmentation disease
(Kent, 1999). Newell (1999) proposed an avoidance-anxiety model to explain
relationships between shame, social skills and decreased social activities amongst
those with facial disfigurement. This model has indirect support because distress
was significantly reduced following a cognitive behavioural intervention addressing
these issues (Newell and Clarke, 2000).
Authors have studied social phobia amongst disabled populations by discounting the
DSMIV exclusion of those with disfiguring/disabling conditions. Over fifty percent
of patients with spasmodic torticollis (condition involving involuntary jerking of
head and neck) were found to be socially phobic (Gundel et al.,2001). Seventeen
percent of Parkinson's disease patients were judged socially phobic and to relate
their embarrassment to tremor symptoms (Stein, 1990). Plausibly, as the effects of
stroke may involve both obvious (for example, poor walking gait) and less obvious
but potentially embarrassing deficits (for example, slurred speech) similar results
may be expected amongst stroke patients. However, the few previous studies that
have assessed anxiety disorders following stroke report a low prevalence of phobias
other than agoraphobia (please see Chapter 1, section 1.4ii).
Preliminary studies support the relevance of shame to distress following stroke.
Symptoms of depression and a global shame measure were found to significantly
associate amongst twenty-four long-term stroke survivors but not age matched
controls (Vine, 1999, personal communication; Vine and Horn, 2004). Jacobsson et
al. (2000) studied eating following stroke. As well as observed physical impairment
(e.g. mouth praxis) and objective difficulties (e.g. dribbling and spillage), stroke
patients reported feeling highly embarrassed about their poor eating in a subsequent
interview. Some apparently reported such a sense of embarrassment and shame that
'they felt was like a burn-mark on the forehead' (p.262, Jacobsson et al., 2000).
Issues related to shame have also been highlighted in other qualitative stroke
literature. Ironically, embarrassment has been found in relation to unrecognised
disability. For example, a man, who looked fine but had weakness felt socially
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misunderstood when strangers helped his wife carry shopping and others
complained of dismissive attitudes such as 'Oh you look fine' (Ellis-Hill et ah,
2000). Young survivors were concerned about not revealing cognitive deficits, and
one middle-aged man actually chose a new city for re-training to avoid even having
to even discuss his changed capacities at his old work (Bendz, 2000).
Examples of patients feeling obstructed or actively rejected are sometimes reported.
Being housebound is related to actual or perceived environmental disadvantage
(missing rails, too many flights of stairs, inconsiderate bus drivers) in one study
(Pound et al., 1998). A prosperous Canadian woman described a husband who
refused to walk with her, and neighbours who 'dropped' her, because she walked
badly and because only the cleaners were expected to walk, not drive, in her
neighbourhood (Clarke, 2003). Relatives may even obstruct accommodative
attempts: for example this woman's husband tried to hide her filing system for
remembering things. Housewives whose husbands took over housework are
described as feeling 'usurped' in the housewife role (Pound et ah, 1998).
A few qualitative studies report quite striking examples of shame about publicly
visible disabilities. Trigg et al. (1999) found some participants to be embarrassed
about their deficits in the company of those they knew well, whereas, Ellis-Hill et al.
(2000) report that participants felt socially at ease in the home and only experienced
what they refer to as a 'social self-body split' when outside. One reported feeling
like 'a freak' and another going 'to pieces' when she saw people she knew. Some
participants in other studies reported 'feeling inferior', feeling 'disadvantaged' or
experiencing a loss of dignity in the view of strangers (Trigg et al., 1999; Nilsson et
al.,1997).
Concern about others' reactions to walking ability was reported by two young
participants but not older ones (Pound et al., 1998). For example, a forty-year-old
appeared particularly embarrassed by older people offering to help and was
concerned to hide her disability ('...you get suspicious... are they looking at me?' p.
342, Pound et al., 1998). Pound et al. (1998) conclude that shame was not a
significant consequence of stroke amongst their older participants. As they seem to
suggest, self-comparison to stereotypes of old age, may engender greater risk of
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feeling socially discredited for young as opposed to old stroke patients' as the
discrepancy they perceive will be broader as well as negative.
Some patients may be less prone to shame if able to interpret differential treatment
positively (Susman, 1994). Disability has been reported as being occasionally
advantageous in a study of leisure pursuits, for example by allowing people to feel
entitled to ask for help (Bedini, 2000). Some young wheelchair users reported
appreciating preferential treatment from salespeople or waiting staff when it
occurred, and even occasionally soliciting unneeded help from strangers for
amusement (Cahill and Eggleston, 1995). What one stroke patient may view as pity,
another may regard as kindness (please see Chapter 6, section 6.7iii).
2.3vi: Summary and notes for developing a hypothesisfor shame
The relevance of shame to distress following stroke has initial support from one
small quantitative study (Vine and Horn, 2004), various qualitative stroke studies
and studies other of disabled populations. Its inclusion broadens the study of self-
evaluations to the social and public self. Originally, I chose to look at general shame
for consistency with Vine and Horn (2003) but this changed to the study of
stroke-specific shame (please see Chapter 6, section 6.7iii for further explanation).
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2.4: Beliefs in recovery and recurrence
2.4i: Recovery pathway from the effects ofstroke
Perhaps the most positive aspect of stroke is neurological potential for recovery, and
the means to make good use of this potential through rehabilitation therapy.
Recovery begins rapidly in the first month, and then slows down over the next few
months. Improvements may continue indefinitely, but most measurable recovery is
seen within six months (Warlow et al., 1987). To some extent, the measurement of
initial basic functions (activities of daily living) commonly measured by 'the Barthel
index' (please see Appendix D, section D.2) can predict long-term functional
outcome (Wade, D and Langton-Hewer, 1987). Experience may enable clinicians to
make better, although still not always accurate predictions than objective measures
(Tinson, 1994). Therefore there will always be an element of uncertainty regarding
recovery following stroke.
Patients' frame of reference and definitions of recovery may differ from professional
measurement of basic functions and observations of change following the day after
stroke (Kaufman, 1988; Pound et ah, 1998). Patients' goals of recovery relate to
comprehensive pre-stroke functioning: memory as well as physical functions that
include many extended valued pursuits, such as work, caring for others, travelling,
reading, walking for pleasure and many indoor and outdoor leisure pursuits (Burton,
2000; Hafsteinsdottir and Grypdonck, 1997; Kaufman, 1988; Murray et ah, 2003;
Pound et ah, 1998; Trigg et ah, 1999). Doswell et ah (2000) specifically highlighted
patients with 'good' recoveries in terms of full Barthel index scores who
nevertheless reported a lack of perceived recovery. For example one woman said
'Everything I liked has gone'. Arguably subjective belief in recovery may also
include a return to feeling the same about oneself.
Given the personal nature of individuals' definitions of recovery and the uncertainty
with which even functional independence may be predicted, subjective beliefs about
recovery rather than objective measures are more likely to further our understanding
of emotional distress following stroke.
Chapter 2: Beliefs in 'stroke' and 'its effects
Introduction 65
2.4H: Recovery locus ofcontrol
'Locus of control' refers to a specific continuous aspect of outcome expectancies.
At the 'internal locus'/ 'high internality' end of the spectrum, outcomes tend to be
regarded as consequences of one's own actions. At the 'external locus'/ 'high
externality' end of the spectrum outcomes tend to be seen as mainly determined by
forces such as chance or powerful others (Rotter, 1960). Individuals who see
themselves as personally responsible for their actions may seem more likely to
succeed in difficult active tasks, and greater 'internality' has been linked to problem
solving, perseverance and achievement in intellectual endeavours (Rotter, 1966). A
meta-analysis of ninety-seven studies supported a positive relationship between
greater externality and symptoms of depression (Benassi et al., 1988). Higher
internality has been associated with various aspects of physical and emotional well-
being amongst medically ill populations, particularly patients with painful
conditions (please see Scharloo et al., 1998 for a review).
In semi-structured interviews specifically addressing subjective perspectives about
recovery, locus of control was frequently mentioned by stroke rehabilitation
patients, suggesting its relevance amongst possible control belief in their attitudes to
recovery (Partridge, 1985). Statements were used to develop a scale to measure
recovery locus of control, in which higher levels indicate a more internal locus.
Subsequent research has demonstrated associations between higher recovery locus
of control and actual recovery (Partridge and Johnston, 1989). More relevant to this
thesis, Sinyor et al. (1986) report that stroke patients with an external orientation to
health in general reported feelings of hopelessness. Morrison et al. (2000) found
that higher internal locus of control specifically regarding recovery was moderately
and statistically significantly inversely associated with depression symptoms at one
month. A low but nevertheless statistically significant inverse association with
anxiety symptoms was also found.
A subsequent analysis suggests that recovery locus of control may predict emotional
distress following stroke over time. Statistically significant moderate inverse
associations were found between recovery locus of control at one month and anxiety
and depression symptoms at six months (Morrison et al., 2000). This association
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with depression symptoms at six months was supported even when one-month
disability levels were controlled for. Furthermore, recovery locus of control at one
month was found to produce statistically significant inverse associations with
measures of depression and anxiety outcomes (i.e. depression and anxiety symptoms
at six months, controlling for levels assessed at recruitment which took place
between ten and twenty days following stroke). This result suggests a predictive
role for recovery locus of control that is independent of earlier distress. However,
this relationship may not have been supported if the estimation of depression and
anxiety outcome had controlled for symptoms assessed at the same time that
recovery locus of control was measured (i.e. at one month).
The relevance of locus of control orientation to distress may itself be influenced by
different outcomes of recovery and service provision. Early measures of recovery
were found to predict follow-up recovery locus of control and it was suggested that
experience of success promotes more positive internal beliefs (Morrison et al.,
2000). Experience of a poor recovery may exacerbate helpless attitudes. However,
when outcomes are negative, depression appears to be less strongly associated with
externality (Benassi et al., 1988). Patients may gain a sense of vicarious control
from their rehabilitation professionals. Morrison et al. (2000) suggest that externally
orientated patients may be more likely to experience negative feelings about
discharge from their care. In Bendzs' (2000) qualitative study all patients were
reported to have developed a dependent relationship with their therapists and felt
'abandoned', 'put out', or 'kept back' when discharged. Together these results
suggest that association between recovery locus of control and distress may tend to
increase once recovery becomes the patient's sole responsibility.
2.4H: Summary and notes on developing a hypothesisfor recovery locus ofcontrol
Previous research supports an association between less internal locus for recovery
and distress following stroke both cross-sectionally and across time. It is a practical
area for investigation because it has been found amenable to modification by simple
intervention involving an internal locus of control for recovery enhancing pre-
physiotherapy appointment letter (Johnston et al., 1992). Therefore it was
considered an essential variable to include in this study.
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2.4iii: Confidence in recovery
Given the uncertainty of recovery following stroke, patients' beliefs about their
future outcomes is an intuitively appealing issue in relation to emotional distress.
There are many different angles that could be taken from tying to assess hope,
outcome expectations, or self-efficacy regarding recovery. Various approaches have
been used with mixed results.
Qualitative results have produced mixed findings regarding recovery beliefs both
within and across studies. Becker and Kaufman (1995) assert universal fear and
uncertainty about recovery, and yet that some of their sample expected a full
recovery. Ellis-Hill (1998) found uncertainty about recovery, described as a sense
of 'limbo' preventing future planning to be common, but also a simultaneous sense
of hopefulness about 'getting back to normal' amongst the same participants. Early
optimism regarding recovery was found to decrease as progress slowed, and grief
reactions were observed by Nilsson et al. (1997). In contrast in another study
optimism was sometimes maintained in spite of objectively poor recoveries by
patients who could still envisage moving towards a 'normal' active future
(Pilkington, 1999). Taken together these somewhat contradictory results reflect a
tension between uncertain expectation and hope regarding recovery.
An intuitively appealing quantitative method for studying beliefs about recovery was
used by Ellis-Hill (1998) who combined the semantic differential assessment of
identity change (please see section 2.2v) with assessment of how stroke patients saw
themselves 'one year in the future'. Mean 'future' ratings were slightly lower than
'before' stroke ratings for a few dimensions (for example independence and in
control) at one month, and for more at six and twelve months. However, none of
these differences were statistically significant at any point in time. The same was
found with traumatic brain-injured patients, and was interpreted as reflective of this
group's tendency to be 'grandiose', 'egocentric' and have 'unrealistic optimism' for
the future (Tyerman and Humphrey, 1984). Intuitively, this description just does not
fit stroke patients as a group.
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The lack of statistical significance in these differences may be partly due to the
small sample (Ellis-Hill, 1998). Also, perceived identity change may be less
extreme in stroke as opposed to traumatic brain injury in the first place. Therefore a
tendency to envisage more or less returning to pre-morbid selfhood after stroke does
not seem quite as 'grandiose' (although in many cases it will still not be realistic).
Perhaps these visions for the future may best be regarded only as an expression of
hope not expectation as the everyday saying goes. This interpretation is more
compatible with the varied qualitative results described earlier that used a subset of
these participants (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). However, these semantic differential
results do suggest that this method fails to capture much variation in stroke patients'
responses and so can tell us little about individual differences in recovery beliefs.
Helpless/hopeful attitudes were assessed using the relevant mental adjustment to
stroke subscale by Lewis et al. (2001). Moderate positive associations with
depression and anxiety symptoms were found amongst a relatively large cohort of
stroke patients, six months following stroke. This study demonstrates more
variability in stroke patients' beliefs regarding the future. However, helpless/
hopeful beliefs subscale items are very global (for example, 'I feel that life is
hopeless') and so probably tap broader future-orientated beliefs than the specific
issue of recovery.
A quantitative approach that appears to have success in capturing variation in stroke
patients' beliefs specific to recovery has been to simply get them to rate how
confident they were about making a full recovery (Morrison and Johnston, 1999).
Moderate inverse associations were found between recovery confidence at one
month and anxiety and depression symptoms at six months (Morrison et al., 2000).
Furthermore, in regression analyses statistically significant associations between
recovery confidence assessed at one month and depression and anxiety outcomes
were found, even once various disability measures and other belief variables
assessed at one month were controlled for. However, it should be pointed out that
the depression and anxiety outcomes measures consisted of residual scores obtained
by regressing initial levels (assessed ten to twenty days following stroke) onto six
month levels. As this outcome measure controlled for symptoms assessed at an
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earlier stage than the recovery confidence assessment, this may have somewhat
confounded the results.
As the authors suggest 'confidence in recovery' is a relatively under-developed
concept, that may reflect dispositional optimism. At face value it seems to reflect a
combination of self-efficacy and outcome expectations. Similarly to locus of
control, over time, degrees of confidence in recovery and its relationship to distress
may be influenced by different recovery outcomes and service provision.
Qualitative research particularly highlights possible interaction between patients'
uncertainty about recovery and messages provided by rehabilitation staff (Becker
and Kaufman, 1995; Cant, 1997; Ellis-Hill, 1998). This makes the study of
confidence in recovery a particularly practical subject of study and raises
professional issues that will be returned to in the discussion.
2.4iv: Summary and notes on developing a hypothesisfor confidence in recovery
Negative beliefs regarding the future is emphasised in Beck's theory of anxiety (the
anxious patient fears negative outcomes) and depression (the depressed patient
expects little improvement in negative circumstances). There appears to be a tension
between hope and expectations regarding recovery following stroke. One previous
study supports an associative relationship for confidence in recovery with distress,
and even suggests that early confidence in recovery can predict change in distress
levels over time following stroke. Given these results and objective uncertainty
regarding functional improvement, confidence in recovery is considered a highly
relevant subject of study regarding distress following stroke.
2.4v: Recurrence fear
'Will I have another one?' is a question stroke physicians are often asked (Becker
and Kaufman, 1995). It is a difficult question to answer precisely because various
factors have been identified which seem to increase risk of recurrent stroke: male
sex, raised blood pressure (before and after stroke) atrial fibrillation (irregular heart
beat) coexisting heart disease, increased age, stroke type and possibly smoking
(Ebrahim and Harwood, 1999). Therefore there will be much variability of risk
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amongst individuals, and there is a need for further medical research to elucidate
how these factors interact amongst themselves and in combination with more recent
treatments (Rothwell, 2001). However, some basic idea of average recurrence risk
seems useful for general background information to the present study.
The Oxfordshire community project (Burn et al., 1994) is the most recent of the
small number of community studies of recurrent stroke risk (Ebrahim and Harwood,
1999). Using this original cohort of 675 patients, 180 events over the next five years
were classified as recurrent strokes, of which 135 were first recurrences. The
cumulative probability of recurrence amongst survivors was thirty percent, and two
thirds of these were severe strokes. A more optimistic perspective emerges by
consideration of annual recurrence risk figures that do not take high attrition rates to
death in the first few weeks into account (Ebrahim and Harwood, 1999). Risk of
(first) recurrence was approximately thirteen percent in the first year and then
dropped to figures in between two and seven percent for subsequent years. Often a
ten percent per year risk figure is quoted, and this refers to the constant hazard figure
over the study period.
Studies of stroke patients' informational needs suggest a strong interest in recurrence
risk. Over eighty percent of patients indicated that they desired 'a lot' of
information about reducing the chances of another stroke relative to other topics
approximately a year and a half following stroke (Haske van Veenedaal et al., 1996).
Forty-six percent of patients indicated still wanting more information about
recurrence prevention at six-month follow-up despite having received information
leaflets about risk factors at one month (Mant et al., 1998). When semi-structured
interviews were used to investigate the type of information wanted, recurrence risk
was the most commonly reported topic (by approximately one in five patients) at
both 6 and 24 months following stroke (Hanger et al., 1998).
Concern and fear about recurrence has now been identified by various qualitative
studies (Becker and Kaufman, 1995; Bendz, 2000; Ellis-Hill, 1998; Haggstrom et
al., 1994; Jacobsen et al., 2000; McCormack, 2000; Pilkington, 1999; Pound et al.,
1998) and even emerged as a theme in a semi-structured interview about the eating
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process (Jacobsen et al., 2000). Concern about recurrence was related to not being
able to understand why strokes occur amongst those who felt they had lived healthy
lifestyles in one study (Ellis-Hill, 1998). Three studies highlighted a specific fear
about becoming even more disabled through another stroke (Becker and Kaufman,
1995; Bendz, 2000; Haggstrom et al., 1994) and one study reported that severe
dependency was feared more than death (Haggstrom et al., 1994). Reluctance to
exert oneself in household chores or to go on holiday was related to the fear of
bringing on another stroke or coping in the event that one did occur by Pound et al.
(1998). Some young participants were reported not to go back to work or to
prolong sick leave because of their 'ever present' fear of relapse (Bendz, 2000).
The reviewed qualitative studies suggest that patients often have heightened concern
about and may even develop avoidances in relation to the possibility of recurrent
strokes. However, studies have not specifically attempted to seek understanding of
variation in emotional distress in relation to levels of recurrence fear. However,
indirect support for an association between distress and recurrence fear is provided
by the cancer literature. Fear of cancer recurrence and death is known to be highly
prevalent (LaFortune Fredette, 1995; Lee-Jones et al., 1997; Welch-McCaffrey et
al., 1984) and has actually been found to associate more highly with psychological
disturbance than original diagnosis (Silberfarb and Greer, 1982). Also clinically,
catastrophic fears of recurrence have been observed amongst depressed and anxious
stroke patients (Laidlaw et al., 2003; Sharpe and Tinson, personal communication,
1998).
2.4vi: Summary and notes on developing a hypothesisfor recurrence fear
Risk of recurrence is something stroke patients are aware of and report being very
keen to obtain risk prevention information about. Also, qualitative information from
clinicians and patients suggests that recurrent strokes and more severe recurrent
strokes are feared and may sometimes result in avoidance behaviour. Extrapolation
from the cancer literature and expert opinion suggests that recurrence fear may well
associate with emotional distress. Taken together, these lines of evidence support
the relevance of fear of recurrence to emotional distress following stroke.
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2.5: Summary of beliefs in 'stroke' and 'its effects' in relation to cognitive
theory and the hypotheses
The preceding review suggests that research regarding stroke patients' subjective
beliefs and associations with distress is at an early stage. However, various beliefs
in 'stroke' and 'its effects' that may have relevance to distress have been identified
and discussed. Of the attributional beliefs introduced in section 2.2, causal
controllability clearly relates to 'stroke', however 'Why me?' and 'Found meaning?'
may relate to either 'stroke' or 'its effects'. The negative self-evaluative beliefs
(acceptance of disability, negative identity change and shame) introduced in section
2.3 resonate more with 'its effects'. Beliefs in recovery (recovery locus of control
and confidence in recovery) are also concerned with 'its effects' whereas recurrence
fear is concerned with both beliefs about 'stroke' and 'its effects' in a future context.
As discussed (please see section 2.1 and Chapter 1, section 1.7) the cognitive
adaptation literature, including theory and research related to adjustment to cancer,
acquired disability and normal ageing has been used to supplement literature
specifically addressing beliefs and emotional distress following stroke. Although
the reviewed research has not been specifically inspired by clinical cognitive
theories of distress, the set of beliefs identified may be seen as compatible with the
central meanings of Beck's theory adapted to 'stroke' and 'its effects'. Very broadly
negative attributional beliefs, negative self-evaluations and negative beliefs in
recovery and recurrence can be seen as representing aspects of: a negative view of
one's position in the world, a negative sense of self and a negative predictions for
one's future respectively. Negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence, and causal
controllability through its relevance to recurrence, are particularly related to ideas of
future threat. As self-evaluation is an ongoing process, and the effects of stroke may
not be viewed as permanent, particularly initially, negative self-evaluative beliefs
may also overlap with a sense of threat.





My main aim was to investigate beliefs in patients who have had a stroke and the
relationship of these beliefs to emotional distress, taking into account demographic
and social background variables. My supplementary aim was to further explore the
nature of beliefs in emotional distress and disorder.
The quantitative study was designed to address my main aim and the following
objectives to:
1) Investigate emotional distress
2) Investigate beliefs considered relevant to stroke patients' emotional distress
3) Examine associations between emotional distress and specific types of beliefs
following stroke
4) Investigate the ability of initial beliefs to predict emotional distress over time
The structured clinical interview study was designed to address the supplementary
aim and the following objective to:
5) Explore the types of beliefs and nature of symptoms related to common
depression and anxiety disorders
The qualitative study was designed to address the supplementary aim and the
following objective to:
6) Explore patients' own experiences and concerns using a qualitative approach
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Main hypotheses *
1) A relationship between beliefs and emotional distress would be found
at an initial point in time (baseline) and at a later point in time (follow-up)
2) Beliefs found at baseline would predict emotional distress at follow-up
* It was expected that the main hypotheses would be fulfilled even once
demographic and social background factors had been taken into account
Specific hypotheses**
1) Certain negative attributions:
- Lower sense of control over causes
- Higher frequency of asking 'Why me?'
- A failure to find meaning in the experience
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress
2) More negative self-evaluations:
Lower acceptance of ones' disability
A more negative change in identity
Higher shame
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress
3) More negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Lower sense of control over recovery
Lower confidence in recovery
Higher fear of recurrence
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress
**The specific hypotheses are intended for baseline, follow-up and across time.
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Chapter 4
Introduction to the mixed method
"What can be counted doesn't always count and what counts can not always be
counted"
Einstein (1879 - 1955), in Famous-Quotes-and-Quoatations.com
The main aim of this study:
'...to investigate beliefs in patients who have had a stroke and the relationship of
these beliefs to emotional distress...'
will be addressed by a mainly quantitative 'counting' approach, and this is actually
considered to 'count'. This chapter is intended to justify why, but also to explain the
decision to combine this main study with two further more exploratory studies.
Quantitative research involves the statistical testing of hypotheses. Within the
bounds of a study's power, quantitative results can be approached with some
confidence that they generalise to the population represented by the study sample
(Peabody, 1985). This is considered advantageous. In this context, evidence that
beliefs do associate with emotional distress and knowledge about their relative
importance is considered useful. It can be used to discriminate amongst hypotheses
for further research and may inform clinical applications; for example, it may
suggest useful outcome measures.
However, the quantitative method is limited by the content of its original hypotheses
and constrained by its measurement techniques. In this thesis, theory, past research
and piloting research (please see chapters 1,2, 6) has been used to try and develop
hypotheses and measures with relevance (that 'count'). However, research into
cognition in distress following stroke is still an early stage. Therefore the addition
of exploratory work was considered a complementary source from which to
corroborate quantitative findings (Casebeer & Verhoef, 1997). Convergence
between the qualitative data and quantitative results can bolster the overall findings.
Divergence between qualitative and quantitative results will provide alternative
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explanations about 'what counts' and this may prove particularly useful in the event
of quantitative findings that appear counterintuitive (Burt & Oaksford, 1997).
In addition, questionnaire items do not always reflect the idiosyncratic language, or
concrete circumstances attached to individuals' beliefs. Qualitative data can, which
makes it rich and living (Robson, 1993). This makes qualitative data an appealing
source of information in its own right.
There is a debate regarding the validity of quantitative versus qualitative approaches,
the protagonists of whom appear to assume that each method is tied to a polarised
ideological view of reality (Burt & Oaksford, 1999). However, methodological
choices need not be determined by historical philosophical allegiances (Bryman,
1994; Casebeer & Verhoef, 1997; Clarke, 2003) and this belief coincides with my
own. I chose a mainly quantitative and partially qualitative method for the practical
reasons discussed.
As regards my own reflexive philosophical position: this thesis comes from the
perspective of cognitive theory, therefore from a moderately relativist perspective.
Therefore the generation of both the quantitative hypotheses and the development of
the qualitative strands are recognised to deliberately investigate this perspective.
Subjective mental experience is considered to 'count' towards individuals' varying
emotional experience. Both are considered amenable to 'valid enough to be useful'
empirical measurement and exploration.
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5.1: Introduction
This chapter will describe and justify the design, participants and procedure used in
the main quantitative study. It should be pointed out that piloting work will be
reported in chapter six. Also, that ethical approval was sought and obtained before
commencing this study (please see Appendix A for ethics form).
5.2: Design
A cross-sectional survey and prospective cohort design was used.
Two cross-sectional surveys were conducted in order to examine both initial and
longer-term adjustment to stroke. By using a prospective cohort of participants, the
predictive ability of baseline variables could be tested at follow-up.
One month was chosen for the initial time point (baseline) and nine months for the
later time point (follow-up) on the basis of survival and recovery rates. The first few
weeks following stroke is the phase of highest mortality (Warlow et al., 1987) so one
month was considered an ethical and practical time for initial interviews. Nine
months was considered to be a time by which most individuals' recovery would have
peaked (please see Chapter 2, section 2.4i) and they would have had time to reflect
upon the impact of their stroke.
5.3: Population
Ideally a sample should represent the wider stroke population as much as possible,,
to maximise the generalisability and usefulness of results. It was considered
important to avoid sampling patients with a restricted range of objective disability
because this would give subjective variables a clear statistical advantage. Community
sampling was impractical due to financial and time constraints and so the Western
General Hospital (WGH) was used as the participant population. This is a large
University teaching hospital, with a specialist stroke unit, to which patients come via
emergency services or a GP referral. A stroke register had been kept at this hospital
during the years preceding this study that involved regular contact with GPs which
would have acted to cue their referral of 'mild' as well as more severe cases of
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stroke. Therefore, the population of patients admitted to this hospital is less likely to
be biased towards more severe cases of stroke than the populations of other hospitals.
5.4: Inclusion/exclusion criteria
To be reasonably confident that reliable and valid data was obtained the following
four inclusion/exclusion criteria were set.
5.4i: Diagnosis ofa 'definite' stroke
Neurological disorders other than stroke can nevertheless present with similar
histories and/or signs and symptoms (Warlow et ah, 2000). These other illnesses
will produce different rates and levels of recovery, which in turn may bias
psychological adjustment.
This study coincided with a stroke diagnosis study at the WGH which involved very
prompt examination and scanning of patients admitted with suspected stroke. Cases
were then discussed by a panel of senior stroke-related consultants within days,
which was considered to be the gold standard for diagnosis (Hand, 2000, personal
communication). Only those considered to have a 'definite' stroke were included.
5.4U: Health
Patients judged unlikely to survive the study period or too unwell to participate were
not included. This decision was made by Dr Jo Kwan, a gerontologist at baseline,
and by participants' GPs at follow-up (please see Appendix B, section B.5).
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5.4iii: Severe cognitive deficit
Patients with severe cognitive deficits were excluded. This was assessed using the
Hodkinson (1972) mental state test (please see Appendix D, section D.l). This is a
brief test of orientation, knowledge, concentration and new learning. A cut-off of
eight out of ten was used. Jutapunkul et al. (1991) found this cut-off correctly
identified ninety-one percent of 168 patients aged between sixty and ninety-seven
years for dementia, delirium, or 'normal' cognitive function in line with DSM-III
criteria. The authors also reported a good internal reliability score for the scale (oc =
.90). Ideally, a full neuro-cognitive assessment would have been conducted to
capture subtle impairments; however, this was considered too time-consuming.
5.4iv Severe language impairment
Proficient use of English language was required for participants to understand and
respond to the questions. The Frenchay Aphasia Screening Test (FAST; Enderby et
al., 1987) was chosen as a language screen. This test was developed for use by non-
specialists using stroke patients and normal controls, by comparison to speech and
language therapists' standard assessments. It was found to achieve high associations
with standard communication tests (r = .90) and high inter-rater (r = .97) and test-
retest (r = .97) reliability results. When the minimum recommended cut-off point of
thirteen out of a possible total score of thirty was used, only three of the fifty patients
without aphasia were misclassified (one had severe visual neglect, one was Polish
and one had dementia). These factors could be taken into account when
administering the test.
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5.5: Introduction of patients to the study
Lothian local research ethics committee required patients to be approached for
research by a clinician. It was considered cumbersome to depend on core ward staff
given the burden to them and the short length of some patients' hospital stays.
Reliance on general practitioners was expected to be unsuccessful (Anderson, 1992).
Fortunately, a clinical research fellow, Dr Jo Kwan, offered to incorporate an
introduction to this project within the course of his 'Integrated Care Pathways'
research.
Dr Kwan saw all stroke patients admitted to the WGH within the first day or so of
their hospital admission. Whenever he considered a patient was well enough to
participate and able to understand him, he:
- introduced the 'Impact of stroke' study
- explained who I was
- sought permission for contact to discuss participation in more depth.
If appropriate, he gave patients the 'Patient information sheet' (Please see Appendix
B, section B.2) and referred contact details, GP details and medical stroke data to me.
He also recorded his reason for non-referrals.
5.6: Recruitment of participants in practice
The early timing of introductions meant that short stay patients were not missed from
the study. However, unfortunately, this led to the exclusion of all patients with acute
aphasia. A quarter of severely aphasic patients from a community sample (Wade et
al., 1986) and a third of originally aphasic patients from a hospital sample (Kauhanen
et al., 2000) were found to regain near normal communication within a month.
Therefore some patients unable to communicate understanding or interest when
invited to participate would have improved to the required level by one month. Of
course, some may have been subsequently excluded for a different reason.
Nonetheless, the exclusion of these patients with aphasia by default of the
introduction method is recognised as a limitation to the study and this issue will be
returned to in the discussion.
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In total, Dr Kwan's research (the 'first phase' of recruitment) took nine months and
involved some 268 patients. About a third were not considered for this project,
because approximately equal proportions:
- had died
- were diagnosed with a TIA
- were diagnosed with a different non-stroke diagnosis
Of the remaining 188 patients Dr Kwan saw for his research, about half (eighty-nine)
were referred. Reasons for not referring the others were:
seventy patients had severe aphasia.
thirteen patients presented other communication problems (for example
deafness or a lack of proficiency in English language),
eleven patients had clear diagnoses of severe dementia,
five patients could not be seen or were not interested.
This 'first phase' of recruitment generated sixty-seven participants, which fell short
of the number required (please see Chapter 7, section 7.3). Dr Kwan continued
recruiting for a further four months ('second phase' of recruitment). He attended
weekly ward rounds, and introduced the study to patients who appeared able to
understand its nature and purposes. He did not have time to keep records of his
reasons for not referring other patients in this 'second phase' but it is likely that they
were proportionally similar to before.
In total 121 patients were referred and the results of their subsequent screening are
illustrated in Figure 5.1. As shown, cognitive impairment was the main reason for
exclusion at screening with one in six patients failing to obtain eight out of ten on the
Hodkinson test. A minimal number of patients did not participate for other reasons.
A young woman and an older man were too highly distressed to maintain
concentration and complete the interview schedule (Total Hospital Anxiety and
Depression scale (HADs) scores of 35/ 42 and 33/ 42 respectively). This female
patient was already under the care of social and psychological services. This male
patient already had a social worker but requested psychiatric help; therefore my
supervisor wrote to his GP to explain the situation.
Chapter 5: Design, participants and procedure
Method 83
Figure 5.1: Screening of patients and participation at baseline and follow-up
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Demographic data describing the eighty-nine participants at baseline and the eighty-
one participants at follow-up will be reported in chapters 10 and 12 respectively
Excluded participants tended to be older (Mean = 83 years, SD = 5.3 years) than
included participants and this difference was statistically significant (t = -4.2, p<
.001). I was able to administer the HADs scale to two people who declined
participation and ten of the eighteen patients excluded due to low Hodkinson test
scores. Mean HADs anxiety scores (Mean = 5.21, SD = 3.89) and depression scores
(Mean = 4.50, SD = 3.06) for these twelve patients did not significantly differ from
scores for the final sample.
Prior to contacting a patient I double-checked discharge status and contact
information with the hospital database. Missing GP information was obtained from
the local authority. Patient contact details were obtained from GP surgeries and
directory enquiries. Immediately prior to contacting a patient I confirmed that he/
she was still alive with his/her GP surgery in order to avoid any undue distress to
relatives if someone had died.
When a patient was still in hospital, I first spoke to his/her named nurse and arranged
a suitable time to visit. I had an honorary contract and trust identification and
attended stroke team meetings and provided staff with information sheets in order to
avoid confusion or concern about what I was doing. When a patient had been
discharged, I telephoned and asked to speak to him/her. If s/he was not available I
briefly explained who I was and arranged a convenient time to phone back.
When I first spoke to patients I explained who I was, the main purpose of the
research, I warned that the interview might take a couple of hours and answered
questions. If appropriate, we made an appointment at a convenient time. When
patients had been discharged this was uncomplicated. When a patient was still in
hospital this involved liaison with the staff to avoid clashes with therapy or ward
rounds. Appointments were noted by patients' bedsides and in ward diaries. Despite
these precautions, clashes occurred when therapy schedules changed. This unsettled
participants who seemed to feel that they personally had 'put me out' when our
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interview was stopped short and re-scheduled. Therefore, I began seeing patients in
hospital only on therapy free Saturday mornings.
At follow-up, GPs were asked to indicate in writing whether any patient was unable
to participate because s/he was too unwell or had died (please see Appendix B,
section B.5). Two weeks later, surgeries were telephoned to double-check that
participants were still living. Participants were then contacted in writing and
telephoned a couple of days later to discuss participation in the same way as at
baseline.
5.7: Screening and consent procedure
While administering screening tests, I was concerned not to 'let on' and potentially
damage pride when someone was excluded so I would stay and listen to their
concerns for a while and answer any questions. Whenever possible, I used the HADs
to obtain some gauge of anxiety and depression amongst those too cognitively
impaired to participate fully.
Prior to interviews, issues of voluntary participation, right to withdraw,
confidentiality and anonymity and any other queries were discussed. Once confident
that these issues were understood I requested written consent (please see 'Consent
form' Appendix B, section B.3). A few participants were embarrassed about their
handwriting on signing the consent form, otherwise concerns were not generally
raised. I remained vigilant to participants' consent to continue throughout each
interview.
5.8: Conduct of interviews
The majority of participants were interviewed at home. Just ten participants were
still in hospital at baseline and one at follow-up and their interviews were conducted
in a seminar room. People may have felt more relaxed in their own homes and this
may have introduced some response bias. Also I felt it too intrusive to insist on total
privacy in people's homes, and when people had small homes it would not have been
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practical. Family members tended to stop 'chipping in' after I emphasised my
interest in participants' viewpoints and often seemed to use the interview as an
opportunity to go out or get on with something. However, the variation in the
presence or absence of relatives may have influenced participants' responses.
All scales and open-ended questions were administered verbally and I marked all
responses. In addition, participants were encouraged to read cards with the items in
large font. The use of face-to-face interviews and verbal administration can be seen
as a potential bias or 'experimenter effect'. However, on balance this issue was
considered less serious than practical and scientific difficulties of missing data that
could be expected with postal questionnaires (O'Rourke, 1996). It is estimated that
one in four Scottish adults have poor literacy (Scottish Executive, 2003) and verbal
administration allowed me to compensate for these difficulties, to double-check
apparently conflicting responses and to compensate for other stroke-related deficits
such as initiation and attention. Verbal administration also allowed continuity
between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the interview.
I continually enquired whether participants needed a break during interviews. When
a participant was tiring or it became clear the interview would go beyond an hour and
a half I discussed rescheduling. This became necessary approximately one third of
the time, in which case interviews were carried over to the next possible day.
An opportunity for further questions was given at the end of the interview, and
participants were reminded that they could contact me in future. Participants who
were distressed or who had unanswered medical questions were reminded that they
could contact their GP for help. One depressed participant who was still in hospital
had been considering suicide and, with his permission, I informed my supervisor and
the rehabilitation team. A couple of other depressed participants had already
unsuccessfully sought help for depression from their GPs by follow-up. At their
request we wrote to their GPs in the hope that this might be of some benefit.
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6.1: Piloting
Piloting was based at the Astley-Ainsley rehabilitation hospital. For seven months, I
liasied with nursing staff to set up meetings with patients they considered able to
communicate. Practical constraints determined I saw twenty-two patients, aged
forty-three to sixty-eight years.
I used meetings to:
Explore acceptability and practical administration issues of scales
Practice structured clinical interviewing and qualitative interviewing
Develop a question route for the qualitative interview
Obtain test-retest data for appropriate scales with fifteen patients
In choosing scales, those specifically designed for stroke patients were prioritised
for reasons of validity, practicality, and comparison with past research. However, it
was also necessary to consider other illness and disability scales.
Minor modifications to scales were made to avoid confusion regarding whether
questions referred to the experience of'stroke' or to 'its effects' (please see section
2.1 for discussion). Some open-ended questions were developed to supplement
closed questions. One scale was particularly modified to improve its reliability and
suitability for stroke patients (please see section 6.8iii). Another scale was found to
be unacceptable and so further piloting was used to develop an alternative. (Please
see section 6.7iii).
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6.2: The quantitative interview and measures
The quantitative interview was developed to assess emotional distress, variables
relevant to the hypotheses and background (non-belief) variables considered relevant
to the study of distress in the stroke population.
The measures used are summarised in Table 6.1 in relation to the hypotheses and
described in more detail in the next section. The actual questions are displayed in the
interview schedule in Appendix D. The ordering of scales was designed to begin
with the less personal variables in order to allow rapport to be built before
administering the distress and self scales.
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Table 6.1: Summary of measures




Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale
(HADs): 14 items, four point frequency ratings
Zigmond and Snaith, 1983
Background variables
Age Age in years Hospital records
Gender Male/ female Hospital records
Social economic status Carstair's index: 1-7 deprivation categories Carstairs and Morris, 1991
Stroke severity N1H stroke severity scale: neurological exam National Institute of Health,
1998
Disability The Barthel index: 10 items, two, three or four
point ratings of independence in basic ADLs
Mahoney and Barthel, 1965
The Nottingham index: 21 extended ADL
items, two point rating of independence
Nouri and Lincoln, 1987




Life events Life events checklist: 12 items, yes/No
responses
Brugha et al., 1985
Pre-stroke history of
depression
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM1V First et al., 2001
Attributions
Causal controllability Open-ended questions and checklist to access
causal attributions, then five point ratings of
control
Fielding, 1987
'Why me?' Single item, five point rating of frequency Thompson et al., 1991
'Found meaning?' Yes/No question and open ended probe Thompson et al., 1991
Self evaluations
Acceptance of disability Adapted Acceptance of illness scale: 8 items,
five point ratings of agreement
Felton and Ravenson, 1984
Negative Identity change Adapted Semantic Differential Scale: 20 sets of




Shame 10 items, five point ratings of agreement Piloting
Recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control Recovery locus of control scale: 9 items, five
point ratings of agreement
Partridge and Johnson, 1989
Confidence in recovery Single item, ten point rating of confidence Lewin et al., 1992
Recurrence fear Adapted fear of recurrence scale: 8 items, five
point ratings of agreement
Northouse, 1981
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6.3: Measurement of emotional distress
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADs; Zigmond & Snaith,1983) was
chosen in preference to other scales that have been used within stroke research
because it:
- avoids floor effects
aims to avoid confounding the measurement of distress with stroke
addresses anxious and depressive symptoms equally
is suitable for the measurement of distress
has good criterion and concurrent validity
has good internal and test-retest reliability
is brief
It consists of fourteen items, split equally between two subscales (anxiety and
depression). Depression items centre mainly on anhedonia (loss of pleasure) and
anxiety items on non-specific worry, tension and panic. Global HADs scores were
used as the distress measure; therefore a maximum scores of forty-two could be
obtained. The HADs authors intended the scale to avoid floor effects by excluding
severe symptom items. This appears successful as a wide range of scores was found
in a study using the same population of stroke patients (O'Rourke, 1996).
The intention of the HADs to assess mood without confounding by physical illness
symptoms was supported by recent exploratory factor analysis work that included
stroke patients (Johnston et al., 2000). A simultaneous analysis of HADs and a
physical quality of life scale demonstrated a good fit between the majority of HADs
items and a psychological rather than a physical factor.
Theoretical issues concerning the choice of distress (symptoms of both anxiety and
depression) as the main outcome measure were discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.2.
Diverging evidence supports the use of the HADs as a global measure of distress.
Zigmond and Snaith (1983) originally intended the scale to distinguish anxiety and
depressive states. Nonetheless, they found the majority of their sample to report
similar degrees of the two states. Subsequent studies report a high level of
association between the anxiety and depression subscales. For example, Herrmann
(1997) found an average correlation of r = .63 across eighteen studies. Experts in
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the field have interpreted high levels of covariance between HADs anxiety and
depression symptoms as supporting the assumption that they share a large distress
component (Spinhoven et ah,1997; Chaturvedi, 1991; Razavi et al., 1989). HADs
total and subscale scores have also been found to produce similarly high correlations
with other measures of distress and anxiety and depression scales which supports the
validity of the HADs as a measure of distress (Bjelland et ah, 2002).
HADs distress scores have been tested as a screening instrument for possible
psychiatric disorder and found to perform comparably to similar instruments with
medical patients, including stroke patients (Hopwood et al., 1991; Lewis & Wessely,
1991; O'Rourke et al., 1998; Wilkinson and Barczak, 1988)). HADs distress scores
have been found to achieve similar, and sometimes better sensitivity and specificity
in the detection of possible cases of anxiety disorder or depression, than the separate
subscales (Costantini et al., 1999; Smith et al., 2002; Spinhoven et al., 1997). This
can be interpreted as providing concurrent validity for global HADs in relation to
specific psychiatric disorders. An opportunity to study association between HADs
scores and diagnoses of depressive and anxiety disorders was taken (please see
Chapter 8, section 8.2).
Criterion validity for global HADs scores as a measure of distress was provided by
different methods of factor analysis that have found a shared distress factor as well
as anxiety and depression factors relating to the original subscales (Dunbar et al.,
2000; Smith et al., 2002). Confirmatory factor analysis work conducted by Johnston
and colleagues (2000) with stroke and MI patients actually made a 'stronger case'
for using the overall measure 'without distinguishing between anxiety and
depression' than for the separation of anxiety and depression on the HADs.
Zigmond and Snaith (1983) reported high test-retest and internal reliability for
HADs subscales. More recently, Hermann (1997) reported similar coefficients with
a sample of 6200 patients and Johnston et al. (2000) found high internal reliability
scores for the HADs with a sample of stroke patients. Therefore it appears to be a
reliable measure for this population.
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Finally, the HADs is briefer than most other measures of distress and therefore
low in respondent burden (Johnston et ah, 2000; O'Rourke et al., 1998). The HADs
can be completed with stroke and cardiac patients within a few minutes (Visser et
al., 1995) and was reported as being highly acceptable to patients (Herrmann, 1997;
Johnston et al., 2000; Wilkinson and Barczak, 1988).
6.4: Measurement of background variables
6.4i: Demographic data
Demographic information (age, gender and postcode for deprivation category
scoring) was obtained from medical records and directory inquiries. In addition
I ascertained and recorded whether or not participants lived with someone, were
single or in a relationship and owned their own home at opportune moments during
interviews.
6.4ii: Stroke severity and type
Dr Kwan provided the assessment of past strokes and the type and severity of index
strokes. Stroke type was assessed using the Oxfordshire community stroke project
(OCSP) system that classifies stroke symptoms into types that approximate the
volume of infarcts in ischaemic stroke:
Lacunar infarts (LACS; 28%)
Posterior circulation infarction (POCS; 24%)
Partial anterior circulation infarction (PACS; 34%)
Total anterior circulation infarction (TACS; 17%)
These percentages were incidence rates found in the OCSP project (Warlow, 2000)
and allow incidence of subtypes in the present sample to be compared to rates
expected in a community sample. Stroke severity was assessed with the National
Institutes of Health Stroke Scale (NIH, 1989), a graded neurological examination
rating speech, language, cognition, visual field deficit, motor and sensory
impairment. It is a widely used scale, with high reliability for use by neurologist
and non-neurologist physicians (Goldstein & Samsa, 1997).
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6.4iii: Disability
The Barthel index and the Nottingham index were used as measures of disability.
The Barthel index (Mahoney and Barthel, 1965) is a ten item standard measure with
well-established validity and reasonable reliability (Wade, 1992). It covers very
basic daily activities of living such as bathing and continence. The Nottingham
index (Nouri & Lincoln, 1987) is an inventory of twenty-one items of extended
activities of daily living, covering mobility, kitchen activities, domestic tasks and
leisure pursuits. By using both measures, possible 'ceiling' effects of the Barthel
index and 'floor' effects of the Nottingham index were avoided.
6.4iv: Social support
The medical outcomes study social support survey (Sherbourne and Stewart, 1991)
was chosen to measure social support because:
- it is relatively brief (nineteen items)
- ir has good validity and reliability
- it was recommended by the Edinburgh psychotherapy in primary
care research team (Law, 2000, personal communication).
This scale was developed by the selection of items by experts following the piloting
of previously developed scales. It consists of four subscales to measure perceptions
of informational/emotional support, tangible support, affection, and social
interaction. Factor analysis supported either the use of the separate subscales, or the
use of a global index calculated by addition of the subscale means. To minimise the
number of background variables in this study, the global index was used as a
measure of perceived social support.
The authors reported good convergent validity (for example, loneliness, and marital
and family functioning) and good discriminant validity (for example, role
limitations) in a study using a large sample of chronically ill patients. Internal
reliability of scale items was found to be extremely high (a = .97) and it achieved an
overall test-retest score of .78.
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6.4v: Life events
Life events were measured using the twelve item 'List of Threatening Experiences
Questionnaire' (LTE-Q, Brugha et al., 1985). It has been developed as a
considerably less time consuming alternative to the Brown & Harris LEDS
interview. In studies that have used the LEDs interview as gold standard, this
questionnaire has been found to:
- capture eighty percent of 'markedly or moderately threatening'
events
- to have a sensitivity of .89 and a specificity of .74
- demonstrate a high level of agreement between patients and
informants reports
- produce high test-retest reliability estimates for eleven of the twelve
items
(Brugha et al., 1985; Brugha and Cragg, 1990).
As recommended, participants were questioned about life events for up to six
months in the past at baseline. However, at follow-up they were asked to report
events that had occurred since the last interview (eight months). Index strokes were
not scored as a life event, however other strokes that occurred six months prior to
baseline or during the study were.
6.4vi: Pre-stroke history ofdepression
Previous episodes of depression were assessed during the structured clinical
interview (please see Chapter 8, sections 8.2 and 8.5, and Appendix D, section
D.14). GP notes were considered as sources of corroboratory evidence. However,
depression is often under-recognised in general practice (please see Paykel & Priest,
1992 for discussion). Older medical records were likely to pose problems with
terminology. On balance, the time-consuming task of examining general practice
records did not seem worthwhile.
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6.5: Note on terminology in interviews
Piloting highlighted the difference between perceptions of'stroke' and 'its effects'
(please see Chapter 2, section 2.1). Therefore, the terms 'stroke' or 'the effects of
stroke', or 'since my stroke' were used to specify the intended frame of reference
throughout the interview. To check my assumption that the main cohort of
participants would also differentiate between 'stroke' and 'its effects' they were
asked to define these terms at the start of the interview (please see Appendix D).
6.6: Measurement of attributions
6.6i: Causal controllability
Causal controllability was assessed by a two-stage process as it was necessary to
elicit 'Causal attributions' before beliefs of control related to these attributions
('Causal controllability').
Assessment ofcausal controllability stage-one: eliciting causal attributions
Past research in stroke suggested that whether or not participants would be able to
make causal attributions required consideration (please see section 2.2ii).
Participants were likely to have received some relevant risk factor information from
their health professionals. Their involvement in a diagnostic study meant that they
would have been primed by questions about smoking, blood pressure, and previous
heart conditions and strokes (Hand, 1999; personal communication).
A method designed to maximise the reporting of causal attributions involved both
open-ended questions and probes to elicit perceived causes. It was emphasised to
hesitant participants that it was their ideas that were of interest (please see Appendix
D). This 'probing' method has been used successfully with MI patients (Fielding,
1987) and with cancer patients (Taylor et ah, 1984). Finally, a checklist described
as 'causes other people who have had a stroke have mentioned' was used to
facilitate further reporting. This was developed using items from the Illness
Perception Questionnaire (IPQ; Weinman et ah, 1996) the results of Fielding's
(1987) MI study and risk factors for stroke.
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Beliefs regarding the relative potency of causal attributions were also assessed
by asking participants to order their attributions from 'the most important' to 'the
least important'. The types of causal attribution made and potency beliefs were
considered supplementary to the main results and are reported in Appendix F,
section F.2.
Assessment ofcausal controllability stage-two: beliefs in control over elicited
causal attributions
The belief that causes can be avoided or controlled in future was assessed using a 5-
point scale from 'difficult to control' to 'easy to control' (Fielding, 1987). From
piloting work I found that I often needed to guide participants in their ratings of
control in terms of orientating them to the future and/or establishing levels of
control. Therefore, for each cause I would first ask participants to rate how
controllable they thought it was in an open-ended way and then funnelled further
questions accordingly (please see Appendix D for further details). Participants were
asked to rate the controllability of each causal attribution they had made. For each
participant, a mean causal controllability score was calculated.
6.6U: 'Why me?'
Single items from Thompson (1991) were used to assess a sense of 'Why me?'.
Participants were first asked whether they had thought 'Why me?' at any point since
their stroke and a yes/no response was recorded. Then participants were asked to
rate how often they found themselves asking 'Why me?' on a five point scale.
Spontaneous remarks made in relation to this item were also recorded.
6.6iii: 'Found meaning?'
Participants were asked whether they had found any 'meaning' in their experience of
stroke (Thompson, 1991) and a 'yes/no' response recorded. As the term 'meaning'
was found to baffle some participants during piloting, the prompt 'Is there anything
good that has come out of your experience of having had a stroke?' was used if
necessary. If appropriate, participants were asked to describe the 'meaning' they
had found.
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6.7: Measurement of self-evaluations
6.7i: Acceptance ofdisability
Linkowski's (1971) original fifty-item 'acceptance of disability scale' was
considered too long. Therefore a shortened version, the 'Acceptance of illness
scale' (Felton and Ravenson, 1984) was chosen and reformulated to address 'the
effects of my stroke' not 'illness'. On the basis of factor analysis work, Mpofu and
Houston (1998) suggested that the 'acceptance of disability' scale does not address
the process of value changes outlined by the theory, but is essentially only a measure
of the end product of this process. This criticism is also applicable to the shorter
measure. However, as a global measure of acceptance, Felton and Ravenson's scale
was considered suitable for the limited aim of this quantitative study to assess
negative beliefs, and not the process by which they are developed.
Felton et al. (1984) reported good internal reliability (a = .81 and .83) and seven
month test-retest reliability (rho = .70) with patients with hypertension, diabetes,
arthritis or cancer. They also reported a negative association between the scale and a
wish fulfilling coping measure (describing a pining or longing for the illness to go
away) as evidence of construct validity.
6. 7ii: Negative identity change
Two similar scales originally developed for measuring changes in the personality of
blunt head injury patients were considered for use (Tyerman and Humphrey, 1984;
Brooks & McKinlay, 1983). Both scales were designed by expert opinion to
provide face validity and consist of twenty pairs of polar opposite adjectives (e.g.
'irritable.. .easy going'). These are presented to respondents for evaluation in a
visual analogue semantic differential format. Tyerman and Humphrey (1984)
provided evidence of concurrent validity (similar results on another self-concept
scale) and report high internal reliability (a = .88) for their scale. For these reasons
and for continuity with past stroke research (Ellis-Hill and Horn, 2000), this scale
was chosen.
Participants' evaluations of themselves 'before' the stroke versus 'now' were
obtained to provide the measure of 'negative identity change'. Only about half of
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stroke patients were found to use visual analogues correctly (Price et al., 1999)
therefore single adjectives and Likert response options were used instead (please see
Appendix D).
6.7iii: Shame
The 'Other as Shamer scale' (OAS: Goss et al., 1994) scale was chosen for piloting
as it had been used successfully with stroke patients (Vine, 1999, personal
communication). It essentially measures the belief that others regard one as inferior
and this was supported by a factor analysis using students (Goss et al., 1994). The
same study reported good convergent and discriminate validity for the scale on the
basis of associations with variables such as 'internalised' shame and self-
consciousness. As regards internal reliability, the authors reported that all inter-item
correlations were significant at the p < .05 level.
However, participants' comments during piloting suggested they found the 'Other as
Shamer' scale unacceptable. Interestingly, they often became defensive about
'others'. A few commented actually appreciating differential treatment by others,
for example how people gave them extra space in public. This was reflected
statistically with floor effects. All participants gave the minimum score for twelve
of the twenty items at both times of testing. The variance on the other eight items
was attributable to just three participants.
Therefore, a new stroke specific ten-item shame scale was developed in
collaboration with my supervisors, whose clinical expertise provided face validity.
We adapted comments from pilot interviews and items from the OAS scale. Items
were made stroke-specific and the emphasis was softened with qualifiers. For
example, the OAS item 'Others see me as not measuring up to them' became 'Since
my stroke, I sometimes feel that others see me as not measuring up to them'. Three
items were designed to reflect a positive experience of differential treatment (please
see Appendix D, section D.20 for items).
Piloting of the new scale ran alongside the start of data collection for the main
cohort. I continued to use the OAS until it appeared that the new measure was
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working adequately. The piloting data is discussed and illustrated along with further
comments in Table C2, Appendix C. Overall it did appear reasonably reliable,
achieving significant test-retest scores between .62 and .97 and an internal reliability
score of a = .77.
6.8: Measurement of beliefs in recovery and recurrence
6.8i: Recovery locus ofcontrol
The Recovery locus of control questionnaire (RLOC; Partridge & Johnson, 1989)
was chosen to assess personal beliefs regarding control over recovery. It is a nine-
item scale for which higher scores indicate a more internal rather than external locus
of control regarding recovery. So, when higher recovery locus of control scores are
described in the results chapters, this refers to higher levels of internality. The
validity of the scale is supported by the development of items from interviews with
stroke and wrist fracture patients, and good predictive reliability has been obtained
(Partridge and Johnson, 1989). Reasonable internal reliability statistics have been
reported for patients assessed a few days (.64) one month (.77) and six months (.53)
following stroke (Morrison & Johnson, 1999).
6.8U: Confidence in recovery
Participants' confidence in recovery was measured using a single ten point visual
analogue scale marked 'extremely confident' at one end and 'Not at all confident' at
the other. This was originally developed for MI patients by Lewin et al. (1992) and
has been used with stroke patients (Morrison and Johnson, 1999). The visual
analogue format is less than ideal with stroke patients (Price et al., 2000) but was
retained for comparative purposes. To compensate, participants were asked to
indicate that they understood the meaning of both ends before being asked for their
response. If they found it difficult to use, they were asked instead to imagine giving
their level of confidence a mark out of ten.
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6.8iii: Recurrence fear
A recurrence fear scale specific to stroke was not available. A range of fear of
cancer recurrence scales were available for adaptation; however most do not report
validity or reliability testing (Lee-Jones et al., 1997). The exception found was the
'Fear of recurrence questionnaire' (Northouse, 1981) which demonstrated high
internal reliability, a = .92, (Hilton, 1988). Originally developed for mastectomy
patients by expert opinion, it contains twenty-two items that generally refer
obliquely to recurrence fear by reference to 'concern' or 'worry' for one's 'future
health'.
I involved my supervisors closely to achieve face validity in the adaptation of this
scale to stroke. Obvious minor modifications were made, for example changing
'mastectomy' to 'stroke'. A few items were omitted because they were vague and
could refer as much to recovery as to recurrence (for example 'I have no physical
concerns at this time'). When two items were essentially duplicates in terms of
meaning, that item which contained a double negative was deleted (for example 'I
am not bothered by uncertainty regarding my health'). This left sixteen items to be
piloted.
The piloting data (test-retest scores and association of items with HADs scores) is
illustrated in Table CI, Appendix C. We decided to retain seven items mainly on
the basis of reasonable retest and association scores. The item 'I do not worry about
my stroke returning' was kept despite poor test results as it was considered of high
face validity. However, it was rephrased as 'I worry about my stroke returning' to
avoid poor performance attributable to the double negative format. Fuller reasons
for excluding other items are described in Table CI, Appendix C. The internal
reliability score for our final eight item 'Recurrence fear' scale was a = .78.
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6.9: Comment on the reliability and validity of measures
It is recognised that in comparison to other measures, the attributional measures and
the confidence in recovery measure were weak in terms of reliability. Test-retest
data has not been reported for any of them. As 'Why me?', 'Found meaning?' and
confidence in recovery were single items they could not be tested for internal
reliability. The measurement of causal controllability was complex being based on
participants' own attributions that were likely to vary in type and number reported.
However, in the absence of better alternatives I decided to go ahead and use these
measures on the basis of face validity, and appropriateness to the hypotheses.
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7.1: Quantitative study description plan (Chapters 10 and 12)
7. li: Resume ofrelevant objectives
The main purpose of statistics employed in these chapters was to aid fulfilment of the
objectives to:
1) Investigate emotional distress
2) Investigate beliefs considered relevant to stroke patients' emotional distress
Statistics were also used to describe the characteristics of the sample and background
variables.
7. Hi: Description of the sample
Participants' age, gender, living situation, deprivation scores, and cognitive screening
scores were described using mean scores, standard deviations, ranges and percentage
scores as appropriate. In addition medical data regarding frequency of stroke type
will be provided.
7.1 Hi: Description ofemotional distress
HADs global scores were used as the distress measure, the dependent variable for
hypothesis testing in Chapters 11,13 and 14. Past research provides support for the
validity of using global HADs scores as a distress scale (please see section 6. 3).
To explore the validity of the choice to use distress as the main dependent variable, I
decided to report descriptive statistics for the anxiety and depression subscales as
well as for the distress scale. This issue was also addressed by examination of
concurrent validity between HADs anxiety, depression and distress scores and
diagnoses of specific disorders (please see Chapter 8, section 8.2 and section 8.6ii).
Mean and standard deviation of HADs anxiety, depression and distress scores and
distribution properties was reported and interrelationships examined using Pearson
correlations.
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7.1iv: Description ofthe other background variables
Background variables that were not included as characteristics of the sample: stroke
severity, disability, social support, life events and pre-stroke history of depression
were described using mean scores, standard deviations, ranges and percentage scores
as appropriate. Comment was also passed on the distribution of background
variables.
7.1v: Introduction to description of the beliefmeasures
The objective to:
2) Investigate beliefs relevant to stroke patients' emotional distress
was complex due to the under-developed nature of relevant measures used in this
study. Therefore I decided to test reliability and explore validity of the measures in
both the pilot and the main study.
7. lvi: Initial development and reliability statistics ofthe beliefmeasures
As described in Chapter 6 (please see sections 6.7iii and 6.8iii) the shame and
recurrence fear questionnaires were specifically developed for this study.
Data relevant to the development of these questionnaires is reported in Appendix C
(please see tables C.l and C.2). Internal consistency and test re-test reliability data
for these questionnaires obtained during piloting is reported in the measures section
(please see Chapter 6, section 6.7ii and section 6.8iii).
I also decided to report internal reliability statistics for main study data, for new
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7. lvii: Descriptive statistics andfurther exploratory description ofbeliefmeasures
Means and standard deviation scores and ranges (or percentage scores) for all belief
variables assessed by scales was reported, and comment was passed on the
distribution of variables.
Further exploration of causal attributions/controllability involved examining
frequencies of raw scores and percentages of individual causal attributions/
controllability ratings (reported in detail in Appendix F). Further exploration of the
identity change scale involved examination of mean changes for individual items and
these were tested using t-tests (two-tailed).
I decided to use factor analysis to conceptually explore beliefs measured by multi-
item scales for which no previous description of psychometric properties with the





Principal component analysis with orthogonal rotation was chosen to maximise
discrimination and so to seek out conceptual differences within scales. Factor
analysis results were briefly described in relation to the relevant belief variables in
the main body of the thesis and in more detail in Appendix C.
Open-ended responses were categorised using standard content analysis (Robson;
1993). However, it was not considered viable to subject this data to the same depth
of analysis or inter-rater reliability checks as the main qualitative data. Results from
open-ended questions contained in the quantitative interview were reported briefly in
parallel with those obtained for belief variables assessed by scales in the main body
of the thesis and in more detail in Appendix F.
7. Iviii: Consistency ofbackground and beliefvariables
Consistency of baseline to follow-up background and belief variables were tested
using repeated measure t-tests or McNemar tests as appropriate (both two-tailed).
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7.2: Analysis plan for the hypothesis testing (Chapters 11,13,14)
7.2i: Resume ofthe hypotheses
The purpose of statistics employed for these chapters was to aid hypothesis testing.
Main hypotheses*
1) A significant relationship between beliefs and emotional distress would be found
at an initial point in time (baseline) and at a later point in time (follow-up)
2) Beliefs found at baseline would predict emotional distress at follow-up
* It was expected that the main hypotheses would be fulfilled even once
demographic and social background factors had been taken into account
Specific hypotheses**
1) Certain negative attributions:
- Lower sense of control over causes
- Higher frequency of asking 'Why me?'
- A failure to find meaning in the experience
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress
2) More negative self-evaluations:
Lower acceptance of one's disability
A more negative sense of identity
Higher shame
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress
3) More negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Lower sense of control over recovery
Lower confidence in recovery
Higher fear of recurrence
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress
**The specific hypotheses are intended for baseline, follow-up and across time.
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7.2H: Choice ofstatistical tests
To test the hypotheses, I choose to examine:
1) Univariate associations between belief variables and distress
2) Univariate associations between background variables and distress
3) Multivariate associations between belief variables and distress while
controlling for background variables
Correlation was chosen to test univariate associations, and linear regression for the
multivariate analysis.
To further explore the validity of the choice to use distress as the main dependent
variable, univariate associations between the independent variables and the
depression and anxiety sub-scales were also examined.
7.2Hi: Statistical considerations for correlative and linear regression analyses
The most important parametric assumptions involved in correlative and linear
regression analyses are normality of distributions and homogeneity of variance in
arrays (Howell, 1997).
Normality of distributions
Histograms of all background and belief variables were inspected visually and the
degree of normality versus skewness was discussed. The pros and cons of
normalising data by transformation, or of dichotomising very skewed variables was
considered, a statistician's advice was sought and appropriate action was taken.
Histograms are displayed in Appendix E, sections E.l to E.4.
Homogeneity of variance in arrays
Essentially this assumption means that reasonably similar perpendicular variances
should be found at all points on a line of best fit drawn between the dependent
variable (HADs distress) and each independent variable (background and belief
variables). As linear relationships between two variables can be significantly skewed
by outliers, the five lowest and highest scores of every variable were checked for
accuracy and corrected if appropriate. Scatter plots of the dependent variable against
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all independent variables were inspected for homogeneity of variance in arrays.
Where this assumption appeared violated following the treatment for normality of
distributions described previously, and corrections for outliers, the implications in
terms of type I versus type II errors was taken into consideration. Scatter-plots are
displayed in Appendix E, sections E.5 to E.10.
7.2iv: Specific considerationsfor correlative analysis
Pearson product moment correlations, which assume data is ratio order, were chosen
for comparability between univariate and multivariate associations, as Pearson
correlations are used in linear regression calculations. As some of the variables
would be dichotomised and others would be more safely classed as ordinal rather
than ratio data, all correlations with distress were also repeated using Spearman's
Rho. Any discrepancies between the parametric and non-parametric method will be
taken into consideration in terms of support for the hypotheses and these tests will be
two tailed.
Pearson correlations alone were reported for the HADs depression and anxiety sub-
scales for comparison to the distress measure. This was to minimise the amount of
information reported.
7.2v: The choice ofdistress as the outcome variable in regression analyses
From a practical and statistical perspective, the use of one main dependent measure
(distress) rather than two (depression and anxiety) was advantageous. This halved
the number of multivariate analyses and reduced the chance of type 1 errors, which
was desirable given the number of independent variables (Lewis, 2000; personal
communication).
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7.2vi: Preparation for the regression analyses
Prior to conducting the regression analyses a correlation matrix of all independent
variables was produced and examined for collinearity. High correlations between
variables and any variable that showed particularly high multi-collinearity with many
variables was highlighted. The possible influences of multi-collinearity was
considered both before and after the analyses.
7.2vii: Method ofvariable selection for the preliminary regression analyses
It was decided to repeat the backward regression procedure using two different
methods of selecting variables at the outset ('univariate' and stricter'). The main
reason for this was a conflict between power considerations versus a more strict
approach.
From my reading there are various perspectives on the power of my sample size that
are discussed in section 7.3. Often, regression analyses are conducted with only
those independent variables that produced significant univariate correlations with the
dependent variable. The benefit of this 'univariate' method is that by minimising the
number of variables at the outset, power is increased.
However, some statisticians advocate including all independent variables,
particularly possible confounders, regardless of univariate significance levels
because:
'...variables may contribute in an unforeseen way due to complex inter-relationships
amongst the variables...'
Altman (1991)
Therefore, in the 'stricter' method, all the background variables were included and
were then 'forced in' at each stage in the analysis (Altman, 1991). In this way the
final results for the belief variables were less subject to the criticism that they were
there by chance confounding with background variables.
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An additional advantage of using two methods is that it allows for subsequent
comparison and is a good way of highlighting robustness versus instability of the
models (Lewis, 2003; personal communication).
7.2viii: Backward regression method ofvariable elimination
The backward method of variable elimination was chosen in preference to a forward
or mixed stepwise regression method. The backward method allows one to manually
eliminate variables until all variables in the equation are of a pre-designated
significance level. Backward regression was considered preferable to forward or
mixed stepwise as it is a less 'black box' or 'reliant on SPSS' method (Graham,
2002; personal communication). Backward regression is also more suited to
hypothesis testing than the other methods (Field, 2000).
This method of variable elimination was used in both the cross-sectional analyses
(main hypothesis 1) and for the predictive analyses (main hypothesis 2):
Baseline background and belief variables to baseline distress: cross-
sectional analyses (Chapter 11)
Follow-up background and belief variables to follow-up distress: cross-
sectional analyses (Chapter 13)
Baseline background and belief variables to follow-up distress: predictive
analyses (Chapter 14)
7.2ix: Particular analysis consideration for the predictive analyses (main hypothesis
2, Chapter 14)
To further stringently test the ability of baseline variables to predict follow-up
distress, an analysis that controlled for baseline distress was also conducted. I
considered doing this by using residualised distress scores as the criterion, but
decided to use hierarchical analysis in which baseline distress was entered as a
predictor, before the addition of other baseline variables. Essentially both methods
would produce the same results. However, the hierarchical method was considered
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conceptually better as it would allow assessment of increment in R2 change between
a model produced with just baseline distress and further models following addition of
other baseline independent variables.
7.2x: Note on reporting ofstatistics and statistical significance levels
Where possible, absolute p values have been reported to three decimal places. This
is not possible for Chi square because SPSS only provides rounded up 'less than'
values. Also, when the significance level was very high, and SPSS provided a series
of zeros, p values of .0001 were reported in tables and p<.0001 in the text. When
asterisks were used to denote significance levels, common nomenclature was
followed (* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01, *** denotes p<.001 or even less).
When t-tests or Chi square were used the statistics were reported, however this was
not possible for McNemar tests because SPSS only provided the significance level.
7.3: Sample size and power considerations (Chapters 11,13,14)
7.3i: Prospective power considerations
Estimations of the ideal number of participants needed in terms of power, were made
using power estimations for correlation, and with the help of past results.
The formula:
8 = d Jn-1,
(p,269, Howell, 1997)
and the G-power program (Buchner et al., 2002) were used to calculate power.
Previous studies of depression with the stroke population have reported moderate
effect sizes for the self-evaluation variables negative identity change and shame
(Ellis-Hill, 1998; Vine, 2003). However, effect sizes for other variables have
sometimes been small (see for example, Morrison & Johnston, 1999). Therefore a
more conservative estimate of a small effect size was used for the power calculation.
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To obtain power of .80 or above with <.05 probability, the formulae suggested:
(2.80/.30)2 = N-l
Therefore ideally N should have been equal to eighty-seven or more.
However, we also considered the large number of variables and:
"the rule of thumb which has been kicking around for years"
(p.522, Howell, 1997)
that suggests that we should have at least ten participants for each independent
variable when using mulitivariate analysis. This rule suggested that 180 participants
would have been necessary, for the nine background and belief variables intended for
multivariate analyses to be analysed simultaneously.
However, Harris (1985, in Howell, 1997) has suggested that there is not strong
evidence for the ten participants per predictor maxim, and that fifty participants plus
the number of predictors is generally sufficient. Going by this rule of thumb it was
only necessary for us to recruit sixty-eight participants.
7.3U: Practical considerations andpower
Conservative estimates based upon prior research with the same population of stroke
patients and similar recruitment patterns suggested that it was only feasible to expect
a sample size of approximately 120 (O'Rourke, 1996) to be recruited over the
planned period of data collection of a year
In practice, participants were recruited for thirteen months and data collection took
twenty months. This lower recruitment rate can be attributed to the exclusion of
patients with severe dementia or aphasia (please see Chapter 5, section 5.6). In total
eighty-nine participants were available at baseline and eighty-one at follow-up.
Given consideration of the above, power is considered reasonable but not strong for
this study.
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8.1: The main purpose of the structured clinical interview study
Structured clinical interviews are designed to maximise the reliability with which
decisions regarding the presence/ absence of psychiatric disorders characterised by
pre-set criteria are made ('diagnoses'). The structured clinical interview for DSMIV
(SCID-I/P, for DSM IV-TR, Patient Edition; Spitzer et al., 2001) that will be
referred to as the SCID from now on, guides the diagnoses of disorders based on
criteria outlined by DSMIV (APA, 1994).
As a consultant psychiatrist, Dr Sharpe was able to guide and supervise me to use
the SCID (please see section 8.7 for further discussion). The SCID is highly
structured in the requirement to address specific topics and the wording of questions
is suggested. However, it allows some leeway with the exact wording and order of
questions that may be adapted to the perceived needs of individual patients. A
measured level of exploration and probing for symptoms is encouraged. Moreover
patients are asked to provide their own descriptions regarding the content of certain
symptoms.
During piloting, I found the SCID to be more flexible than questionnaire
assessments. I was particularly taken with how patients' responses to questions
about cognitive symptoms appeared to tap some stroke-specific negative beliefs.
This seemed to be a relatively succinct method of generating interesting data and
this led to the development of the exploratory objective to:
5) Explore the type of beliefs and nature of symptoms related to common
depression and anxiety disorders
In this context DSMIV criteria were treated as 'working definitions' and the process
of exploring beliefs accessed by the SCID, essentially allowed appraisal of the 'fit'
between stroke-related issues and DSMIV criteria for specific disorders.
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8.2: Other uses of the structured clinical interview study
The SCID enabled the main quantitative study background variable (a pre-stroke
history of depression) to be assessed using recognised criteria (please see Chapter 6,
section 6.4vi). Also, participants with depressive disorder or GAD could be
distinguished from those without for comparison within the qualitative study (please
see Chapters 9 and 16). Concurrent validity between continuous measurement of
emotional distress, depression and anxiety symptoms (HADs scores) and emotional
disorders (SCID diagnostic categories) was studied primarily to provide a link
between all three sets of data.
The use of the SCID was also considered beneficial in supplementary ways that
were interesting to clinical practice or ongoing debates in the stroke literature.
Using the SCID and the HADs allowed me to develop my own ideas about the issue
of emotional awareness and the testing of concurrent validity between the two was
considered of interest to clinical practice (please see Appendix G, section G.4 for
further discussion). The ongoing debate about the use of cognitive versus somatic
symptoms for the assessment of depression (please see Nicholl et al., 2002 for
discussion) could be explored with SCID data. Given the neglect of anxiety
research relative to depression in stroke, obtaining prevalence rates for anxiety
disorders was considered a useful spin-off in and of itself. Comparison between
those with/without emotional disorders and key background characteristics was
considered an interesting complement to the reporting of overall prevalence rates.
Finally the opportunity was taken to develop two minor additional hypotheses
comparing two types of specific fears and specific anxiety disorder. These were:
i) Higher shame scores would be found amongst those with social phobia and
agoraphobia
ii) Higher fears of falling would be found amongst those with agoraphobia
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8.3: The depression and anxiety disorders that were assessed
In keeping with DSM-IV a diagnosis of depression was made on the basis of
depressed mood and/or a loss of interest or pleasure in life over a two-week period.
Additionally, four, or, two further symptoms, such as feelings of worthlessness or
disturbed sleep were required to meet the criteria for major, or, minor depression
respectively. All participants were asked about all symptoms of depression (please
see Appendix D, section D.14).
Criteria used for the anxiety disorders are illustrated by the interview schedules in
Appendix D section D. 15. The repetition of many arousal items across the different
anxiety disorders was considered burdensome, therefore SCID screening questions
were used, and further questioning as appropriate. An exception was made for
agoraphobia without panic disorder as the interview was short. In general DSMIV
criteria were applied; exceptions that were made are highlighted in the following
brief descriptions of disorders:
General anxiety disorder (GAD) involves excessive levels of worry in various areas
of life, difficulty controlling the worry, the presence of three or more anxious
symptoms and significant impairment or distress. The criterion that symptoms have
persisted for six months was discounted because of interest in the development of
GAD since stroke.
Agoraphobia (with/without panic disorder) involves the hallmark fear of situations
in which escape may be difficult and subsequent avoidance, or endurance with
marked distress, or the need for a companion. Agoraphobia with panic disorder also
involves recurrent panic attacks (please see Appendix D, section D.14 for panic
disorder criteria). Additionally, participants were asked whether physiotherapists
had advised them not to attempt going out alone.
Social phobia involves a marked and persistent fear of social situations such as
speaking to strangers or eating in public. The symptoms I was most interested in
were: A) the fear of acting in a humiliating or embarrassing way B) anxiety in the
feared situation C) a recognition that one's level of fear is excessive or unreasonable
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D) avoidance and E) significant impairment or distress. The criteria that symptoms
have persisted for at least six months and are not due to a general medical condition
were discounted because I was specifically interested in social phobic symptoms
related to stroke.
Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) involves persistent re-experiencing of an
event that threatened death or serious injury. All stroke survivors were considered
to have undergone an event that threatened death so PTSD was screened by
enquiring about re-experiences (intrusive thoughts, nightmares, or a sense of reliving
the stroke). Additionally PTSD involves symptoms of numbing or avoidance and
increased arousal (please see Appendix D. section D.15).
8.4: Measures used for the minor hypotheses
The measure of shame has been described previously (please see Chapter 6, section
6.7iii). A fear of falling scale could not be found in the literature. Therefore I
developed comments from patients who reported fear of falling into four items
addressing fear, confidence, and coping regarding falls (please see Appendix D,
section D.6). This brief scale achieved a high internal reliability score during
piloting (a = .78) and moderate to low test-retest scores for individual items (.57,
.53, .60, .41) with an overall test-retest score of .67. In addition I asked individuals
whether they had fallen since their stroke.
8.5: Sample and procedure for the structured clinical interview study
This study was embedded within the main quantitative study. Therefore sample
characteristics and the procedure previously described in Chapter 5 applied to this
subsidiary study.
I conducted the SCID interviews and collated information for each participant. All
possible cases of depression, GAD, agoraphobia, and social phobia were discussed
in depth with Dr Sharpe and all possible cases of PTSD with Dr Tinson, and
consensus agreement was reached. Please also see section 8.7 for further comment.
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Participants who met criteria for depression were given a 'diagnosis' regardless of
whether or not they met criteria for an anxiety disorder and vice versa.
8.6: SCID data description and analysis plan (Chapter 15)
8.6i: Description and analysis offrequency ofdisorders
Prevalence rates of emotional disorders were described using both raw numbers and
percentage frequencies for the whole sample at both baseline and follow-up.
Frequencies were also described amongst subgroups based on 'key' background
variables:
Gender (.male' and 'female')
Pre-stroke history of depression ('yes' and 'no')
Age ('older' and 'younger')
Disability ('lower' and 'higher')
These were chosen as key comparisons to make based on previous research (please
see chapter 1, section 1,6ii). Sufficient numbers of very old or particularly young
participants to allow special consideration of these interesting groups was not
expected. Therefore retirement age (sixty-five years) was chosen as a relatively
meaningful point for the division of participants into 'older' and 'younger' groups.
Participants were dichotomised into groups of'higher' and Tower' disability
following examination of Barthel and Nottingham indices of activities of daily living
scores (Please see Appendix F, section F.4 for an explanation and description of how
this was done).
Chi square (two-tailed) was chosen to statistically compare frequency_of emotional
disorder amongst these key groups.
McNemar tests (two-tailed) were chosen to test consistency in the diagnosis of the
emotional disorders between baseline and follow-up.
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8.6H: Exploration of the emotional disorders
To address the objective to:
5) Explore the type of beliefs and nature of symptoms related to common
depression and anxiety disorders
issues were chosen for exploration based on my knowledge of DSMIV descriptions
of the disorders, knowledge of issues from the stroke literature, my observations
during the SCID interviews and discussion from our consensus meetings.
Depression
Raw numbers and percentage frequencies of each symptom of depression was
reported for those with depression (major or minor) and those without. Chi square
(two-tailed) was chosen to statistically compare frequency of individual symptoms
between those with and without depression. It is emphasised that this analysis was
solely exploratory.
Observations regarding the nature of specific symptoms, in particular the content of
cognitive symptoms and issues with the interpretation of criteria, was commented
upon and patient quotes provided.
Anxiety disorders
Stroke-specific content of beliefs related to symptoms of fear and avoidance was
discussed and illustrated with patient quotes. Raw numbers and percentage
frequencies of symptoms amongst sub-groups (for example those with/without an
anxiety disorder) were reported and used to explore the nature of disorders. The 'fit'
between DSMIV criteria and the nature of stroke specific problems observed was
commented upon.
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8.6iii: Comparison ofSCID diagnostic categories and HADs scores
MANOVA was chosen to compare HADs scores (depression, anxiety and distress
scores) across diagnostic groupings of emotional disorders:
- Major depression c.f. Minor depression c.f. Not depressed
- GAD c.f. No GAD
- Agoraphobia c.f. No agoraphobia
- Social phobia c.f. No social phobia
The results for these analyses are presented and commented upon in Appendix G,
sections G.4i, G.4ii and G.4iii.
8.7: Note regarding the reliability of 'diagnoses' made
It should be borne in mind that the SCID was administered within a larger set of
measures that would have 'un-blinded' me to various issues that were found of
interest in SCID data (please see Appendix D for order of all assessments and
measures administered). In addition, when I saw patients at follow-up I could
probably remember most participants' diagnostic status from baseline before
readministering the SCID, and this may have in some way biased what was reported
and/ or what I found.
Dr Sharpe has experience in training researchers to use the SCID and I was
instructed using role-play and discussion of tape-recorded pilot interviews. This was
similar to the training of interviewers with similar backgrounds to mine, which was
found to result in high inter-rater reliability, diagnostic accuracy and interview skill
(Ventura et al., 1998). Also, consensus agreement was used throughout the study.
However, it should be acknowledged that the SCID was originally developed to
improve the reliability of diagnosis by trained clinicians (Spitzer et al., 2001) and I
am not a clinician.
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9.1: The purpose of the qualitative study
The purpose of the qualitative study was to fulfil the objective to:
6) Explore patients' own experiences and concerns using a qualitative approach
Intrinsic advantages of obtaining qualitative data that reflects patients' own
idiosyncratic perspectives, and supplementary advantages to the main quantitative
approach have been described (please see Chapter 4). Because I was particularly
interested in beliefs amongst more highly distressed participants, I decided to
compare participants with major or minor depression (which will be referred to as
depression for brevity) or with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) to those without
in the analysis.
9.2: Development of the qualitative interview
Various approaches were piloted. Other qualitative stroke researchers have used a
narrative approach that involves asking patients to tell the story of their illness
(Pound et ah, 1998) or even their life (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). However, I found that
asking patients for the story of their stroke tended to prompt rather 'auto-pilot' and
time-consuming history giving. I found that, having established rapport during
administration of quantitative interview measures, patients appeared to accept an
immediate focus on the questions of interest.
The overall content of the interview questions was developed to address
participants' main concerns in life, their main concerns relating to stroke and how
participants thought their lives had changed following stroke. The wording and
order of questions varied from participant to participant but followed the general
structure outlined in the question route. Dr Tinson and Dr Sharpe helped me to
develop a probing interview approach that was nevertheless open-ended. For
example, when a participant was not immediately forthcoming the question was
repeated in a slightly different way with slightly different emphasis. The sort of
questions I found most useful when trying to capture feelings and beliefs related to
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areas of concern are illustrated in the question routes. Please see Appendix D,
sections D.l 1 and D.22 for the question routes.
The 'concerns' part of the interview was placed within the main quantitative
interview at the point by which I felt a good rapport tended to be established but
before the assessment of emotional disorder and distress (please see Appendix D,
D.l 1). I used the 'important areas' questions to end the interview. I always ended
with a brief summary of what participants had told me overall, double-checked my
understanding and thanked participants for sharing things to help in research.
9.3: Sample and procedure for the qualitative study
I decided to include sixty participants in the qualitative analysis. This number was
chosen to capture enough participants with depression/GAD for comparison to those
without. The subset of participants who were used in the qualitative study consisted
of participant 21 to participant 80 from the main quantitative study at baseline.
Their demographics, disability and emotional disorder status is displayed in Table
F.4 in Appendix F. As can be seen, characteristics of this sub-sample are similar to
characteristics for the total sample of participants from the quantitative study.
Because the qualitative interview was embedded within the main quantitative study,
the procedure for recruiting participants, gaining consent and scheduling
appointments was the same as that described in Chapter 5. For all interviews, notes
were taken and typed out as soon as possible.
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9.4: The qualitative analysis
9.4i: Choice ofanalysis method
Content analysis using the 'Frameworks' method (Ritchie and Spencer; 1994) was
chosen because it is suitable for use with a wide range of data, including interview
notes. Also, content analysis has a precedent for bridging quantitative and
qualitative data. This was ideal for the purposes of comparing responses between
participants with/without depression or GAD.
9.4U: Coding development and consensus agreement
I conducted most of the analysis but Dr Sharpe and Dr Tinson were closely
involved. Initially, notes were labelled only with participants' gender, age and
identification numbers. In this way any bias in my judgement due to recognition of
participants' diagnoses was minimised, and avoided for Dr Sharpe and Dr Tinson.
The process began with intensive immersion in the data (reading and rereading
notes). I developed codes (minor themes) via constant comparisons within the data,
or by recognition of issues suggested by theory. These codes were grouped together
to form preliminary frameworks (major themes). As more codes were developed,
compared amongst each other, and slotted into the frameworks, the nature of both
codes and frameworks went through various modifications. In order to manage the
large number of codes going into each framework and draw similarities between
them, sub-themes were also developed. To clarify there were:
1) Frameworks (major overarching themes to which codes were allocated and in
which sub-theme divisions were made)
2) Sub-themes (clusters of minor themes/codes within a framework)
3) Minor themes (codes representing minor themes within the data)
In general, minor themes clearly tended to fit into a framework, and cluster together
conceptually into sub-themes. Some codes were seen as 'floaters' during early
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stages, because they did not fit well into a framework or because they overlapped
between frameworks. These crossovers of relevancy were to be expected given the
complexity of qualitative data.
I produced the first draft comprehensive scheme of codes and frameworks, Dr
Sharpe and Dr Tinson studied this and then we met for discussion. The
'Frameworks' method allows codes to be named as well as identified by theoretical
concepts. We agreed that theory was bound to play a role, but that it was preferable
to maximise the use of participants' language in code labels.
Secondly, we observed that the content of the coding schemes for the first two
frameworks was predominantly functional, and did not in itself always capture the
more psychological aspects of participants' experiences. For example, within the
framework 'Being like this', the 'Can't do what I did before' codes had been
developed but the 'Meanings and feelings' codes had not (please see Chapter 16,
main theme 1). This was to be expected with the 'Frameworks' analysis where the
coding is intended largely just as a means for labelling data into manageable bites
for subsequent retrieval and more interpretative analysis. However, we decided to
award all psychological aspects in the data independent coding. In many respects
our development of the 'Frameworks' method pushed the analysis more towards the
method of 'Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis' (Smith et al., 1999).
The coding scheme was reformulated over a period of a couple of months. Dr
Tinson and I met regularly to discuss the process. When there were areas of
disagreement, pilot categorising exercises were used which involved trying codes
out on all relevant data and then refining them through extensive discussion.
As the frameworks became more developed most 'floating' codes could be
incorporated. Some floaters were sub-divided to illustrate a difference of emphasis
in relation to different frameworks. For example, dislike of needing help was coded
both as 'Feeling reliant' (that emphasised loss of valued independence) and as
'Being a burden' (that emphasised concern about inconveniencing others). These
were considered relevant to main theme 1 - Being like this, and main theme 4-
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They're OK, I'm OK, or not respectively (please see Chapter 16, sections 16.2 and
16.5).
Overall, the iterative process of coding, discussion, and re-coding went through
three full cycles until consensus was achieved. Altogether ninety-two codes were
developed and these are presented in Chapter 16. To double-check the operation of
the coding scheme, Dr Tinson independently coded ten sets of interview notes using
the final frameworks coding schemes are presented in Chapter 16. Dr Sharpe then
examined this material for disagreement. Dr Tinson's coding concurred with my
own, although I was more likely to award more than one code to each statement. In
turn, Dr Sharpe agreed with Dr Tinson's codings. Therefore, there was a good level
of consensus amongst us.
9.4Hi: Conduct ofthe final analysis
All responses relating to each individual code were collated to enable a systematic
charting of the prevalence of codes and easy sorting between groups of participants
across themes. Transcripts were now marked according to depression and GAD
status. Diagnoses of agoraphobia or social phobia were also considered due to their
relevance to the 'Specific fears and issues codes' in the first 'Being like this' theme
(please see Chapter 16, 16.2). Common or interesting associations within the data
were searched for and notes made. In many ways a large degree of this work had
been accomplished via the process of such detailed coding and re-coding. The
beliefs that appeared to associate with depression/GAD were focused on in this final
stage. Patient quotes were chosen that captured the overall nature of themes or that
distinguished between the participants' with/without depression or GAD.
I decided to report numbers of participants who reported each theme. These
'quantified' results cannot be considered to represent prevalence counts because
participants were not systematically questioned about every issue. However, these
numbers were considered to help 'bridge' comparisons to the quantitative and
structured clinical interview results. The reporting of issues in the context of the
qualitative interviews, as compared to the context of a systematically structured
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interview was considered to aid consideration of the relative importance of issues.
Differences in the content or strength of beliefs reported by participants with/without
depression or GAD were generally captured by description or with quotes.
However, often differences observed between those with depression/GAD and those
without emerged once the proportion of each group reporting an issue was
compared. Therefore, when appropriate, numbers and percentages were used to
illustrate these findings.
The results are reported in Chapter 16 and Appendix H. All the codes that were
developed within sub-themes and the five main themes are presented across these
chapters in their respective frameworks.
Chapter 9: The qualitative study
Method
Chapter 9: The qualitative study
Results 131
Chapter 10
Description of sample, background and belief variables at baseline
Section Pages
10.1 Description of the sample at baseline 132
10. li Final sample at baseline 132
10. lii Demographic and cognitive ability of the sample at 132
baseline
10.1 Hi Medical data at baseline 134
10.2 The continuous measure of distress (HADs) at baseline 136
10.2i HADs distributions at baseline 136
10.2U Inter-correlations between HADs scores at baseline 137
10.2iii Comment on HADs scores at baseline 137
10.3 Descriptive data for background variables at baseline 138
10.3i Disability at baseline 138
10.3U Social support at baseline 138
10.3iii Life events at baseline 140
10.3iv Pre-stroke history ofdepression at baseline 140
10.4 Descriptive data for belief variables at baseline 140
10.5 Attributions at baseline 140
10.5i The difference between 'stroke'and'its effects' 140
10.5ii Causal controllability at baseline 141
10.5iii 'Why me?' at baseline 141
10.5iv 'Found meaning?' at baseline 142
10.6 Self evaluations at baseline 144
10.6i Acceptance ofdisability at baseline 144
10.6U Negative identity change at baseline 145
10.6U Shame at baseline 148
10.7 Beliefs in recovery and recurrence at baseline 148
10.7i Recovery locus ofcontrol at baseline 148
10.7ii Confidence in recovery at baseline 149
lOJiii Recurrence fear at baseline 149
Chapter 10: Description ofsample, background and beliefvariables at baseline
132 Results
10.1: Description of the sample at baseline
10. li: Final sample at baseline
Eighty-nine eligible consecutive stroke survivors from the Western General Hospital
were recruited for the quantitative study at baseline. On average participants tended
to be interviewed after one month following their stroke (Mean = 36.72 days, SD =
9.52 days). Often this was because patients were discharged at approximately the
one-month stage and preferred to settle in at home before the interview.
10. lii: Demographic and cognitive ability of the sample at baseline
Demographic and cognitive ability data for participants at baseline is illustrated in
Table 10.1. Sixty percent of participants were male, which was not surprising as
being male is a risk factor for stroke, (Warlow et al., 1987). However this figure still
seems slightly high because women are as likely to have strokes once they are in old
age and are more likely to live into old age (Warlow et al., 1987). However, old age
also brings an increasing likelihood of dementia. Twelve of the eighteen patients I
excluded with low Hodkinson scores were female. On balance the higher proportion
does not appear particularly unusual once the screening procedure was taken into
account.
The age of participants in this sample produced a fairly normal distribution, and
approximately two thirds of participants' ages fell between one standard deviation
below or above the mean age of seventy years. Compared to general stroke
population incidence rates 'younger' stroke patients are probably over-represented in
this sample, as young patients tend to be referred to this specialist stroke unit from a
wide geographical area (O'Rourke, 1996). In contrast 'older' stroke patients were
more likely to have been lost during screening and so are probably under-
represented. The actual numbers of both 'young' (less than fifty years) participants
and 'old' (greater than eighty-five years) participants were very low and would
preclude testing of age differences at these levels. A quarter of participants' ages fell
below retirement age which made this a reasonable dividing point for
'younger'/'older' comparisons for the SCID data (please see chapter 15).
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Table 10.1: Demographic and cognitive ability data for all participants at
baseline





Female 1 36 (40%)
Age
Age in years 2
<50 years 1
51 - 60 years 1
61-70 years 1
71-80 years 1
81 - 90 years 1
>85 years 1
'Younger' participants < 65 years
'Older' participants > 65 years 1
Social economic status
Carstairs index scores 2 3.60 (1.55) 4 1 -7









Deprivation category 1 or 2 1 21 (34%)
Deprivation category 3 or 4 or 5 1 61 (58%)
Deprivation category 6 or 7 1 7 (8%)
Living situation
Living alone 1
Living with spouse 1





Hodkinson scores 9.54 (.64) 10 7-10
FAST scores 2 26.31 (3.81) 27 15-30
1 Number and percentage of participants 2 Mean and standard deviation of scores
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A larger proportion of participants was found with low than high deprivation scores
was found. Specific epidemiological data concerning deprivation scores amongst the
stroke population was not available for comparison. This finding is likely to be
unusual in comparison to the stroke population at large, because Edinburgh is one of
the most affluent areas of Scotland (Carstairs and Morris, 1991).
As shown in Table 10.2 below, female participants were more likely to be single or
to live alone which was to be expected amongst participants of this age range.
Despite broad ranges, high average cognitive status scores were found, suggesting
levels of ability higher than those amongst the general stroke population (Warlow et
al., 1987). However, these levels may be comparable to other samples in the
psychological stroke literature where similar exclusion/inclusion criteria have been
used.
Table 10.2: Living arrangements for male and female participants at baseline
Living alone Living alone Living with Living with
and single but has spouse offspring or
partner sibling
Female participants 19 (38%) 0 12 (33%) 5 (14%)
(N = 36)
Male participants 12 (22%) 2 (4%) 35 (66%) 4 (8%)
(N = 53)
10.1 Hi: Medical data at baseline
Relevant medical data concerning previous strokes, stroke types, and stroke severity
was missing for four participants, but available for eighty-five participants and is
illustrated in Table 10.3. As can be seen, participants with TACs strokes had higher
mean stroke severity scores and this difference was significant F (3, 79) = 4.29, p<.
01. In the general stroke population, a lower proportion of LACS, a higher
proportion of TACS would be expected (Warlow et al., 2000). However, the
proportions of stroke types seen here was to be expected given the higher likelihood
of death or severe cognitive impairment following a TAC stroke, which would
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increase exclusion rates, and the absence of speech impairments following a LAC
stroke which would decrease exclusion rates.
Table 10.3: Medical stroke data for participants at baseline




Mean = 4.48, SD = 3.35
Median = 4.00, Range =1-21
Oxford Community Stroke Number andpercent
Project OCSP stroke type: with that stroke type
- TACS (Total Anterior 7 (8%)
Circulation stroke) 2
- PACS (Partial Anterior 22 (27%)
Circulation stroke)
- LACS (Lacunar 34 40%)
Circulation stroke)
- POCS (Posterior 22 (25%)
Circulation stroke)
Mean and SD stroke severity





Available for all 89 participants Available for just 85 participants
As regards psychoactive drug treatment at baseline, four participants reported that
they were on anti-depressants and five that they used prescribed sleeping pills. In all
cases this medicine had been prescribed by GPs prior to stroke. Of those on
antidepressants, two met criteria for major depression, but two did not meet criteria
for major or minor depression. Of the five who used sleeping pills, four reported
that they worked, but one still described herself as an insomniac.
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10.2: The continuous measure of emotional distress (HADs scores) at baseline
10.2i: HADs distributions at baseline
As shown in Histogram 10.1, a fairly positively skewed distribution for HADs
depression was found across a range of scores from 0-13. A low mean depression
score for the total group was found, M = 4.51 (SD = 3.54) and the median was 4.
Histogram 10.1: Baseline HADs depression
scores
HADs depression scores
Anxiety HADs scores also ranged from 0-13 and produced a fairly positively skewed
distribution but with slightly less kurtosis, which is shown in Histogram 10.2.
Similarly, the mean anxiety score for the total group was low, M = 4.58 (SD = 3.20)
and the median was 4.
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Depression and anxiety scores were totalled to give the global measure of distress,
please see Histogram 10.3. This was also a fairly positively skewed distribution with
a range of 0-24. The mean distress score was 9.10 (SD = 6.08) and the median
was 8.
Histrogram 10.3: Baseline HADs distress scores
HADs distress scores
10.2U: Inter-correlations between HADs scores at baseline
Pearson correlations were used to examine inter-relationships between HADs scores.
Depression and anxiety were found to associate highly together (r = .63, p< .0001)
and very highly with global distress scores (depression and distress, r = .91, p<
.0001; anxiety and distress, r = .89, p<.0001).
10.2iii: Comment on HADs scores at baseline
Scores were generally low and distributions were fairly positively skewed. The level
of association between HADs anxiety, depression and global distress symptoms was
considered high enough to indicate a large degree of overlap. Therefore, the use of
the HADs global distress scores for future tests of associations between distress and
belief variables and as the dependent variable in the regression analyses was
considered reasonable.
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10.3: Descriptive data for background variables at baseline
Demographic data, cognitive ability and medical stroke data was described at the
beginning of this chapter (please see Table 10.1 and Table 10.3). Basic descriptive
data for the remaining background variables is provided in Table 10.4. Further
details regarding disability measures, social support, life events pre-stroke history of
depression are provided next.
10.3i: Disability at baseline
Over half the participants were found to have low levels of basic disability as they
achieved the median score of full marks on the Barthel index (49/89; 55%). A
ceiling effect for Barthel scores was reflected by a very high mean and low standard
deviation (Mean = 18.27, SD = 2.83) as well as an extremely negatively skewed
distribution (please see Histogram in Appendix E). However, scores for a few
participants were fairly low, showing the relevance of this measure to some people
who were still experiencing problems with very basic activities of daily living at one
month after their stroke.
Scores for the Nottingham extended ADL index were more varied across
participants, suggesting a wide range of ability regarding more advanced activities of
daily living (please see Histogram in Appendix E). This variation was reflected in a
less high mean score and wider standard deviation (Mean = 13.97, SD = 5.57).
Interestingly, the distribution of scores was bimodal but it was beyond the bounds of
this thesis to explore this issue further. Overall, the distribution of scores was fairly
negatively skewed showing that participants were more likely to report high than low
levels of ability in extended activities of daily living.
10.3U: Social support at baseline
On average very high support scores were reported, indicated by a mean score of
73.97 (SD = 20.99) where the top possible score was 100. Additionally, mean scores
for the four subscales where similar to the global scale, ranging from 72.05 to 75.91,
with similar-sized standard deviations. Therefore most participants indicated that
most types of support were available to them 'all the time', and if not that they were
available 'most of the time', or 'some of the time'.
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Table 10.4: Basic descriptive data for background and belief variables at
baseline






Disability: Barthel index 18.27 (2.83) 20 6- 20
Disability: Nottingham index 13.17 (5.57) 15 3 - 21
Social Support 73.97 (20.99) 75.78 14 - 100
Life Events 53 (60%)
• 2Pre-stroke history of depression 23 (26%)
Attributions
Causal controllability3 1.48 (.91) 1.50 0-4
'Why me?' (Rating of frequency now) 3 .80 (1.09)
'Found meaning?'2 31 (35%) 0 0-4
Self-evaluations
• • • ^
Acceptance of disability 18.61 (5.96) 18 6- 32
"3
Negative identity change 7.91 (8.57) 5 -8 -34
Shame 3 12.31 (4.79) 12 0- 27
Attitudes to recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control 24.61 (3.91) 25 12 -33
# T
Confidence in recovery 7.94 (2.28) 8 0- 10
Fear of recurrence 15.38 (4.56) 16 3 - 26
1 Other background variables were described in Tables 10.1 and 10.3
2 Number and percentage of participants 3 Mean and standard deviation of scores
Chapter 10: Description ofsample, background and beliefvariables at baseline
140 Results
10.3iii: Life events at baseline
Three fifths of participants reported at least one life event other than the stroke from
the last six months (53/89; 60%). Some of these participants reported two life events
(9/89; 10%) a few reported three (4/89; 5%) and one person actually reported four
life events in addition to stroke.
10.3iv: Pre-stroke history ofdepression
Twenty-three (23/89; 26%) participants reported a history of depression previous to
their stroke. Having already been interviewed regarding current mood, participants
seemed able to comprehend what was meant regarding their past experience of
depression. Often episodes of grief were mentioned as being times when they felt
depressed. However this was discounted as low mood as grief is not recognised as
abnormal. Relationships between pre-stroke history of depression and present
depression status are described in Chapter 15, section 15.3.
10.4: Descriptive data for belief variables at baseline
This presentation of descriptive data for the belief variables will include conventional
statistics, reporting of spontaneous comments and internal reliability statistics. A
more detailed report on attributions is reported in Appendix F, section F.2 and factor
analysis results for the acceptance of disability, negative identity change, shame and
recurrence fear scales are reported in Appendix C, section C.2.
10.5: Attributions at baseline
10.5i: The difference between 'stroke' and 'its effects'
As discussed previously (Chapter 6, section 6.5i) participants' definition of'stroke'
and 'the effects of stroke' were sought to further clarify this distinction and its
relevance to stroke research. Regardless of the accuracy or confidence of
participants' reports, they did seem to talk about 'stroke' as a time-limited past event
and 'its effects' in terms of present consequences. Having been prompted and
asked to describe 'the effects of stroke', participants' responses were all related to
later consequences rather than to the event of a stroke. This supports using the
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distinction between 'stroke' and 'its effects' in this study. Please see Appendix F.2,
sections F.li and F.lii for a more detailed description of participants' responses.
10.5U: Causal controllability at baseline
The majority of participants (84/89; 94%) made at least one causal attribution, on
average, they reported 2.46 causes (SD = .91, Median = 3, Range = 4). Please see
Appendix F, section F.2 for detailed description of type, frequency and potency of
attributions.
The main finding regarding causal controllability was that it tended to be low. For
each participant, controllability ratings were first summed and then divided by the
number of causes reported to calculate an average controllability score (please see
Table 10.4 for relevant descriptive statistics). Given a mid-point of 2, this shows that
participants tended to feel that they were less than moderately able to control causes
of stroke in future (please see Appendix F, section F.2 for further details regarding
controllability ratings of different causes).
10.5iii: 'Why me? ' at baseline
Participants were first questioned whether they had asked 'Why me?' in relation to
their stroke at any time and thirty-eight participants (38/89; 43%) reported that they
had.
Immediately afterwards they were asked to indicate how frequently they asked this
question now and respond in terms of: 'never', 'rarely', 'sometimes', 'often', or
'nearly all the time'. This was the measure that was used as the 'Why me?' variable
in subsequent analyses. Thirty-nine participants (39/89; 44%) gave responses
between 'rarely' and 'nearly all the time', while the others indicated that they 'never'
asked 'why me?' nowadays.
Thirty-three participants indicated that they asked 'Why me?' to both questions. Six
participants indicated that they used to, but had now moved on to think in terms of
'Why not me?'. Seven participants indicated they had never asked 'Why me?' but
then contradicted themselves by responding 'rarely' or 'sometimes' when asked how
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frequently they asked the question now. The youngest participant, a thirty-two year
old female, explained that her family often asked 'Why you?' and only that made her
consider the issue. Open-ended responses from the other six participants were less
illuminating. They said things such as they did 'not really' think this way. Perhaps
their apparently contradictory responses were due to coping by trying to overcome
'Why me?' thoughts.
The very low mean and large standard deviation (Mean = 80, SD = 1.09) and median
score of zero regarding the frequency of how often 'Why me?' was asked illustrates
that the distribution of scores was heavily positively skewed. The actual numbers of





'Nearly all the time': 2 participants
Participants who reported asking 'Why me?' the most frequently made some
interesting open-ended remarks. A few of these related to the belief they had been
'too healthy' to have a stroke. Others' comments related more to a sense of injustice
'Oh, what have I done?'. Some suggested their stroke was unjust because they had
had to bear other misfortunes in life already (for example a murdered husband or
cancer). These participants sometimes came back to the question of 'Why me?' in
the qualitative interview (please see Appendix H, section H.2i).
10.5iv: 'Found meaning?' at baseline
Similarly to piloting, participants quite often appeared bemused when asked if they
had 'Found meaning?' in their experience, and it was necessary to enquire whether
'anything good...?' had come of their experience to get a response. Nevertheless,
thirty-one participants (31/89; 35%) did report a meaning. Two broad themes of
meanings were reported: health gains, and appreciation of friends and family.
Most commonly, participants reported an advantage in terms of health. A few
seemed to have felt the stroke acted as a 'warning' regarding their weight. One man
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described his overall experience as a 'net gain' because his diabetes had been
identified A few reported that 'the need to stop smoking' had been brought home to
them. This was a sobering experience for one who described it as happening in 'the
hardest possible way'. A few men reported the fairly sober realisation that they were
'fallible' after all and needed to take health into account. For example one man said:
'I think about health more and wonder what I can do to make it better. So it's a brief
reminder of your mortality, but that's not really a good thing. I'd rather be thirty
years younger.'
A few participants emphasised the role hospital staff played in their health gains.
One man reported never having listened to smoking advice before but having
realised 'They're only trying to save my life' and quitting, after a doctor had rushed
down the corridor to plead with him not to go for a smoke. Another appeared really
impressed by how much of a 'great lad' the doctor who had found a blood clot in his
leg had been. One man reported finding the staff 'so caring' as comforting to him as
he had seen his deceased wife 'helpless' in hospital for so long.
A couple of female participants reported having decided to prioritise their own needs.
They felt they had been doing too much for other people previously, but did not need
to feel responsible for everyone else anymore. Another participant reported using
her experience to try to help others realise they needed to 'slow down'. Her message
was also based on her mother's belief:
'Every morning is a good morning if your health is good'
A deepened appreciation of how caring friends or family were, or just the realisation
one was lucky to have them was often reported as meaningful. A couple of younger
participants reported more profound changes in their attitudes to family. A fifty-
seven year old female participant reported having re-established contact with an
estranged sister because:
'Life's too short to bear grudges'
A forty-seven year old male described himself as a 'bad visitor' to his sister prior to
stroke but now wanting to make amends following her visits while he was in
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hospital. The importance of family and friends emerged as a strong theme for a good
proportion of participants in the qualitative analysis and will be discussed later
(please see section 16.5).
A few participants reported other meanings in their experience. A fifty-two year old
male participant described the cancellation of their plans to move house and the loss
of his landscape gardening business as 'serendipity'. He figured that it was probably
meant to be, and that his business had been unprofitable anyway. A female
participant reported being proud that she had coped. A seventy-nine year old
participant found it had given her a re-appreciation of life in general:
'You realise life is sweet and you want to live'
One participant reported feeling lucky in comparison to others who had had worse
strokes.
10.6: Self-evaluations at baseline
10.6i: Acceptance ofdisability at baseline
Overall, given a mid-point of sixteen, average score statistics indicated that
participants tended towards moderate acceptance of disability levels (please see
Table 10.4). The range of scores was wide and slightly positively skewed with a
moderate sized standard deviation. Overall, just over a third of participants (30/89;
34%) scores were below the mid-point suggesting low levels of feeling able to accept
their disability.
Internal reliability for this measure was very high (a = .87). Factor analysis
produced a solution that explained 66% of the variance and produced two factors:
Unhappy about limitations and dependency
Feeling burdensome and inadequate
Please see Appendix C, Table C3 for a full report.
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10.6H: Negative identity change at baseline
As we expected negative rather than positive changes in identity were reported by the
great majority of participants (75/89; 84%). However, some participants reported no
change at all (10/89; 11%) and a few even reported a slight positive change (4/89;
5%). The distribution of change scores across participants was fairly wide but
positively skewed. The low mean score and lower median score suggest that most
participants saw themselves in only slightly more negative terms. However, the high
standard deviation indicates a large degree of variation amongst individuals.
Internal reliability was found to be very high both for responses relating to 'before'
the stroke (oc = .83) and for responses relating to 'now' (oc = .86). Factor analysis
was conducted for both sets of responses, and a fairly complex solution was found
for each, with five factors for 'before' responses and six factors for 'now' responses.
Only the first three factors are discussed here, but please see Appendix C for the
others. As can be seen, roughly similar concepts generally seemed to be found
across both analyses. However, these were not necessarily obtained in the same
order and were different enough in themselves to suggest a difference of emphasis in
the way participants saw themselves now as opposed to before.




The first three factors for identity ratings 'now' seemed to represent:
Ability/negative emotional reaction to disability
Sense of worth
Fed up
The first factor for both 'before' and 'now' was the most similar of these in terms of
shared items as both contained: 'in control', 'confident', 'independent', 'capable' and
'active'. However, two negative affect items, 'bored' and 'unhappy' were included
in the first factor found for 'now' ratings. This indicates that within participants'
ratings of themselves 'now', unhappiness and boredom appear to be intimately
bound up with a sense of ability. This actually makes this factor conceptually very
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similar to the first and main factor found for the acceptance of disability measure
{'unhappy about limitations and dependency').
Table 10.5 displays mean 'before' the stroke and mean 'now' scores for each item.
These were compared using t-tests and the significance levels are also displayed. As
shown, the level of change reported for individual items varied greatly. In
conceptual terms, the largest changes were seen for those items relating to ability (for
example 'active', 'confident'). Relatively moderate changes were seen for adjectives
relating to affect (for example 'worried', or 'unhappy'). Much smaller and often
insignificant changes were seen for items reflecting interpersonal personality
characteristics (for example 'friendly', or 'hopeful').
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Table 10.5: Mean differences in scores from 'Before I had my stroke' to 'Now
I've had my stroke' at baseline
'Before my stroke' mean scores: 'Now I've had my' stroke mean scores:
n.s. Non-significant, * p<.05, ** p<01, ***p<.001
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10.6iii: Shame at baseline
Taking into account a mid-point of twenty, descriptive statistics indicate that levels
of shame were typically rather low (please see Table 10.4). The same indication
appeared to be given by the negatively and positively constructed items. The median
and modal scores of all items was one, and mean scores were low, ranging from 1.66
(SD = 1.05) to 1.00 (SD = .58). So, typically participants tended to disagree with
items suggesting others looked down on them and agree they appreciated differential
treatment. Only four participants (4/89; 5%) actually reported scores above twenty
suggesting higher than moderate shame. The difference between most participants
then seemed to rest with how strongly they rejected shame items, whether they felt,
very low, low or moderate levels of shame.
The measure was found to have high internal reliability (a = .78) however this may
be partly attributable to floor effects. Factor analysis produced a solution that
accounted for 64% of the variance with three factors:
- Considered feeble and in need of protection
Considered relatively incompetent
Given welcome consideration
please see Appendix C, Table C6 for a table showing the full factor structure.
10.7: Beliefs in recovery and recurrence at baseline
10.7i: Recovery locus ofcontrol at baseline
This scale is constructed such that higher scores indicate a more 'internal' and lower
scores a more 'external' locus of control, scores may range from zero to thirty-six
with a mid-point of eighteen. Taking this into account, indicators of average scores
illustrated in Table 10.4 suggest that participants' responses indicated a generally
more internal locus of control. If scores below the midpoint of eighteen are taken to
indicate an 'External' locus of control, then only six participants' (6/89; 7%) could
be labelled as such. Therefore the variation in scores for most participants seems to
indicate a more or less internal locus of control.
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10.7ii: Confidence in recovery at baseline
The high mean and median scores shown in Table 10.4 suggests that in general
participants were very confident that they would make a full recovery. Just over a
third of participants (30/89; 34%) responded with the modal score of ten out of ten
and a similar number gave sores of either eight or nine (22/89; 25% and 11/89; 12%
respectively). Only three participants (3/89; 3%) indicated they were 'Not at all
confident' by giving scores of zero. Scores for the remaining participants (23/89,
26%) were between five and seven suggesting more moderate levels of confidence
for about a quarter of participants.
10.7iii: Recurrence fear at baseline
Taking into account a mid-point of sixteen, descriptive statistics indicate that
typically recurrence fear scores were moderate (please see Table 10.4). The
distribution of scores was slightly negatively skewed, and the standard deviation was
moderate showing that participants appeared more likely to indicate moderate to high
levels of concern, than little concern.
Over half of the participants (50/89; 56%) did actually 'Agree' or 'Strongly agree'
with item 6 which was the most direct recurrence fear item:
'I worry about my stroke returning'
Interestingly, eleven participants (11/89; 12%) who did not agree with this item went
on to comment that although they did not 'Worry' about another stroke, they did
'Think' about it.
This measure was found to have high internal reliability (a = .78). Factor analysis
produced a solution with two factors that accounted for 49% of the variance:
'Increased health worry following stroke'
'Increased health consideration following stroke'
(please see Appendix C, Table C7 for a full report). Interestingly the only item that
loaded onto both factors with a value of at least .40 was item 6. This finding could
be taken to suggest that this was simply a less discriminate item. However, taken
along with spontaneous think' not 'worry' comments made by participants it could
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be taken to indicate something more meaningful. Perhaps direct questioning about
'worry' regarding another stroke was unsettling for some participants because they
were trying so hard not to. This issue is discussed further in relation to relevant data
from the qualitative interviews (please see section 16.4).
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11.1: Resume of the hypotheses
Examination of associations with distress at baseline relates to the following main
hypothesis and specific hypotheses:
Main hypothesis
1) A significant relationship between beliefs and emotional distress would be
found at an initial point in time [at baseline].
It was expected that this main hypothesis would be fulfilled even once demographic
and social background factors had been taken into account.
Specific hypotheses
1) Certain negative attributions Tat baseline]:
- Lower sense of control over causes
- Higher frequency of asking 'Why me?'
- A failure to find meaning in the experience
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at baseline]
2) More negative self-evaluations [at baseline];
Lower acceptance of ones' disability
A more negative change in identity
Higher shame
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at baseline]
3) More negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence [at baseline].
Lower sense of control over recovery
Lower confidence in recovery
Higher fear of recurrence
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at baseline].
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11.2: Statistical considerations at baseline
11.2i: Consideration ofnormality ofdistributions at baseline
As illustrated previously (please see chapter 10) the dependent variable distress is
fairly positively skewed to the left. I considered transforming the data to produce a
normal distribution as is often recommended by medical statisticians (for example,
Altman, 1991). However, on balance, a complex transformation of the dependent
variable was considered disadvantageous. It seemed inaccurate to normalise distress
because theory and practice suggests it should be skewed. After all, the most
distressed participants were the ones we were interested in and a transformation
would produce data that was less intrinsically meaningful. Dichotomisation was not
considered for the dependent variable as it would violate the linearity assumption
(Field, 2000). I was advised that the fairly 'flat' distribution of distress would
mitigate against its skewness affecting parametric statistical tests (Lewis, 2003;
personal communication). On balance, I decided to leave the dependent variable in
its original form.
Histograms of all background and belief variables relevant to the main hypotheses at
baseline are illustrated in Appendix E, sections E.l and E.2. As can be seen, few
variables produced idealised normal distributions. Also, the five most skewed
continuous independent variables were:
Barthel index (Very negatively skewed and limited range)
Nottingham index (Bimodal)
Life events (Very negatively skewed)
'Why me?' (Fairly negatively skewed)
Confidence in recovery (Fairly positively skewed and limited range)
Complex transformations for the independent variables were considered
unbeneficial for the same reasons as have been described for the dependent variable.
However, following statistical advice (Lewis, 2003; personal communication) I
decided to dichotomise these five variables. Where possible this was done on ad hoc
theoretical meaningful grounds rather than on statistical information.
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Wade et al. (1987) found that a categorisation of patients into those with full Barthel
index scores and those with scores of nineteen or less was able to differentiated well
between those with and without functional independence. For example only 3% of
those with scores of nineteen or below could bathe alone and only 14% could dress
alone. More recently, Hankey et al. (2002) have reviewed nine studies that have
used this classification demonstrating its wide acceptance. Also, examination of
histograms using a four-way split, the three-way split and the two-way fit, showed
that only the latter was able to reduce the skew in the data.
Nottingham index items can be divided approximately by half on the basis of
whether they refer to activities within compared to outside the home. This half-way
split also coincided with the bi-modal distribution, and so this variable was
dichotomised at the mid-point. Two thirds of participants reported a life event but
very few reported more than one (please see Chapter 10, section 10.3iii). Therefore
this variable was dichotomised by whether or not life events were reported
(regardless of the number of life events) in order to reduce the skew in the data.
As described, just over half of participants reported they 'never' asked 'Why me?'
and increasingly smaller numbers of participants reported asking this question more
frequently (please see Chapter 10, section 10.5iii). Therefore it was necessary to
dichotomise this variable into a 'never' group and a 'rarely' to 'nearly all the time'
group in order to reduce its' skew. On examination of the histogram for confidence
in recovery, it was clear that a cut-off of eight or greater appeared to be a meaningful
place to use for dichotomising the data; this reduced the skew considerably.
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77.2//: Homogeneity ofvariance in arrays at baseline
Data relevant to the hypotheses was checked for inaccuracies regarding outliers. In
all cases the five highest and five lowest scores for each variable recorded in the
database corresponded with the scores recorded on paper during interviews, or
obtained from Dr Kwan (stroke severity, age). Therefore, extreme values were not
attributed to error and were considered to reflect relevant participants'
characteristics as legitimately as more typical values did other participants.
Scatter plots of all variables relevant to the hypotheses against distress scores were
produced and are illustrated in Appendix E, sections E5 and E6. These were
examined visually for biasing effects toward type I or type II errors from extreme
values. Regarding background variables, extreme values that pulled the data one
way seemed to be balanced by other extreme values working in the opposite
direction (in particular, please see the scatter plots for age and social support).
Regarding belief variables, the scatter plots generally suggested that, if anything
extreme values seemed to be working against the hypotheses (i.e. more likely to
increase chances of a type II error). This was particularly the case for the two
variables that went on to produce the strongest associations with distress (acceptance
of disability and identity change). The points outside the general linear pattern for
these variables would have worked to produce a more conservative correlation.
Therefore the issue of homogeneity of variance was not considered problematic to a
strict test of the hypotheses.
The exception was shame. As described previously most participants reported 'very
low', or Tow to moderate' shame and only a few reported 'moderately high' shame
(please see Chapter 10, section 10.6ii). The scatter plot, suggested little lawful
relation between Tow to moderate' shame and distress levels. However, a good
'chunk' of 'very low' shame scores clustered with very low distress scores to
produce a step down to the left in the scatter-plot. Then a few 'moderately high'
shame and high distress scores seemed to create an opposing 'blip' pulling the data
up towards the right top corner. So the homogeneity of variance in arrays
assumption was violated for this variable. I considered dichotomising this variable
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but that this would lose the variation in the data at tail ends and so increase chances
of a type II error. Therefore it was left as a continuous measure, but it is recognised
that any significant correlations should be considered mainly attributable to a
minority of individuals with 'very low' and a minority with 'moderately high'
shame.
11.3: Hypothesis testing at baseline stage 1: Correlations between baseline
belief and background variables by baseline distress
11.3 i Univariate correlations between baseline beliefvariables and distress
Univariate correlative relationships between belief variables and distress were first
tested with Pearson correlations and the results are displayed in Table 11.1. As can
be seen, variables are grouped in relation to the specific hypotheses. Please refer to
the hypotheses in section 11.1 for the expected direction of the relationship between
distress and the individual belief variables.
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
As can be seen from Table 11.1, attributions produced low associations with distress.
However, higher distress levels were significantly associated with a lower sense of
control over causes, and a failure to have found meaning in the experience. There
was a tendency for 'Why me?' to associate with distress but this was not statistically
significant.
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative self-evaluations
As shown in Table 11.1, moderate to reasonably large associations between distress
and variables indicating a more negative view of self were found. The strongest
relationships between distress and individual variables were for acceptance of
disability and negative identity change. However, these two variables were actually
quite highly inter-correlated (please see later).
Specific hypothesis 3: Negatives beliefs in recovery and recurrence
A low but significant negative association between recovery locus of control and
distress was found. Meanwhile, lacking confidence in one's recovery and having a
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higher fear of recurrence were moderately and statistically significantly associated
with distress.
Table 11.1: Univariate correlations between baseline belief variables and




Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Causal controllability -.27 .016*
'Why me?' .20 .067
'Found meaning?' -.25 .018*





Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in
recovery and recurrence









As discussed (please see Chapter 7) to control for violations of parametric
assumptions, associations were also tested using Spearman's Rho. Extremely
similar results were obtained (please see Appendix G, section G3i, Table G.3)
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Table 11.2: Univariate correlations between baseline belief variables and HADs
depression, and baseline belief variables and HADs anxiety relating to specific
hypotheses 1,2 and 3 using Pearson correlations (N - 89)
HADs depression scores HADs anxiety scores







Causal controllability -.21 .057 -.21 .013*
'Why me?' .12 .247 .24 .022*
'Found meaning?' -.28 .008** -.18 .094
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative
self-evaluations
Acceptance of disability -.57 oooi*** -.50 oooi***
Identity change .53 .0001*** .62 .0001***
Shame .35 .001*** .29 .006**
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative
beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control -.23 .032* -.24 .023*
Confidence in recovery -.50 oooi*** -.32 .002**
Recurrence fear .44 oooi*** .44 .0001***
To further explore the validity of using the depression and anxiety sub-scales of the
HADs as a combined global distress measure, correlations for the separate
depression and anxiety sub-scales were also conducted and the results are displayed
in Table 11.2
The pattern of results found for the individual depression and anxiety subscales were
very similar to the results found for the global measure of distress, although in
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general slightly lower correlation coefficients were obtained for the individual
subscales. However, 'Found meaning?' was only statistically significantly
associated with depression but not anxiety. Although 'Why me?' had not produced
a statistically significant correlation with distress, it did with anxiety. Overall, a
high level of similarity in results between the depression and the anxiety subscale
were found. This seems to indicate a high degree of interdependence between these
two measures, and suggests that the use of the global measures of distress in
subsequent multivariate analysis was reasonable.
11.3U: Univariate correlations between baseline background variables and distress
Association between background variables and distress were first examined using
Pearson correlations, and are displayed in Table 11.3. As can be seen, a statistically
significant result was only found for one demographic variable, showing that female
participants tended to report higher distress levels.
When Pearson correlation was used, stroke severity and basic disability (Barthel
index) did show trends towards statistically significant association with distress,
disability measured by the Nottingham index produced a low but statistically
significant correlation. The strongest association for the background variables was
found between present distress levels and reports of a pre-stroke history of
depression. Surprisingly social support was not found to be statistically significant,
but life events were.
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Table 11.3: Univariate correlations between baseline background variables and
distress using Pearson correlations (N = 89 unless indicated otherwise)
Distress (Global HADs p value
scores)
Demographic variables
Age (in years) -.02 .865
Gender .25 .019*
Deprivation; Carstairs index -.03 .750
Other background variables
Stroke severity .19 .076
Disability: Barthel index -.18 .086
Disability: Nottingham index -.26 .014*
Social support -.11 .308
Life events .21 .049*
Pre-stroke history of depression .36 .0001***
Stroke severity data was missing for four participants; therefore this whole analysis is based on
eighty-five rather than eighty-nine participants
To control for violations of parametric assumptions, associations between the
background variables and distress were also tested using Spearman's Rho. The
results were generally similar (please see Appendix G, section G.3i, Table G.4).
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Table 11.4: Univariate correlations between baseline background variables and
HADs depression and baseline background variables and HADs anxiety using
Pearson correlations (N = 89 unless indicated otherwise)







Age (in years) .05 .653 -.09 .381
Gender .19 .069 ,25 .018*
Deprivation: Carstairs index - .09 .392 .04 .693
Other background variables
Stroke severity 1 .19 .079 .16 .139
Disability: Barthel index -.26 .013* -.06 .569
Disability: Nottingham index -.35 .001** -.11 .296
Social support -.14 .183 -.05 -.662
Life events .16 .137 .23 .028*
Pre-stroke history of depression .31 .003** .34 .004**
Stroke severity data was missing for four participants; therefore this whole analysis is based on
eighty-five rather than eighty-nine participants
Association between the individual HADs depression and anxiety sub-scales and
distress were also examined and the results are displayed in Table 11.4. These
results were similar in terms of the size of associations, and the variables found were
statistically significant, but were more varied in terms of significance levels than the
results for distress. This is perhaps not surprising given the generally small sizes of
associations. Only a pre-stroke history of depression was found to be statistically
significantly associated with both anxiety and depression. Two background
variables that had been statistically significantly associated with distress (gender and
life events) were found to statistically significantly associate with anxiety but not
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depression. Both disability measures statistically significantly associated with
depression but not anxiety.
11.3Hi: Comment on univariate correlative results at baseline in relation to the
hypotheses
Highly similar results for the belief variables were found using HADs global distress
scores, the depression subscale and the anxiety subscale. Reasonably similar results
were also found for the background variables. This indicates the interdependence of
the anxiety and depression subscale in this study. It also supports the use of the
HADs global scores as the measure of distress for the subsequent multivariate
analyses.
Regardless of whether parametric or non-parametric correlation coefficients were
used, statistically significant small to moderately large associations between distress
and eight belief variables were found. The largest two associations were for two of
the self-evaluation variables: acceptance of disability and negative identity change
(two of the variables relevant to specific hypotheses 2). In contrast, only four of the
nine background variables were consistently found to statistically significantly
associate with distress.
Overall, at the univariate level, the relationship between the background variables
and distress appeared weaker than the relationship between the belief variables and
distress. These results offer preliminary support to main hypothesis 1 and the
specific hypotheses, particularly specific hypothesis 2. However, these results do
not take into account the possibility that associations between the belief variables
and distress may be confounded by the background variables. To test the
hypotheses fully associations between the belief variables and distress needed to be
tested with the background variable taken into account.
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11.4: Hypothesis testing at baseline stage 2: Multiple regression analyses for
distress at baseline
11.4i: Multi-collinearity considerations at baseline
Prior to conducting the analysis, the belief and background variables were examined
for multi-collinearity. Some multi-collinearity was to be expected particularly
between conceptually similar measures, and multiple regression can withstand low
to moderate inter-correlations between variables (Howell, 1997). As can be seen in
Table G.l (Appendix G, section G.l) most inter correlations between variables were
low enough to be considered unproblematic. However, a high level of correlation
was found between the two measures of disability (r = .79, p<.0001) which was
unsurprising. I decided not to combine these measures in the regression analyses as
I was advised that some information would be lost in doing so.
Regarding the belief variables, the largest number and size of inter-correlations were
observed for the self-evaluation variable: acceptance of disability. On the one hand
this seems to suggest that it is a good global measure that seems to be tapping
aspects of all the other belief variables. However, this also means that it would be
expected to behave unusually in the regression analysis, either by overwhelming the
other variables, or by appearing redundant as its variance could be accounted for by
the others. Negative identity change was similarly, but less strongly, inter-correlated
with the other variables, as was acceptance of disability. High levels of associations
between other belief variables were not found.
Overall, the strongest, correlation amongst the belief variables was actually between
acceptance of disability and negative identity change (r = -.69, p<.0001).
Statistically this suggests that they were measuring highly similar beliefs, as if
perceptions of change in oneself, was tantamount to not being able to accept one's
level of disability. Therefore, it was to be expected that when analysed
simultaneously, one may render the other redundant. The possibility of combining
these two variables was considered unhelpful, as subsequent results would be
conceptually and statistically difficult to untangle. Therefore, it was decided to
include both variables in the analysis.
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11.4ii: Resume ofthe 'univariate' and 'stricter' regression method
As discussed previously the backward stepwise method was chosen to
simultaneously examine the association between the belief and background variables
with distress (please see Chapter 7). Also, as discussed previously, two methods of
analysis ('univariate' and 'stricter') were conducted (please see Chapter 7). Results
for the 'univariate' method (uses only variables with significant univariate
correlations with distress) will be presented first, then results for the 'stricter'
method (includes all background variables regardless of univariate significance
levels) will be presented. Comment in relation to the hypotheses will then be made.
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11.4iii: Results for the 'univariate' multiple regression analyses at baseline
The results of the first 'univariate' analysis in which all twelve univariate
statistically significant belief and background variables were included are presented
in Table 11.5. Overall this model was highly significant, R2 = .67, p<.0001, which
suggests that almost half the variance in distress scores were accounted for by these
variables.
Table 11.5: Preliminary regression model for baseline distress using all baseline background
and belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate correlations (N = 89)
B* Std. error t Significance of t Partial
Correlation
Background variables:
Gender 2.16 .93 2.34 .022* .26
Disability: Nottingham index .00 .96 .07 .941 .01
Life events 1.29 .83 1.56 .123 .18
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.50 1.01 3.48 .001*** .37
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -.96 .47 -2.03 .046* -.23
'Found meaning?' -1.71 .97 -1.75 .083 -.20
Acceptance of disability .13 .11 -1.10 .274 -.13
Negative identity change .20 .07 2.86 .005** .31
Shame .24 .10 2.45 .017* .27
Recovery locus of control .00 .13 .78 .436 .09
Confidence in recovery -1.33 1.10 -1.21 .231 -.14
Recurrence fear .28 .11 2.65 .010** .29
*Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
As seen in Table 11.5, gender, a pre-stroke history of depression and four belief
variables were found to be statistically significant at the p<.05 level in this model.
The least significant variable was eliminated from the second analysis, and then the
next least significant variable from the following analysis. This process was
continued until a model was produced in which all variables were statistically
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significant at the p<.05 level. The variables that were eliminated, in order of
removal, were:
Disability: Nottingham index
Recovery locus of control
Confidence in recovery
- Acceptance of disability
Life events
The final model is illustrated in Table 11.6.
Table 11.6: Final regression model for baseline distress using all baseline background and
belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate correlations and remained
statistically significant following the backward regression procedure (N = 89)
B * Std. error t Significance of t Partial
Correlation
Background variables:
Gender 2.08 .87 2.39 .019* .16
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.94 .97 4.08 .0001*** .27
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -.96 .47 -2.04 .045* -.14
'Found meaning?' -1.99 .89 -2.24 .028* -.15
Negative identity change .25 .06 4.46 .0001*** .30
Shame .29 .09 3.23 .002** .21
Recurrence fear .33 .10 3.34 .001** .22
♦Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
As can be seen in Table 11.6, the background and belief variables in this final model
were those that were statistically significant in the first analysis, and also the belief
variable 'Found meaning?'. Together they produced a similar overall association
with distress: R2 = .65, p<.0001.
Comment on the 'univariate' regression results in relation to the hypotheses is made
in section 11.5.
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11.4v: Resultsfor the 'stricter' multiple regression analyses at baseline
The backward stepwise regression procedure was repeated, except this time all
background variables were included at each stage regardless of significance. The
• 2results of the first analysis produced a highly significant overall model, R = .69,
p<.0001, and is detailed in Table 11.7 below.
Table 11.7: Preliminary regression model for baseline distress using all baseline background
and those belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate correlations' (N
= 85 2)
B 1 Std. error t Significance of t Partial
Correlation
Background variables:
Age .00 .05 -.96 .341 -.12
Gender 1.86 1.04 1.78 .080 .21
Deprivation: Carstairs index .00 .29 -.21 .832 -.03
Stroke severity2 -.23 .17 -1.41 .162 -.17
Disability: Barthel index -.23 1.29 -.18 .860 -.02
Disability: Nottingham index -.34 1.41 -.24 .812 -.03
Social support -.00 .02 -.35 .730 -.04
Life events 1.44 .87 1.65 .103 .20
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.05 1.10 2.77 .007** .32
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -1.05 .50 -2.11 .038* -.25
'Found meaning?' -2.19 1.09 -2.00 .049* -.24
Acceptance of disability -.15 .12 -1.22 .227 -.15
Negative identity change .22 .08 2.88 .005*** .33
Shame .21 .10 2.03 .046* .24
Recovery locus of control .00 .14 .71 .476 09
Confidence in recovery -1.34 1.20 -1.12 .267 -.14
Recurrence fear .28 .11 2.52 .014* .29
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for four participants; therefore this whole analysis is based on
eighty-five rather than eighty-nine participants
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The least significant belief variables were removed from subsequent analyses until
all the belief variables in the model were significant at the p<.05 level. The final
model produced by this method was similar in size and significance to that obtained
before, R2 = .67, pc.OOOl, and is detailed in Table 11.8.
Table 11.8: Final regression model for baseline distress using all baseline background variables
and belief variables that remained statistically significant following the backward regression
procedure (N " 85 2)
B 1 Std. error t Significance of t Partial
Correlation
Background variables:
Age .00 .05 -1.28 206 -.15
Gender 1.70 1.03 1.65 .103 .19
Deprivation: Carstairs index -.11 .29 -.36 .719 -.04
Stroke severity2 -.22 .17 -1.28 .204 -.15
Disability: Barthel index -.39 1.27 -.31 .757 -.04
Disability: Nottingham index -.89 1.36 -.65 .516 -.08
Social support -.00 .02 -.59 .560 -.07
Life events 1.51 .87 1.74 .086 .20
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.24 1.08 3.01 .004** .34
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -1.01 .49 -.15 .045* -.24
'Found meaning?' -2.43 1.04 -.19 .022* -.27
Negative identity change .27 .06 .38 .0001*** .45
Shame .25 .10 .20 .009** .30
Recurrence fear .34 .10 .25 .002** .36
'Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for four participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on
eighty-five rather than eighty-nine participants
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The variables that were removed the same ones that had been in the 'univariate'
analysis. The order of variable removal was also the same:
Recovery locus of control
Confidence in recovery
Acceptance of disability
Extremely similar results were produced using this 'stricter' method. The only
really apparent difference that the inclusion of all the background variables meant
the significance of gender dropped to the p<.10 level, and a trend for life events was
found. It is hard to speculate how the balance of associations between variables may
have led to these slight differences. However, the conclusions in relation to the
belief hypotheses remain essentially the same.
Comment on the 'stricter' regression results in relation to the hypotheses is made in
section 11.5.
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11.5: Comment on the multiple regression results for baseline distress using
baseline belief and background variables in relation to the hypotheses
The first main hypothesis that beliefs and distress would associate was tested in
analyses that took associations between background variables and distress into
account.
Background variables produced few independent associations in both the
'univariate' analyses and 'stricter' analyses (in which background variables were
included regardless of univariate association with distress). Gender and pre-stroke
history of depression were the only two background variables left in the final
'univariate' model. Pre-stroke history of depression was the only background
variable that was statistically significant in the final 'stricter' model. Interestingly,
these variables did not generally correlate with the belief variables in the equations
(please see Appendix G, section G.l, Table G.l) and so something about being
female or having been depressed in the past appeared associated with distress in a
way that was largely independent of the belief variables. Both disability variables
were dropped from the equation, suggesting that participants' beliefs about the
meaning of their disability were better associated with distress.
A statistically significant relationship between emotional distress and over half of
the belief variables was found once all variables that had been statistically
significant at the univariate level were tested together in the 'univariate' model. The
same result was obtained in the 'stricter' regression analyses and bolsters this
finding. Together these results offer support to the first main hypothesis, and
suggest that the relationship between emotional distress and certain beliefs was
largely un-confounded.
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Both causal controllability, and 'Found meaning?' were univariately associated with
distress at the p<.05 level and both were found statistically significant in the final
'univariate' and 'stricter' method equation. Therefore these analyses offer firm but
partial support to specific hypothesis 1.
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Specific hypothesis 2: Self-evaluations
Only one of the two self-evaluation variables that had produced strong univariate
associations with distress, but also a very strong association with each other and
multi-collinearity with other belief variables, remained in the final models.
'Negative identity change' was found to remain highly statistically significant and to
produce the largest partial equation. However, acceptance of disability was lost
from the models. This may have been because negative identity change was
generally less collinear with the other belief variables. Alternatively, acceptance of
disability may have been relatively disadvantaged because it spanned a narrower
range of points (Lewis, 2003; personal communication). If negative identity change
had not been measured, acceptance of disability may have taken its place in these
models. Interestingly, shame remained in the final models and produced a partial
correlation that was hardly reduced in size from its' univariate correlation with
distress. Overall, these results firmly but partially support specific hypothesis 2.
Specific hypothesis 3: Beliefs to recovery and recurrence
Both of the variables measuring participants' beliefs to recovery (confidence in
recovery and recovery locus of control) failed to statistically significantly associate
with distress once other variables were taken into account. However, recurrence
fear remained able to independently associate with distress. Overall these results
partially support specific hypothesis 3. More specifically, these results fail to
support beliefs in recovery, but firmly support fear of recurrence as associating with
distress independent of background variables.
In summary, these results suggest that at baseline distress was associated with a
sense of having changed for the worse as a person and in the eyes of others, without
being able to find any compensatory positive meaning. Participants who believed
they had their perceived risk factors under control tended not to be distressed.
Conversely, distress was positively associated with greater fear of recurrent stroke.
These results appear to be statistically independent of confounding by background
variables.
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12.1: Description of the sample at follow-up
12.1i: Final sample atfollow-up
The majority of the original sample (81/89; 91%) was followed up. Of those eight
participants who were not; two people had died, two declined, four were too ill due
to severe further strokes, one had cancer and another had significant problems with
alcohol abuse. The average time-point when participants were interviewed was just
under nine months following their stroke (Mean = 273 days, SD = 37 days and
Median = 262 days) with a range between 219 days and 396 days. The distribution
of time actually produced a fairly normal curve, but with seven outliers who were
seen much later. The reasons for these long delays were due to postponements
following death or illness in the family, going back to work, or a change of address
that took months before registration with GP records.
12. Hi: Demographic and cognitive ability of the sample atfollow-up
The high follow-up rate meant demographic and cognitive statistics at follow-up
were very similar to baseline. Distribution of gender, age and social-economic status
and participants' living situation and cognitive ability were very similar at this later
point in time. Therefore the same comments made in relation to demographic and
cognitive ability characteristics apply now. Please see lO.lii for comments and
Appendix F, section F.3 for actual follow-up statistics.
12.1 Hi: Medical data atfollow-up
Original scores for stroke severity were reused at follow-up. Descriptive statistics
for the seventy-eight participants for whom stroke severity data was available are
illustrated in Table 12.1. Similar proportions of participants were found for each
OCSP stroke type as at baseline (please see Chapter 10, Table 10.3 and Table 12.1
above). Two participants who were unavailable due to a further severe stroke had
both originally sustained a TACs stroke, a participant who had died originally had a
LACs stroke and another a POCs stroke. Higher stroke severity scores amongst
remaining participants with a TACs stroke were found and this difference was
statistically significant [F(3, 73) = 4.52, p<.01]. Four participants reported having
experienced a further stroke. They all reported these to be of mild severity, but
actual objective data regarding these strokes was not obtained.
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Table 12.1: Medical stroke data for seventy-seven participants at follow-up
Previous history of stroke 1 19 participants (25%)
New stroke during study 1 4 participants (5%)
National Institute for Health Mean = 4.33, SD = 3.25
Stroke Severity Scores 2 Median = 4.22, Range =1-18
Oxford Community Stroke Number and percent Mean and SD stroke severity
Project OCSP stroke type: With that stroke type score per stroke type
- TACS (Total Anterior 5 (6%) 8.86 (5.97)
Circulation stroke)2
- PACS (Partial Anterior 22 (27%) 4.86 (3.77)
Circulation stroke)2
- LACS (Lacunar Circulation 32 (42%) 3.94 (2.26)
stroke)2
- POCS (Posterior Circulation 18 (22%) 3.39 (2.17)
stroke)2
' Available for all 89 participants 2 Available for just 85 participants
As regards psychoactive drug treatment, participants generally reported that their
status regarding medication for emotional problems during the study remained
unchanged. As before there were five participants who used sleeping pills, four of
whom reported that they worked and one who still regarded herself as an insomniac.
One man reported he had had a short course of sleeping pills prescribed during the
study and that his sleep problems had 'totally resolved'. Another man had been
prescribed minor tranquillizers for his anxiety about leaving the house. He reported
that he had used a few and that they had helped get him out, but that he was still
unable to enjoy going out as before.
Six participants reported currently taking anti-depressants at follow-up. Four of
these had been on anti-depressants pre-stroke and right through the study: two met
criteria for major depression both at follow-up and at baseline, one did not meet
criteria for depression either at follow-up or at baseline, one met criteria for minor
depression at follow-up but had not done so at baseline. The other two had not been
on anti-depressants at baseline: one had been pre-stroke but hers had been stopped
while she was in hospital. She reported that her GP had represcribed it, but she still
met criteria for major depression. One of the youngest participants, a fifty-two year
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old, reported developing depression during the study and being prescribed an anti¬
depressant by his GP. He met criteria for major depression at follow-up (please see
Chapter 15, section 15.6).
One participant who had met criteria for minor depression at baseline had been
prescribed an anti-depressant during the study period. She was no longer taking it
and no longer met criteria for depression. The participant who met criteria for major
depression and reported suicidal intentions at baseline reported that the hospital
doctors had considered him for an anti-depressant but had not prescribed one.
Another participant who met criteria for major depression at both baseline and
follow-up had requested 'a course' from her GP but been refused. A thirty-two year
old female reported developing depression during the study and she now met criteria
for major depression (please see Chapter 15, section 15.6). Her GP had offered her
an antidepressant and she was considering it.
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12.2: The continuous measure of emotional distress (HADs scores)
72.2/: HADs distributions at follow-up
A fairly flat shaped and slightly positively skewed distribution for HADs depression
scores was found which was similar to that seen at baseline, please see Histogram
12.1 and Histogram 10.1. Similarly to baseline, the median was 4. The mean score
was very slightly higher, Mean = 4.62 (SD = 3.47) but not statistically significantly,
t = -323, n.s.
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HADs anxiety scores produced a similar distribution to that found at baseline (please
see Histogram 12.2 and Histogram 10.2). Like the depression distribution, it was
skewed positively but with less kurtosis. Similarly to baseline, the median was 4.
The mean score was very slightly higher, Mean = 4.78 (SD = 3.78) but this was not
statistically significant, t = -414, n.s.
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The distribution of global distress scores was also similar to that found at baseline
being slightly positively skewed but with a wider range (2 -32) due to a couple of
extreme scores, please see Histogram 12.3 and Histogram 10.3. Similarly to
baseline, the median was 8. Overall the mean was just slightly higher, Mean = 9.38
(SD = 6.63) but not statistically significantly so, t = -.386, n.s.
Histogram 12.3: Follow-up HADs distress scores
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12.2H: Inter-correlations between HADs scores
Depression and anxiety scores correlated highly together (r = .68, p<.0001) and with
global distress scores (Depression and distress, r = .91, p<.0001; Anxiety and
distress, r = .92, p<.0001).
12.2Hi: Comparison ofbaseline to follow-up HADs scores
High levels of consistency between baseline and follow-up HADs scores were found
shown by the three insignificant paired t tests in Table 12.2 below. Pearson
correlations are also reported in Table 12.2 as these are relevant to the final
predictive analyses in Chapter 14.
Table 12.2: Correlations between baseline and follow-up HADs and t test results
Baseline - Follow-up Correlation Significance t value Significance
of correlation of t
HADs Depression .57 <.0001 -.32 n.s.
HADs Anxiety .59 <.0001 -.41 n.s.
HADs Distress .64 <.0001 -.39 n.s.
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12.3: Descriptive data for background variables at follow-up
Demographic data and cognitive ability is reported in Table F.3, Appendix F, and
stroke severity data was described in section 12.1 ii at the beginning of this chapter.
Descriptive data for the disability measures, social support and life events and pre-
stroke history of depression is illustrated in Table 12.3.
12.3i: Disability atfollow-up
The majority of participants (48/81; 59%) gained full marks on the Barthel index.
Overall, mean scores for Barthel index and for the Nottingham extended ADL index
had increased slightly since baseline (please see Table 12.3 and Table 10.4). The
increase in Barthel index scores was not significant (t = -.87, n.s.), showing that there
had been no significant increase in basic levels of independence. In contrast, the
mean increase in Nottingham index scores was significant, showing that some
participants had increased their ability to carry out more extended daily activities
(t = -3.46, p<.001).
12.3U: Social support atfollow-up
Social support was not reassessed at follow-up, and so scores from baseline were
reused. Descriptive statistics for this smaller sample again showed a high level of
support, please see Table 10.4 for further description.
12.3iii: Life events atfollow-up
Half the participants (42/81; 49%) reported one or more life events between baseline
and follow-up. Most had experienced just one, but six had experienced two events,
two had experienced three events and one man had experienced five life events. He
reported that his friends had been 'dropping like flies' but nevertheless he was not
depressed. Again, some participants reported events they still found upsetting but
which were not counted as they fell out of the time-scale. Interestingly, the number
of life events reported at baseline and follow-up overlapped, indicated by a
statistically insignificant McNemar test (p=. 121). In fact most participants who
reported a recent life event at follow-up had done so at baseline (26/42; 62%).
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12.3iv: Pre-stroke history ofdepression atfollow-up
Exactly the same proportion of participants reported having been depressed (21/81;
26%) prior to their stroke at follow-up as had done at baseline. A cross-tabulation
table showed they were the same participants, suggesting that the assessment of pre-
stroke history of depression was consistent. Relationships between pre-stroke
history of depression and present depression status is described in Chapter 15,
section 15.6.
12.4: Descriptive data for beliefs at follow-up
This presentation of descriptive data for the belief variables will include conventional
statistics, reporting of spontaneous comments and internal reliability statistics. A
more detailed report on attributions is reported in Appendix F, section F.2, and factor
analysis for the negative identity change, shame and recurrence fear scales are
reported in Appendix C, section C.2.
12.5: Attributions at follow-up
12.5i: The difference between 'stroke' and 'its effects'
The conceptual difference between 'stroke' and 'its effects' was evident in patients
descriptions at follow-up (please see Appendix F, sections Fl.i and Fl.ii for more
detailed description).
12.5ii: Causal controllability at baseline
On average 2.68 causes (SD =.79, Median=3, Range=0-5) were reported at follow-
up. Please see Appendix F, section F.2 for detailed description of types, frequency
and potency of attributions.
Similarly to baseline, causal controllability scores were typically low (please see
Table 12.3 for relevant descriptive statistics). Given a mid-point of 2, this suggests
that participants typically felt less than moderately able to control causes of stroke in
future (please see Appendix F, section F.2 for further details regarding controllability
ratings for different causes).
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Table 12.3: Basic descriptive data for numerical background variables and
beliefs at follow-up
Number and Median Range
percent, or Mean
and SD as indicated.
Background variables
• <
Disability: Barthel index 19.44 (2.78) 20 7-20
."1
Disability: Nottingham index 14.72 (5.56) 17 2-21
Social support 73.69 (21.32) 75.78 14- 122
Life events .69 (.51) 1 inio
• 2Pre-stroke history of depression 21 (26%)
Attributions
■j
Causal controllability 1.74 (.79) 3 2-5
•i
'Why me?' (Rating of frequency now) .67 (.91) 2 2-5
2'Found meaning?' 17 (21%)
Self-evaluations
Acceptance of disability 3 19.49 (6.92) 22 5 ■ 32
Negative identity change 7.79 (8.13) 5 -1 -38
Shame 3 12.33 (5.56) 12 2-■27
Negative beliefs in recovery and
recurrence
Recovery locus of control 23.89 (3.27) 25 13 -31
Confidence in recovery 6.59 (2.93) 7 2 - 12
Fear of recurrence 15.42 (4.66) 15 4-■25
Other background variables (demographics and stroke severity) are described in Appendix F, Table
F.3. and in Table 12.1 earlier in this chapter.
2 Number and percentage of participants 3 Mean and standard deviation of scores
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12.5iii: 'Why me? ' atfollow-up
As can be seen, a median of zero indicates that participants were unlikely to report
thinking 'Why me?' at follow-up. The data was skewed and nobody now reported
that they questioned why they had a stroke 'nearly all the time'. The numbers of





Overall there was little change in responses across time, as shown in Table 12.3 and
Table 10.4. Participants generally gave the same response or indicated a frequency
of asking 'Why me?' just slightly lower or higher than before. Once 'Why me?'
scores were dichotomised and compared to baseline responses, using a McNemar
test, the result (p<. 122) suggested no statistically significant change in responses
across time.
12.5iv: 'Found meaning?' atfollow-up
A very low proportion of participants (17/81; 21%) reported they had found meaning
in their experience at this point in time. Thirteen participants who had reported
finding something positive in their experience at one month no longer did so. Only
one participant who had not reported finding meaning at baseline, now reported that
they had. She was an eighty-six year old lady who now reported feeling empathy
for young people with strokes. The nature of meanings reported by other participants
could be broadly classified either as health gains in terms of a warning, or as a
new-found appreciation of friends and family. These meanings were very similar to
the meanings reported at baseline (please see Chapter 10, section 10.5iv). The range
of these meanings did not appear to be particularly different amongst those who
reported them at both points in time, and those who reported them only at baseline.
The overall drop in proportion of participants who reported finding meaning in their
experience was found to be statistically significant using a McNemar test (p=.221).
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12.6: Self -evaluations at follow-up
12.6i: Acceptance ofdisability atfollow-up
Overall a tendency towards moderate acceptance levels was suggested. Although the
range of scores was wide, the standard deviation was moderate, and the overall
distribution produced was slightly negatively skewed. Nevertheless, nearly half of
participants' (36/81; 44%) scores fell below the mid-point, suggesting a low level of
acceptance regarding the personal limitations and dependencies imposed by their
disability.
On average, participants reported only slightly higher acceptance of disability levels
than they had at one month (please see Table 12.3 and Table 10.4) and this increase
was not significant, t = -1.49, n.s.
As before internal reliability for this measure was extremely high (a = .92). Factor
analysis produced a solution that explained 66% of the variance, and produced just
one global acceptance of disability factor, with loadings between .75 and .92 for each
item.
12.6H: Negative identity change atfollow-up
The mean identity change score was relatively low and the distribution was
positively skewed suggesting that, at this nine-month stage, most participants saw
themselves as slightly negatively changed from their pre-stroke self. Some
participants reported no change (11/81; 14%) and only a few reported an overall
positive change of one point (3/81; 4%). However, the standard distribution and
range of scores were high indicating that some saw themselves in very negative
terms 'now' as opposed to 'before'.
The descriptive data obtained for this measure was extremely similar to that obtained
at baseline. The mean identity score was slightly lower, but not significantly, t = -
.187, n.s. (please see Table 12.4 and Table 10.4).
Internal reliability scores for both the 'before' stroke and 'now' set of responses was
high ('Before' a = .79; 'Now' a = .87). Factor analysis produced sets of six factors
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for both 'before' and 'now' responses. Only the first three factors will be discussed
here but please see Appendix C, Tables C8 and C9 for the full results. As can be
seen similar but not identical results for baseline and follow-up, and for the 'before'
and 'now' responses were found.








So, although the order was different, these factors for 'before' and 'now' were
conceptually alike. These factors both bore more resemblance to the first three
factors obtained for baseline 'before' the stroke rather than 'now' factor analyses
results (please see Appendix C, Tables C4 and C5). While unhappiness and boredom
seemed to be intimately bound up with a sense of ability in participants' ratings of
themselves one month following stroke, at this nine month stage they seemed to
differentiate between ability and negative reactions or personality patterns more
clearly.
Nevertheless, negative reactions do appear particularly important in participants'
sense of identity 'now' because the adjectives: 'bored', 'unhappy', 'worried'
'dissatisfied', 'hopeful', 'confident' and 'worthless' combined to produce the first
and main factor 'feeling down/or not'.
Mean changes reported for individual adjectives were very similar to those at
baseline (please see Table 12.4, and Table 10.5), but significant negative changes
were now found for all but two adjectives. The largest changes were still seen for
items relating to ability (for example 'confident' and 'capable') and then moderate
changes were found for negative affect items (for example 'unhappy' and 'irritable').
Changes in most interpersonal characteristic items were smaller. However, in
contrast to baseline, significant levels of change were now seen for three more of
these ('patient', 'caring', 'co-operative'). Also, in contrast to baseline, participants
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indicated that they 'now' considered themselves significantly less 'hopeful' than they
had been before their stroke.
12.6iii: Shame atfollow-up
In general participants indicated that they typically experienced low levels of shame
in relation to others' attitudes. Descriptive data showed very little change across
time (please see Table 12.3, and Table 10.4) and the slight decrease in the mean was
not significant, t = .24, n.s.
Internal reliability for the measure was found to be high (a = .84). Factor analysis
produced a solution accounting for 63% of the variance, which contained two
factors:
Considered weak and less able
Given welcome consideration
Please see appendix C, Table CIO for further details. Similarly to at baseline, a
positive appreciation of allowances and protective behaviours from others was
shown by a tendency to agree with relevant items and the production of the second
factor. However, this data produced just one main factor for all the more negative
items at this point in time.
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Table 12.4: Changes in Identity scale mean scores from 'Before I had my
stroke' to 'Now I've had my stroke' at follow-up
1.5 Mean scores 3.5
Bored (r) * * *
Unhappy (r) J * * *








^—~~~~~~~ ' J. J. J,^
Independent \ N ***
Capable / / ***





Caring - - **
Co-operative
' *
Attractive rrrr^-^r^^^~ * * *
Stable - - ** *
Friendly n.s.
(r) = items reverse scored
'Before my stroke' mean scores:
* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001
'Now I've had my stroke' mean scores:
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12.7: Beliefs in recovery and recurrence at follow-up
12.7i: Recovery locus ofcontrol atfollow-up
A slightly lower mean recovery locus of control score was obtained (please see Table
12.3, and Table 10.4) suggesting that participants had tended to become slightly less
'internal'; however, this difference was not significant, t = 1.46, n.s. Scores on this
measures was not obtained for eleven participants because they felt they had
recovered fully and so their responses would be hypothetical.
12.7ii: Confidence in recovery atfollow-up
This was the only variable for which a significant change between baseline and time
two was observed (please see Table 12.3 and Table 12.4). The lower mean and
median score now indicated that participants were generally less confident in making
a full recovery at this nine month stage, t = 5.49, p<.001. This was despite eleven
participants' opinion that they were already fully recovered, and the decision to give
them a score of ten out of ten for confidence in recovery.
12.7iii: Fear of recurrence atfollow-up
Descriptive data indicated a general decrease in fears of another stroke (please see
Table 12.3 and Table 10.4); however, this tendency was not quite statistically
significant, t = 1.76, p<.12. The distribution of scores was normal suggesting an
even spread of concern across participants. This was also reflected in the results for
item 6 'I worry about my stroke returning', which was considered most direct. At
this stage just under half of participants (36/81; 44%) agreed or strongly agreed with
this item, compared to over half at baseline.
Factor analysis produced two factors which accounted for 58% of the variance:
- Concern about health, particularly for the future
Worried feelings about health and the possibility of stroke
This solution was fairly different from that found at baseline (please see Appendix C,
Table CI 1). Instead of emphasising a difference between thoughts and worry about
health and stroke, these factors appear to distinguish between the more immediate
experience of concern, and concern for the more distant future.
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13.1: Resume of the hypotheses
Examination of associations with distress at follow-up relates to the following main
hypothesis and specific hypotheses:
Main hypothesis
1) A significant relationship between emotional distress and beliefs would be
found at a later point in time [at follow-up].
It was expected that the main hypotheses would be fulfilled even once demographic
and social background factors had been taken into account
Specific hypotheses
1) Certain negative attributions Tat follow-up]:
- Lower sense of control over causes
- Higher frequency of asking 'Why me?'
- A failure to find meaning in the experience
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at follow-up]
2) More negative self-evaluations [at follow-up];
Lower acceptance of ones' disability
A more negative change in identity
Higher shame
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at follow-up]
3) More negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence [at follow-up].
Lower sense of control over recovery
Lower confidence in recovery
Higher fear of recurrence
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at follow-up].
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13.2: Statistical considerations at baseline
75.2/: Consideration ofnormality ofdistributions atfollow-up
As illustrated previously the dependent variable distress is fairly positively skewed
to the left, but also fairly flat (please see Chapter 12, section 12.2i). Having sought
statistical advice (Lewis, 2003; personal communication), I decided that on balance
it was best to leave the dependent variable in its original form for continuity with
baseline and for the same statistical considerations described at baseline (please see
Chapter 11, section 11,2i)
Histograms of all background and belief variables relevant to the main hypotheses
are illustrated in Appendix E, section E.3 and E.4. As can be seen, few variables
produced idealised normal distributions. Similarly to baseline, the most skewed
continuous independent variables were:
Barthel index (Extremely negatively skewed)





Following statistical advice (Lewis, 2003; personal communication) I decided to
treat these variables in the same way as I had at baseline. Therefore, the first five
listed here were dichotomised using the same cut-offs as at baseline (please see
Chapter 11, section 11,2i) However, negative identity change was not dichotomised
to maintain consistency in the treatment of this variable within the study.
13.2U: Homogeneity ofvariance in arrays
Follow-up data was checked for outliers as described previously (see Chapter 11,
section 11,2ii) and the highest and lowest values of each variable were found to be
accurate. Scatter-plots were produced and are illustrated in Appendix E, sections E7
and E8. These were examined visually for biasing effects toward type I or type II
errors from extreme values.
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Regarding background variables, some changes in the data were observed from
baseline. There was more variability in distress by age, particularly amongst
younger to middle-aged participants, who tended to report particularly high or low
distress. As the vast majority of participants were older, this apparent polarisation in
emotional adjustment for younger stroke survivors was likely to be suppressed in the
following analyses. The scatter-plot for stroke severity suggested a tendency for a
stronger relationship between stroke severity and distress at the higher end of the
stroke severity spectrum. However, due to the relatively small numbers of
participants with severe stroke, this relationship may also be suppressed in this
study. Similarly, the scatter-plot for life events shows that participants with very
high distress did tend to report a life event at follow-up; however this was likely to
be suppressed by large numbers of participants reporting a life event with low to
moderate distress. These differences amongst sub-groups were interesting and
created some lack of homogeneity in arrays for these variables. However, the small
numbers of participants involved meant that this was unlikely to strongly skew
correlative or regression results.
Regarding, belief variables, the scatter plots generally portray more lawful linear
relationships than they did at baseline. The scatter-plot for shame seemed to be
particularly less subject to skewing by extreme values. The most heterogeneity in
arrays was seen for causal controllability, which was less variable for the high end of
the distress spectrum than for the low end. However, as most participants' scores
fell in the middle, heterogeneous variance was not a problem for most. Outliers
were most apparent for identity change and recovery locus of control and identity
change; however extreme values puling the data one way seemed to be
counterbalanced by other extreme values pulling the data in the opposite direction.
Therefore, on balance heterogeneity of variance in arrays did not seem too
problematic for this data set.
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13.3: Hypothesis testing at follow-up stage 1: Correlations between follow-up
belief and background variables by follow-up distress
13.3i: Univariate correlations between follow-up beliefvariables andfollow-up
distress
Univariate correlative relationships between belief variables and distress were first
tested with Pearson correlations and the results are displayed in Table 13.1. Please
refer to the hypotheses in section 13.1 for the expected direction of relationships
between individual belief variables and distress
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Small associations, but with high values of statistical significance were found
between distress and a lower sense of control over causes, and a greater frequency of
continuing to ask 'Why me?'. However, distress levels were not statistically
significantly associated with whether or not participants reported having 'Found
meaning' in the experience at this nine-month stage.
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative .self-evaluations
As shown in Table 13.1, large associations between distress and variables indicating
a more negative view of self were found. Extremely strong relationships between
distress and acceptance of disability and negative identity change were found.
However, similarly to baseline, these two variables were again highly inter-
correlated (see later). A fairly high univariate correlation between distress and the
perception that others saw one negatively (shame) was also found. All these
associations were statistically significant.
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Distress levels were not statistically significantly associated with recovery locus of
control; however a trend for greater distress with lower levels of internality was
seen. Lacking confidence in one's recovery was moderately and statistically
significantly associated with distress. A fairly high and statistically significant
association between distress and fear of recurrence was found.
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Table 13.1: Associations between follow-up belief variables and distress relating





Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Causal controllability -.39 .0001***
'Why me?' .32 .004**
'Found meaning?' -.10 .358





Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in
recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control 1








1 Eleven participants believed they had now fully recovered. They could not be assessed for locus of control so this
correlation was based on just seventy participants They were scored as fully confident in recovery and included in this
correlation calculation.
To control for violations of parametric assumptions, associations were also tested
using Spearman's Rho. Extremely similar results were obtained (please see
Appendix G, section G.3ii).
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To further explore the use of the depression and anxiety sub-scales of the HADs as a
combined global distress measure, correlations for the separate depression and
anxiety sub-scales were also conducted and the results are displayed in Table 13.2
Table 13.2: Associations between follow-up belief variables and HADs
depression, and follow-up belief variables and HADs anxiety relating to specific
hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 using Pearson correlations (N = 81, unless indicated
otherwise)
HADs depression scores HADs anxiety scores







Causal controllability -.24 .029* -.41 .0001***
'Why me?' .21 .056 .24 .032*
'Found meaning?' -.16 .362 -.02 .913
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative
selfevaluations
Acceptance of disability -.70 .0001*** -.64 .0001***
Identity change .71 .0001*** .63 .0001***
Shame .57 .0001*** .50 .0001***
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative
beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control 1 -.36 .004** -.13 .280
Confidence in recovery 1 -.36 .001*** -.28 .011*
Recurrence fear .48 .0001*** .57 .0001***
1 Eleven participants believed they had now fully recovered. They could not be assessed for locus of control so this
correlation was based on just seventy participants. They were scored as fully confident in recovery and included in this
correlation calculation.
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In general, the pattern of results found for the individual depression and anxiety
subscales were very similar to the results found for the global measure of distress.
However, a few exceptions can be seen. A moderate and highly statistically
significant correlation for causal controllability and anxiety was found (r = -.41,
p<.0001) but a lower and less statistically significant association for depression (r =
-.29, p = .029). Neither depression or anxiety was statistically significantly
associated with 'Found meaning?', however the lack of a relationship was more
evident for anxiety. While an almost null relationship between locus of control and
anxiety was found, a negative association between greater levels of internality and
depression was actually significant (r = -.34, p = .004).
In general a high level of interdependence between depression and anxiety
symptoms was indicated by these results and so using the global measure of distress
for the subsequent multivariate regression analyses seems generally reasonable. It is
recognised that the low but significant relationship between a less internal locus of
control and depression would not be taken into account in the regression analyses
due to the lack of a significant relationship at the p<.05 level between this variable
and global distress. Therefore, the 'stricter' analysis was rerun including recovery
locus of control, and the essentially the same results in terms of variables remaining
in the equation were found.
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13.3H: Univariate correlations between follow-up background variables and
follow-up distress
Association between background variables and distress were first examined using
Pearson correlations, and are displayed in Table 13.3. As can be seen, a statistically
significant result was only found for one demographic variable, showing that female
participants were more likely to report higher distress levels.
Table 13.3: Associations between follow-up background variables and distress
using Pearson correlations (N = 81, unless indicated otherwise)
Distress (Global HADs p value
scores)
Demographic variables
Age (in years) -.14 .224
Gender .25 .024*
Deprivation: Carstairs index .01 .948
Other background variables
Stroke severity 1 .24 .036*
Disability: Barthel index -.22 .054
Disability: Nottingham index -.27 .015*
Social support -.17 .134
Life events .04 .707
Pre-stroke history of depression .42 .0001***
1
Stroke severity scores were missing for three of the participants seen at follow-up, and so this
correlation was based on just seventy-eight participants.
A small, yet statistically significant association between stroke severity measured
within a few days of the event and distress levels at this later follow-up was found.
Participants' self-reported basic disability measured by the Barthel index did not
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quite produce a statistically significant association with distress; however their
extended ADL disability measured by the Nottingham index did. Neither of the
more social variables, life events, or social support were found to be statistically
significant. The strongest association for the background variables was found
between present distress levels and reports of having been depressed during life
before the stroke.
To control for violations of parametric assumptions, associations between the
background variables and distress were also tested using Spearman's Rho. The
results were generally similar (please see Appendix G, section G.3ii).
Associations between background variables and the individual HADs depression and
anxiety sub-scales were also examined and the results are displayed in Table 13.4.
A fairly similar pattern of results for the individual depression and anxiety subscales
as for the global measure of distress was found. However some minor differences
were seen. Overall, demographic variables were more associated with anxiety than
depression. Similarly to global distress, there was no relationship between age and
depression, however, younger age showed a tendency to associate with anxiety
scores. Gender was statistically significantly associated with anxiety, but only
showed a tendency to associate with depression.
Stroke severity not only showed a tendency to associate with depression but was
statistically significantly associated with anxiety. Barthel and Nottingham index
disability scores were associated with depression at a statistically significant level
but not with anxiety.
Similarly to results for global distress, no associations for either social support or
life events were found with depression or anxiety. Also, the strongest most
statistically significant association for both depression and anxiety was found for
reports of a pre-stroke history of depression.
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Table 13.4: Associations between follow-up background variables and HADs
depression and follow-up background variables and HADs anxiety using
Pearson correlations (N = 81, unless indicated otherwise)







Age (in years) -.04 .745 -.21 .057
Gender .19 .092 .27 .015*
Deprivation: Carstairs index - .04 .707 .06 .628
Other background variables
Stroke severity 1 .19 .096 .24 .032*
Disability: Barthel index - .25 .023* -.14 .204
Disability: Nottingham index -.29 .008** -.20 .071
Social support -.15 .175 -.15 .177
Life events .03 .815 .05 .637
Pre-stroke history of depression .43 .0001*** .35 .001***
Stroke severity scores were missing for three of the participants seen at follow-up, and so this
correlation was based on just seventy-eight participants
Overall, a fair level of correspondence for associations of the background variables
with the depression subscale, with the anxiety subscale, and with the global measure
of distress was seen at follow-up.
Chapter 13: Associations with distress atfollow-up
200 Results
13.3 in: Comment on the univariate correlative results atfollow-up in relation to the
hypotheses
Overall, the main hypothesis was supported by these results as statistically
significant small to large associations between distress and most belief variables
(seven out of nine) were found.
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
This hypothesis was partially supported at follow-up by statistically significant
associations between distress and two attributional variables: causal controllability
and 'Why me?'. However, in contrast, whether or not participants had 'Found
meaning?' did not appear related to distress. A generally low rate of reporting of
having 'Found meaning?' was observed at follow-up (please see Chapter 12, section
12.5iv) and this may partly explain its lack of association with distress.
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative self-evaluations
This hypothesis was strongly supported at follow-up at the univariate correlation
level which found large and statistically significant associations between distress
and all three self-evaluative variables: acceptance of disability, negative identity
change and shame. However, these variables were all significantly inter-correlated
(please see Appendix G, section G.2, Table G.2) which threw some doubt on their
ability to produce independent association with distress when tested together in the
subsequent multivariate regression analyses.
Specific hypothesis 3: Negatives beliefs in recovery and recurrence
This hypothesis was partially supported at follow-up by statistically significant
associations between distress and confidence in recovery and recurrence fear.
However, association between recovery locus of control and distress was not found.
Participants' own sense of control over recovery may simply be less relevant at this
stage now most recovery has taken place and some even believe they are recovered.
Background variables were found to associate statistically significantly with distress
less often and to produce lower correlations than belief variables. The only
moderately sized association between a background variable and distress at follow-
up was for a pre-stroke history of depression. Nevertheless gender and disability
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measured by both the Barthel and Nottingham index were consistently associated
with distress at follow-up at a statistically significant level. A less consistent
relationship was seen for stroke severity, that produced a statistically significant
association only using the parametric method.
Overall, univariate correlations at follow-up suggest a generally stronger
relationship between the belief variables and distress as compared to the background
variables and distress in terms of the number, size, significance levels and
consistency of associations. However, these results do not take into account the
possibility that associations between the belief variables and distress may be
confounded by the background variables. To test the hypotheses more strictly,
associations between the belief variables and distress needed to be tested with the
background variables taken into account.
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13.4: Hypothesis testing at foliow-up stage 2: Multiple regression analyses for
distress at follow-up
13.41: Multi-collinearity considerations atfollow-up
Prior to conducting the analysis, the belief and background variables were examined
for multi-collinearity. As can be seen in Appendix G, section G.2, Table G.2) a fair
degree of multi-collinearity was observed, but most of these correlations were low
enough to be considered unproblematic. Similarly to baseline, the highest inter-
correlation amongst background variables was found between the two measures of
disability (r = .77, p<.0001). Again, similarly to baseline, some multi-collinearity
was observed between belief variables, in particular a strong correlation between
acceptance of disability and negative identity change (r = -.75, p<.0001). Therefore
the issues surrounding multi-collinearity were relevant to both methods of variable
selection and the same as those discussed at baseline (please see Chapter 11, section
11.4i).
13.4U: Resume ofthe 'univariate' and 'stricter' regression method
As discussed previously, the backward stepwise method was chosen to
simultaneously examine the association between follow-up belief and background
variables with follow-up distress (please see Chapter 7). As before, a typical
'univariate' method of variable selection using only those variables with statistically
significant univariate correlations with distress, seemed reasonable due to
considerations of power and the number of participants. However, in recognition of
the position of some statisticians (Altman, 1991), I also conducted a second 'stricter'
analysis that included all background variables throughout.
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13.4iii: Results for the 'univariate' multiple regression analyses atfollow-up
The result of the preliminary analysis which included all eleven belief and
background variables with univariate statistically significant correlations with
distress is presented in Table 13.5. Overall this model was highly significant, R =
.75, p<.0001, which suggests that over half the variance in distress scores was
accounted for by these variables. As seen in Table 13.5, a pre-stroke history of
depression and two of the belief variables produced statistically significant t values
and larger partial correlations in this model.
Table 13.5: Preliminary regression model for follow-up distress using follow-up background
and belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate correlations





Gender .58 .97 .60 .551 .04
Stroke severity2 .00 .15 -.12 .904 -.01
Disability: Barthel index .14 1.30 .11 .913 .01
Disability: Nottingham index 1.62 1.39 1.17 .248 -.07
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.03 1.21 2.72 .008*** .17
Beliefvariables: 1
Causal controllability -.80 .62 -1.27 .208 -.08
'Why me?' .97 1.02 .95 .345 .06
Acceptance of disability -.36 .16 -2.21 .031* -.14
Negative identity change .27 .08 3.24 002*** .20
Shame .00 .14 .30 .766 .02
Confidence in recovery .00 1.01 -.08 .936 -.005
Recurrence fear .21 .11 1.92 .060 .12
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients












A large and highly statistically significant final regression model for follow-up
distress R2 = .73, p<.0001 was found with this 'univariate' method and is illustrated
in Table 13.6. As can be seen, the variables remaining were those that had been
statistically significant in the preliminary analysis, and also recurrence fear.
Table 13.6: Final regression model for follow-up distress using follow-up background and belief
variables that had produced significant univariate correlations and that remained statistically
significant after the backward regression procedure
B 1 Std. error t Significance of t Partial
Correlation
Background variables:
Pre-stroke history of depression 4.15 .95 4.38 .0001*** .45
Beliefvariables:
Acceptance of disability -.39 .09 -.4.28 .0001*** -.44
Negative identity change .23 .08 3.09 .003** .33
Recurrence fear .26 .10 2.64 .01** .29
' Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on
seventy-eight rather than eighty-one participants
Comment on the 'univariate' regression results in relation to the hypotheses will be
made in section 13.5.
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13.4iv: Results for the 'stricter' multiple regression analyses atfollow-up
The backward stepwise regression procedure was repeated, except this time all
background variables were included at each stage regardless of significance. The
results of the preliminary analysis produced a highly statistically significant overall
model: R2 = .76, p<.0001, and is detailed in Table 13.7 below.
Table 13.7: Preliminary regression model for follow-up distress using all follow-up background
variables and follow-up belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate
correlations with distress
B 1 Std. error t Significance of t Partial
Correlation
Background variables:
Age .00 .05 -1.43 .157 -.18
Gender .23 1.02 .22 .823 .03
Deprivation: Carstairs index .00 .30 .27 .792 .03
Stroke severity 2 .11 .16 -.70 .486 -.09
Disability: Barthel index .00 1.37 .07 .948 .01
Disability: Nottingham index .74 1.54 .48 .630 .06
Social support -.00 .02 -.91 .369 -.12
Life events -.00 .91 .00 .998 -.00
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.11 1.25 2.49 .016* .31
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -.87 .65 -1.36 .180 -.17
'Why me?' .79 1.06 .74 .460 .10
Acceptance of disability -.40 .17 -2.40 .019* -.30
Negative identity change .25 .09 2.88 .005** .35
Shame -.00 .14 -.02 .988 -.00
Confidence in recovery -.21 1.06 -.20 .844 -.03
Recurrence fear .21 .11 1.90 .063 .24
Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on seventy-eight rather than
eighty-one participants
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The least significant belief variables were systematically removed until all in the
model were significant at the p<.05 level. However, background variables






The overall final model for this 'stricter' method was large and highly statistically
significant: R2 = .75, p<.0001.
Table 13.8: Final regression model for follow-up distress using all follow-up background
variables and follow-up belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate
correlations with distress and that remained statistically significant after the backward
regression procedure
B' Std. t Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Background variables:
Age .00 .05 -1.19 .237 -.15
Gender .30 .95 .31 .755 .04
Deprivation: Carstairs index .18 .29 .62 .541 .08
Stroke severity 2 -.11 .16 -.72 .476 .09
Disability: Barthel index -.12 1.31 -.10 .925 .01
Disability: Nottingham index 1.04 1.48 .70 .485 .09
Social support .00 .02 -1.13 .264 -.14
Life events .00 .85 .05 .957 -.01
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.73 1.07 3.49 .001*** .40
Beliefvariables:
Acceptance of disability -.44 .10 -4.41 .0001*** -.48
Negative identity change .24 .08 2.86 .006** .33
Recurrence fear .24 .11 2.29 .025* .27
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on seventy
- eight rather than eighty - one participants
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13.5: Comment on the multiple regression results for follow-up distress using
follow-up belief and background variables in relation to the hypotheses
The first main hypothesis that beliefs and distress would associate was tested in
analyses that took associations between background variables and distress into
account.
Highly statistically significant and large regression models were produced for
follow-up distress. Only extremely slight differences in the size of models exist
between the 'univariate' and 'stricter' method and preliminary and final models.
Also, regardless of how other variables were controlled for, just four variables were
consistently found to independently enter these regression models at a statistically
significant level. Therefore these four variables alone appear able to account for
practically as much of the variance in follow-up distress levels as all variables taken
together. Of these just one was a background variable (pre-stroke history of
depression) and three were belief variables (acceptance of disability, negative
identity change and recurrence fear).
These results offer strong support to the main hypothesis, as a relationship between
emotional distress and certain beliefs was found to be both highly statistically
significant and relatively un-confounded by background variables. However,
support for the specific hypotheses was more patchy.
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Once all variables were taken into account, this hypothesis failed to be supported at
follow-up. Statistically significant associations between distress and causal
controllability and 'Why me?' had been found at the univariate level; however they
failed to remain in the regression analyses.
Specific hypothesis 2: Self-evaluations
Once all variables were taken into account the hypothesis that self-evaluations and
distress would be related was strongly but partially supported. Despite being highly
inter-correlated, both acceptance of disability and negative identity change were
found to produce highly statistically significant associations with distress in the
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follow-up regression analyses. However, shame failed to contribute to follow-up
distress at a statistically significant level once other variables were taken into
account. It was very highly inter-correlated with acceptance of disability (r=.75,
p<.0001) and so therefore possibly at a statistical disadvantage.
Specific hypothesis 3: Beliefs to recovery and recurrence
Once other variables were taken into account these results clearly failed to support
the first half of this hypothesis- that beliefs in recovery would be related to distress
at follow-up. However, the regression results firmly support the second half of this
hypothesis - that fear of recurrence and distress would be statistically significantly
related at follow-up.
In summary, these results suggest that at follow-up distress was associated with a
sense that one had changed for the worse as a person, being unable to accept ones
reduced capabilities and also, ongoing fears of having further strokes. These results
appear to be statistically independent of confounding by background variables.
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14.1: Resume of the hypotheses
Prediction of distress at follow-up relates to the second main hypothesis and specific
hypotheses:
2) Beliefs found at baseline would predict emotional distress at follow-up
It was expected that the main hypotheses would be fulfilled even once demographic
and social background factors had been taken into account
Specific hypotheses
1) Certain negative attributions Tat baseline]:
- Lower sense of control over causes
- Higher frequency of asking 'Why me?'
- A failure to find meaning in the experience
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at follow-up]
2) More negative self-evaluations [at baseline]!
Lower acceptance of ones' disability
A more negative change in identity
Higher shame
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at follow-up]
3) More negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence [at baseline].
Lower sense of control over recovery
Lower confidence in recovery
Higher fear of recurrence
would be associated with higher levels of emotional distress [at follow-up].
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14.2: Statistical considerations from baseline to follow-up
There was little participant attrition during the study (eighty-nine participants at
baseline and eighty-one at follow-up). The same statistical issues, advice and
decisions for the treatment of distress at follow-up made earlier were applicable to
the testing of the hypotheses across time (please see Chapter, 13.2i). Histograms
and descriptive statistics of baseline belief and background variables were examined
using only those who participated at follow-up and distributions were observed to be
extremely similar to those found with all eighty-nine baseline participants (please
see Appendix E, sections E.l and E.2). Therefore, the same comments made earlier
applied at follow-up, as did the same decisions regarding dichotomising the most
skewed variables (please see Chapter 11, section 11.2i).
Scatter-plots of follow-up distress by baseline background variables and belief
variables by follow-up distress were produced and are displayed in Appendix E,
sections E.9 and E.10. Regarding background variables, more variability in distress
was observed amongst younger participants, but their small numbers suggested that
this would be suppressed in subsequent analyses. Otherwise little heterogeneity of
arrays was observed.
Regarding belief variables compared to cross-sectional scatter-plots, in which causal
controllability tended towards a funnel shape in its relationship to distress, the
scatter- plot for baseline causal controllability and follow-up distress was step
shaped with an absence of points in the top right corner (please see Appendix E,
section E.10). Follow-up distress levels varied widely when baseline causal
controllability scores were low to moderate, but were less varied and on the low side
when baseline causal controllability scores were high. Therefore, any statistically
significant association found between baseline causal controllability and follow-up
distress is likely to be attributable to this minority who reported a greater sense of
control over causes at one month. Similarly to the baseline shame by baseline
distress scatter-plot, this baseline shame to follow-up distress scatter-plot lacked
homogeneity (please see Chapter 11, section 11,2ii for relevant comments).
However, there appeared to be less of a 'blip' to the top right corner; similar distress
levels were seen in relation to the lowest and highest baseline shame scores.
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Therefore, although this relationship did not appear linearly lawful, it did not seem
to pose much threat of a type II error.
14.3: Hypothesis testing from baseline to follow-up stage 1: Correlations
between baseline belief and background variables with follow-up distress
14.3i: Univariate correlations between baseline beliefvariables withfollow-up
distress
Univariate correlative relationships between belief variables and distress were first
tested with Pearson correlations and the results are displayed in Table 14.1. Please
refer to the hypotheses in section 14.1 for the expected direction of relationships
between individual belief variables and distress. Small to moderate significant
associations were found between two thirds of the baseline belief variables and
follow-up distress.
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Associations between both causal controllability and 'Why me?' at baseline and
distress at follow-up were small but statistically significant. However, whether or
not participants had reported having found meaning at one month appeared to have
little bearing on their levels of distress nine months following stroke.
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative self-evaluations
Both acceptance of disability and negative identity change at baseline were found to
produce reasonably moderate statistically significant correlations with follow-up
levels of distress. However baseline shame failed to significantly predict follow-up
distress at a statistically acceptable level.
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Participants' early sense of personal responsibility for their recovery (i.e. internal
locus of control levels) did not predict distress at nine months. However, baseline
confidence in recovery was inversely related to follow-up distress at a statistically
significant level. Fears of recurrence reported at one month also appeared to predict
later distress in a small but statistically significant way.
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Table 14.1: Associations between baseline belief variables and follow-up




Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Causal controllability -.36 .001***
'Why me?' .21 .045*
'Found meaning?' -.14 .197
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative
selfevaluations
Acceptance of disability -.46 <0001***
Negative identity change .43 <0001***
Shame .21 .057
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in
recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control -.14 .220
Confidence in recovery -.39 <.0001***
Recurrence fear .24 .028*
To control for violations of parametric assumptions, associations were also tested
using Spearman's Rho. Extremely similar results were obtained (please see
Appendix G, section G.3iii, Table G.7)
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To further explore the use of the depression and anxiety subscales of the HADs as a
combined global distress measure, correlations for the individual subscales were also
calculated. These are displayed in Table 14.2.
Table 14.2: Associations between baseline belief variables and follow-up HADs
depression, and baseline belief variables and follow-up HADs anxiety relating
to specific hypotheses 1,2 and 3 using Pearson correlations (>1=81)
HADs depression scores HADs anxiety scores







Causal controllability -.30 .007** -.35 .001**
'Why me?' .14 .212 .25 .024*
'Found meaning?' -.16 .145 -.11 .344
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative
self- evaluations
Acceptance of disability -.46 <0001*** -.43 <0001***
Identity change .36 .001*** .43 <0001***
Shame .28 .012* .12 .286
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative
beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control -.18 .101 -.08 .508
Confidence in recovery -.40 <0001*** -.31 .005**
Recurrence fear .17 .140 .28 .011
The results for the individual depression and anxiety subscales were similar to those
found with the global distress measure. However, a statistically significant
association between baseline shame and follow-up depression was found, whereas,
the association between baseline 'Why me?' and follow-up depression was not
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statistically significant. Also, the correlation between baseline recurrence fear and
follow-up anxiety was larger and statistically significant, but the correlation between
baseline recurrence fear and follow-up depression was lower and statistically
insignificant. Overall, a high degree of correspondence between results for the
depression and anxiety subscales and the global measure was seen. This suggests
that subsequent analysis using the global distress measure would reflect both
depression and anxiety symptoms well.
14.3U: Univariate correlations between baseline background variables andfollow-
up distress
Associations between baseline background variables and follow-up distress were
first examined using Pearson correlations and are displayed in Table 14.3. As can
be seen, a slight but statistically significant association between follow-up distress
and one demographic variable, gender, was found. A small yet statistically
significant association was found for stroke severity. However, self-reported
baseline disability was inconsistently associated with follow-up distress. The more
basic Barthel index did not produce a statistically significant association, but the
extended ADL Nottingham index did produce a trend.
Associations between baseline background variables and follow-up distress were
also tested using the non-parametric method. The results were generally similar
(please see Appendix G, section G.3iii, Table G.8).
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Table 14.3: Associations between baseline background variables and follow-up
distress using Pearson correlations (N = 81 unless indicated otherwise)
Distress (Global p value
HADs scores)
Demographic variables
Age (in years) -.14 .224
Gender .25 .024*
Deprivation: Carstairs index .01 .948
Other background variables
Stroke severity .24 .036*
Disability: Barthel index -.15 .188
Disability: Nottingham index -.20 .067
Social support -.17 .134
Life events .17 .130
Pre-stroke history of depression .42 <0001***
Stroke severity scores were only available for seventy-eight participants seen at follow-up
Associations between baseline background variables the individual follow-up HADs
depression and anxiety subscales were also examined and are displayed in Table
14.4.
Associations between pre-stroke history of depression with both the anxiety and
depression sub-scales were both of high significance and this was consistent with the
results found for overall distress. However, gender and stroke severity were
significantly correlated with anxiety but not with depression, while the reverse was
found for Nottingham index disability.
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Table 14.4: Associations between baseline background variables and follow-up
HADs depression and baseline background variables and follow-up HADs
anxiety using Pearson correlations (N = 81 unless indicated otherwise)







Age (in years) -.04 .745 -.21 .057
Gender .19 .092 .27 .015*
Deprivation: Carstairs index -.04 .707 .06 .628
Other background variables
Stroke severity 1 .19 .096 .24 .032*
Disability: Barthel index -.19 .085 -.08 .482
Disability: Nottingham index -.23 .042* -.15 .188
Social support -.15 .175 -.15 .177
Life events .11 .312 .20 .079
Pre-stroke history of depression .43 <0001*** .35 .001***
Stroke severity scores were only available for seventy-eight participants seen at follow-up
Overall associations between these baseline background variables and follow-up
anxiety and depression varied quite a bit in terms of significance levels. However,
this is not surprising given their small sizes. The size of associations and the
baseline background variables that did produce statistically significant correlations
across the parametric and non-parametric analyses with distress and the parametric
analyses with anxiety and depression were fairly consistent.
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14.3iii: Comment on univariate correlative results for baseline beliefand
background variables andfollow-up distress in relation to the hypotheses
The main hypothesis was supported by the univariate results, as six out of nine
baseline belief variables were consistently associated with follow-up distress.
However, the size of correlations tended to be smaller than those found for the cross-
sectional baseline and follow-up results (please see Chapters 11 and 13).
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
This hypothesis was partially supported. A baseline belief in control over causes
was positively predictive and asking 'Why me?' was statistically negatively
predictive of follow-up levels of distress using univariate associations. However, no
statistically predictive association was seen between baseline attributions of meaning
and follow-up distress.
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative self- evaluations
This hypothesis was also partially supported. Baseline levels of acceptance
regarding one's disability were inversely related to follow-up distress. The belief
that one had changed for the worst (negative identity change) was positively related
to distress levels at nine months. Both at levels of statistical significance. However,
baseline shame scores were not associated with follow-up distress at a statistically
significant level.
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence
Again only partial support was found for this hypothesis. Baseline recovery locus of
control was not associated with follow-up distress levels. However, participants'
reported degree of confidence that they would eventually make a full recovery
measured at one month did inversely associate with subsequent distress at nine
months at a statistically significant level. These univariate results also support the
idea that baseline fears of recurrent strokes were predictive of follow-up distress.
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Background variables
Participants who reported having experienced depression at some point in life before
their stroke were found to be more distressed nine months following their stroke.
This was shown by firm statistically significant correlation coefficients with follow-
up anxiety and depression and global distress scores. Gender also correlated with
follow-up emotional distress at a statistically significant level. Stroke severity
produced a statistically significant correlation with the parametric method and
Nottingham index scores with the non-parametric method. The results showed some
inconsistency dependent on parametric versus non-parametric method with distress,
and use of anxiety versus depression sub-scale scores. Overall baseline background
variables were less associated with follow-up distress than baseline belief variables.
Nevertheless to test the hypotheses fully, associations between the baseline belief
variables and follow-up distress needed to be tested with the baseline background
variables taken into account.
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14.4: Hypothesis testing from baseline to follow-up stage 2: Multiple
regression
analyses for follow-up distress using baseline variables
14.4i: Multi-collinearity considerations for baseline variables with follow-up
sample
Inter-correlations between baseline belief and background variables were examined
for this follow-up sample of eighty-one participants. The results were almost
identical to those found using the full baseline sample of eighty-nine participants
(please see Appendix G, section G.l, Table G.l). All significance levels were
identical and the size of correlation coefficients were either identical or they differed
by a decimal place. Therefore the previous discussion regarding issues of multi-
collinearity is applicable now (please see Chapter 11, section 11.4i). However,
because disability measured by the Barthel index was not univariately associated
with distress, its multi-collinearity with the Nottingham index measure was not
relevant to the 'univariate' analyses. Also, the inclusion of stroke severity in the
'univariate' method is recognised as potentially controversial as a significant
association with follow-up distress was not found with the non-parametric method.
However, its inclusion errs towards a stricter test of the belief variables.
14.4ii: Results for the 'univariate' multiple regression analyses forfollow-up
distress using baseline beliefand background variables
Results of the preliminary 'univariate' method that included only the six belief
variables and three background variables found significant with Pearson correlations
is displayed in Table 14.5. Overall this model was highly significant but smaller in
size than cross-sectional models, R = .47, p<.0001,
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A pre-stroke history of depression was the only background variable that was
significant in this equation. Just two belief variables were found to be significant.
Of these, causal controllability was the strongest. The self-evaluation variable
acceptance of disability was also significant, but only at the p<.05 level.
Table 14.5: Preliminary regression model for follow-up distress using baseline background and
belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate correlations (N = 78 2)
B1 Std. t Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Background variables:
Gender 1.91 1.32 1.45 .152 .13
Stroke severity2 .17 .20 .83 .409 .07
Pre-stroke history of depression 5.18 1.50 .34 .001*** .30
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -2.18 .68 -.30 .002** -.28
'Why me?' .00 1.33 -.01 .947 -.01
Acceptance of disability -.31 .15 -.27 .044* -.18
Negative identity change .00 .10 .01 .916 .01
Confidence in recovery -1.61 1.51 -.11 .288 -.09
Recurrence fear .00 .15 .01 .961 .00
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on seventy-eight rather than
eighty-one participants
The backward regression process was executed until a model in which all variables
were significant at the p<.05 level was produced. The variables that were
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A highly statistically significant but modestly sized final model was obtained, R2
=.43, pc.OOOl, in which just one background variable and two belief variables
remained. These variables (pre-stroke history of depression, causal controllability
and acceptance of disability) were those significant in the preliminary model.
Table 14.6: Final model for follow-up distress using baseline background and belief variables
that had produced statistically significant univariate correlations and which remained
statistically significant after the backward regression procedure (N = 81)
B1 Std. t Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Background variables:
Pre-stroke history of depression 5.66 1.30 4.37 <.0001*** .45
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -1.97 .62 -3.16 .002** -.34
Acceptance of disability -.43 10 -4.38 <.0001*** -.46
' Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
Comment on the 'univariate' results for prediction of follow-up distress using
baseline variables will be made in section 14.6i
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14.4iii: Resultsfor the 'stricter' multiple regression analysesforfollow-up distress
using baseline beliefand background variables
For a more strict test of the hypotheses, prediction of follow-up distress was also
studied using all background variables regardless of univariate significance and
baseline belief variables with significant univariate correlations with follow-up
distress. The results of the preliminary model using this 'stricter' method are
illustrated in Table 14.7.
Table 14.7: Preliminary regression model for follow-up distress using all baseline background
variables and those baseline belief variables that had produced statistically significant
univariate correlations (N = 78 2)
B1 Std. t Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Background variables:
Age -.13 .08 -1.75 .085 -.15
Gender 2.27 1.46 1.56 .125 .14
Deprivation: Carstairs index -.22 .41 -.54 .591 -.05
Stroke severity2 .00 .25 -.01 .993 -.00
Disability: Barthel index .98 1.81 .54 .590 .05
Disability: Nottingham index -.99 1.92 .52 .607 -.05
Social support .00 .03 -.98 .332 -.09
Life events 1.62 1.24 1.34 .197 .11
Pre-stroke history of depression 4.58 1.53 . 2.99 .004** .26
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -2.40 .69 -3.05 .001*** -.31
'Why me?' -1.97 1.63 -1.20 .234 -.11
Acceptance of disability -.33 .16 -2.03 047*** -.18
Negative identity change .00 .11 .61 .546 .05
Confidence in recovery -1.06 1.61 -.65 .515 -.06
Recurrence fear .00 .16 .03 .975 .00
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on
seventy-eight rather than eighty-one participants
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Overall this preliminary 'stricter' model was highly significant if not large in size,
R2 = .52, p<.0001.






The final 'stricter' model is illustrated in Table 14.8.
Table 14.8: Final regression model for follow-up distress using all the baseline background
variables and those baseline belief variables that had produced statistically significant
univariate correlations and which remained statistically significant after the backward
regression procedure (N " 78 2)
B1 Std. T Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Background variables:
Age .00 .06 -1.22 .225 -.11
Gender 2.11 1.38 1.54 .128 .13
Deprivation: Carstairs index -.18 .40 -.45 .655 -.04
Stroke severity 2 .12 .22 .54 .591 .05
Disability: Barthel index 1.39 1.72 .81 .420 .07
Disability: Nottingham index -.96 1.87 -.51 .613 -.04
Social support .00 .03 -1.29 .203 -.11
Life events 1.28 1.18 1.09 .282 .09
Pre-stroke history of depression 4.66 1.46 3.20 .002** .28
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -2.44 .67 -3.68 <0001*** -.32
Acceptance of disability -.38 .12 -3.20 .002** -.28
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on
seventy-eight rather than eighty-one participants
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• 2This final 'stricter' model was similar in size to the preliminary model, R = .51,
pc.OOOl, and as shown in Table 14.11, the three significant variables were those
also significant in the preliminary model.
Comment on the 'stricter' results for prediction of follow-up distress using baseline
variables will be made in section 14.6i
14.5: Hypothesis testing from baseline to follow-up stage 3: Hierarchical
multiple regression analyses for follow-up distress using baseline distress and
baseline belief and background variables
14.5i: Resultsfor the 'univariate' hierarchical regression analysesforfollow-up
distress using baseline variables
The following hierarchical analyses were to test whether baseline belief variables
were able to predict follow-up distress once baseline distress, as well as baseline
background variables, were controlled for. Baseline distress was regressed onto
follow-up distress first and then any further variables were added in a second block
and subjected to the backward regression procedure. As described previously
(please see Chapter 12, section 12.2iii) the level of association between baseline
distress and follow-up distress was high (r=.64, p<.0001). This made the likelihood
of other baseline variables being able to 'add anything' further to the prediction of
follow-up distress low. Nevertheless, the following tests were still considered to be
valuable further stringent tests of the hypotheses.
Baseline distress regressed onto follow-up distress to produce a highly significant
model R2 = .41, p<.0001. Following addition of other variables an overall model of
R2 = .53, p<.0001, was produced. Results of the preliminary 'stricter' method are
displayed in Table 14.9.
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As can be seen, in addition to baseline distress, just one background variable (pre-
stroke history of depression) and one belief variable (causal controllability) were
found to be statistically significant.
Table 14.9: Preliminary regression model for follow-up distress using baseline distress and all
the baseline background and belief variables that had produced statistically significant
univariate correlations with follow-up distress (N = 78 2)
B1 Std. t Significance of t Partial
Error Correlation
Baseline distress .41 .15 2.75 .008** .32
Background variables:
Gender 1.26 1.28 .98 .329 .12
Stroke severity2 .23 .20 1.15 .256 .14
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.57 1.55 2.30 .024* .27
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -1.68 .67 -2.51 .015* -.29
'Why me?' .24 1.27 .19 .851 .02
Acceptance of disability 1.23 .15 -1.56 .125 -.19
Negative identity change .00 .10 -.71 .482 -.09
Confidence in recovery -.72 1.47 -.49 .628 -.06
Recurrence fear -.12 .15 -.78 .440 -.09
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on seventy-eight rather than
eighty-one participants
The backward regression process was executed until a model in which all variables
were significant at the p<.05 level was produced. The variables that were










A highly statistically significant but modestly sized final model was produced, R
=.49, p<.0001. This contained baseline distress and the background variable (pre-
stroke history of depression) and belief variable (causal controllability) that were
significant in the preliminary model (please see Table 14.10).
Table 14.10: Final regression model for follow-up distress using baseline distress and all the
background and belief variables that had produced statistically significant univariate
correlations and which remained statistically significant after the backward regression
procedure (N = 81)
B1 Std. t Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Baseline distress .53 .09 5.39 <.0001*** .52
Background variable:
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.20 1.34 2.38 .020* .26
Beliefvariable:
Causal controllability -1.48 .61 -2.43 .017* -.27
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
Comment on the 'univariate' regression results for prediction of follow-up distress
using baseline variables and baseline distress will be made in section 14.6ii
Chapter 14: Prediction offollow-up dish-ess using baseline variables
Results 229
14.5U: Resultsfor the 'stricter' hierarchical regression analyses forfollow-up
distress using baseline variables
The hierarchical process was repeated using the 'stricter' method that used all
baseline background variables regardless of their univariate significance with
follow-up distress.
Table 14.11: Preliminary regression model for follow-up distress using baseline distress, all the
baseline background variables and those baseline belief variables that had produced
statistically significant univariate correlations (N = 78 2)
B1 Std. t Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Baseline distress: .34 .16 2.13 .037* .26
Background variables:
Age -.10 .08 -1.35 .183 -.17
Gender 1.63 1.45 1.12 .266 .14
Deprivation: Carstairs index -.16 .40 -.40 .691 -.05
Stroke severity2 .00 .25 .39 .698 .05
Disability: Barthel index 1.08 1.76 .61 .544 .08
Disability: Nottingham index -.76 1.87 -.41 .685 -.05
Social support .00 .03 -.90 .371 -.12
Life events .80 1.27 .63 .530 .08
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.41 1.59 2.15 .036* .27
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -1.95 .70 -2.79 .007** -.34
'Why me?' -1.14 1.64 -.70 .490 -.09
Acceptance of disability -.27 .16 -1.68 .099 -.21
Negative identity change .00 .11 -.15 .880 -.02
Confidence in recovery -.48 1.59 -.30 .763 -.04
Recurrence fear .11 .16 -.67 .507 -.09
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on seventy-eight rather
than eighty-one participants
Once all baseline background variables and baseline belief variables that were
statistically significant univariate correlates were added to the regression of baseline
distress onto follow-up distress, a model of R2 = .53, p<.0001, was produced.
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Results for individual variables involved in the preliminary 'stricter' hierarchical
analyses are illustrated in Table 14.11. As can be seen, a pre-stroke history of
depression and causal controllability were the only statistically significant variables
other than baseline distress.






The hierarchical 'stricter' method produced a highly statistically significant model,
■j
IT = .53, p<.0001. Results for individual variables are illustrated in Table 14.12. In
addition to baseline distress, both the background variable (pre-stroke history of
depression) and the belief variable (causal controllability) that were statistically
significant in the preliminary analyses were found to remain so.
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Table 14.12: Final regression model for follow-up distress using baseline distress, all baseline
background variables and those baseline belief variables that had produced statistically
significant univariate correlations and which remained statistically significant after the
backward regression procedure (N = 78 2)
B1 Std. t Significance of t Partial
error Correlation
Baseline distress .43 .11 3.76 <0001*** .42
Background variables:
Age .00 .06 -1.21 .231 -.15
Gender 1.24 1.36 .91 .365 .11
Deprivation: Carstairs index -.18 .38 -.47 .637 -.06
Stroke severity2 .20 .21 .96 .341 .12
Disability: Barthel index .80 1.68 .48 .635 .06
Disability: Nottingham index -1.28 1.81 -.71 .481 -.09
Social support .00 .03 -1.07 .288 -.13
Life events .48 1.18 .41 .682 .05
Pre-stroke history of depression 3.06 1.52 2.01 .049* .24
Beliefvariables:
Causal controllability -1.88 .68 -.2.77 .007*** -.32
1 Beta values quoted are the un-standardised coefficients
2 Stroke severity data was missing for three participants, therefore this whole analysis is based on seventy-eight rather than
eighty-one participants
Comment on the 'stricter' regression results for prediction of follow-up distress
using baseline variables and baseline distress will be made in section 14.6ii
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14.6: Comment on the regression analyses for follow-up distress using baseline
variables
14.6i: Comment on the multiple regression analysesforfollow-up distress using
baseline beliefand background variables in relation to the hypotheses
Both the 'univariate' and the 'stricter' methods produced statistically significant
models for follow-up distress using baseline belief and background variables.
However, they were smaller in size than cross-sectional models for distress (please
• • 9
see chapter 11 and chapter 13). The 'univariate' final model of R = .43, suggests
that less than a fifth of variance in follow-up distress was accounted for, while the
'stricter' model of R2 = .51, suggests that just over a quarter was accounted for.
Regardless of how baseline background variables were controlled for, just three
variables (pre-stroke history of depression, causal controllability, acceptance of
disability) were found to enter these regression models at the level of statistical
significance
These results do provide some support for the main hypothesis that participants'
baseline beliefs would predict follow-up distress. However, when each specific
hypothesis is considered in turn, the results are patchy:
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Once baseline variables were considered in combination, just one of three
attributional variables, causal controllability- was able to offer independent
prediction of follow-up distress levels. Therefore, this hypothesis was only partially
and weakly supported.
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative self-evaluations
This hypothesis was also partially and weakly supported as one of three baseline
self-evaluative variables (acceptance of disability) was seen to statistically
significantly contribute to follow-up distress in the regression. Interestingly this
variable was collinear with three background variables (stroke severity, Barthel
index and Nottingham index scores) and appeared to tap elements of all baseline
belief variables other than causal controllability, particularly negative identity
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change (please see Chapter 11, section 11,4i for relevant discussion, Appendix G,
section G.l, Table G.l for inter-correlations).
Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in recovery and recurrence
This hypothesis failed to be supported. Baseline recovery locus of control was not
univariately statistically significantly associated with follow-up distress. Baseline
levels of confidence in recovery and recurrence fear were, however, neither variable
was found significant in the regression analyses.
Overall, as only baseline causal controllability and acceptance of disability out of the
nine belief variables were in the final models, overall support for the second main
hypothesis seems fairly weak. However, the collinearity of acceptance of disability
with all other baseline belief variables except causal controllability (please see
Appendix G, section G.l, Table G.l) is worthy of consideration. Statistically, this
collinearity could have led acceptance of disability to 'overwhelm' these other
variables in the regression analyses. Conceptually, to the extent that other belief
variables, particularly negative identity change, were associated with acceptance of
disability, its position in the final model suggests that they may be involved, as it
were by proxy. The hypothesis that a range of baseline beliefs would predict
follow-up distress is more widely supported by this interpretation of the results. It is
interesting that the reverse pattern of results was found in the cross-sectional
analyses at baseline (please see Chapter 11, section 11.5).
There is good indication that the belief one has little control over perceived causes
of stroke and a sense that one is unable to accept the limitations imposed by the
effects of stroke reported at one month predicted distress at nine months following
stroke.
However, these analyses did not include baseline distress levels. Hierarchical
regression was used to investigate whether belief variables were able to offer any
predictive power additional to baseline distress by repeating these results with the
latter included.
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14.6H: Comment on the hierarchical regression analysesforfollow-up distress
using baseline variables in relation to the hypotheses
Baseline distress regressed onto follow-up distress levels to produce a highly
• 2 •
significant but modestly sized model, R =.41, p<.0001. When other baseline
variables were taken into consideration, small gains in the prediction of follow-up
• « 2 ••••distress were made. An increment of just R =.08 was achieved with the 'univariate'
2 • *2method to give a final model of R =.49, p<.0001. An increment ofjust R =.12,
• 2
<.0001 was achieved with the 'stricter' method to give a final model of R =.53,
p<.0001. Causal controllability was the only baseline belief variable in these final
models.
Overall, support for this more stringent test of the hypothesis that:
2) Beliefs found at baseline would predict emotional distress at follow-up
after having controlled for baseline distress was tenuous. It could be argued that the
hypothesis was supported by the small but consistent and significant independent
relationship seen between causal controllability and follow-up distress. However, it
is recognised that one out of nine variables under consideration represents a fairly
tenuous argument, and may constitute a Type I error.
In terms of the specific hypotheses, these results weakly support specific hypothesis
1 (one out of three variables) but with no statistically significant relevant results
specific hypotheses 2 and 3 were clearly not supported (please see section 14.1 for
the outline of the specific hypotheses).
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14.6iii: Overall comment on the regression analysesforfollow-up distress using
baseline variables
Compared to the robust cross-sectional models of association between belief
variables and distress described in Chapters 11 and 13, these results appear weak.
Baseline belief variables demonstrated only limited success at predicting follow-up
distress, nevertheless causal controllability and acceptance of disability were found
to be predictive. However, once baseline distress levels were taken into account,
only one baseline belief variable (casual controllability) was seen to independently
predict follow-up distress.
Table 14.13: Summary of final regression models for follow-up distress using
baseline variables
Univariate method Stricter method
Baseline belief and background variables R2 =.43 a R2 =.51 b
used as predictors
Baseline distress, baseline belief and R2 =.49 c R2 =.53 d
background variables used as predictors
a Please see section 14.4ii for individual variables included in this model and their relevant results
b Please see section 14.4iii for individual variables included in this model and their relevant results
c Please see section 14.5i for individual variables included in this model and their relevant results
d Please see section 14.5ii for individual variables included in this model and their relevant results
However, on a more positive note, the final hierarchical models that included
baseline distress were not much stronger than those that did not (please see Table
14.13). This is consistent with the finding that baseline belief variables and baseline
distress levels were highly associated (please see Chapter 11, section 11.3). This
issue will be returned to in the discussion.
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The main purposes of this structured clinical interview study were (1) to make DSM
diagnoses (2) to meet objective 5 to:
Explore the types of beliefs and nature of symptoms related to common depression
and anxiety disorders
DSMIV criteria for the chosen disorders were used (APA, 1994). These criteria
were not originally designed to describe the nature of stroke patients' emotional
problems, for example, general medical patients are actually excluded from
diagnostic criteria for social phobia. However, they were considered to be a good
starting point. The process of exploring beliefs accessed by the structured interview
for a specific disorder, effectively went hand in hand with appraising the 'fit'
between pre-determined criteria and stroke related issues. For heuristic purposes
the language of diagnosis will be used. The reader is trusted to understand that this
does not imply that the suitability of diagnostic groupings is unquestioningly
promoted.
An opportunity was taken to develop two subsidiary hypotheses comparing levels of
shame and fears of falling amongst those with specific disorders:
Higher shame scores would be found amongst those with social phobia and
agoraphobia
Higher fears of falling would be found amongst those with agoraphobia
Chapter 15: Description ofemotional disorders and exploration ofbeliefs from the
structured clinical interview
240 Results
15.2: Diagnosis of depression and anxiety disorders at baseline
Forty participants (45%) were diagnosed with an emotional disorder, and the
number and percentage of participants with each specific disorder is illustrated in
Table 15.1. There was a large degree of co-morbidity between depression and
anxiety diagnoses: nine (10%) with just depression, eleven (12%) with just an
anxiety disorder and twenty (23%) with both depression and an anxiety disorder.
Table 15.1: Number and percentage of diagnosed emotional disorders amongst
participants at baseline 1
Emotional disorders (SCID) Number and percent
1: Participants were awarded diagnoses for all disorders in which criteria was met regardless of the












Agoraphobia (with or without panic attacks)
Agoraphobia with panic attacks
Social Phobia
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
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15.3: Depression at baseline
A third (29/89; 33%) of participants were found to be depressed, with approximately
equal proportions of major depression (14/89; 16%) and minor depression (15/89;
17%). Female participants were approximately twice as likely to be diagnosed as
depressed than male participants (17/36 females; 47%: 12/53 males; 23%). As
shown in Table 15.2, females were approximately twice as likely to be diagnosed
with both major and minor depression, and this difference was statistically
significant, y2 = 8.58, p = .044.
Over half (13/23; 56%) of participants with a pre-stroke history of depression, but
only about a quarter (16/66; 24%)) of those without were diagnosed with depression
at baseline. As can be seen in Table 15.2, minor depression was actually diagnosed
in equal proportions amongst those with and without a pre-stroke history. However,
major depression was determined far more frequently amongst participants who
reported a pre-stroke history of depression than those who did not (9/23; 39% c.f.
4/66; 6%). The association between pre-stroke and present depression was
statistically significant, y = 13.44, p <.001.
As can be seen in Table 15.2, participants who reported a higher level of disability
were approximately twice as likely to be diagnosed with either major or minor
• ... 9
depression, and this association was statistically significant y = 8.58, p =.003
(please see Appendix F, section F.4 regarding the categorisation of disability).
When participants were categorised by retirement age, essentially similar rates of
major and minor depression were found amongst 'older' and 'younger' groups (y2 =
.73, p = .694).
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The prevalence of the different depressive symptoms is illustrated in Table 15.3.
As can be seen those diagnosed with depression were more likely to report
depressed mood (83%) than diminished pleasure (35%). Five participants with
depression (17%) reported both these key symptoms. Often participants attributed
their generally low mood to not being able to do 'what they wanted' most of the
time, but still reported being able to enjoy pleasant events. Neither depressed mood
nor loss of pleasure was reported by anyone who was not depressed.
Although whether or not a patient experienced low mood could be established in this
interview, it was harder to decide whether it was experienced enough of the time to
meet criteria for this symptom. I interpreted the instruction to establish 'most of the
day, nearly every day' (APA, 1994) to mean over half the time, someone else may
have interpreted this instruction differently.
I was taken by how often and readily depressed participants reported a sense of
worthlessness while I was conducting the interviews. Typically, when asked how
they had been feeling about themselves lately, the depressed participants would
describe themselves as feeling 'useless'. Some made quite strong comments to
describe this feeling, for example 'I feel a waste of space'. Others revealed anger or
shame in their negative self-descriptions, for example:
'I'm frustrated that I can't walk, I feel stupid'.
As shown in Table 15.3, a sense of worthlessness was reported by two thirds of
depressed participants but by only five percent of participants who were not
depressed. This supports the idea that this symptom was characteristic of depression
following stroke as it was both common amongst, and particular to, depressed
participants.
However, again for me the criterion for this symptom was not entirely definitive.
Worthlessness is described as being 'not merely self-reproach or guilt about being
sick' (APA, 1994). A different interviewer may not choose to interpret physically
disabled patients' descriptions of themselves as 'useless' as indicating personal
worthlessness.
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Table 15.3: Depressive symptoms amongst all participants and those diagnosed with and












II so (N = 60) (N = 89)
Depressed mood 3 24 (83%) 0 24 (27%) 99 27***
Diminished pleasure 3 10(35%) 0 10(11%) 23 3i***
Sense of worthlessness 19(66%) 3 (5%) 22 (25%) 40 3i***
Pre-occupation with death/suicide 9 (31%) 1 (2%) 10(11%) 16.91***
Insomnia/hypersomnia 19 (66%) 16 (27%) 35 (39%) 12.37**
Psychomotor agitation/retardation
reported
17(57%) 7 (12%) 24 (27%) 25.86***
Psychomotor agitation observed 5 (17%) 0 5 (6%) 10.96**
Fatigue 20 (68%) 36 (60%) 56 (63%) .63
Unusual weight or appetite change 9(31%) 11 (18%) 21 (24%) 1.39
Diminished concentration 15 (52%) 6(10%) 21 (24%) 17.40***
1: With the SCID an 'uncertain' score can be made if it is difficult to determine the presence versus
absence of a symptom. However, only certain scores were used for the construction of this table.
2: Chi square tests were computed between participants with and without depression: * indicates
p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, *** indicates p<001
Only one depressed participant reported having considered suicide to the extent of
forming a plan. The other eight reported often wishing they could die or had died.
Of these, a couple reported feeling 'too cowardly' to contemplate suicide, but the
others had not even contemplated suicide. An eighty-two year old female
participant who was not at all depressed or anxious but had been disabled for fifteen
years from previous strokes described often wishing for death. She was quite matter
of fact but argued that after having had a 'wonderful life and marriage' that she
would be 'happy to go'.
Nearly all the depressive symptoms were found to be statistically discriminatory
when tested with Chi-square with the exceptions of fatigue and weight/appetite
change. This may suggest that these are less good indicators of depression
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following stroke. Loss of appetite post-stroke can be due to swallowing difficulties,
however this was not reported by any of these participants probably because of the
screening procedure (please see Chapter 5, section 5.6). Hospital food appeared to
be to blame for one male participant with major depression who strongly missed his
wife's cooking.
The overall prevalence of 'fatigue' is notable. The comments participants made to
describe their fatigue did generally portray a pervasive sense of tiredness or lack of
energy. However, some people described a situation in which they tended to feel
energetic initially but then tire much more easily than normal. In addition to
reporting pervasive tiredness a couple of participants actually described something
more like 'initiation' than of fatigue. They described finding it 'hard to get things
started' yet that they could keep going as well as before once they did. For example,
one man described feeling he needed someone to 'prod him'. Therefore questioning
about fatigue may have actually been tapping into various other post-stroke
problems.
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15.4: Anxiety Disorders at baseline
15.4i: Overview ofanxiety disorders at baseline
Of the thirty-one (35%) participants found to have an anxiety disorder, almost a
third of them (10/31; 32%) met criteria for more than one type of anxiety disorder. A
significantly larger proportion of female participants were diagnosed with an anxiety
disorder (18/36 females; 47%) than male participants (13/53 males; 23%) and this
9 •
difference was found to be statistically significant (x = 6.13, p =.013). Similarly,
approximately twice as many participants with a pre-stroke history of depression
(13/23; 56%) were determined to have an anxiety disorder than those without
(18/66; 27%) and this difference was statistically significant, % = 6.43, p = 011.
Diagnosis of an anxiety disorder was more frequent amongst participants with
'higher' as opposed to 'lower' levels of disability (15/33; 46% c.f. 16/56; 27%) but
• 9 • •
this was not statistically significant, % = 2.61, p =. 110. Likewise, 'older'
participants were determined as having an anxiety disorder more often than
'younger' participants (11/41; 27% c.f. 20/48; 42%) but this was not statistically
significant, %2 = 2.15, p =.143.
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15.4U: Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) at baseline
Twelve participants (13%) were diagnosed with GAD. A striking level of co¬
morbidity between GAD and depression was observed. Only one participant
determined as having GAD was not also diagnosed with depression. Participants
with GAD were also more likely to have major depression (7/14; 50%) than minor
depression (4/15; 27%).
As would be expected with uncontrollable worry, topics of concern were wide-
ranging. Family problems were mentioned most frequently (9/12; 75%).
Participants with GAD often mentioned their children's problems such as divorce,
being a single parent or alcoholism. Concerns about spouses' health, or about the
effects of their strokes on their partners were also frequently mentioned. For
example, one man worried about how he'd be able to cope if his diabetic wife had a
'hypo', also about whether she'd be able to cope if he had another stroke and died.
Half the participants with GAD (6/12; 50%) reported worrying about personal
restrictions or fears related to stroke. For example, three participants mentioned
fears of falling and four participants reported being extremely worried about a
recurrent stroke. Other issues ranged from more general health issues (3/12; 25%)
to household or gardening chores (5/12; 42%) to the political situation (2/12; 17%).
On average, participants with GAD reported just over four of the six anxiety
symptoms, and two participants reported experiencing all six.
I5.4iii: Agoraphobia at baseline
This was the most commonly found disorder, and approximately one in five of all
participants were given the diagnosis (19/89; 21%). No one met criteria for panic
disorder without agoraphobia. Only three participants were found to meet criteria for
agoraphobia with panic disorder (one of these also reported claustrophobia and had
panicked before her scan). The other sixteen participants were found to be
agoraphobic without panic disorder, therefore they were cognitively (fear) and
behaviourally (avoidant) agoraphobic but did not experience the physiological
symptoms.
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A proportion of participants (18/89; 20%) were unclassifiable for agoraphobia
because they were physically not able to go out. Of these, eight participants were
still in hospital and not able or allowed to walk unaccompanied. Two participants
were almost completely wheelchair-bound in their own homes. Six participants in
lived in flats and were effectively house-bound as physiotherapists had advised them
against using stairs unaccompanied. A further two male participants reported that
they were forbidden to go out by their wives. When these participants were
excluded, the rate of agoraphobia amongst those feasibly able to go out was actually
over one in four (19/73; 26%).
Giving a diagnosis of agoraphobia implies the behaviour is problematic. However,
as can be seen from Table 15.4, the avoidance behaviour of just over a third of those
diagnosed as agoraphobic could be described as successful adaptation because they
reported being quite content to stay in. A few reported having adapted to a house
bound life by bringing their social life to them. Others reported having no desire to
face the crowded or dangerous outside environment. For example an eighty-year old
woman who lived with her daughter and granddaughters was diagnosed with
agoraphobia and panic disorder and reported an onset of symptoms a few years prior
to her stroke. However, she reported no longer missing trips into town because:
'Life is sweet in here'
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Table 15.4: Agoraphobic fear and avoidance, and reported distress about













(N = 19) (N = 18) (N = 52) (N = 89)
Agoraphobic fear
reported 2
19 (100%) 5 (27%) 5 (10%) 29 (33%)
Did not go out 2 19 (100%) 18 (100%) N/A 37 (42%)
Staying in reported
as a problem 3
12 (63%) 10 (55%) N/A 22 (25%)
1 16 participants were considered physically unable to go out and 2 male participants were forbidden to attempt going out by
their wives and so were unclassifiable for agoraphobia
2 These are the DSMIV criteria for agoraphobia without panic disorder
3: This is not specified as a criterion for agoraphobia in DSMIV but I began recording it when I found my first 'agoraphobic'
participant reported being content to stay in
Interestingly, a similar proportion of participants who were physically unable to go
out reported being content with this situation. For example a seventy-five year old
female participant reported:
'I'm quite happy sitting here letting life go by without making a noise in it any
more'
However, approximately two-thirds of participants with agoraphobia did regard
staying in as problematic, and for them the diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder seems
more reasonable. Additionally, a further ten participants reported agoraphobic fear
but were not diagnosed with agoraphobia because they were not yet avoidant or
were considerable unclassifiable due to physical inability. However, these
participants could still be seen as at risk of agoraphobia.
The content of participants' agoraphobia-related fears are illustrated in Table 15.5.
Fears of falling and its' consequences were reported most frequently. A few
mentioned the fear of being left in the street if they did fall, and others reported a
fear of being run over, for example an eighty-five year old female reported:
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'If I trip I could get killed by a car'
Some reported social fear consisting of embarrassing thoughts of how others may
see them. For example a ninety-year old female participant was embarrassed about
using her walking aid to go and sit in the park outside her house as people may
think:
'Silly old besom, that silly old besom should stay indoors'
Quite commonly, a combination of shame and fears of falling and stroke were
mentioned, for example, an eighty-six year old female reported having a stroke,
falling and exposing herself in an undignified way, because this had happened when
she had a TIA in church (which she now avoids).
In addition a couple of male participants feared being attacked. A sixty-one year old
male had developed a specific fear and avoidance of walking alone at night because
he felt he would no longer be able to defend himself. A forty-two year old male
reported having agoraphobia with panic prior to his stroke due to a mugging;
however he was not classified as agoraphobic because he was not physically able to
go out.
Table 15.5: Types of agoraphobic fears reported by participants at baseline
Participants with Participants without
agoraphobia (N = 19) agoraphobia (N = 70)
Falling or being run over 1 13 (68%) 9 (13%)
Shame due to appearance 1 6 (32%) 1 (1%)
Shame related to possibility of 5 (26%) 3 (4%)
falling or stroke in public 1
1: The percentages do not add up as some were scored for more than one category and some did not
report any fear
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15.4iv: Social phobia at baseline
Ten participants (11%) were classified as having social phobia. However, three
participants' social phobia was not stroke-related. A sixty-six year old male
reported feeling a Toss of social status' following the removal of his top set of teeth,
the fear others would consider him 'unintelligent' due to his lisp and avoidance of
social engagements. An eighty-two year female reported messy eating due to her
recent loss of sight from macular degeneration and embarrassment that others may
think 'What's wrong with her?' and avoidance of lunching out. A male participant
reported a lifelong lack of confidence with strangers ('I always knew they'd think I
was stupid'). He felt his shyness had been disadvantageous to his career in his
youth, but he reported being content with life now.
Of the seven participants whose social phobia was stroke-related, three were
embarrassed about appearing disabled or old, two were embarrassed about
emotionalism, one was embarrassed about his handwriting and one about the
possibility of having a stroke in public. For example, a sixty-year old male
participant had been avoiding going to restaurants or bingo because of his tendency
to limp and his slow hand:
'I'm not wanting people to take pity.. .They're pitying you and they're no real
meaning it'
A forty-eight year old male had developed the habit of leaving the room whenever
anything sad came on TV to avoid the possibility of being seen crying, and had
avoided going out socially since his stroke. A forty-seven year old female
participant who was considered agoraphobic due to her fear of falls and of being
seen having a stroke in public, was also classed as socially phobic because her fear
of the latter was so extreme. Her friends had even tried to persuade her to go out by
coming to collect her in the car, but she refused even to go to their homes.
Eight other participants described social fears but were not classed as being socially
phobic, because these fears did not interfere with their normal lives or cause distress.
This was often because the embarrassment participants reported was not related to
something they considered highly important, or because it was not sufficient to
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cause avoidance. For example, a female participant with 'atrocious' handwriting
only needed to write cheques very occasionally, another feared public speaking, but
no longer needed to in life, and a male participant who complained of slurred speech
was not sufficiently put off from socialising.
The diagnoses of participants with social phobia tended to rest on the description of
socially fearful beliefs (criteria A) and subsequent reports of related interference or
distress (criteria E). As can be seen from Table 15.6, not all participants considered
to have something meriting 'social phobia' met criteria B, C or D. Four participants
given the diagnosis of social phobia had not tried out their feared situations, and so
could not report whether anxious symptoms were experienced (criteria B).
About half of participants with social fears 'failed' to recognise that their fears were
excessive or unreasonable (criteria C). For example, when asked whether she
considered herself 'more afraid' of her experience of emotionalism than she 'should
be, or that makes sense' an eighty-five year old female participant, told me:
'Well it doesn't make sense, it makes me feel very sorry for myself and ashamed of
myself
I felt that that the belief that participants considered their social 'fears' as truly
shameful or embarrassing did not make them any less serious than if they did
recognise them as excessive or unreasonable. Also, avoidance (criteria D) was not
possible for a few participants, whose 'fears' were based on issues they had no
physical control over. For example, the above participant was not able to avoid her
emotional liability despite her best efforts.
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Table 15.6: Social phobic criteria 1 in relation to numbers and percent of






social fear but not
judged 'phobic'
All Participants
(N = 10) (N = 8) (N = 89)
A) 'Socially phobic' type fear 10 (100%) 8 (100%) 18 (20%)
B) Experiences unpleasant
sensation when faces situation
6 (60%) 5 (63%) 11 (12%)
C) Recognises fear is excessive/
unreasonable
5 (50%) 0 5 (6%)
D) Avoidance 7 (70%) 0 7 (8%)
E) Significant interference or
distress
9 (90%) 0 9 (10%)
1: Only DSM IV criteria A - E for social phobia are listed. Criterion F (Duration > 6 months) and
criterion H (Fear is unrelated to a general medical disorder) were discounted in this study.
Criterion G (Fear not due direct physiological effects of substance, or better accounted for by another
mental disorder) applied to all participants.
I felt this data highlighted the interaction between social reality and participants'
own belief systems, and that participants' social fears were possibly more realistic
than DSM IV implies those of typical social phobics to be. For example, a male
participant expected to be pitied and that people might think:
'Old geezer who's past his time'
but, he did walk with a bad gait and reported that other members in his golf club had
already begun to show pity, for example by offering their seats, following a previous
recent stroke, so he was probably not unrealistic. In relation to social phobia, DSM
IV notes do actually state that '.. .the diagnosis should not be given if the fear is
reasonable given the context of the stimuli...' (APA, 1994). When participants'
social fears were based on real visible disabilities they could be seen as relatively
reasonable.
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In light of these issues and the failure to find this group of participants fully meeting
the DSM IV criteria I had reservations about describing them as 'socially phobic'.
Nevertheless, despite my reservation about implying 'excessive and irrational' with
this diagnostic label I felt that highlighting 'having a problem with social
shame/fear' could be usefully applied. In addition to reasonable estimations of
potentially negative reactions from others, embarrassment seemed to be driven by
harsh self-judgement and by actually caring about others' negative reactions. These
more personal beliefs could be amenable to change, and this seemed to justify
highlighting these participants' 'problem'. This issue and discussion of the
different terms 'fear' and 'shame' will be returned to in the discussion.
15.4v: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at baseline
Three participants (3/89; 3%) were classified as having PTSD as they reported re-
experiencing type symptoms and evidence of a general sense of alienation and over-
arousal.
As well as reporting symptoms of hyper-vigilance and general over-arousal, and an
ambivalent interest in his friends and family, a forty-two year old man reported a
particularly striking fantasy. He imagines seeing a giant jigsaw puzzle that he
eventually solves and it reads 'WHY ME?'. A seventy-one year old was one of
only two participants who reported nightmares. These remind her of her stroke and
cause her to awaken covered in sweat. She also takes 'wee funnies' or headaches
accompanied by difficultly catching breath and sweating that mimic the symptoms
she experienced when she had her stroke. These occur when she is unable to 'shove
off the idea she may take another. Another seventy-three year old described
becoming particularly afraid of another stroke at night and sometimes her throat
begins to tighten painfully as it did before. She also reported feeling permanently on
guard because:
'I try not to be but I'm always waiting for another!'
However, the diagnosis of PTSD was made with some reservation because their
'traumatic' thoughts and symptoms were not often focused on the event of their
stroke per se. This young man's PTSD-like distress and beliefs were often focused
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on his present disabilities, while the others experienced PTSD-like symptoms related
to the possibility they may have another stroke.
Some quite intriguing symptoms were observed amongst other participants in the
PTSD interview, although they did not meet criteria for the disorder, 're-living'
experiences related to bodily symptoms, or the place stroke occurred were reported
most commonly. For example, one man, who had had his stroke in the shower,
reported experiencing the same 'numbish' feeling whenever he takes a shower.
Other interesting examples are described later (please see Chapter 16, section
16.2ii). Other participants reported avoidance behaviour similar to superstitions.
For example, one woman no longer uses the kitchen shelf she had used just prior to
her stroke and another avoids walking down the same bit of street. Interestingly,
participants often seemed very aware that these measures to avoid tempting fate
were quite 'silly' but nevertheless persisted.
Overall, it was interesting to find that reliving experiences and stroke-related
avoidances were quite common amongst stroke patients, some of whom were not
otherwise depressed or anxious. The PTSD syndrome and the idea of being
'traumatised' resonated well with the experience of a few participants. These
participants did all have major depression and GAD diagnoses already. However,
the PTSD interview brought out further distressing symptoms and beliefs relating to
stroke, its effects, and the possibility of further strokes.
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15.5: Diagnosis of depression and anxiety disorders at follow-up
A similarly high proportion of participants (36/81; 44%) were diagnosed with an
emotional disorder at this point in time (please see Table 15.7) as were at baseline
(please see Table 15.1).
Table 15.7: Number and percentage of diagnosed emotional disorders amongst
participants at follow-up
Emotional disorders (SCID) Number and percent
1: Participants were awarded diagnoses for all disorders in which criteria was met regardless of the










Agoraphobia (with or without panic attacks)
Agoraphobia with panic attacks
Social Phobia
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
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15.6: Depression at follow-up compared to baseline
Just under a third of participants (24/81; 30%) were found to be depressed with
equal proportions of minor and major depression. Diagnoses of major depression
appeared particularly persistent across time (please see Table 15.8). Only one
participant with major depression at baseline had recovered by follow-up, and she
had been treated with anti-depressants. Meanwhile, a further four participants are
shown to have gone from major to minor depression, who would be more accurately
described as having 'major depression partially resolved' (please see Table 15.8).
Participants with minor depression appeared to have fared much better across time.
Less than half of them were found to still have minor depression, and none had
developed major depression. Meanwhile, a further five participants had developed
depression over time. When diagnoses of either major or minor depression at
follow-up and baseline were compared using McNemar test, the statistically
insignificant result obtained (p = .414) is indicative of consistency across time.











9 (75%) 4 (33%) 1 (2%)
Minor depression1
(N = 15) 0 6 (50%) 8 (14%)
Not depressed
(N = 60) 3 (25%) 2(17%) 48 (84%)
One participant with minor depression at baseline died before follow-up
2 Seven non-depressed participants at baseline could not be followed up
The reasons for development of major depression for two young participants (a
thirty-two year old female and fifty-two year old male) really stood out. The male
participant's gardening business had collapsed following his stroke, he had had to go
to a tribunal for benefits and was unable to afford the cost of retraining in his former
profession as a graphic designer. He was also experiencing a collapse in his
marriage. Similarly, this young female participant had various credit debts, a new
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mortgage and had previously had two jobs. Now she was financially trapped: she
could only afford to work if she could manage full time but was not able to take this
on yet. She had been unable to keep up with her friends and was increasingly
isolated. The emotional reaction of these participants appeared much more affected
by contextual factors than the reactions of older participants, whose relationships
and finances perhaps tended to more stable, or less heavily dependent on physical
ability.
'Younger' participants were more likely to have major depression, and 'older'
participants to have minor depression, please see Table 15.9. However, an age
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group by depression diagnoses association was not statistically significant, y =
3.59, p = .166. Females tended to be diagnosed with depression more than males,
however this difference was also not statistically significant, y2 = 2.25, p = .324.
Similarly, those with 'higher' levels of disability were more likely to be depressed
than those with Tower' levels, but this was not statistically significant, % = 1.37, p =
.504. As at baseline, major depression was found far more frequently amongst
participants who reported a pre-stroke history of depression than those who did not
(9/21; 43% c.f. 3/60; 7%). Overall the association between a history of depression
prior to stroke and present diagnosis of depression was highly statistically
significant, y2 = 13.44, p <.0001.
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Frequencies of depressive symptoms between those diagnosed with depression and
those without depression are displayed in Table 15.10. As can be seen, an
essentially similar symptom pattern was observed at this nine-month stage to that
found at one month (please see Table 15.3). Therefore the observations made earlier
are applicable now. As before, these results suggest that depression following stroke
is most strongly associated with 'depressed mood' rather than 'diminished pleasure'
at nine months.
Table 15.10: Depressive symptoms amongst all participants and those diagnosed with and
without depression at follow-up1
Participants Participants All yf and
with without Participants significance
depression depression level2
(N = 29) (N = 60) 2 II oe so
Depressed mood 3 22 (92%) 0 22 (27%) 71.73***
Diminished pleasure 3 4 (17%) 0 4 (5%) 9 99**
Sense of worthlessness 14 (58%) 6 (11%) 20 (25%) 20.76***
Pre-occupation with death/suicide 7 (29%) 1 (2%) 8 (10%) 14.26***
Insomnia/hypersomnia 16(67%) 7 (12%) 23 (28%) 24.57***
Psychomotor agitation/retardation
reported
11 (46%) 7 (12%) 18 (22%) 11.00***
Psychomotor agitation observed 2 (8%) 0 2 (3%) 4.87*
Fatigue 22 (92%) 22 (39%) 44 (54%) 19.17***
Unusual weight or appetite change 7 (29%) 4 (7%) 11 (14%) 7.06**
Diminished concentration 13 (54%) 4 (7%) 17 (21%) 22.64***
1: With the SCID an 'uncertain' score can be made if it is difficult to determine the presence versus
absence of a symptom. However, only 'certain' scores were used for the construction of this table.
2: Chi tests were computed between participants with and without depression.
* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, *** indicates p<.001.
Feelings of worthlessness, typically expressed as feelings of 'uselessness' were
expressed commonly by depressed patients at nine months, but were found to be
slightly less exclusive than at one month (please see Table 15.3, and Table 15.10).
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No one reported suicidal intent at follow-up; however, some participants did still
report sometimes wishing they had died/were dead, including the same non-
depressed female participant as before. Other symptoms were reported in similar
ways and with similar frequencies. The high prevalence of fatigue was still notable
across all participants (44/81; 54%). However, a slight decrease in the prevalence of
depressive symptoms of fatigue and appetite loss was noted. This may be partly due
to lessened potential confounding from the hospital environment or of stroke. These
two depressive symptoms were now able to discriminate between depressed and
non-depressed participants to a statistically significant level (please see Table
15.10).
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15.7: Anxiety disorders at follow-up
15. 7i: Overview ofanxiety disorders atfollow-up
A large proportion of participants were found to have an anxiety disorder (36/81;
44%). The majority (27/36; 75%) had been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder at
baseline, and this overlap was supported by a McNemar test showing no statistical
difference (p = .791
Approximately half of female participants (18/34; 53%) were found to have an
anxiety disorder, whereas only about a fifth of male participants (9/47; 19%) were,
and this difference was statistically significant, x2 = 10.14 p<.001. Twice as many
participants with a history of depression pre-stroke (12/21; 57%) were diagnosed
with an anxiety disorder than those without (15/60; 25%) and this was also
• • • 9
statistically significant, % = 7.23 p = 007. Anxiety disorders were more common
amongst those with a higher level of disability (9/20; 45%) than those with lower
levels (18/61; 30%) but this difference was not statistically significant, x2 = 1-63, p
= .203. Similarly, 'younger' participants (8/20; 40%) were somewhat more likely
to have an anxiety disorder than 'older' participants (19/61; 31%) but not at a
• • 2
statistically significant level, x = -53, p = .466.
15.7ii: Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) atfollow-up
Of all the disorders, there was a slight increase in the proportion of participants
determined to have GAD at follow-up (15/81; 19%) as compared to baseline (12/89;
13%). Nine participants who were found to have GAD at baseline still did at
follow-up, while a further six participants had developed the disorder. An
insignificant McNemar result (p = .508) offered statistical support to an overlap
between GAD diagnoses across time. Similarly to baseline, a high level of co¬
morbidity between GAD and depression was found. Almost three quarters of those
with GAD (11/15; 73%) were also diagnosed with depression.
A similar range of topics was reported as worrying to participants with GAD as
those found at baseline. Most were worried about a family matter (13/15; 87%) and
their functional disabilities resulting from the stroke (11/15; 73%). Concerns about
health problems were commonly reported (9/15; 60%), in particular fear of another
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stroke (8/15; 53%). A few people were also worried about the upkeep of their
garden or home, or about the political situation. In contrast to baseline, a few
participants (4/15; 27%) reported being worried about finances. On average
participants with GAD were found to have five of the six possible anxiety symptoms
(Mean = 4.67, SD = 1.23).
15.7iii: Agoraphobia atfollow-up
Similarly to baseline, approximately one in five of all participants were found to
have agoraphobia (18/81; 22%). Just four participants with agoraphobia also
reported adjunct panic attacks (this accounted for all the participants with panic
attacks). Almost two-thirds of agoraphobic participants had been agoraphobic at
baseline (11/18; 61%) six participants had improved and seven had developed this
disorder. Consistency in this diagnosis across time was statistically supported by an
insignificant McNemar test p = 1.00).
Table 15.11: Agoraphobic fear and avoidance, and reported distress about
staying in at follow-up
Participants Participants Other Total
diagnosed with considered participants4 sample
Agoraphobia unclassifiable for
agoraphobia '
Agoraphobic fear 18 (100%)
reported 2
Did not go out 18 (100%)











1: 11 participants were considered physically unable to go out and 1 male participant was forbidden
to attempt going out by his wife and so were unclassifiable for agoraphobia
2: These are the DSM IV criteria for agoraphobia without panic disorder
3: This is not actually a specified criterion for agoraphobia in DSM IV
4: These participants could and did go out without marked distress but reported some loss of
confidence
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Twelve participants were considered unclassifiable for agoraphobia: eight were only
able to walk with an aid and had been advised to stay housebound by a
physiotherapist, three were wheelchair-bound and one man was still forbidden to go
outside alone by his wife. Once this was taken into consideration, a rate of
approximately one in four participants with agoraphobia (18/69; 26%) was found
amongst those who were physically able to go out
However, only half diagnosed as agoraphobic and less than half of participants
considered unclassifiable for agoraphobia actually reported staying in as being
problematic (please see Table 15.11).
Fears of falling were as commonly reported amongst those with agoraphobia as they
were at baseline. However, shame regarding others' perceptions was reported as the
reason for avoiding going out alone twice as often now as it was previously (please
see Table 15.5 and Table 15.11).
A few participants' fears classified as 'shame' seemed to stem from reported
experience of stigma. A forty-two year old male participant said he had actually
been taunted for walking as if he had 'shat himself by teenage boys. A fifty-three
year old man reported that old ladies often made derogatory remarks to imply he
was 'a fake' regarding his use of a stick and the disabled bus seat. A sixty-eight year
old man had been rehoused on the ground floor for accessibility. However, he
reported believing there were 'plenty of idiots' around and feared being mugged,
this was not based on personal experience, but he pointed out a police car opposite
as he was describing his fear. He lives in a very deprived part of the city and so his
fear seemed to be grounded in good reason.
On the more positive side, a couple of other participants described how they had
been helped by family or friends to regain confidence by gradually building up
distances travelled and tailing off companionship. Also, one participant reported
that she was finding it very helpful to learn how to rise from a fall in physiotherapy,
and that she was gaining the confidence to go out alone as a result.
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Table 15.12: Types of agoraphobic fears reported by participants at follow-up
Participants with Participants without
agoraphobia (N = 18) agoraphobia (N = 63 )
Falling or being run over 1 11 (61%) 8 (13%)
Shame due to appearance 1 12 (67%) 1 (2%)
Shame related to possibility of
falling or stroke in public 1
5 (28%) 0
1: The percentages do not add up as some were scored for more than one category and some did not
report any fear
15.7iv: Social phobia atfollow-up
Just seven participants (7/81; 9%) were found to have social phobia at this point in
time. Most had been considered to have this problem at baseline (5/7; 71%) and
they tended to report the same problems and embarrassments now. Of these, two
were still distressed by emotionalism, one by her clumsiness and blindness, one by
her extreme fear of having a stroke in front of strangers. The other was someone
whose social phobia had been lifelong.
One participant who had social phobia before had since died. Three male
participants ceased feeling ashamed following improvements in the disabilities that
had been the causes of their distress. A fifty-seven year old ex-psychiatric nurse had
experienced little physical improvement but she had recovered from depression and
showed a turn-around in her social attitudes. She now challenges negative attitudes,
and suggested that, if she had the energy, she would like to educate the public and
health workers on how to treat disabled people. Generally though consistency in
social phobia diagnosis across time was statistically supported by an insignificant
McNemar result (p = .687).
The two young participants who had developed major depression during the study
(please see section 15.6) had also developed extreme social shame and avoidance.
They both reported lacking the stamina to socialise as expected by their peers and
extreme embarrassment at their stroke-related disabilities in venues such as bars and
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gigs. The young female participant had also recently become uncontrollably tearful
which, like other participants with emotionalism, she seemed to regard out-right as
'unacceptable social behaviour'. Similarly to baseline, participants who were
regarded as having a disorder did not necessarily recognise their fears as excessive
or unreasonable (criteria C) one had not actually faced his feared situation (criterion
B) while a few were unable to avoid the source of their embarrassment (criterion D)
(please see Table 15.6, and 15.13).
Similarly to baseline, I felt these participants' experience was better described as
'having a problem with social shame/fear' than by the diagnostic label 'social
phobia' for the same reasons as before (please see section 15.4iv).
Table 15.13: Social phobic criteria 1 in relation to numbers and percentage of












A) 'Socially phobic'type fear 7 (100%) 5 (100%)
B) Experiences unpleasant 6 (86%) 0
sensation when faces situation
C) Recognises fear is excessive/ 2 (29%) 0
unreasonable
D) Avoidance 5 (71%) 2 (40%)







1: Only DSM IV criteria A - E for social phobia are listed. Criterion F (Duration > 6 months) and
criterion H (Fear is unrelated to a general medical disorder) were excluded.
Criterion G (Fear not due direct physiological effects of substance, or better accounted for by another
mental disorder) applied to all participants.
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15.7; Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) atfollow-up
Just two participants were determined as having PTSD at follow-up and they were
two of the three diagnosed at baseline. As at baseline, a forty-two year old still
reported spending a lot of time puzzled over 'Why me?'. He was discharged at six
months on September 11 2001 and felt that this did not bode well for his future. He
had now avoided going to sleep in the same position he fell from when he had the
stroke in his bedroom for fear of the event repeating itself. As at baseline, a
seventy-one year old described essentially the same nightmares and fears of another
stroke as she did at baseline (please see section 15.4v). She also reported that
having been such 'a bitch' to others that now she was effectively, as well as
emotionally, cutoff from them. In contrast, the trauma-type symptoms reported by a
seventy-three year old at baseline had lessened. She still feared another stroke but
was less on guard and no longer experienced tightening in her throat. She was also
no longer uninterested in her family but instead met criteria for GAD and was
extremely concerned for their welfare.
Interestingly, the two younger participants who had developed major depression
over time were also experiencing some traumatic symptoms. The thirty-two year
old female suggested that perhaps she had been numbed until recently as she now
thinks she 'should' have been more 'freaked out before'. She also reported being
bothered about her behaviour during her stroke and that she often remembers it in a
'surreal fashion'. The fifty-two year old male described feeling that no one could
understand him not even his wife, and finding himself easily startled. He had begun
to re-experience the sensation of having a stroke as he drops off to sleep, but
actually as a 'warm, comforting' feeling. He often fantasises about hitting out at his
past reckless lifestyle but never quite manages to hurt it. Taken together these
results tentatively suggest that PTSD type symptoms may tend to be more relevant
to younger stroke survivors.
In contrast to baseline, participants who were otherwise not anxious or depressed no
longer reported re-living type experiences. For example, the participant who
saliently described seeing pictures on her wall 'swirling' as they had during her
stroke when she was interviewed at baseline (please see Chapter 16, section 16.2iv)
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did not even mention this at follow-up. I felt that this was interesting as it suggests
that these symptoms can occur and fade in the natural course of emotional
adaptation.
15.8: Comparison between levels of shame and fear of falling with agoraphobia
and social phobia diagnoses
These results relate to the following minor additional hypotheses:
1) Higher shame scores would be found amongst those with social phobia and
agoraphobia
2) Higher fears of falling would be found amongst those with agoraphobia
15.8i: Comparison between shame and social phobia and agoraphobia diagnoses at
baseline
Descriptive results for shame are described in Chapter 10, section 10.6ii. Relevant
shame by diagnoses data is displayed in Table 15.14.
Table 15.14: Shame scores by diagnoses of agoraphobia and social phobia at
baseline
Mean (standard Median Range
deviation)
Participants with agoraphobia (N == 19) 11.95 (4.31) 11 0--20
Participants without agoraphobia (N == 70) 12.41 (4.92) 12 0--27
Participants with social phobia (N == 10) 14.30 (3.34) 14 0--20
Participants without social phobia (N == 79) 12.06 (4.89) 12 0--27
As can be seen, there was a wide variation in the range of shame scores within
diagnostic groupings of agoraphobia and social phobia. Participants with
agoraphobia actually reported slightly lower shame scores than participants without
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agoraphobia. However, this difference was not found to be statistically significant, t
= 0.405, p = .344. On average, higher shame scores were reported by participants
with social phobia, and this difference was found to be statistically significant, t = -
1.88, p = .040.
The hypothesis that participants with social phobia and agoraphobia would have
higher shame scores was only partially supported at baseline. Participants who were
diagnosed as socially phobic were found to have higher shame, but participants
diagnosed with agoraphobia were not.
15.8H: Comparison between fear offalling and diagnoses ofagoraphobia at
baseline
Descriptive results for fears of falling are described in Appendix F, section F5.
Relevant fears of falling by diagnoses data is displayed in Table 15.15.
Table 15.15: Fear of falling scores for participants with and without
agoraphobia at baseline
Mean (standard Median Range
deviation)
Participants with agoraphobia 8.47 (2.84) 8 3- 13
(N= 19)
Participants without agoraphobia 6.50 (2.59) 7 0- 13
(N = 70)
As can be seen, participants with agoraphobia reported higher fear of a fall than
participants not determined to have agoraphobia, and this difference was statistically
significant, t = -2.73, p = 004.
Out of interest, reports of actual falls and agoraphobia diagnosis were compared.
Participants with agoraphobia (13/19, 68%) were statistically significantly more
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likely to have had a fall than participants without agoraphobia (18/70, 26%), % =
12.01, p <.001.
This hypothesis was fully supported: higher fears of falling were found amongst
those with agoraphobia at baseline.
15.8iii: Comparison between shame and social phobia and agoraphobia atfollow-
up
Descriptive results for shame are described in Chapter 12, section 12.6ii. Relevant
shame by diagnoses data is displayed in Table 15.16. In contrast to baseline, higher
shame scores were now found for participants with agoraphobia compared to those
without, and this was found to be statistically significant, t = -2.75, p = .013. In
general, higher shame scores were also reported by participants with social phobia
rather than those without, and this difference was statistically significant too, t = -
3.37, p = .005.
This hypothesis was fully supported, higher shame scores were found amongst those
with agoraphobia and social phobia at follow-up.
Table 15.16: Follow-up shame scores by diagnoses of agoraphobia and social
phobia at follow-up
Mean (standard Median Range
deviation)
Participants with agoraphobia (N == 18) 15.78 (6.29) 16 2-■27
Participants without agoraphobia (N == 63) 11.35 (4.97) 11 0- 27
Participants with social phobia (N == 7) 18.71 (5.96) 17 13 -27
Participants without social phobia (N == 74) 11.73 (5.17) 12 0-■26
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15.8iiv: Comparison between fear offalling and diagnoses ofagoraphobia at
follow-up
Descriptive data relating for fears of falling are described in Appendix F, section
F.5. Relevant fears of falling by diagnoses data is displayed in Table 15.17.
Table 15.17: Fear of falling scores for participants with and without
agoraphobia at follow-up
Mean (standard Median Range
deviation)
Participants with agoraphobia (N= 18) 7.94 (3.17) 8 3- 14
Participants without agoraphobia (N = 63) 6.11 (2.55) 6 2- 13
As can be seen, participants with agoraphobia reported higher fear of a fall than
participants not found to have agoraphobia, and this difference was significant,
t = -2.54, p = .007.
Out of interest, reports of actual falls and agoraphobia diagnosis were also
compared. Participants with agoraphobia (13/18, 72%) were more likely to report
having had a fall than participants without agoraphobia at follow-up (21/63, 33%),
• • 9
and this was statistically significant, % = 8.89, p <.005.
15.8v: Comment regarding shame andfear levels by agoraphobia and social
phobia diagnoses
The finding that participants who fitted the criteria I used for social phobia reported
higher levels of shame at both points in time, and those who met criteria for
agoraphobia did at follow-up is theoretically pleasing. This gives some support to
the validity of this shame measure and the importance of these stroke-specific
negative social beliefs to the social and emotional well-being of this small minority
of patients.
Material generated during the administration of the fears of falling questionnaire and
the clinical interview did suggest ways in which it could be improved (please see
Chapter 15: Description ofemotional disorders and exploration ofbeliefs from the
structured clinical interview
272 Results
Appendix F, section F.5). Nonetheless scores were statistically higher amongst
those who met criteria for agoraphobia, and participants often cited fear of falling
during the agoraphobia interview. Together this can be taken as an indication of the
relevance of a specific fear of falling to emotional well-being amongst some stroke
patients, particularly those who are not content to avoid going out.
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15.9: Overall comment on description of emotional disorders and exploration
of beliefs from the structured clinical interview
A high prevalence of depressive and anxiety disorders has been described at both
baseline and follow-up. A high level of consistency in the data was observed across
time and major depression appeared to be particularly persistent. Generalised
anxiety disorder was not very common and over-lapped with depression a lot. Of
the specific anxiety disorders, agoraphobia was common but social phobia
uncommon and PTSD rare.
The structured clinical interview for DSM IV (SCID) is designed only to provide
quantitative diagnoses of disorders. However, it also provided descriptive
exploratory data concerning the nature of affective beliefs and emotional problems
following stroke. These results relate to objective 5 to:
To explore the types of beliefs and nature of symptoms related to common
depression and anxiety disorders
The exploration of depression suggested that a sense of being unable to experience
pleasure or contemplate taking one's life was rare whereas somatic symptoms were
common and not strongly discriminatory between depressed and non-depressed
stroke patients. Low mood was most often the key symptom on which the decision
that a patient had depression rested. Depressed patients characteristically reported
low self-worth, and they tended to do this by describing a sense of 'uselessness' in
relation to their limited abilities.
From my own personal experience of conducting these interviews and our consensus
meetings, I felt that there was a reasonable 'fit' between the content of symptoms
described as depressive disorder by DSMIV criteria and what I found with these
patients. The distinction between major depression and minor depression was
subsequently supported by comparison with HADs scores (please see Appendix G,
section G4). However, conducting these interviews highlighted to me ways in
which the severity of specific symptoms could be subject to different interpretation
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by different interviewers. The comparison with HADs scores suggested low levels
of symptoms despite meaningful statistically significant differences amongst groups.
As regards anxiety disorders, in general the 'structured' interview appeared to be
accessing meaningful negative anxious symptoms and beliefs. Agoraphobia was
often related to stroke specific issues (falling and shame) but some participants'
avoidance could sometimes be seen as successful adaptation (They reported being
content to stay in). The diagnostic interviews for social phobia and PTSD
highlighted emotional and avoidance issues that were problematic to some
participants. I felt that these problems did not perfectly match standard DSMIV
criteria or descriptions of these disorders, but had usefully highlighted similar
clusters of symptoms.
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16.1: Overview of the qualitative main themes and sub-themes
The final five overarching main themes and the sub-themes that were developed are
listed below.
Main theme 1- Being like this
Sub-themes- Can't dos
Meanings and feelings
Specific fears and issues
Main theme 2- Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not
Sub-themes- Getting back
What the future holds
Acclimatising (coping)
Main theme 3- Taking another, or not
Sub-themes:- Concerns about taking another
Prevention issues
Main theme 4- They're OK, I'm OK, or not
Sub-themes- Family concerns
Spouses and friends
Main theme 5- Maintaining way of living or thinking, or making changes




Getting/ staying at home
Getting old and to the end of life
This chapter is divided into sections based on the first three main themes and
subsections based on the sub-themes. Each section begins with a presentation of the
main theme in the framework format, that includes all its relevant codes (minor
themes) clustered into its sub-themes.
Chapter 16: Qualitative results
Results 277
Quantitative study characteristics of the sixty participants, including diagnoses of
emotional disorders, are presented in Appendix F, F.4. Twenty-one participants had
major or minor depression (that will be referred to as depression for brevity). Seven
participants had generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). Six of the seven participants
with GAD also had depression. Comparisons between participants with depression/
GAD have been highlighted when differences were found in the final analysis
(please see Chapter 9, section 9.4iii for a description of this process) but when
beliefs seemed particularly related to depressed feelings only depression has been
referred to. Also associations that were observed to be stronger between beliefs and
participants who had GAD in addition to depression has been highlighted, and when
relevant diagnoses of agoraphobia and social phobia has been referred to.
The first three main themes:
Being like this
Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not
Taking another, or not
were considered to cross-over most obviously with the main quantitative study
results. Therefore each section for these themes will end with a summary of the
main relationships that emerged between relevant codes and depression/ GAD.
This was to aid the exploration of convergence and divergence between quantitative
and qualitative results. In contrast the last two main themes:
They're OK, I'm OK, or not
Maintaining way of living or thinking, or making changes
were considered to provide qualification of the quantitative results in and of
themselves, because they raised mainly different issues. These will be presented in
Appendix H.
Note regarding organisation and cross-referencing in this chapter
Participant codes used in this chapter indicate gender/ subject number/ age in that
order. To aid cross-referencing, chapter section numbers and main theme headings
will be displayed at the foot of pages in addition to the chapter title from now on.
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Twenty-eight participants reported limitations in being able to do things they
wanted to do. Sometimes limitations were talked about in general terms of 'being
like this' and so not being able to do what they 'used to' or would Tike to' do. More
often participants went on to report concern about specific activities that they could
not do or were less able to do. Some reported being unable to carry out day to day
tasks, for example, grocery shopping or household chores. Even more participants
voiced concerns about not being able to partake in social or leisure activities. A
range of indoor pursuits were mentioned such as reading, knitting, writing, baking or
doing DIY. Many participants complained about no longer being able to walk for
pleasure, or to go to the shops for the sake of it. Sometimes these were also social
activities, for example one man could no longer go walking with his church group.
Similarly, a female participant described how she used to enjoy the shops:
'I enjoyed it for its own sake. I liked to go to Princes street and Leith, it dinnae
bother me if I was buying or not. You'd enjoy a coffee and a chat and comparing
prices. I don't like to get done, I feel good if it's a true bargain.' f26, 84yrs.
Participants reported having enjoyed a diverse range of socio-cultural activities such
as dancing, day clubs, the pub, bridge, bingo or the theatre but being no longer able
to do them. Quite a few participants were concerned about their lack of ability to
engage in more strenuous leisure pursuits such as golfing, fishing, bowling, or even
sponsored abseils. The implications of these loses were also often expanded on and
these will generally be examined in the following 'meaning and feelings' section.
Particularly social losses and their implications ('Social life' and 'Going places') are
described in the fourth more social theme (please see Appendix H, section H.lii).
Eleven participants reported concerns that tiredness prevented them from being able
to do things to the same level as before. A few described feeling slowed down since
their stroke or that they felt a lack of energy. Others reported that they became tired,
or ran out of energy, more easily than before. A few described both aspects, for
example, a male participant said:
'It's the fact you cannae get the energy to do things. I can sleep eight hours in bed
and take naps during the day and still feel sleepy. If the TV is on I will drop off
after a short while... I just feel sleepy, "Oh I'm sleepy again'" m69, 65yrs
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Ten participants were judged to have experienced a loss of role concerning family or
household duties. Female participants quite often stressed housework as an
important role, and a few who could no longer do it cited it as a concern, for
example:
'All my life it's been I like it just so. It's not just so at the moment' f62, 87yrs
A few male participants seemed to hold more stereotypically male household chores
such as gardening, DIY or doing the bills with the same sort of duty bound
emphasis. For example a male participant with depression who was still in hospital
said:
'Is my wife coping?.. .With things coming through in the post to be dealt with. I just
said to my wife "Just take out the cheques and bin the rest" - she gets a bit uptight'
m59, 75yrs
A few female participants raised concern over no longer being able to mind and
nurture their grandchildren, for example to give them 'Granny's home cooking'.
Five male participants emphasised being unable to drive as a serious loss of role.
Two men had provided regular lifts to their grandchildren to help their daughters
out. One man's wife was resident in a long-term care ward and driving had enabled
him to visit daily. The other men were concerned as their wives depended on their
driving. For example, one man with depression and GAD explained:
'She's reasonably healthy but has Meniere's disease and chronic sickness and for
years at a time has had to have anti-emetics and now permanently. As a result she's
lost confidence about going out on her own. I used to take her out and now I can't...
Well these are just the thoughts of someone stuck in a chair who feels they should be
up doing things' m58, 80yrs
Essentially the decision to code 'can't do' activities as roles rested on the
implication that participants felt these were things they 'should be' doing rather than
they would just like to be able to do them. In this way the actually coding of roles
became somewhat circular with its implied adjunct meaning (please see section
16.2ii). However, we felt it was important to distinguish between 'can't dos' per se
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and those 'can't do' issues that seemed to imply a sense of moral or social
responsibility.
Nine participants' jobs were affected by the stroke. Six of these participants were of
working age, three had been in full-time paid employment (a lecturer, a kitchen
assistant and a printer technician) but were now on sick leave. One female
participant was the administrator for her family business and so was not benefiting
from sick leave or compensation for her stroke. One female participant had
provided respite care for a child with physical disability and a teenager with learning
difficulties on a part-time basis. A man who was a mental health services user, had
been working in 'therapeutic' part-time work as a clerical assistant. Three
participants had worked part-time, one as a voluntary carer on her church visiting
list, one as a voluntary verger for his church, and the other as a driver for a
residential home.
Not being able to work could technically always be seen as a loss of role. However,
participants varied tremendously in how much they seemed to value work, and their
levels of concern related to not working. Additionally, some retired participants
raised various work issues. The meaning of work was considered to push beyond
the boundaries of this theme and was awarded its own sub-theme (please see
Appendix H, section H.2iii).
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16.2U: Being like this sub-theme 2- Meanings and feelinss
Only a small number of participants reported concern about the actual event of the
stroke. A couple still seemed to be slightly upset by their experience in hospital.
One man had thought the doctors must have written of his chances of survival,
because he was introduced to a drug trial but then actually not included. One lady
reported feeling ashamed of her behaviour in hospital but now seemed actually able
to joke about it:
'Not knowing where I was. I was trying to find the loo in the ward, I couldn't find
the button for the nurse and I wet the bed. I felt terrible, really ashamed. I didn't
want to shout "Would someone come and help me" you're the only one I've told.. .It
disnnae bother me now - I always make sure I know where the toilet is!'
f42, 70yrs
Another lady gave this graphic report of waking on the sofa with her stroke and
looking over to the opposite wall on which twelve small pictures were hung:
'I couldn't think what on earth was happening, everything was swirling. When my
daughter saw my mouth had dropped I thought it was a stroke and I was still very
frightened as I felt it was worse than the last one. I often think about how
frightening it was. The pictures, I can still imagine them swirling around'
B6, 79yrs
Nevertheless, she went on to report that really she had 'no concerns' in life generally
and was not anxious or depressed. A couple of other participants were still
concerned about why they had 'taken' a stroke because it had been unexpected, and
these were patterns of thought that fed into fearing another stroke (please see section
16.4ii) and 'Why me?' (please see Appendix H section H.2i).
Various negative meanings and feelings were related to participants' concerns about
what they couldn't do now. Five participants reported that things were just not as
good as before. Generally this was in relation to things they could do, but not as
well, because of weakness, slowness or tiredness. For example, a seventy-six year
old lady who had been wheelchair-bound pre-stroke, reported that she could still do
transfers, but found them such 'hard work' that she enjoyed going out in the car with
her husband a lot less.
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Nine participants expressions suggested a lost sense of normality or proper way of
doing things. They complained about how they used to take being able 'for granted'
or do things without a 'second's thought'. Sometimes they made quite global
comments to suggest that their lives seemed to have changed 'completely' now they
were unable to do the same things, or do things the 'right' way. A young male
participant with depression reported concern that he may have lost normal sexual
functioning. Another depressed male's reported concern about being unable to eat
as before, also conveyed a more general sense of lost normality:
'At the present moment I can't grip my left hand normally and normal daily life, for
example, using a knife and fork properly' m59, 75yrs
This participant also reported feeling that 'time drags' and complained about the
'daily monotony' of hospital life. A few other participants cited boredom as a
problem or as a concern for the future.
Ten participants emphasised that they found reliance on others aversive. Three male
participants who were still in hospital were concerned about their reliance on staff.
One reported feeling grateful but yet that he really wanted 'to be able to do' for
himself, another reported disliking being at their 'mercy'. Some participants who
were at home receiving care from spouses or children emphasised their own sense of
independence as a loss. One female participant reported feeling the stoke had
'definitely taken away my independence'. A couple of participants described recent
events that had made them recognise their dependency. For example, a depressed
lady described feeling 'completely helpless' while her husband was laid up with flu.
Her inability to go and get basic supplies made her recognise her dependency but
she doesn't want 'to have to rely on him'.
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Some participants seemed to find reliance on others very difficult in terms of pride.
One man stated 'you just can't rely on others' and a female participant with
depression said:
'I don't like to ask F and M [her neighbours] as I'm very independent. I
don't like to be beholden.'
f62, 87yrs
One lady with depression who was discharged into sheltered housing but waiting for
a nursing home place gave a particularly negative account:
'When you can't do for yourself, you feel so stupid, so useless, the simplest wee
thing like trying to walk... You sit here, you go to get up and you can't walk, so you
have to phone your daughter-in-law. Everything that goes wrong, I have to phone
someone. Dependency is the worst thing... Some people like being looked after
hand and foot. I like doing for myself
f71, 81yrs
Altogether, eleven participants reports implied a loss of self-esteem related to their
limited ability. Typically, they tended to describe themselves as 'useless'. A few
described feeling useless because they could not maintain their pre-stroke interests,
for example being able to bake, play bridge, or do the garden as effectively. One
man described feeling he had changed as a person because he could not do as he
wanted. More often participants tendency to see themselves as 'useless' seemed to
hang on the implication that were failing to do what they 'should'. Their reactions
tended to relate to losses that could be described as family or home roles discussed
earlier. For example, a male participant with depression who was concerned about
his wife's ability to cope while he was in hospital said:
'What on earth am I doing lying here for when I could be doing something useful?'
m59, 75yrs
Other participants echoed this kind of self-reproach with comments that they
'should' be able to do more or others 'shouldn't' have to help them.
Chapter 16: Qualitative results- 16.2- Being like this
286 Results
Many participants described negative emotional reactions to their lost ability to do
what they used to. Conversely, sometimes a sense of loss could be inferred because
participants gave emotionally positive descriptions of activities as important areas of
life before their stroke but were now not able to do them. For example, a male
participant with depression described his love of woodwork in this way:
'I enjoy making stuff, I like working with wood, I like the smell. I feel smashing
when I do a job well' m41, 69yrs
However, he was now only just beginning to walk and still in hospital. Similarly,
others described how they used to 'feel good', 'proud' or 'excited' when they
achieved things in their pursuits such as having done some baking, finished a
complicated knitted article or caught a fish. In this way the emotional meaning of
losses were implicit through the absence of these positive sources of pleasure.
Twenty-five participants reported emotional reactions that were coded as feeling
down. Participants with depression (15/22) were particularly likely to describe
feeling down or sad. The commonest way in which participants expressed sadness
was to report that they missed what they could no longer do, for example one lady
said:
'I've started a book but only read fifty pages so far, but I would have had it finished.
I miss that' 06, 79yrs
Others used terms such as feeling 'a wee bit disappointed' or 'a bit cheesed off or 'a
wee bit dismal'. Some participants described much stronger or darker feelings and
they were typically depressed participants. For example one depressed man talked
about missing fishing in this way:
'That's a bit disappointing and cuts you and you think "What can you do?". Life's
got to carry on, but I've been enjoying it for forty years'
m55, 66yrs
A depressed female participant who used regularly to go hill walking and raised
money for an arthritis charity stated:
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'If you've led an active life and then something like this hits you, it knocks you right
down' f71, 81yrs
A few depressed participants portrayed feelings of being trapped through emotive
images or analogies. One man with depression seemed to talk about the restrictions
on his life and of being in hospital metaphorically as a job without a day off:
'I used to play bowls and sort of miss it. I used to watch the kiddies play football
and enjoyed it. It's just something you miss, you think "If I were off today what
would I be doing?" and if it were raining it would just be a different day and you'd
go to the pictures.' m64, 74yrs
Another depressed male participant revealed how devastating the loss of driving was
to him by actually using a driving metaphor:
'I was out in the car every day of my life, local shopping, the theatre, for meals.. .a
good part of my life in general and now I'm afraid that's taken a back seat since I
had the accident and the stroke.. .That's me, it puts you out the picture for now'
m59, 75yrs
One depressed male participant described his loss of independence as 'hellish', and
another described his situation as being similar to prison:
'Once you have it, it's like being in prison. I won't even put a dog in prison.'
m55, 66yrs
Eighteen participants were coded as feeling annoyed or frustrated in some way.
However, the emotion range varied from slight annoyance to fairly strong
expressions of anger. Similarly to reports of sadness, participants with anxiety and
depression were more likely to express feelings of annoyance (10/22) than
participants without anxiety or depression (8/38).
Feelings of annoyance usually stemmed from losses of ability to do things and
ranged from housework to being able to drive or partake in physical activities such
as golf or fishing. For example, a female participant described not being able to do
her own housework:
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'It's the home help not me doing it. I like pottering about on my own. I'm annoyed
Sometimes participants expressed frustration at not being able to do things as-well
as before, for example, one man described how he feels when he can't hurry to get a
bus:
'I go mental cos' I know I will have to try and not walk faster because I get all out of
A female participant with depression was unusual because she brought memory loss
up as a stroke-related concern and she felt annoyed at herself that she had missed
appointments with her nurse and hairdresser as a result. Another female participant
was unusual as she actually reported feeling 'a bit jealous' of her friends for being
able to go out shopping and to Christmas parties.
Stronger feelings of frustration seemed to be vented by those who had multiple
losses and were depressed. A male participant with depression listed various things
he found frustrating and made the global comment that 'Generally if it wasn't for the
stroke, life would be marvellous'. A lady with depression reported feeling frustrated
about not being able to look after her grandchildren or go to the shops and that it was
'a bloody nuisance'.
A few depressed female participants seemed to direct feelings of angry towards
various authorities for being against them or not sufficiently for them. A sixty-three
year old depressed participant reported having battled with social services for a long
time about her health and ability to physically care for foster children. Her stroke
put an end to this but she described feeling it had 'been taken out my control'. One
depressed lady described feeling 'mad' at the Church of Scotland because they had
taken nearly a week to phone back about a home help and talked at length about her
dissatisfaction with the regulations and expense that goes with employing home
helps generally. Another, described feeling 'very angry' that her carers were not
insured to take her out and her feeling that:
that I can't get into the corners' f26, 84yrs
sequence' m43, 60yrs
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'There's something more against the disabled'. f71, 81yrs
The strongest description of anger came from a young male participant with
depression who was 'really angry and frustrated' about his restricted life and having
to learn to walk. He talked aggressively about his stroke and the chore of
rehabilitation as if they were things to be reckoned with:
'Damn this stroke and damn all this carry on' m65, 42yrs.
16.2Hi: Being like this sub-theme 3- Specific fears and issues
Eight participants reported concerns about falling or fears related to going out and
about alone in this interview. Often they talked in terms of a lack or loss of
confidence. A participant who also had severe arthritis reported fearing a broken
bone if she fell. Other participants tended to relate their fears of falling to dangerous
traffic and the possibility of being run over, for example:
'The problem is getting out and I think "Will I fall?...Is there anything to fall on
to?". With roads I have to turn to see round and think "Would that go off balance?"'
f50, 71yrs
Interestingly, this participant, who was diagnosed with agoraphobia, had a stepsister
who is a support worker, who appeared to have been using graded exposure with
her. So far she had been accompanied but had learnt to hold her bag and get on the
bus unaided and her next step was to take a short bus ride alone to meet her sister.
Another participant reported her GP encouraged her to get out even if it meant using
taxis, but she resented paying for them.
Two participants who were physically unable to walk outside alone reported fear
about falls inside. A young male participant reported fearing a serious bang to his
head and, as with other restrictions in his life, he reported feeling angry when he fell.
A female participant graphically described her fear:
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'Once you've fell, the fear is always there... I hold on like grim death, and I'm
sometimes afraid to put one foot in front of the other' f71, 81yrs
She was also the only participant to report feeling let down and unconfident due to
the termination of physiotherapy; she described feeling 'forgotten about'.
Seven of these eight participants had depression, and five of the six who could
physically go out met criteria for agoraphobia. Most of them linked sadness or
frustration to their lack of ability to go out, for example, one female participant
reported:
'It is an awful thing to be shut in doors all on your own' f62, 87yrs
Twelve participants reported feelings of shame Four participants reported feeling
ashamed or upset by incontinence or personal care issues. The involvement of
children seemed to be particularly upsetting for a few. One man with social phobia
reported feeing embarrassed that his son should have to launder his soiled garments.
Participant f71, 81yrs explained her dependence in personal care as embarrassing
both to herself and her daughter in law, but that it would be better if she had a birth
daughter to do it.
Other participants were concerned about feeling embarrassed or devalued in public.
A retired opera singer who was in hospital explained:
'I know people would treat me fine but I would like to be able to enter the social
world in the same way as before' m31, 74yrs
He was concerned because he tended to socialise with younger people, including his
girlfriend and wanted to chat, flirt and do karaoke with them as before. A similar
idea that disability is more embarrassing amongst young people was echoed by a
sixty year old who tended to socialise with a predominantly younger crowd.
Most participants who reported a lack of confidence with appearing in the public eye
were diagnosed with social phobia. A forty-seven year old female participant, with
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social phobia related to the possibility of a stroke in public, described walking her
dogs very late at night with her hood pulled up round her face. A forty-seven year
old male participant whose diagnosis of social phobia related to embarrassment
about emotionalism, reported being unconfident about going back to the pub to play
darts in case others saw him 'throwing bad'. A female participant, also later
diagnosed with social phobia, felt that she had been made to feel embarrassed in a
restaurant:
'People do look at you. We all do it and anyone who says they don't is lying. I
want to go back to just eating normally. I knocked a glass of wine over and people
looked more because there was something wrong with me... It made me feel like
watching every move I made' f52, 57yrs
Finally, a female participant diagnosed with social phobia voiced concern about
being patronised by her family since her stroke. She described their manner as
'annoying':
'People are inclined to treat you as if you're unintelligent. My family appear to do
that when they speak slower.' f46, 82yrs.
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16.2iv: Summary ofrelationship between Be ins like this and depression/GAD
In general, participants without depression/GAD raised concerns about 'can't do'
issues as much as those who did have depression/GAD please see Table 16.2.1.
However, participants with depression/GAD were more likely to emphasise the
family or home role aspect of activities as if they felt a moral duty towards
housework, helping the wife, or ferrying one's grandchildren about and so on.
Table 16.2.1: Types and frequencies of'Can't do' concerns
Can't do: Can't do: Can't do: Can't do: Can't do:
Basic What I As tired family or Job
physical want home role
Participants with 3 (14%) 12 (54%) 4 (18%) 7 (32%) 3 (14%)
Depression/GAD (N = 22)1
Participants without 2 (5%) 16 (42%) 7 (18%) 3 (8%) 6 (16%)
depression/GAD (N = 38)
Total number of participants 5 (8%) 28 (47%) 11 (18%) 10 (17%) 9 (15%)
3 II o
1
Diagnoses of depression/GAD were made using DSMIV criteria, please see Chapter 8, section 8.3
The 'should' element that permeated participants' descriptions of family or home
roles linked in with feelings of uselessness, and those with anxiety and depression
also tended to talk about feeling useless more often (please see Table 16.2.2).
Concerns about being beholden to or having to rely on others were more often
reported by participants diagnosed with depression/GAD. They also reported
feelings of being down three times more frequently and feelings of annoyance twice
as frequently. When stronger feelings of disappointment and anger were expressed,
it was always by participants who were diagnosed as having depression/GAD.
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Table 16.2.2: Types and frequencies of meanings and feelings
Not Feeling Feeling Feeling Feeling
'normal' reliant useless down annoyed
Participants with 4 (18%) 7 (32%) 6 (27%) 15 (68%) 10 (45%)
Depression/GAD (N = 22) 1
Participants without 5 (13%) 3 (8%) 5 (13%) 10 (17%) 8 (21%)
depression/GAD (N = 38)
Total number of participants 9 (15%) 10 (17%) 11 (18%) 25 (42%) 18 (30%)
(N = 60)
1 i A
Diagnoses of depression/GAD were made using DSMIV criteria, please see Chapter 8, section 8.3
Twelve participants in this group had been found to meet criteria for agoraphobia
during the structured clinical diagnostic interview. In this less structured interview
in which they themselves raised issues, seven agoraphobic participants brought up
relevant fears. Five reported a fear of falling or the danger of being run over and
two issues of shame. Similarly to the structured clinical interview results (please
see Chapter 15, section 15.4iii) this emphasises the relative importance of
agoraphobic issues to just a proportion of those who can be diagnosed with the
disorder following stroke.
Seven participants in this group had been diagnosed with social phobia, and six of
them reported relevant feelings of shame themselves in this interview, which seems
to underlie the importance of these issues. Interestingly, a few of them raised
different embarrassing issues in this interview from those they brought up during the
structured clinical interview.
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16.3: Main theme 2- Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not
Codes and sub-themes regarding 'Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not'
are outlined on the following page. As can be seen, this theme broadly concerns
beliefs about recovery, anticipation of its likelihood and coping with this uncertain
situation.
16.3i: Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not sub-theme 1-
Gettins back
When participants expressed concern about making recovery, they tended to talk in
terms of 'wanting' or 'getting' or 'coming back'. Nine participants talked very
broadly about 'Getting back', for example:
'I want to get back ' m79, 83yrs
Similarly to the range of activities participants complained that they could not do
now, goals of recovery ranged from: doing basic physical things, getting back to
doing what s/he wanted, or, to regaining a role.
Five participants reported wanting to see improvements in physical ability, for
example:
'I just wish I could get the leg going better - get walking around and about'
f47, 82yrs
More commonly participants (18/60) reported wanting to regain functions and to be
able to do what they wanted. A few emphasised wanting improvements in terms of
independence in the home, for example:
'If I can manage on my own I'll be alright' m57, 80yrs
A few wanted to see improvements in their indoor pursuits such as knitting or
baking. Others talked about wanting to being able to walk to go out and about or to
'jump on a bus' so they could start doing the shopping again or get their social life
back.
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Seven participants whose strong concerns about not being able to carry out their
driving or housework roles were discussed earlier (please see section 16.2i) also
emphasised the importance of regaining them. For example, a depressed male
participant used repetition to stress the importance of being able 'to get up and get
out' in the car again. A female participant with depression emphasised how
important she felt it was to do her own housework again by her reference to it as
'work' and as part of having her own life:
'I'm concerned about being able to do my own housework and live my own life.. .1
would like to do my own work and house work. Two times now my second cousin
has come and done the house. I don't want to trouble her, I don't want her to make a
habit of this.' f62, 86yrs
Seven participants talked about getting back alongside the idea of becoming
'normal' or 'right' again. Sometimes the emphasis was on the importance of being
able to function normally or properly. For example:
'Getting self right again, I'm not used to this immobility' m43, 60yrs
At other times, it seemed to be the sense of being able to get back to feeling normal,
or like a normal person that was craved. In the context of discussing regaining the
ability to walk, and his fears of not being able to have sex or produce children, the
youngest male participant said:
'If I never get better people may look down on me because I'm an invalid... I just
want to feel like everyone else' m65, 42yrs
Overall, participants tended to express concerns about 'getting back' less often than
'can't dos'. However, it is assume that the appeal of recovery had been pretty much
implied through many peoples concerns about what they could not do. Regardless
of whether participants talked about dissatisfaction with not being able, or wanting
to get back ability, they tended to emphasise function, roles and normality as much,
or more than physical ability.
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However, in contrast to most participants' concerns to get back to normality and
being able to feel normal, seven participants actually felt they were already back to
normal. A couple of them recognised they had some residual effects remaining but
tended to emphasise that they were feeling 'excellent' or that they were very pleased
with their progress. Their disability levels did tend to be low; however, a seventy-
five year old female participant was the exception to the rule. She was actually
housebound in a third floor flat, but nevertheless appeared cheerfully free from
concern about her stroke and joked:
'It came it went and conga!' f25, 72yrs
16.3U: Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not sub-theme 2-
What the future holds
Eleven participants expressed beliefs that their abilities would come back. Often
their confidence was built on their recovery so far; for example a ninety year old
man said:
'As time goes on it will gradually get better. I'm not sure it will be permanent
because the slight feeling in my lower lip has gone now' m44, 90yrs
Sometimes the idea that 'It'll come' was implied because participants spoke with
certainty about themselves as back to their pre-stroke selves in the future. For
example, a lady who was presently depressed and agoraphobic nevertheless said:
'I've never been out socialising, but once I get back I will be back as normal'
f50, 71yrs
Ten participants expressed uncertainty, often through 'Will I?' type questions, about
whether and how much they could expect to get back. Their uncertainty often
seemed very reasonable especially for the four who were still in hospital. As one
man said:
'Will I be able to do my own shopping? They assure me I will, I'm walking now
here but I will be in a different environment... Will I improve? Will I get back to
somewhere near normal?' m31, 74yrs
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Another man pointed out that it was hard to estimate whether one would recover
because the doctors and physiotherapists were uncertain themselves. Another
queried why some people seemed to get better in a month while he was taking a lot
longer.
Five participants suggested they may never get back to their pre-stroke ability levels.
A few spoke of quite specific issues: the eldest participant doubted he would play
golf again, one lady doubted she would dance again and another that he would travel
as far as Africa. Meanwhile, the youngest participant who was depressed spoke
more globally:
'I might not get better, it's pretty bad.. .1 might never be able to live a normal life
again' m65,42yrs
His negative perspective was not unrealistic, as he had not managed to walk yet.
However, another depressed man's cynical comments in reference to getting home,
for example:
'I just don't see it happening' m59, 75yrs
appeared out of proportion to the actual situation as he was now walking and had a
home visit scheduled.
Ten participants remarked that things would be bad if they did not get back some
level of ability or a specific function. Often they suggested that they would be sad
or 'miss it' otherwise. Driving was the most commonly reported function in this
context and was brought up by four male participants. One depressed man said he'd
be 'useless' to his family if he could not drive in future and another said that it
would be 'a big loss'. A depressed female participant who wanted to regain driving
to enable visiting her children and getting to bridge club said that otherwise:
'Life would be hell.' f80, 75yrs
A man who was still wheelchair-bound in hospital reported he would feel sad and
embarrassed if he was not able to get home. Other activities mentioned as holding
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potential for sadness if not regained were walking in a social club, golf, bowls and
woodwork.
16.3iii: Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not sub-theme 3-
Acclimatisins
Participants comments revealed various ways of thinking to cope with or
'acclimatise' to what they could no longer do, or might not be able to get back to.
However, for eighteen participants this was apparently not necessary. They stated
quite clearly that they were simply not worried or concerned about anything. They
tended to make these statements at the beginning of the qualitative interview, for
example:
"I'm not concerned about anything' m23, 71yrs
A few explained that they were characteristically not worriers, for example:
'I think that once you get to eighty years old that unless you're the worrying type
you're not suddenly going to get depressed or sad' f27, 80yrs
With further probing questions most of these participants maintained that they had
no concerns about what they could not do, or about recovery or recurrence, but four
participants did go on to report some stroke-related concerns after all.
Five participants appeared to be making a conscious effort not to worry, or admit to
worrying about disability or recovery. They statements of not worrying were less
convincing as they contradicted themselves elsewhere and did reveal concerns. For
example, one man described himself as someone who had never been one to 'think
negative' and as being concerned about 'nothing really', but went on to say:
'You must worry, but it's not like I talk to myself or anything like that. I'm not
always thinking about health all the time. I don't think about it when I wake in the
morning: "Will I be able to walk?"' m54, 62yrs
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One lady who actually described herself as constantly worried and was found to
have GAD in the diagnostic interview. However in this interview she insisted that
she didn't 'worry' about recovery, but was just 'thinking about it'.
Ten participants made comments stating or implying they had accepted what they
could not do. Often they used cliches like 'that's life' or 'what's happened has
happened' to show their stoicism. A few implied that their ability to accept reflected
the type of people they were, for example, one lady said:
'I'm not dying to get back, it's just my passive nature' f73, 74yrs
For others, their acceptance was something they had seemed to have had to work at,
for example one man described himself as becoming 'acclimatised' to things.
Another man's comments portrayed a very sober kind of acceptance:
'I have to accept it, that I can't do much... You've got to do your best, so I'm just
resigned. No one has a magic wand to wave.' m57, 80yrs
His acceptance was perhaps better described as resignation whereas the others in this
group tended to convey a more convincing upbeat state of acceptance.
Many participants made 'It's bad... but' compensatory-type remarks, often as tail
ends to statements of concern about what they would like to get back to or could no
longer do. Thirteen participants implied they didn't mind being unable to do
something. Often participants made 'don't mind' type remarks about hobbies such
as bowls, woodwork, a holiday or gardening. One lady who had attended bingo
weekly for years now said that actually she 'weren't that into it' after all. In contrast
to some female participants' angst about the housework (please see 16.2i) one lady
reported she was quite happy to put the spring cleaning off until she felt up to it.
The implication tended to be that in retrospect things that were no longer possible
had never been important anyway, and so they were easy to let go. A couple of
people reported that they could not write well following stroke, but one lady said she
had never been a 'great writer' anyway and another described not being able to send
Christmas cards as 'not a great inconvenience'. A forty-seven year man appeared to
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have undergone a fairly striking turn around in his attitudes to drinking. He
described himself as someone whose dream had been to 'drink the pub' in his youth,
but now said:
'I've just been once during the daytime, just had one pint and it tasted rotten, I think
it may have been a bad pint' m53, 47yrs
Fifteen participants made remarks implying 'OK for now'. These sort of statements
suggested that relevant activities were still valued, but that a restriction could be
accepted, so long as it was temporary. People tended to talk about activities outside
the home in this way, for example, socialising, going for car rides, and church. A
couple made 'OK for now' remarks about DIY, one about reading, and a man who
was still in hospital said he coped with the separation from his family only because it
was time - limited. Slightly ironically, three participants mentioned that the winter
weather made it easier to accept being unable to do things outside. For example,
although one man wanted to get back to gardening eventually, he said:
'I can't do anything at the moment anyway, the weather won't permit it at the
moment with soaked ground, which is good in a way' m32, 74yrs
Seventeen participants reported that 'At least' they could do some things, even
though they were concerned about others. A few participants comments implied that
they at least felt grateful for what they could still do, for example, one man said:
'At least I can still walk, I just will never be able to run or kick a ball.'
m54, 62yrs
Some participants seemed to have behaviourally substituted losses by increasing
other equally valued pursuits, for example a lady who used to enjoy dancing now
went to the theatre more often to 'make up for it'. Others were grateful that they
could still maintain interests, even if it was in a different capacity. For example, a
man who loved music and was missing his CD collection in hospital said he was
pleased to be able to listen to tapes his son had made.
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A house-proud man with GAD, who liked to do his own DIY hadn't felt confident
enough to mend a door so had hired someone else to do it. As he said:
'I felt rotten about getting someone in, but still pleased I was getting it done.'
m45, 76yrs
Nine participants made remarks to imply they were glad because after all their
predicament 'Could be worse'. Most of them reported feeling fortunate in
comparison to other people with worse strokes, for example:
'I've had it lucky compared to some folk who cannae do a thing' f63, 83yrs
One man pointed out he was glad to have had a right-sided stroke, as he is
left-handed and an artist. Another reported feeling lucky that at least he did not
suffer the kind of'mental blockage' associated with Alzheimer's disease.
Ten participants reported trying to make improvements. Some talked in very
positive terms, for example one man said:
'I will fight it and still make it.. .1 never lie down to anyone.' m35, 84yrs
A couple of depressed participants' reports contained an element of self-reprimand,
for example one man said:
'I've just got to make my mind up to get on with it' m58, 75yrs
One man specifically voiced enthusiasm about the importance of trying in
physiotherapy, for example:
'I'm putting all my energies into this physio, I never miss a chance.' m79, 83yrs
Twelve participants reported hoping for improvements. Statements of hope, or
wishing and waiting were made in reference to getting back to various activities
such as going shopping, driving, gardening, travelling. Generally participants tended
to make very simple statements of hope. One man who was very keen to get back to
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his normal life outside the hospital made slightly more complex comments and
seemed to be mentally bargaining with what he hoped for:
'I hope I will come back to normal, maybe not so good but so I'm able to give it a
try' m29,76yrs
Nine participants seemed to be actively mentally coping by looking forwards ('Will
dos'i or backwards ('Did dos') with pleasure. A few reported looking forward to
positive events or being able to manage certain things again in the future, such as
seeing the family at Christmas if not this summer, or getting into the garden by
spring. For example, one man reported disappointment that a walk round the block
had made him exhausted but reported:
'I maybe overdid it, if I do it routinely it will improve' m44, 90yrs
More often, participants reported that they used past happier memories as comforts.
For example, a lady who missed being able to dance said:
'I miss it but I still enjoy the fact that I did dance' f47, 82yrs
She had won awards dancing awards and went and fetched the photographs to prove
the point. Similarly, a retired forestry commissioner who was now housebound
made the point:
'There's something of me in the countryside that wouldn't be there apart from
me.. .1 still look back with pleasure, although I can't do' m68, 88yrs
Seven participants made jokes about their predicament. No one actually explicitly
stated that they used it as a coping strategy; however one participant valued 'being
funny' as the most important part in her life and her continual joking certainly
worked to imply her mood was good. Being depressed, didn't seem to deter a few
participants from being able to make a joke, for example one man said:
'At least my stroke has given us another talking point, which is a change from hips
etcetera' m58,80yrs
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16.3iv: Summary of relationship between Gettins back to normality, feeIins normal
or not and depression/GAD
In terms of issues participants talked about wanting to get back, these results
paralleled those for concerns about 'Being like this' (please see section 16.2i). In
general participants with and without depression wanted to get back to valued
activities and normal life. However, those with depression/GAD appeared to
emphasise the need to regain valued roles to feel useful. Also the strongest craving
for being able to feel normal again was expressed by a young depressed man.
Interestingly, apparent confidence in recovery, shown by remarks that 'it'll come'
back, were not made more frequently by those without depression/GAD as by those
with. Also, participants without depression/GAD actually reported uncertain 'Will
I?' comments more often. However, participants with depression/GAD were more
likely to make stronger statements of uncertainty and suggest that recovery might
never occur (please see Table 16.3.1). One depressed male's comments suggested
particularly unrealistic pessimism. Also, participants with anxiety or depression
more often commented that life would be bad, without sufficient recovery.
Table 16.3.1 Types and frequencies of'What the future holds' beliefs and beliefs in good
progress
Positive beliefs Negative beliefs
Back to It'll come Will I? Might Would bes
normal never (If not then bad)
Participants with anxiety or 0 4 (18%) 1 (5%) 3 (14%) 5 (23%)
depression (N = 22)1
Participants without anxiety or 7 (18%) 7 (18%) 10(24%) 2 (5%) 5 (13%)
depression (N = 38)
Total number of participants 7 (12%) 11 (18%) 11 (18%) 5 (8%) 10 (17%)
(N = 60)
1
Diagnoses of depression/GAD were made using DSMIV criteria, please see Chapter 8, section 8.3
The belief that a good recovery had already been made, shown by remarks that they
felt 'Back to normal' were made by some participants who were not anxious or
depressed. Many participants with depression/GAD were also quite physically well
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recovered, but not one of them appeared to share the highly positive belief that they
had got back to normal.
A strong sense of resiliency emerged from the reports of participants who were not
anxious or depressed. They often said they were just not worried or concerned
period. Many acknowledged but yet accepted losses or they seemed to devalue past
endeavours and say they didn't really mind their absence. This was rarely the case
for participants who were anxious or depressed (please see Table 16.3.2).
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Various more effortful reasoning strategies were apparent amongst some participants
with and without depression/GAD. They seemed to be mentally weighing things up
to try and see a more positive side, sometimes by focusing on the temporary nature
of things, or alternatively by thinking about what 'at least' they could do or about
how things might be worse. Some participants were actually doing more of what 'at
least' they could and some were putting effort into recovery. A few participants
joked about problems and some seemed to be comforted by looking to the future or
by reminiscences of the past. Participants who had depression/GAD may have been
less hopeful about the likelihood of recovery (see earlier) however they were even
more likely to say they were wishing or hoping things would get better.
Overall this theme suggests that participants own perceptions of change and
recovery seem to play some part in the explanation of distress. Some participants
who were not anxious or depressed were not worried, had accepted changes, or even
felt they were almost back to normal. For them coping strategies were apparently
not needed. Regardless of diagnostic status, some participants were uncertain about
their recovery and those with anxiety and depression were more likely to seem
cynical. Various ways of thinking to cope with an uncertain recovery were reported
but these tended to be as frequent amongst those who were and those who were not
found to have depression/GAD.
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16.4: Main theme 3- Taking another, or not
Codes and three sub-themes for 'Taking another, or not' are outlined on the
following page. As shown this main theme is organised into sub-theme 1 'Concerns
about taking another one' and sub-theme 2 'Prevention issues'
16.4i: Taking another, or not sub-theme 1- Concerns about taking another
Fear of a further stroke clearly emerged as a major theme from the present data.
When participants raised concern about the possibility of recurrent strokes they
talked in terms of 'another one' and commonly about 'taking' another one.
Fearing 'taking another' was common, and in total three quarters of participants
(44/60; 73%) brought it up in some context.
A couple of single people mentioned their fear of being left alone in the house
unable to get help if they did take another. However, in general the content of fears
were orientated towards more long-term potential consequences: the possibility of
dying, or of having a more severe stroke.
The fear of death was reported by ten participants. This was generally reported
matter of fact and not expanded on. Only two participants, both of whom were
depressed gave more detailed responses. For one depressed lady just the possibility
of death itself was what appeared frightening:
'I could die. I'm not sure what it is I'm scared of, I've just got a fear of it. It's come
on since the stroke, that it really could happen. I just blame this stroke, I could have
another.' f77,73yrs
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A relatively young participant, who also met criteria for GAD, stated that her main
concern in life was 'not being here for my family'. She was concerned whether her
recently divorced son and lone parent daughter would cope, and about the future of
her granddaughter's welfare and education:
' I don't know how she'd cope without me, she'd really miss me. I'm not going to
be here when she's sixteen years, seventeen years old. I don't want her not using
her brains and just getting a job. My daughter's not strong enough without a
husband.. .If I'm not here what are you all going to do?.. .What are any of you going
to do?' 178, 63yrs.
The fear that a further stroke could be more severe was reported more often than the
fear of death. Sixteen participants expressed fearing 'a more severe one' generally,
and some expanded this fear with thoughts such as: being wheelchair-bound, unable
to communicate, or, ending up a 'vegetable'. For example, a male participant with
major depression and GAD said:
'How much more could you be disabled?...It would be terrible not to communicate
normally. I would find it awful to get used to and I don't think I could.'
m59, 75yrs
Anxiety appeared common amongst this group. Five of the eight participants
diagnosed with GAD expressed concerns about a more severe stroke.
The nature of concerns often centred on being able to cope with 'becoming
disabled'. A few participants expressed views that they felt unable to cope with
something so 'awful' and others expressed their aversion to the idea of their family
having to cope with 'this vegetable'. For example, a male participant with minor
depression and GAD said:
'The thought of the disability that could follow stroke could be monumental for me,
and my family, for example, speech and movement. I would think "What the hell is
the point?" I couldn't deal with that. It worries me of how this could lead to a
reoccurrence of any more disability' m58, 80yrs
The sharing of experience, and interpersonal nature of concerns, was apparent for
four participants who worried about a loved one taking a stroke. For example, one'
man wished his wife would slow down, because:
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'This stroke hit me like that, so could her.. .It's just that if this happened what would
we do? That's why I want to get back to cutting the grass' m66, 62yrs
A female participant with minor depression expressed a similar sentiment:
'If my husband took one, how would it affect my quality of life, mine as well as
his?' f52,66yrs
The view that death would be preferable to a more severe stroke was expressed by
eight participants. One man suggested he would consider euthanasia if he had a
severe stroke. Concerns for others welfare and quality of life, permeated
participants' views that severe disability would be worse than death For example,
one husband said:
'It would be worse if not fatal and lingering on in a vegetative state. Rather better to
have a quick "Goodbye" than have this vegetable you're going to take care of
m33, 66yrs
In general, a preference for death compared to a more severe stroke was reported
matter of fact.
Participants' fears of recurrence often seemed to stem from their own personal
experience, or, from their observations or knowledge of others experience. Some
mentioned they had already had more than one stroke, and some the unpredictable
nature of stroke as if to suggest it could be expected again. A few described having
known someone who experienced recurrent strokes, and some participants recounted
their observations of other patients in hospital, please see Table 16.4.1.
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5 (13%) 5 (13%) 1 (3%) 7 (18%)
Total number of participants 6 (10%) 6 (10%) 3 (5%) 10 (17%)
(N = 60)
1 Diagnoses of depression/GAD were made using DSMIV criteria (please see Chapter 8, section 8.3)
Four participants who reported a prior hospital admission for a stroke mentioned it
in the context of their chances or fears of recurrence. For example, one man's
previous experience seemed to lead him to suggest that the doctors could not
reassure him, and, he made a high estimation of the probability of a recurrence:
'Well they know and have a lot more experience, but as I've had two or three
already they can't say "Alright now".. .probably about five in ten' m57, 80yrs
Other participants who mentioned a previous history of stroke did not seem
particularly concerned about recurrences. One female participant actually joked
about it:
'That I've had it four times! Somebody up there is wanting me in a hurry, it's me
who's not in a hurry to go!' f47, 82yrs
So it seems that participants who had survived multiple strokes often remained
admirably stoic against the fear of future recurrences. Paradoxically, the experience
of a second mild stroke seemed to make the possibility of a severe one seem less
rather than more likely, for a male participant who did have GAD:
'I've often thought it could happen to me. But, it's never been that bad, for
example, my memory is perfect.. .I've had two well ones so I could have another
well one, but it's always at the back of my mind that I could have a severe one.'
m45, 75yrs.
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Interestingly, a male and a female participant not previously aware of previous
strokes reported that they'd had more than one. Scans can sometimes reveal
evidence of old lesions, which physicians may feel patients have a right to know
about. However, while appreciative of the doctor's information giving, these
participants appeared perturbed by the knowledge:
'I was quite surprised when the doctor said I'd had two...If I've had two strokes, I
could have three or four! I used to think once you've had a stroke that was it'
m79, 83yrs
The lack of any forewarning prior to stroke, and its unexpected sudden onset was
mentioned by six participants during this interview, for example:
'I felt so well pre-stroke, I felt fine, absolutely great, it was out the blue'
m66, 62yrs
The unpredictable nature of stroke seemed to enhance the idea that it could be
expected again, for example:
'It just happens so suddenly, there's not even a warning. ..It can happen to anyone,
anytime, that's all really' 175, 68yrs
This pattern of thought was actually mentioned by a man, diagnosed with
depression, when he was asked to describe his understanding of 'What a stroke is?'
at the beginning of the quantitative interview. His idea that a stroke is 'a dirty
thing' which can 'strike' in the night was emotionally powerful:
'I'll tell you what a Stroke is, it's a dirty thing, I think it's a dirty thing. It means
you're losing half the power of your body practically, you're going to bed normal
and waking up not being able to speak or move and depending on other people to do
things you'd normally do yourself. It's the dirtiest thing you can get. You've no
idea when it will strike, how it will strike or what side effects it will bring'
m41, 69yrs
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Only a few participants described personally knowing someone who had
experienced a recurrent stroke in the context of recurrence fears. However, when
they did, their accounts were highly salient. One man described his best friend's
progressive deterioration through three successive strokes:
'Each one got worse, and now he is in a chair and can't speak' m67, 66yrs
A male participant with GAD, was afraid of re-enacting his father's very severe and
eventually fatal stroke. Likewise, a female participant with GAD and depression
reported:
'I'm concerned it could be like my mother's which was fatal...For two months she
had TIAs and recovered, then one night I was restless and went to visit. It was the
weekend so I got the Doctor to come in the morning and she slipped into
unconsciousness for two days and then haemorrhaged and died. I thought she was
doing quite well.. .So if I did have one it could be fatal' f52, 57yrs
Fears of taking another oneself were commonly accompanied by comments about
having seen others with recurrent strokes in hospital. For example, one man was
concerned, as he'd noticed patients already known by the nurses being admitted
during his stay. Sometimes, the idea that another stroke would be more severe was
implied through observations of others, for example, one man with depression said:
'Others have to be in wheelchairs, they can't talk and their memories are away'
m55, 66yrs
Altogether, ten people mentioned observations of other patients with more severe or
recurrent strokes. Interestingly, three of these participants were amongst the seven
who were still in hospital at the time of the interview. They reported having
listened to or talked to others, and gave fuller accounts of others' 'misfortunes', for
example:
'Wee T in the bed opposite, that's his fourth! After listening to people who've
had three or four, I think, I'm not having any more of this hospital! It would be
frustrating to have to start doing all this again.' m79, 83yrs
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16.4H: Taking another, or not sub-theme 2- Prevention Issues
Some participants' accounts did reveal an orientation to risk factors or prevention
issues. Some took a questioning stance, and a few had been thinking in depth their
risk of recurrence or what they could do to prevent it. Others had specific issues
about what they should or shouldn't be doing, or what they could or couldn't do to
decrease their risks of further strokes.
A couple of participants actually estimated how likely they thought a recurrence
would be. One man felt he had a fifty-fifty chance, while a participant, who was
depressed, reported
'I'm just hoping it doesn't but there's a quite good possibility I could... I think it's
more than likely' m59, 75yrs
In contrast, one man argued that he now considered himself unlikely as he had
'come a long way' so far. Retrospectively, it would have been interesting to directly
enquire after all participants perceived chances of recurrence, because the above two
estimations are troublingly high.
A couple of participants appeared to be weighing up their relative risks, partly by
comparison to others. On the one hand, f52, 57yrs, who had depression and GAD
was anxious about strokes in the family, but she also recognised that her chances
were favourable in other respects:
'I feel myself I won't, but my mother did, she was sixty-four years and had a
different kind of stroke. It has crossed my mind, but I don't think I will just because
she did. In the family Aunties and Uncles have had strokes and heart problems. I
would be worried about taking another, but age is for me' f52, 57yrs
Similarly, m67, 66yrs compared himself to his best mate who'd had three strokes.
He was concerned because they were both active, but heavy drinkers. But, then he
argued that he was never as overweight as his friend. However, he was also
concerned that his heart problems might lead to a stroke:
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'Especially as I've not got rid of angina. Two arteries behind my heart are not
working, so I could have another one, even if I never had angina, it could happen for
no reason anyway.' m67, 66yrs.
A questioning stance about prevention was fairly common, and fourteen participants
brought up control-seeking issues. Five of these participants were men who
revealed a proactive stance to controlling risk. They had already all made steps to
have their blood pressure taken. One man asserted he was going to 'find out' how to
'narrow' his chances further and 'nip this in the bud'. Another had already read
leaflets and was intending to learn more about exercise. Their assertiveness and
sense of entitlement to doctors as a resource was apparent. Although they varied in
how satisfied they were with their GPs, this did not seem to have hindered their
determination, for example:
'I had to argue him down from a month to two weeks for my blood pressure
checks!'
m48, 60yrs
Other participants who raised control-seeking issues, seemed to have been less
assertive with professionals. Although they were interested in knowing more they
hadn't sought medical advice or made plans to do so. Their knowledge levels varied
and a few even asked me about recurrence and prevention in the interview. For
example, a man concerned about recurrence asked:
'Whether it will? You tell me, do they come in cycles or what?' m54, 62yrs
Two participants seemed to be confused by the 'one side, other side' issue of brain
to body function, and wondered whether they were more likely to have a stroke on
the other side of the body. Sometimes their more passive orientation may have
been because they feared what they might find out if they did make enquires. For
example, one depressed female, had been refused medical insurance and reported
being unsure whether go and see her GP to ask as 'at the back of my mind I don't
want to know'.
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A particularly troubling lack of knowledge was apparent for two male participants,
with depression, who was still in hospital. One asked:
'What can be done to prevent it happening again?...Stress and worry may be
important?.. .1 haven't a clue how to control this!' m41, 69yrs
Then, he commented that he hadn't asked his named nurse about his concerns
because he felt she had far too much to do. They were both unusual because, even
with the aid of the checklist, they had been unable to make even one causal
attribution in the quantitative interview. The other initially reported:
'I'm very curious to know what caused it for the simple reason to try and make sure
it never happens again' m64, 74yrs
However, at another point he said he was concerned to learn more as 'I'd hate to
think it could go any deeper'. Overall the less assertive participants with
control- seeking issues were quite likely to be depressed (five out of nine) whereas
none of the more assertive participants were.
Some participants raised concerns about whether they should or shouldn't avoid
certain activities for fear they might 'trigger it off again'. For example, a participant
with depression and GAD reported:
' Should I be doing the hoovering that's the big question? Someone told me the
spring cleaning gave me the stroke. I'm frightened to do things in case of another
stroke' f62,87yrs
Likewise, a retired bar lady, with depression and GAD, wanted to clean her
windows. But she was afraid of overexertion and 'getting a row for it' from her
concerned daughter. The 'Should I/shouldn't I?' question seemed so anxiety
provoking, as it created a tension between the idea one should not risk one's health
and an almost moral compulsion that one 'should' be doing the house.
Chapter 16: Qualitative results- 16.4- Taking another, or not
318 Results
This paralleled the sense of having a role and continuity with a working life
discussed in previously (please see section 16.2i) for example:
'Am I affecting myself by doing this? But, what's for you won't go past you. ..I'm
one who cannae sit still, I've worked all my life...I would like to clean the windows,
I feel I should be up doing something.. .Should I stop exerting myself? But, I don't
want to be lying in bed' f74, 64yrs
A similar dilemma was faced by f52, 57yrs, who was very motivated to get back to
work but who was worried that doing so may cause another stroke. Overall, four of
the eight participants with 'Should I/shouldn't I?' issues had depression, and three of
them were females with GAD.
For ten participants, the question was whether they could or couldn't change
something, to help prevent exacerbating a recurrence. Some were concerned with
reducing physical or mental stress in their lives. For example, one man hoped to be
able to 'enjoy it without pushing it' in the garden next spring. Another hoped he
could arrange to do less when he returned to work. Sometimes the issue was to
avoid the stress of others problems. One man reported wanting to address his frail
mother in law's living situation, partly to decrease his own stress. Two female
participants reported conserving their emotional energies for themselves for the time
being, for example:
'Putting myself higher on the list...not letting others stresses stress me. On the
phone I felt a friends stress was off loading on me - I managed to distance myself
which was difficult as it's not in my nature to do that.' f49, 60yrs
Participants who brought up the need to do less or be less involved with others
generally seemed quite confident that they could or had done so.
Two participants reported they did not want to give up smoking. One man said it
was just a problem for his sister and he didn't appreciate her nagging. A female
participant, who attributed her depression to her blindness not the stroke, reported:
'It's an important indulgence in my limited life'
f46, 82yrs
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Two other participants with depression/GAD reported struggling with giving up as
they used smoking to cope in life. Despite the motivation of asthma as well as
stroke, and having stopped in hospital, a female participant with GAD and
depression reported starting again once she was home:
'I'm a fool but I do enjoy a cigarette...if worried grab for a fag' f24, 70yrs
A similar sense of powerlessness and lack of belief in his ability to stop smoking
was reported by a young male participant, who had major depression:
'I can't stop smoking... I need to know how to deal with craving and other things to
do instead' m65, 42yrs
Overall, three of ten participants with 'Can I?/can't I?' issues had depression, and
they all reported smoking cessation as the issues.
A small number of participants seemed to be coping by countering recurrence fears
with positive comments about their doctors or medical treatment. For example, one
participant reported her concern about another one, but then that she'd 'put her faith'
in her new prescription. Similarly, a male participant reported:
'I'm quite happy about the doctors doing their job. As an expert in one area, I'm
quite happy to let them get on with it and follow their advice' m38, 60yrs
Interestingly, none of these participants had depression/GAD.
However, participants were more likely to seem lacking in medical reassurance, or
to express concerns about negative attitudes from their doctors. A couple of the
assertive participants criticised their GPs lack lustre approach. One man reported he
had had to ask for blood pressure monitoring and was wary about 'being passed
over' because of age. Another described, asking for physiotherapy and blood
pressure checks as like 'arguing for concessions'. A female participant, with
depression reported reluctance to ask her GP about causes for fear of 'holding him
back'. Meanwhile, a male participant expressed the view he didn't think his doctors
knew any more than he did.
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Two depressed participants held particularly suspicious and saddening views. One
participant thought her consultant may have decided not to see her because he
suspects she still smokes:
'I think they never bothered sending me one because I smoked, I don't think he
believes me [about having given up smoking]...' f77, 73yrs
She described feeling 'miserable' about not getting an appointment and being
particularly worried because she has had a leaky valve for fifty years and her
grandson (who worked in the Royal Infirmary as a porter) had told her this was too
long. The young male participant with depression suspected his stroke was
associated with the general anaesthetic he'd had for a cancer biopsy two days
previously. However, he didn't believe he could have a frank discussion about this:
'I've never asked the doctors, I don't think they will give me a definite answer or
will blame it on something that's not the cause at all' m65, 42yrs
Altogether six of the ten people scored as lacking reassurance or having an issue
with 'ageism or prejudice' were also found to be depressed.
In contrast to the range of ways participants coped mentally with the issue of
recovering or not (please see section 16.3iii) they appeared to be just trying not to
worry about recurrence. This was done in various ways. Some participants reported
attempts to block worrying about recurrence out, or to only permit thinking about it.
This did not seem particularly successful for this participant, with depression and
GAD:
'Am I going to take another one? I don't let it worry me, but it's the first thing I
think.' f24,70yrs
Similarly, others mentioned putting it 'to the back of their minds' but that it was still
there, albeit 'deep down'. One man described feeling it 'at the back of my mind
particularly' when he was reminded about it in the company of his friend who was
severely disabled by stroke. Some argued that they resisted worry by: seeing it as a
fruitless activity. Paradoxically others used the suddenness of stroke as an argument
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for not worrying. This female participant seemed to using all these ideas, and more,
to resist the temptation to worry:
'It is so sudden, there's no point worrying about it. I never really think about it -
you die if you do and you die if you don't so why worry?' f42, 70yrs
The efficacy of strategies to block out or rationalise away worry about further
strokes is ambiguous in this data. On the one hand, most of the eleven participants
who made 'Why worry?' type comments were not depressed or anxious, however,
three were depressed and had diagnoses of GAD.
Fatalistic ideas that nothing could be done to prevent a recurrence were expressed by
eight participants. For example:
'If I will, I will and nothing is going to stop it' f24, 70yrs
The idea that 'nothing could be done to prevent a stroke' in isolation appears highly
anxiety provoking. However, often participants' expressions of fatalism, seemed to
be used as an adjunct to the argument that worrying was pointless. For example,
f42, 70yrs above, and a male participant who stated:
'Nothing really, it's been and gone. If it comes back it does and que sera sera'
m69, 65yrs.
The strength of some people's actual belief in fatalism was not convincing because
they expressed it within a broader discussion of risk. For example one woman with
GAD commented 'What's for you won't go by you' but continued to question
whether over-exertion was a risk. Likewise, one man commented 'It could happen
for no reason anyway' after a careful consideration of his behavioural and medical
risk. Discussion of risk factors implies some belief in the possibility of control, and
so, they seem to be using fatalistic sayings idiomatically, to imply only so much can
be done and so why worry?.
Overall, depressed participants were slightly more likely to make fatalistic
comments that 'nothing can be done'. The thoughts of a relatively young
participant, with major depression, were particularly saddening and stronger than the
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others. She actually expressed the belief that she was fated to have a further and
severe stroke. Indeed, she reported 'not being totally unconvinced' that she had not
already had further strokes. She had experienced 'fizzy feelings' in her head prior to
her stroke and had been experiencing the same sensation since. She questioned
whether 'it was worth it anymore?' and suggested that death would resolve her from
her present worry and concern about recurrence:
'If something really serious happened and I died I wouldn't have these problems'
f21, 47yrs
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16.4iii: Summary ofrelationship between Taking another, or not and
deyression/GAD
Overall, a wide range of negative and few positive beliefs about taking another
stroke were reported. Three main beliefs concerning the nature of a recurrent stroke
were reported ('death', 'a more severe stroke' and 'preference for death versus a
severe stroke'). Various personal and vicarious experiences appeared to lie at the
root of participants fears of recurrence ('personal experience of more than one
stroke', 'unpredictable nature of stroke', 'known someone who had recurrent
strokes' or 'observed other patients with recurrent strokes'). Many of these beliefs
represented misconceptions, particularly recurrence fears seeming from seeing other
patients in hospital with recurrent stroke, or ideas that it may happen again because
when it does it happens suddenly.
Unlike previous main themes participants with depression/GAD only occasionally
tended towards stronger or more emotive descriptions of the various negative beliefs
about recurrence. However a few exceptions to this general pattern were notable.
Participants with GAD as well as depression (5/8) seemed particularly likely to
report fearing a severe stroke. Also two of the three participants whose fear was of
repeating the fate of someone close to them had depression/GAD, but it is
recognised that the numbers here are small.
Table 16.4.2: Number of 'Taking another, or not' beliefs and whether recurrence fear was
reported as a main concern in life amongst participants with and without depression/GAD
Recurrence fear a Number of 'Taking another, or not'
'main concern in life' beliefs reported
0 1 or 2 3 or more
Participants with 7 (32%) 4 (19%) 6 (27%) 11 (53%)
depression/GAD 2
(N=22)
Participants without 1 (3%) 12 (31%) 13 (34%) 14 (36%)
depression/GAD
(N=38)
1 In the calculation, the codes WW? And NCSI were counted as one, as there was so much overlap between the two, and the
code FM was ignored as it was not regarded as a fearful belief
1 Diagnoses of depression/GAD were made using DSMIV criteria (please see Chapter 8, section 8 .3)
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Participants with depression/GAD were compared to those without in terms of
numbers of'Taking another, or not' beliefs and this is illustrated in Table 16.4.2.
As can be seen, less participants with depression/GAD reported no 'Taking another,
or not' beliefs, and more reported three or more 'Taking another, or not' beliefs
than participants without depression/GAD. Also, more participants with
depression/GAD reported fears of recurrence as a 'main concern in life' suggesting
that it was a more dominant pre-occupation amongst them than amongst participants
without depression/GAD.
Compared to the range of mental coping strategies to deal with the uncertainty of
recovery reported in qualitative interviews (please see section 16.3iii) participants
often appeared to be just trying to block recurrence fears. Some participants brought
up issues of control and objective risk factor issues Of those who did, only a few
reported being reassured by medical treatment or taking a proactive stance to getting
it. Others appeared to lack basic knowledge, have unanswered questions or hold
misconceived notions of behavioural triggers. In contrast to the common reporting
of behavioural risk factors when specifically probed to do so in the quantitative
interview, only a few brought up behavioural risks in this interview. The few who
did were depressed and lacked confidence that they could quit smoking. Sadly, one
depressed woman who had successfully stopped believed she had not been given a
follow-up appointment or heart treatment because her consultant did not believe her.
Also relevant to this theme is the young woman who was too distressed to
participate fully (please see Chapter 5, section 5.6). She reported having been told
one of her arteries was 'thin as a piece of thread' and she explained that her reason
for sitting holding her neck with her hands was due to the fear it would snap. The
depressed participant described earlier as believing 'fizzy feelings' were multiple
strokes, reported that her G.P had agreed with her at follow-up. A forty-two year
old man, who met criteria for PTSD reported similar beliefs at nine months (please
see Chapter 15, section 15.7) and he said that his physiotherapist had agreed. These
views and the lack of alternative more optimistic views are very concerning.
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17.1: Forward
Quantitative univariate and multivariate results have been summarised in relation to
the specific hypotheses (please see Chapter 11, sections 11.3iii.and 11.5; Chapter 13,
sections 13.3iii and 13.5; Chapter 14, sections 14.3ii, 14.6). In this chapter the main
findings from the quantitative study, the structured clinical interview study and the
qualitative study will be summarised in relation to the objectives, which were to:
1) Investigate emotional distress
2) Investigate beliefs considered relevant to stroke patients' emotional distress
3) Examine associations between emotional distress and specific types of beliefs
following stroke
4) Investigate the ability of initial beliefs to predict emotional distress over time
5) Explore the types of beliefs and nature of symptoms related to common
depression and anxiety disorders
6) Explore patients' own experiences and concerns using a qualitative approach
Where appropriate comment will be made on the convergence/divergence of
findings across the different methods of investigation.
17.2: Summary of the sample characteristics and results for the background
variables
Sample characteristics
A consecutive series of eighty-nine stroke patients, without severe cognitive or
language impairment made up the sample at baseline. Eighty-one of these patients
were seen again at follow-up. There were approximately equal proportions of male
and female participants. Their ages ranged from thirty-two-years-old to ninety-
years-old and were normally distributed around the mean age of seventy-years-old
(M=70.13, SD=11.29). Their social economic status tended to more affluent than
deprived. Stroke severity scores suggested that the sample tended towards the lower
end of the severity spectrum.
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Descriptive results for other background variables
A majority of patients were found to be independent in basic activities of daily
living according to the Barthel index (55% at baseline and 59% at follow-up) and a
ceiling effect for this variable was found at baseline (M=18.27, SD=2.83) and at
follow-up (M=19.44, SD=2.78). Ability to carry out more extended activities of
daily living was more varied according to the Nottingham index (M=13.97, SD=5.57
at baseline) and was found to statistically significantly improve during the study
period (M=14.72, SD=5.56 at follow-up).
Participants reported that they had high levels of social support available, indicated
by a mean score of 73.87 (SD=20.99) where the top possible score was 100. Three
fifths of participants reported having experienced at least one life event during the
six-month period prior to their stroke. About half of participants reported having
experienced at least one new life event during the course of the study period, and
surprisingly most of these participants were those who reported having experienced
life events prior to stroke. About a quarter of participants reported a pre-stroke
history of depression at baseline (23/89; 26%) and at follow-up (21/89; 26%) and a
cross-tabulation of these participants suggested that their reporting was entirely
consistent across time.
Note on the reporting of univariate associations
Associations between independent variables and distress were tested with both
Pearson correlations and Spearman's Rho. The findings were extremely similar
(please see Appendix G, section G.3), which bolsters the findings. However, for
brevity only the results for Pearson correlations will be summarised in this chapter.
Univariate associative results between background variables and distress using
Pearson correlation
Female gender was found to associate with distress at baseline and at follow-up and
across time using Pearson correlation. However, the correlation coefficients it
produced were low and only statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Neither age,
nor deprivation level produced a statistically significant association with distress in
any of the analyses (please see Chapter 18, sections 18.6i and 18.6ii for discussion).
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Stroke severity was not associated with distress at baseline, but was at follow-up and
across time using Pearson correlation. The correlation coefficients it produced were
low and only statistically significant at the p<.05 level.
Disability relating to more extended activities of daily living (Nottingham index)
was associated with distress in both the cross-sectional analyses at baseline and at
follow-up, but not across time as tested by Pearson correlation. The correlation
coefficients it produced were low and only statistically significant at the p<.05 level.
Disability relating to basic activities of daily living (Barthel index) was not
associated with distress in any of the analyses.
Whether or not participants reported at least one life event was associated with
distress at baseline using Pearson correlation, but not at follow-up or across time.
The correlation coefficient it produced at baseline was low and only statistically
significant at the p<.05 level. Social support was not associated with distress in any
of the analyses.
Pre-stroke history of depression was associated with distress at baseline, at follow-
up and across time using Pearson correlation. Unlike results for other background
variables, the correlation coefficients produced between a pre-stroke history of
depression and distress were moderate in size and statistically significant at the
p<.0001 level.
Note on the summaries of the multiple regression results
In order to test the hypotheses as stringently as possible, two methods of backwards
multiple regression analysis were used: the 'univariate' method (only independent
variables with statistically significant univariate correlations with distress entered
into the equation) and the 'stricter' method (all background variables entered into
the first equation to control for the possibility that they may contribute in otherwise
unforeseen ways). The findings between both methods were extremely similar
(please see Chapter 11, sections 11.4; Chapter 13, section 13.4 and Chapter 14,
section 14.4 and 14.5), which is pleasing and strengthens the findings. However,
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for brevity only the results for the 'univariate' method will be referred to in this
chapter.
Backward multiple regression results for the background variables
At baseline, two background variables (Gender and a pre-stroke history of
depression) remained in the final regression model for distress. Gender was
statistically significant at the p<.05 level and pre-stroke history of depression was
statistically significant at the p<.0001 level. A pre-stroke history of depression was
the only background variable to remain in the final regression models in all other
multiple regression analyses and in all cases it was found to be statistically
significant at the p<.0001 level. Therefore it was found to independently associate
with distress at follow-up and to predict distress at follow-up even when baseline
levels of distress had been controlled for.
17.3: Summary description of emotional distress
These findings relate to the first objective to:
Investigate emotional distress
HADs distributions and means
Both at baseline and at follow-up the distribution of the distress measure (global
HADs scores) was slightly positively skewed. Highly similar distributions were
found for the HADs depression and anxiety sub-scales that made up the distress
measure. Despite this variation in scores, mean HADs scores were low, please see
Table 17.1.
Table 17.1 Summary table of mean HADs scores at baseline and follow-up
HADs scores at baseline HADs scores at follow-up
Mean and (SD) Mean and SD
HADs distress 9.10(6.08) HADs distress 9.38 (6.63)
HADs depression 4.51 (3.54) HADs depression 4.62 (3.47)
HADs anxiety 4.58 (3.20) HADs anxiety 4.78 (3.78)
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Association between HADs distress, HADs depression and HADs anxiety scores
HADs distress scores were highly associated with HADs depression scores (r= .91,
p<.0001 at baseline and r=.91, p<.0001 at follow-up).
HADs distress scores were highly associated with HADs anxiety scores (r= .89,
p<.0001 at baseline and r=.92, p<.0001 at follow-up).
HADs depression and anxiety subscales were highly associated (r= .63, p<.0001 at
baseline and r=.68, p<.0001 at follow-up).
This degree of inter-correlation between the sub-scales and the HADs global distress
scores suggested it had good validity as the dependent variable distress measure.
Consistency in emotional distress across time
Emotional distress was found to be fairly consistent across time, using repeated
measure t-tests and Pearson correlations (please see table 17.2).
Table 17.2: Correlations between baseline and follow-up HADs scores and t test results
Baseline - Follow-up Correlation Significance of
correlation
t value Significance of
t
HADs Depression .57 <.0001 -.32 n.s.
HADs Anxiety .59 <.0001 -.41 n.s.
HADs Distress .64 <.0001 -.39 n.s.
Comparison to the emotional disorder results obtained in the structured clinical
interview study
The HADs global distress scores, and anxiety and depression sub-scales were all
highly associated with the anxiety and depressive disorders (please see Appendix G,
section G.4). This high level of correspondence offers support to comparisons that
have been made between the quantitative study, the structured clinical interview
study and the qualitative study results. It provides an indication of concurrent
validity of the measure of distress with the emotional disorders, and vice versa.
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17.4: Summary of descriptive results for the belief variables
These findings relate to the second objective to:
Investigate beliefs considered relevant to stroke patients' emotional distress
Attributional belief variables
Casual controllability
Given a possible range of 0-4, the mean causal controllability scores reported were
low and no statistically significant change in scores was found across time [M=1.48
(SD=.91) at baseline and M=1.74 (SD=.79) at follow-up],
'Why me?'
A minority of participants reported ever having asked 'Why me?' and no statistically
significant change was found across time (39/89; 44% at baseline and 34/81; 42% at
follow-up).
'Found meaning?'
Few participants reported they had found a positive meaning in having a stroke at
baseline (31/89; 35%). An even lower proportion reported having found a positive
meaning at follow-up (17/81; 21%) but this drop in scores was not statistically
significant.
Self-evaluative variables at baseline
Acceptance ofdisability
Mean acceptance of disability scores were moderate at baseline, given a possible
range of 0-32 on the scale [M=18.61 (5.96)]. They increased slightly at follow-up
[M=19.49 (6.92)] but not to a statistically significant level.
Negative identity change
Mean negative identity change scores were low [7.91 (8.57) at baseline and 7.79
(8.13) at follow-up] and these scores were found to be statistically significantly
consistent across time. The high standard deviation scores, median scores below the
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mean (Median=5 at baseline and at follow-up) indicate a skewed distribution and a
large degree of variation amongst participants.
As regards individual adjective items, the largest changes in 'before' versus 'now'
identity ratings were for those items relating to ability (for example 'active',
'confident'). Relatively moderate changes were seen for adjectives relating to affect
(for example 'worried', or 'unhappy'). Much smaller and often insignificant
changes were seen for items reflecting interpersonal personality characteristics (for
example 'friendly', or 'aggressive'). However most 'before' versus 'now' mean
changes were found to be statistically significant at baseline and nearly all were at
follow-up suggesting a tendency to see oneself less positively in many ways
following stroke.
Shame
Given a possible range of 0-40, mean shame scores were low [M=12.31 (SD=4.79)
at baseline and M=12.33 (SD=5.56) at follow-up] and these scores were found to be
statistically significantly consistent across time. However, a few participants did
report moderate levels of shame at both points in time.
Recovery and recurrence variables at baseline
Recovery locus ofcontrol
Given a possible range of 0-36, mean recovery locus of control scores indicated that
participants typically reported a high internal locus of control regarding their
recovery from stroke [M=24.61 (3.91) at baseline and M=23.89 (3.27) at follow-up].
Consistency testing suggested that the slight drop in scores across time was not
statistically significant.
Confidence in recovery
Given a possible range of 0-10, mean scores indicated participants typically felt very
confident about making a full recovery at baseline [M=7.94 (2.38)]. However, the
mean score found at follow-up suggested a decrease in recovery confidence across
time [M=6.59 (2.93)]. This drop in scores was found to be statistically significant.
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Recurrence fear
Given a possible range of 0-32, mean recurrence fear scores suggested that fear
levels were typically moderate [M=15.38 (4.56) at baseline; M=15.42 (4.66) at
follow-up]. No statistically significant change in scores was found across time.
17.5: Summary of associations found between emotional distress and the belief
variables
These findings relate to the third objective to:
Examine associations between emotional distress and specific types of beliefs
following stroke
Univariate associative results between belief variables and distress using Pearson
correlation at baseline
Statistically significant small to moderately large associations between distress and
all of the belief variables except 'Why me?' were found. Two of the self-evaluation
variables were particularly highly associated with distress: acceptance of disability
(r=-.59, p<.0001) and negative identity change (r=.63, p<.0001).
Comparison between background and beliefvariables at baseline
In contrast to 8/9 belief variables only 4/9 background variables were found to
statistically significantly associate with distress at baseline. Overall, at the
univariate level, the relationship between the belief variables and distress appeared
stronger than the relationship between the background variables and distress in terms
of the number, size and significance of associations.
Backward multiple regression results for the belief variables as compared to the
background variables at baseline
All variables statistically significant at the univariate level were tested together and a
highly significant final model (R2 = .65, p<.0001) was obtained which suggests that
almost half the variance in distress scores was accounted for. Over half of the belief
variables (casual controllability, 'Found meaning?', negative identity change, shame
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and recurrence fear) remained in this final model, suggesting that their statistically
significant relationship with emotional distress was largely independent. Both
disability variables were dropped from the equation, suggesting that participants'
beliefs about the meaning of their disability were better associated with distress.
Only two background variables (gender and pre-stroke history of depression)
remained in the final model.
In summary, these results suggests that at baseline distress was associated with a
sense of having changed for the worse as a person and in the eyes of others, without
being able to find any compensatory positive meaning. Also, a lack of belief about
being able to control risks associated with stroke and fearing one may have another
one. These results appeared to be statistically independent of confounding by
background variables.
Univariate associative results between belief variables and distress using Pearson
correlation at follow-up
Statistically significant small to moderately large associations between distress and
all of the belief variables except "Found meaning?' and recovery locus of control
were found. Two of the self-evaluation variables were particularly highly associated
with distress: acceptance of disability (r=-.73, p<.0001) and negative identity change
(r=.73, pc.OOOl).
Comparison between background and beliefvariables at baseline
In contrast to 7/9 belief variables only 4/9 background variables were found to
statistically significantly associate with distress at baseline. Overall, at the
univariate level, the relationship between the belief variables and distress appeared
stronger than the relationship between the background variables and distress in terms
of the number, size and significance of associations.
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Backward multiple regression results for the belief variables as compared to the
background variables at follow-up
All variables statistically significant at the univariate level were tested together and a
highly significant final model (R2 = .73, p<.0001) was obtained which suggests that
almost half the variance in distress scores was accounted for. Three belief variables
(acceptance of disability, negative identity change and recurrence fear) remained in
this final model, suggesting that their statistically significant relationship with
emotional distress was largely independent. Most background variables including
disability variables were dropped from the equation, suggesting that participants'
beliefs about the meaning of their disability were better associated with distress. In
contrast only one background variable (pre-stroke history of depression) remained in
the final model.
In summary, these results suggest that at follow-up distress was associated with a
sense that one had changed for the worse as a person, being unable to accept ones
reduced capabilities and also, ongoing fears of having further strokes. These results
appeared to be statistically independent of confounding by background variables.
17.6: Summary of predictive results
These findings relate to the fourth objective to:
Investigate the ability of initial beliefs to predict emotional distress over time
Univariate associative results between baseline belief variables and follow-up
distress using Pearson correlation
Statistically significant small to moderate associations between distress and six
belief variables were found (casual controllability, acceptance of disability, negative
identity change, confidence in recovery and recurrence fear).
Comparison between background and beliefvariables at baseline
In contrast to 6/9 belief variables only 3/9 background variables were found to
statistically significantly associate with distress at baseline. Overall, at the
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univariate level, the relationship between the belief variables and distress appeared
stronger than the relationship between the background variables and distress.
However these results were not as strong as the cross-sectional results.
Multiple regression results for follow-up distress using baseline variables
All variables statistically significant at the univariate level were tested together and a
highly significant final model (R =.43, p<.0001) was obtained. This was more
moderate in size than models found in cross-sectional analyses. Two belief
variables (acceptance of disability and causal controllability remained in this final
model and one background variable (pre-stroke history of depression).
Given that acceptance of disability appeared to operate as a global representative of
the belief variables (due to inter-correlations) this result broadly supports the ability
of initial belief variables to predict emotional distress at follow-up However, not that
much variance in distress was explained. To more stringently test the ability of
belief variables to predict distress 'over time' the analysis was repeated taking
baseline distress into account.
Hierarchical multiple regression results for follow-up distress using baseline
variables and controlling for baseline distress
The final model obtained from this analysis that entered baseline distress before
other baseline variables produced a final model (R =.49, p<.0001) that was not
much larger than the one that did not control for baseline distress. Just one belief
variable (causal controllability) and one background variable (pre-stroke history of
depression) remained in this final model. This may be explained by consideration of
the level of consistency in distress levels across time (please see section 17.3), which
would have statistically disadvantaged those beliefs variables that were highly
associated with distress from remaining in the model. As they stand these results
suggest that a higher initial sense of control over perceived causes of stroke played a
protective role against distress across time.
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17.7: Summary of findings from the structured clinical interviews and
comparison to quantitative and qualitative results
These findings relate to the fifth objective to:
Explore the types of beliefs and nature of symptoms related to common
depression and anxiety disorders
A high prevalence of depressive disorder was found (33% at baseline and 30% at
follow-up). Approximately equal proportions of minor and major depressive
disorder were found. Participants who were considered to have the cognitive
symptom of worthlessness tended to report thinking about themselves as 'useless'
because of their disabilities. Non-somatic symptoms discriminated between those
with/without a depressive disorder better than somatic symptoms, particularly at
baseline. Major depression was found to be more persistent across time than minor
depression.
A high prevalence of anxiety disorder was found (35% at baseline and 33% at
follow-up). Twelve participants (13%) at baseline and fifteen participants (19%) at
follow-up met criteria for GAD. Only one participant who met criteria for GAD did
not also meet criteria for one of the depressive disorders, suggesting a very high
level of co-morbidity between depressive and non-specific anxious symptoms.
The exploration of beliefs and symptoms in relation to the criteria for the specific
anxiety disorders (agoraphobia, social phobia and PTSD) suggested that there was
not a perfect fit between DSMIV nomenclature and patients' reported experiences.
Nonetheless, the data obtained from the structured clinical interview usefully
highlighted the nature and relative importance of specific anxiety symptoms and
beliefs:
Symptoms of panic were rare
Agoraphobia was common, but not always reported as problematic
Stroke-specific fears of falling and shame were reported by participants with
agoraphobia.
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Statistically higher levels of the continuous measure of fears of falling were
found amongst participants with agoraphobia at baseline and follow-up
A small proportion of participants reported severe levels of stroke-specific
social shame/fear and high levels of related social avoidance
Statistically higher levels of the continuous measure of shame were found
amongst these participants at both time points and amongst participants with
agoraphobia at follow-up
Most PTSD symptoms were rare, however re-living symptoms were quite
common but tended not to cause much distress and to fade with time
A few patients reported severe PTSD like symptoms in association with
catastrophic fears of recurrent stroke
Comparison to the quantitative and qualitative study
As described (please see section 17.3), a high level of correspondence was found
between depressive and anxious disorders and HADs distress, anxiety and
depression scores and this provides an indication of concurrent validity.
The sense of uselessness described in the depression interview corresponds to the
quantitative study finding that negative self-evaluations and distress were highly
statistically associated.
Beliefs about shame and fears of falling reported in the interviews for agoraphobia
and social phobia correspond with qualitative reports and the quantitative finding
that shame and distress were associated.
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17.8: Summary of findings from the qualitative interviews and comparison to
quantitative and structured clinical interview results
These findings relate to the sixth objective to:
Explore patients' own experiences and concerns using a qualitative approach
Five main themes emerged from qualitative data, these were:
Main theme 1- Being like this
Sub-themes- Can't dos
Meanings and feelings
Specific fears and issues
Main theme 2- Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not
Sub-themes- Getting back
What the future holds
Acclimatising (coping)
Main theme 3- Taking another, or not
Sub-themes:- Concerns about taking another
Prevention issues
Main theme 4- They're OK, I'm OK, or not
Sub-themes- Family concerns
Spouses and friends
Main theme 5- Maintaining way of living or thinking, or making changes




Getting/ staying at home
Getting old and to the end of life
The first three main themes were considered most centrally relevant to this study of
beliefs in 'stroke' and 'its effects' and these results have been summarised in
relation to depression/GAD previously (please see Chapter 16, sections 16.2iv,
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16.3iv and 16.4iii). What I consider to be the most essential key findings will be
summarised here.
Main theme 1- 'Being like thissummary ofkeyfindings
Most participants reported missing being able to do things.
Participants with depression/GAD emphasised aversion to feeling reliant and
the belief that one 'should' still be able to carry out valued roles.
Participants with depression/GAD were more likely to describe themselves as
useless.
Participants with depression/GAD reported feeling down or annoyed more
frequently and in stronger terms.
Participants with social phobia and agoraphobia reported shame and fears of
falling most often.
Comparison to the quantitative and structured interview study
These results cross validate the diagnoses of depression/GAD as these
participants were more likely to report negative feelings and more often reported
strong feelings. However they also suggest that frustration/annoyance are emotions
often experienced by stroke patients.
In parallel to the association between distress and the belief variables
acceptance of disability and negative identity change (for which the largest changes
for 'before' to now' were found for items such as and 'independence' 'ability');
these qualitative findings reflect aversion to reliance and a sense that reduced
capacity is unacceptable amongst participants with depression/GAD.
Descriptions of believing one had become 'useless' amongst participants with
depression/GAD corresponds to the structured clinical interview findings for
depressive disorder.
The spontaneous reporting of shame and fears of falls corresponds to the
association found between the distress and shame measure and the agoraphobia and
social phobia data.
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Main theme 2- 'Getting back to normality, feeling normal, or not'- summary ofkey
findings
Participants reported wanting to get back to valued activities and normal life.
A few participants without depression/GAD reported feeling they were back to
normal already.
Some participants reported uncertainty about recovery.
Participants with depression/GAD were more likely to be pessimistic or
suggest that life would be bad without sufficient recovery.
Participants with/without depression/GAD reported a range of effortful coping
strategies such as thinking about what at least they could still do.
Participants without depression/GAD often said they were not worried about
things, didn't mind their losses or that they were able to accept them.
Comparison to the quantitative and structured interview study
These findings suggest that some participants with/without depression/GAD
were perhaps more uncertain about recovery than the quantitative data suggests, but
also backs up the association between distress and confidence levels.
The finding that some participants reported devaluing, disregarding or accepting
their limitations corresponds with the positive association found between acceptance
of disability and distress in the quantitative study.
Main theme 3- 'Taking another one, or notsummary ofkeyfindings
Most participants reported concern that they may have another stroke.
A wide range of negative beliefs about recurrence were reported, such as
concern about family history of stroke, fear of a severe stroke, or preference for
death in comparison to a severe disabling stroke.
A few participants without depression/GAD reported taking a proactive stance
to prevention or that they felt reassured by their medical treatment.
Other participants reported fatalistic beliefs that 'nothing' could stop another
one, or misconceived notions of behavioural triggers, and there was a general
tendency for participants to be coping by just trying not to worry.
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Few participants brought up issues involving the control of objective risk
factors, those who did had depression/GAD and were worried about not being
able to stop smoking.
Participants with depression/GAD were much more likely to report that their
fear of having another stroke was a main concern in their lives.
One very depressed and anxious participant reported the catastrophic belief
that she was experiencing ongoing tiny strokes in the qualitative interview and
a couple of other very depressed participants did so elsewhere.
Comparison to the quantitative and structured interview study
These findings, particularly the finding that some participants with
depression/GAD rated recurrence fear as a main concern in their lives, correspond
with the quantitative finding that recurrence fear and distress were highly associated.
Insight into the nature and origins of recurrence fears is provided and the results
suggest that it is not just the possibility of another stroke, but also the potentially
severe nature of future stroke that is concerning.
The finding that the few participants who reported a proactive stance to
controlling risk did not have depression/GAD is correspondent with the finding that
causal controllability scores were positively associated with distress. So is the
finding that a few participants with depression/GAD reported being concerned that
they could not stop smoking.
However, these findings diverge in the sense that many participants reported
very fatalistic ideas about prevention and misconceived ideas about triggering
factors. This contrasts with the types of causal factors they had reported in the
quantitative interview.
Main theme 4- They're OK, I'm OK, or not- summary ofkeyfindings
Participants in general reported feeling reassured by the knowledge that their
children and grandchildren were OK and derived pleasure from their company.
Being able to provide family members with support was considered important
and a few participants with depression/GAD were worried that they would not
be able to do so in future.
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- Participants with depression/GAD tended to be more concerned about
burdening family members.
- A few participants reported feeling lonely and they tended to be single female
participants with depression/GAD.
Comparison to the quantitative and structured interview study
These results largely correspond with the quantitative results that found high
levels of social support, but no association with distress. However, it may be that
loneliness is relevant to a minority of distressed individuals particularly single
females.
Interpersonal concerns to be able to 'be there' for one's family and concern
about burdening them with one's new disabled status may be more relevant to
distressed reactions.
Main theme 5- Maintaining ways ofliving or thinking, or making changes-
summary ofkeyfindings
Participants who reported asking 'Why me? in qualitative interviews were all
depressed. They often emphasised feeling it was unjust because they were
young or had already had their fair share of misfortune in life.
Many other concerns about changes in life or day to day life issues such as
money were included in this theme but most did not seem to discriminate
between participants with/without depression/GAD.
The exception to the above was that participants with depression/GAD were
more likely to report concern about other medical conditions such as cancer or
heart problems.
Comparison to the quantitative and structured interview study
Concerns about other medical conditions was not that surprising given the co¬
morbidity of stroke with other illness and the age of the sample, however it raises a
methodological issue with the recurrence fear measure.
The finding that 'Why me?' was reported by participants with depression/GAD
qualitatively contradicts the lack of a statistically significant association between
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this variable and distress at baseline. However, these findings suggest that a sense
of injustice about having a stroke is distressing amongst a certain sub-set of
distressed participants. This finding is actually consistent with the quantitative inter-
correlative results for 'Why me' which is associated with age and a pre-stroke
history of depression.(please see Appendix G, section G.l).
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18.1: Limitations of the sample
The sample was drawn from a population of consecutive admissions to a
specialist stroke unit in a University hospital in Edinburgh. This is less ideal
than consideration of all strokes occurring in a well-defined representative
community population. However the sample population may only represent a
slight selection bias in terms of stroke severity (please see Chapter 5, section
5.3). Issues relating to the age and social economic status of participants are
discussed in sections 18.6i and 18.6ii.
Approximately two fifths of patients who received a definite diagnosis of
stroke and who survived the acute stage of stroke, were not introduced to this
study because of communication deficits, mainly aphasia. Approximately a
fifth of remaining participants, not already known to have a clear diagnosis of
dementia, were then excluded on the basis of cognitive impairment screening
(please see Chapter 5, section 5.6).
The exclusion of patients with severe cognitive impairment was merited on the
grounds of the large number of questionnaire measures used and the
considerations of reliability and validity (please see Chapter 5, section 5.4).
The exclusion of patients with severe cognitive impairment represents a
limitation to all quality of life research with older adults and medical
populations in which there is a high proportion of these individuals (Sampson
et al., 2003). The future development of alternative methods to assess
subjective experience with reasonable reliability and validly amongst
cognitively impaired individuals is a challenge for the future (UK Alzheimer's
Society, 2004; Bedard et al., 2003; Lawton, 1997).
The high prevalence of aphasia following stroke suggests that the development
of reliable valid tools to assess distress amongst aphasic patients should be
prioritised in future stroke research (Lincoln, 2003). Avenues for the
development of assessment of subjective experience may involve
collaboration with speech and language therapists and the adoption of
supportive communication techniques (Kagan, 1998). At the very least future
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research should aim to avoid the inconsistent assessment, inclusion/exclusion
and even reporting of aphasia common to past stroke research (Carson et al.,
2000; Spencer et al., 1997).
In this study the language impairment assessment used and the criteria for
exclusion (please see Chapter 5, section 5.4iv) was comparable to quality of
life research conducted by speech and language therapy aphasia specialists
(Hilari & Byng, 2001). Therefore it was a relatively inclusive approach that
made efforts to recognise aphasic individuals residual capacities, in line with
current incapacity recommendations (Scottish Executive, 2000). It was
actually a combination of ethical committee regulations and the logistics of
recruitment that led to the broad exclusion of patients who had aphasia
immediately following stroke in this study (please see Chapter 5, section 5.6).
This highlights a tension between protection and prejudice in the regulations
that influence research practice.
In conclusion, this study aimed to achieve a balance between an inclusive
sample selection and valid and reliable results, however this was constrained
by the logistics of recruitment. Participation rates at baseline and follow-up
were very high (please see Chapter 5, section 5.6) thus reducing bias from
self-selection characteristics. However, the generalisability of this study is
limited to stroke patients without severe cognitive or language impairment.
However, within this limitation, it can be argued that the present sample is
comparable to those in most other psychological stroke research studies
reviewed in Chapter 2 that generally indicated exclusion of participants with
severe communication and cognitive impairment.
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18.2: Power and statistical methods
The sampling limitations discussed resulted in a sample size that was smaller
than originally anticipated. However, as described previously (please see
Chapter 7, section 7.3) the size of the sample was considered large enough to
detect moderate sized effects.
The hypotheses were tested with both parametric and non-parametric
correlative statistics to compensate for violation of parametric assumptions
(please see Appendix G, section G.2). The findings across both methods were
extremely similar, and this makes the results more robust. In addition, more
rigorous testing of the hypotheses was conducted with both a 'univariate' and
'stricter' method of backward regression analysis to explore the possibility
that background variables may be confounding association between belief
variables and distress. The findings between both methods were extremely
similar (please see Chapter 11, sections 11.4; Chapter 13, section 13.4 and
Chapter 14, section 14.4 and 14.5). This is pleasing and makes the results
more robust.
The findings for the cross-sectional analyses support the first main hypothesis
that a relationship between distress and beliefs would be found at baseline and
follow-up (please see Chapter 11, section 11.5 and Chapter, section 13.5 for
description of support for the specific hypotheses). However, it is important to
recognise that associations between beliefs variables and distress in cross-
sectional analyses, even the independence of these associations as tested by
regression analyses, do not tell us about the direction of the relationship. They
do not show that negative beliefs cause distress.
The longitudinal design and statistical model used (please see 'stage 2' in
Chapter 14, section 14.4, pages 221-225) allowed the second main hypothesis
that negative stroke-related beliefs predict distress un-confounded by initial
background variables to be tested. The hierarchical statistical model
employed (please see 'stage 3' in Chapter 14, section 14.5, pages 226-231)
allowed this hypothesis to be even more stringently tested by taking into
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account baseline distress. However, predictive testing can only imply
causality if predictor variables can be assumed to exist prior to the onset of the
criterion (Haaga et al., 1991). This was not the case, I cannot assume that the
negative beliefs studied developed prior to distress at baseline, and distress
remained fairly consistent across the study period (Chapter 12, section 12.2iii).
At face value the findings only weakly support the second main hypothesis as
both 'stage 2' and 'stage 3' testing only explained a small proportion of the
variance in follow-up distress (please see Chapter 14, section 14.6i and 14.6ii).
However, as discussed, the baseline belief variable acceptance of disability
was collinear with most other baseline belief variables suggesting it was a
global representative of the beliefs studied (Chapter 11, section 11.4). Its
position, alongside causal controllability in the 'stage 2' predictive models of
follow-up distress conceptually supports the involvement of the negative
beliefs generally in the prediction of distress across time (please see Chapter
14, section 14.6i).
Causal controllability was the only belief variable involved in the final
hierarchical/'stage 3' analyses. As it was not collinear with other belief
variables, the general involvement of negative beliefs in the prediction of
follow-up distress once baseline distress was accounted for was less supported
(please see Chapter 14, section 14.6ii). However, it is worth considering that
the lack of change in baseline to follow-up distress variables statistically
disadvantaged other baseline variables from being able to 'add anything
further' in these analyses (please see Chapter 12, section 12.2iii, Chapter 14,
section 14.5i,). Also, that the hierarchical models (that included baseline
distress), were not much stronger than those obtained using just the baseline
variables pre-stroke history of depression, causal controllability and
acceptance of disability (please see Chapter 14, section 14.6iii).
Paradoxically, the very strength of association between some baseline belief
variables with baseline distress actually would have put them at a statistical
disadvantage in the prediction of follow-up distress once baseline distress was
controlled for.
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The theoretical implications of the cross-sectional and predictive analyses
results and the support for the hypotheses are discussed in relation to cognitive
theory and past stroke research in Chapter 19.
The quantitative results can be viewed with confidence in generalisability to
other patients that the sample represents (Peabody, 1985). Statistical tests are
based around group means. Therefore the results of this study provides
information about the type of negative belief most likely to be encountered
within the group of interest, or what may be regarded as a prototype distressed
individual following stroke. However, while valuable, this process can gloss
over important exceptions to the rule that may be encountered in clinical
practice. Examples of this have been highlighted by the use of a mixed
method, and will be discussed as appropriate.
18.3: Use of a mixed methodology
Quantitative and qualitative methods were used simultaneously. In addition to
the main quantitative study of negative beliefs and distress, structured clinical
interviews allowed 'quantitative' diagnoses of emotional disorders to be made
and subjective beliefs relevant to specific disorders to be explored. Brief
qualitative interviews were used to further explore participants' concerns. It
was argued that convergent results across the different methods would bolster
and extend main findings but that divergence could offer alternative
explanations about 'what counted' to be generated (please see Chapter 4). The
interest in this chapter is in methodological issues highlighted by the mixed
method.
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18.4: Self-report biases
Issues of bias in self-report have always been recognised in psychological
research (Edwards, 1957). As face-to-face interviews were used, some
individuals may have wittingly/unwittingly-biased responses towards what
they thought I wanted to hear, known as 'demand characteristics' (Cooligan,
1994). In turn, as the interviewer 'un-blinded' to the hypotheses, I may have
unwittingly socially reinforced questionnaire responses in line with my
expectations (Barber, 1976, cited in Cooligan, 1994). In the clinical and
qualitative interviews, this process is viewed in a different light and the
interviewer is encouraged to probe for emotional symptoms or for patients'
concerns because the purpose of enquiry is more questioning and exploratory.
Sometimes participants' responses may be constrained by social desirability,
or beliefs about what is proper in the eyes of society (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
This may be relevant to the assessment of social support (please see section
18.6v). Patients may even be reticence about admitting to things ('deny') that
they regard as very socially undesirable, or that makes them feel apprehensive
(Cooligan, 1994). This issue may be relevant to smoking and incontinence
(please see sections 18.6iii and 18.7i). Often authors have discussed potential
bias in the assessment of emotional distress and disorder following stroke due
to denial.
Denial may be common in the early stage of an emotional disorder (Stravraki
and Vargo, 1986). House et al. (1989) report that a few of their stroke patients
appeared to 'down-playing depressives' because they did not offer symptoms
when first asked how they felt but could when they were questioned more
specifically in a structured clinical interview. Fedoroff et al.(l991) and Kishi
et al. (1996) report similar findings (please see Appendix G, section G.4).
A similar but more paradoxical construct, emotional agnosognosia (actual
unawareness of emotional state) is described in the stroke literature (Black,
1993; Gordon et al., 1991; Hibbard et al., 1993; Spencer et al., 1997). It
appears to be operationalised as a discrepancy between observed and reported
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low mood (as denial would be), considered attributable to the stroke lesion
site, and to bias the assessment of emotional symptoms by self-report
questionnaires due to under-reporting (Spencer et al., 1997).
Both the HADs self-report questionnaire and the SCID interview were used in
this study. The general correspondence found between them strengthens the
findings of this study (please see Appendix G, section G.4). Specific
methodological issues regarding the different assessments, including
observation of denial or emotional unawareness are considered in the next
section.
In summary, subjective bias within the data and results is acknowledged due
to the possible influence of demand characteristics, social desirability, or
denial. However, on balance, face-to-face interviews enabled benefits that are
considered to outweigh these possible limitations. These were the
participation of patients who could not read or who had visual neglect, and
avoidance of problems with missing data.
18.5: Methodological issues-emotional distress and disorder
Comparison between the HADs and the SCID has highlighted certain
methodological issues that will be discussed. These are not all necessarily
relevant to the aims and hypotheses of the present study, but all are considered
of general interest to emotional stroke research and/or clinical practice.
18.5i: Low mean HADs scores
Mean HADs scores obtained in this study were lower than may be expected
given the prevalence of emotional disorders found. Mean HADs scores
amongst those diagnosed with emotional disorders were meaningfully higher
than amongst those without, but still lower than may be expected (please see
Appendix G, section G.4, Tables 9 and 10). Higher mean HADs scores are
usually found amongst other medically ill patients diagnosed with an
emotional disorder (Bjelland et al., 2001; Herrman et al., 1997; Johnston et al.,
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2000; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). This concurs with previous results using
this population (O'Rourke et ah, 1998) and raises the possibility that the
symptoms sampled by the HADs does not match the range of symptoms
relevant to stroke patients.
The HADs depression sub-scale contains two mood items but particularly
focuses on anhedonia (5 items) because this aspect of depression was
considered most amenable to anti-depressant therapy (please see p362,
Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). The results (please see Chapter 15, section 15.3
and 15.6) suggest that low self-esteem and worthlessness are non-somatic
depressive symptoms with high relevance to stroke patients. Their absence in
the HADs may partially explain the low mean depression sub-score obtained.
However, this also has the benefit of limiting confounding between the HADs
and the self-evaluative belief measures used in this study.
The HADs anxiety sub-scale was designed to address non-specific worry (two
items), tension (three items), and panic (two items). The diagnostic results
show that agoraphobia was very- and social phobia was relatively- common
but rarely accompanied by panic symptoms (please see Chapter 15, section
15.4 and 15.7). This may be due to participants' phobic avoidance, and
concords with epidemiological research with older adults (please see Chapter
1, section 1,3ii). HADs scores were higher amongst those with GAD than
agoraphobia and social phobia (please see Appendix G, section G.4), which
corresponds with the higher reporting of physiological symptoms for GAD in
diagnostic interviews (please see Chapter 15, section 15.4ii and 15.7ii).
The overall low HADs anxiety sub-scale mean may be partially accounted for
by inclusion of two panic items. Relatively low HADs anxiety sub-scale
scores appear to accurately reflect the lack of physiological symptoms
amongst those with agoraphobia and social phobia, but do not reflect the
specific fears and avoidances involved in these disorders. However, this has
the benefit of avoiding confounding between the HADs and the shame and
fear of falling measures used in this study.
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Despite low mean scores adequate variation in HADs distress scores for the
testing of associations with independent variables was found (please see
Chapter 10, section 10.2i and Chapter 12, section 12 2i) and this served the
purposes of the main quantitative study effectively.
The operation of the HADs as a screening measure for emotional disorder is
not relevant to the aims or hypotheses of this study. However, the results
support the finding that a relatively low cut-off point may be appropriate if it
is to be used as such (O'Rourke et ah, 1998). Also that the inclusion of items
addressing low self esteem, worthlessness and specific fears could be
considered in the development of a questionnaire screening tool for use with
stroke patients.
18.5H: The issue ofdenial/emotional unawareness
As described in section 18.4, the possibility that stroke patients may deny or
even be unaware of low mood is often discussed in the stroke literature. I did
find that some patients appeared to 'downplay' low mood initially, but not
other depressive symptoms during the SCID, as described by House et al.
(1989). This may represent a witting/unwitting 'denial' similar to that
encountered in other populations perhaps due to a coping response or
culturally influenced reticence about discussing feelings amongst mainly older
British adults (Watkins et al., 2001), or emotional unawareness attributable to
brain damage (Black, 1993; Gordon et al., 1991; Hibbard et al., 1993). Some
stroke patients may seem to struggle to describe their mood due to alexithymia
or an 'absence of words for emotion' (Sifneos, 1972), that is fairly prevalent in
the general population (Lane et al., 1996). Comparative studies are not yet
available to enlighten this discussion (Spencer et al., 1997).
Statistical comparison between the HADs and the SCID suggests that despite
potential under-reporting on mood items, the HADs was still meaningfully
highly related to depression diagnoses (please see Appendix G, section G.4).
It would be interesting in future research, to investigate under-reporting on
specific self-report distress questionnaire items by comparing responses
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amongst patients diagnosed with depressive disorder who do/do not seem to
'downplay' low mood in a structured interview. Also to conduct research that
compares the issues of denial, alexithymia and emotional unawareness
between stroke patients and age matched non-neurologically impaired
populations.
18.5iii: Symptom thresholdsfor SCID items
The technique of the structure clinical interview that allows some leeway with
the wording of questions and probing of responses provided confidence that
participants were actually responding in line with the intended meaning of
questions. However, a few issues regarding the clarity of certain symptom
thresholds has been discussed (please see Chapter 15, section 15.3i). This
issue may have relevance to the reliability of diagnoses and variation in
prevalence estimates (please see Chapter 1, section 1.4ii).
18.5iv: The suitability ofDSMIV defined emotional disorders
As discussed previously, the content of DSMIV criteria for depressive
disorder appeared to reasonably 'fit' the pattern of symptoms reported by
highly distressed participants. However, for many highly distressed
participants, the criteria for GAD did too. Only one participant with GAD did
not also meet criteria for major or minor depressive disorder. This supports
Johnston's (1991) suggestion that a mixed anxiety-depression diagnosis may
prove useful with stroke patients. However, the proposed DSMIV criteria for
'Mixed anxiety-depressive disorder' (Zinbarg et al., 1994), does not delineate
symptom thresholds in detail and therefore may be difficult to apply reliably.
Findings obtained from the structured clinical interviews for common anxiety
disorders have been summarised (please see Chapter 17) and the usefulness of
these interviews for gaining insight into stroke-specific symptoms has been
discussed (please see Chapter 15, section 15.9). A less good fit between
DSMIV criteria and descriptions of agoraphobia, social phobia or PTSD and
highly distressed participants' reported experiences was found. The
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discussion of these issues is theoretically as well as clinically relevant and will
be presented in Chapter 19 sections 19.4iii and 19.4vi.
18.5v: Construct validity ofdistress
The results of this study support the position that anxious symptoms and
disorder are worthy of consideration in addition to depressive symptoms and
disorder (please see Chapter 1, section 1.3ii). As discussed, there was much
overlap between generalised anxiety disorder and depressive disorder (please
see section 18.5iv).
HADs global distress scores were highly inter-correlated with the anxiety and
depression sub-scales suggesting that the sub-scales are sampling a large
degree of common variance (please see Chapter 12, section 12.2ii). The
associations between HADs distress and the background and belief variables
were similar in size and statistical significance levels to the associations
between depression symptoms alone- and anxious symptoms alone- and these
variables (please see Chapter 11, sections 11.3i and 11.3ii; Chapter 13,
sections 13.3i and 13.3ii; Chapter 14, sections 14.3i and 14.3ii).
The HADs global distress scores, and anxiety and depression sub-scales were
all highly associated with the anxiety and depressive disorders (please see
Appendix G, section G.4). This high level of correspondence offers support to
comparisons that have been made between the quantitative study, the
structured clinical interview study and the qualitative study results. It provides
an indication of concurrent validity of the measure of distress with the
emotional disorders, and vice versa.
These results converge to provide construct validity to the use of the
continuous measure of distress in this study.
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18.5vi: Emotional distress reported in the qualitative interviews
The qualitative interviews involved questioning participants about their main
concerns and also their main stroke-related concerns in a fairly probing
manner. This may have been more conducive to accessing fearful beliefs than
a more narrative approach (please see Chapter 9, section 9.2). For example,
an extensive range of recurrence and preventative beliefs clearly emerged as
the 'Taking another one, or not' main theme (please see Chapter 16, section
16.4). In contrast, previous qualitative studies have only reported one or two
of these beliefs (please see Chapter 2, section 2.4vi).
Despite being based around 'concerns', meanings and feelings about what
participants could no longer do (please see Chapter 16, section 16.2ii), ranged
from missing things, having lost a sense of normalcy to a sense of low self-
esteem or even uselessness which also supports the relevance of the dimension
of depression/sadness following stroke. In addition, the qualitative results
indicated that many participants were feeling annoyed or frustrated and some
described feeling trapped or angry about their losses. These qualitative
findings suggest that the dimension of anger may be relevant in distress
following stroke and it would be interesting to follow this up with quantitative
research.
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18.6: Methodological issues-background variables:
Background measures consisted either of well-defined entities (gender and
age) or scales for which good reliability and validity had been previously
reported were used (please see Chapter 6, section 6.4). The only exception
was the Nottingham index, for which reliability and validity data was not
available. Nonetheless, some results were surprising and this raised certain
methodological issues.
18.6i: Deprivation- Carstair's deprivation index
The very small numbers of participants classified with high deprivation scores
is notable, but reflects the relative affluence of Edinburgh (Carstairs and
Morris, 1991). Fifty-eight percent of participants' post-codes fell within the
mid-range deprivation bracket. These tend to be areas of mixed material
wealth/deprivation and so less accurate at identifying fine-grained material
differences between individuals (Carstairs and Morris, 1991) and this reflected
my observations while collecting the data. However, examination of the
pattern of distress by deprivation scores (please see Appendix E, section E.5,
E.7, E.9) suggests a wide range of variation in distress for most deprivation
categories, not just those in the middle range. Therefore it is unlikely that the
zero-order associations found between deprivation and distress would change
with a larger sample.
18.6H: Age
The distribution of age in this sample was normally distributed, and the
reasons for this have been discussed (please see Chapter 10, section lO.lii).
There was not a statistically significant association between age and distress at
either point in time, however examination of scatter-plots (please see
Appendix E, section E.5, E.7, E.9), suggests that by follow-up distress levels
were more spread out amongst younger as opposed to older participants.
Certain issues specific to a few young participants were highlighted in the
SCID and qualitative data, and theoretically interesting associations between
age and the belief variables 'Why me?' and 'Found meaning?' were observed.
These will be discussed in the next chapter. More rigorous investigation
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regarding specific issues relevant to emotional distress and disorder amongst
young and 'old old' stroke patients could benefit from age-stratified research.
18.6iii: Stroke severity and disability
As discussed, individuals with more severe strokes were probably under-
represented in this sample due to exclusion of patients with severe cognitive
impairment (please see Chapter 10, section lO.liii). Participants also tended
to have low levels of severe disability. For example, according to Barthel
index scores, fifty-nine percent were fully independent at nine months;
whereas forty-eighty percent were fully independent at six months in a study
that used the same population but did not exclude patients with severe
cognitive impairment (O'Rourke, 1996). The limited range of stroke severity
and Barthel index scores puts these variables at a statistical disadvantage.
However, this may have been somewhat offset by also measuring extended
activities of daily living (Nottingham index).
The superior strength and statistical significance of associations between
distress and the belief variables related to the effects of stroke compared to the
stroke severity and disability measures is pleasing in view of the hypotheses.
However, the belief measures may have benefited from certain aspects that the
disability measures lacked. Similarly to past research (please see Chapter 2,
section 2.4i), the qualitative results (please see Chapter 16, section 16.2i)
suggests that patients miss not being able to do a more comprehensive range
of daily activities, social and leisure pursuits than even the more 'extended'
Nottingham index addresses. In contrast, the global and abstract nature of
items within the self-evaluative belief variables makes them flexible measures
(please see Appendix D, sections D.19 and D.21) that allowed individual
participants to respond in relation to those activities they personally valued.
Qualitative research has emphasised that stroke patients tend to compare
themselves and their abilities 'now' as opposed to 'before' the stroke (please
see Chapter 2, section 2.3v). The self-evaluative belief measures, in particular
the negative identity change measure, captured this sense of change.
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However, the disability measures do not assess change in abilities from before
to after stroke. By assessing disability statically rather than in relation to
change following stroke, the Nottingham index contains a degree of
redundancy. Some patients never drove, some never gardened, a few were
unable to write letters and a few had never attempted to use a washing
machine pre-stroke. However, not doing these things post-stroke would result
in a points being deducted from the extended activities of daily living score
(please see Appendix D, section D.13).
As disability was assessed by self-report its measurement was subject to self-
report biases (please see section 18.4). Incontinence is a socially undesirable
topic and possibly subject to under-reporting. Some participants actually
discussed their embarrassment about incontinence (please see Chapter 16,
section 16. 2iii), but I suspect others preferred not to even report it. One
man's wife made a point of telling me her husband was actually severely
incontinent when he was out the room. Two other men who had not reported
incontinence went for a toilet break during the interview and I heard them
shouting at their wives about finding trousers that looked the same to hide the
fact they had needed to change.
It is possible that distress confounded the measurement of disability, because
distressed participants may under-report ability. A lack of confidence could
result in an unwillingness to test out and assess one's ongoing recovery. This
possibility was suggested because a few participants were surprised at how
well they were able to sign the consent form. Participants with agoraphobia
would report that they do not walk outside but this does not mean that they
were actually physically unable to (please see Chapter 15, section 15.4iii).
Confounding between distress and self-reported disability would have worked
against the hypotheses regarding association between distress and subjective
beliefs about the effects of stroke.
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18.6iv: Life events
A statistically significant association between life events and distress was only
found at baseline, but not at follow-up. This is not that consistent with past
research in which a more moderate sized statistically significant association
was found at six months and one year respectively (Andersen et ah, 1995;
Bush, 1999). This may be because life events were measured differently in
these studies. The overlap in the reporting of life events between the pre-
stroke period, and the period of the study (please see Chapter 12, section
12.3iii) may represent a response or memory bias.
18.6v: Social support
The finding that social support was not statistically significantly associated
with distress was surprising in view ofpast findings (please see Chapter 1,
section 1,6iii). It may be that older participants tend to be very loyal and
under-report a lack of support from others (Power, 2002, personal
communication) or that they do not always feel entitled to it (Laidlaw et al.,
2003). Most participants also emphasised how wonderful and caring their
children, grandchildren and spouses were in qualitative interviews (please see
Appendix H, section H.li). Although as discussed, social support, or, more
specifically a sense of loneliness, did appear to be a relevant factor to a small
minority of depressed participants (please see Appendix H, section H. 1 ii).
It may be that social 'support' is not the most ideal choice of subjective social
variable involved in emotional well-being amongst stroke patients. This may
he particularly the case amongst samples consisting of mainly older British
adults. This was suggested by spontaneous comments participants made about
'emotional support' items. Some suggested that they did not want someone to
'talk to', 'confide in' or 'understand' their problems and that they thought this
was all a bit 'American'. The qualitative results suggested the need to give as
much as receive support within the family and provided insights regarding
other social aspects of participants' lives that seemed to be emotionally
beneficial (please see Chapter 19, section 19.3).
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18.5: Methodological issues-belief variables
A balance always has to be struck between using measures with well-
established reliability and validity and the relevance of measures to the
hypotheses and their acceptability to participants. The weakness of the single-
item belief measures was recognised before conducting the study (please see
Chapter 6, 6.9). However, on balance I decided it was better to choose
measures with good face validity, than to abandon relevant hypotheses. Also,
when a measure suited to stroke patients was not available, new ones were
constructed and piloted.
18.5i: Casual controllability
As described (please see Chapter 6, section 6.6i), this was a complex variable
that involved eliciting causal attributions before being able to question
participants about their perceptions of future control. To maximise the
reporting of causal attributions, a checklist of causes as well as probing open-
ended questions were used. Different methods to elicit casual attributions can
produce results will slightly different emphasis (French et al., 2002). Some
participants were initially hesitant about reporting causal attributions (please
see Appendix F, section F.2 for description). Therefore, it should be
acknowledged that this measure may not be highly reliable. However, very
similar proportions of different attributions and overall causal controllability
scores were obtained at baseline and follow-up (please see Appendix F,
section F.2, and Chapter 12, section 12.5ii), which provides an indication of
consistency at the group level.
The causal controllability variable consisted of the mean of all causal
controllability ratings made by an individual. This was fairly crude, because it
did not account for varied relative responsibility ratings amongst causal
attributions. Some causes, such as smoking and worry, (please see Appendix
F, section F.2) tended to be rated as 'most responsible' more often than others,
such as family history and cholesterol. Also some participants reported
believing that the different risk factors they reported were acting in
combination, for example, that worry was linked to smoking and both were
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linked to high blood pressure. Finally, as discussed (please see Chapter 2,
page 41), distinctions between agents of control and other control factors such
as self-efficacy were not measured. Given the finding that higher causal
controllability scores were predictive of distress across time, a measure that
does at least weight relative perceived responsibility meaningfully and allow
for synergistic causal thinking may be worthy of development in future.
The qualitative data indicated fatalistic and na'ive attitudes about prevention.
For example, that 'nothing' could be done to stop another stroke, or, that
over-exertion may bring strokes on. This may seem incongruent with the
finding that all but two participants had been able to report the types of causal
factors described in the quantitative results. However, both sets of beliefs
may operate simultaneously. One can be aware of distal risk factors and see
these as being more or less controllable. Nonetheless, the actual moment in
time in which a stroke occurs may still be seen as entirely unpredictable, or as
triggered by something such as doing heavy housework. The checklist for
causal attributions did not include an item such as 'no reason at all', but the
qualitative results suggest that some participants may have endorsed it.
Therefore, although mean causal controllability scores were low, they may
have actually been an underestimation of some patients' sense that strokes are
beyond control.
Some participants did not rate smoking as a risk factor until a later stage
during the interview, for example when questioned about recurrence fear.
This may be because smoking is a taboo subject. I was not convinced that two
participants who reported having given up smoking really had. One had
nicotine-stained fingers and when another told me he had stopped, his son
shook his head to indicate this was not the case. A couple of participants said
they were not convinced smoking was a risk factor at baseline but changed
their mind at follow-up. A couple of participants who had initially managed to
quit but relapsed during the course of the study reported the reverse. Although
some bias (social desirability and the dynamics of addiction and denial), in the
reporting of this attribution appeared evident, this in itself suggests that
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smoking may be a particularly emotionally and cognitively demanding issue
amongst stroke patients that is perhaps worthy of future investigation.
18.5H: Why me? '/'Found meaning? '/Confidence in recovery
The variables 'Why me?', 'Found meaning?' and confidence in recovery were
assessed with single items which is less ideal than the use of well standardised
questionnaires. They have been used in past research with stroke patients
(Larner and Sampson, 2000; Morrison and Johnston, 1999; Thompson, 1991)
and so using them was therefore considered beneficial for comparative
purposes. Also, alternative measures were not available. The variables 'Why
me?' and 'Found meaning?' had a restricted range of scores and confidence in
recovery was dichotomised because its distribution was so skewed. Therefore
these variables were slightly disadvantaged in the multivariate analyses. It is
possible that better, more reliable measures may have produced stronger
results.
Some older participants commented that the ' 'Found meaning?' question was
'stupid' and the majority of participants reported that they had never asked
'Why me?'. Paradoxically, it seems that the question of meaning is only
relevant subsequent to the question of'Why me?' (please see section 18.6ii).
This seems to be a pattern of thinking that is more typical of young patients or
those with a pre-stroke history of depression. Therefore these belief variables
may have been overwhelmed by these background variables in the
multivariate analyses.
18.5Hi: Negative identity change/ acceptance ofdisability
The variables negative identity change and acceptance of disability were
assessed with multi-item questionnaires with reports of good reliability as well
as some evidence of reasonable validity (please see Chapter 6, section 6.7i and
6.7ii). The flexible advantages of these variables at being able to tap
perceptions of change and the comprehensive range of activities participants
engaged in pre-stroke has already been discussed (please see section 18.6iii).
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The negative identity change questionnaire contained a few items ('bored',
'unhappy' and 'worried') and the acceptance of disability measure one item
('Because of the effects of my stroke, I miss the things I like to do most') that
would have confounded the measurement of these beliefs with emotional
distress. The extent to which this may have biased results is difficult to
ascertain. However, as discussed the disability measures were also probably
confounded with distress (please see section 18.6iii). Therefore, bias towards
a type II versus a type I error due to confounding within the disability versus
the self-evaluative measures was balanced out.
Strictly speaking it was not accurate to refer to the identity change measure as
'negative' identity change. For example ten participants reported no overall
change and four even reported a slight positive overall change at baseline
(please see Chapter 10, section 10.6ii). However, the majority of participants
did report negative changes, and this title reflected the manner in which the
measure was scored and indicated the direction of relationship with distress.
The qualitative results (please see Append H, section H.2) and open-ended
responses for the 'Found meaning?' item suggest that the content of the
negative identity measure was not particularly conducive to accessing some
possible positive changes. These were being less grudging, appreciative or
committed to family members (please see Chapter 10, section 10.5iv), or more
empathic to other disabled persons (please see Appendix H).
18.6iv: Shame
As discussed (please see Chapter 6, section 6.7iii), some participants
complained about items in the first piloted scale. The stroke-specific shame
scale we designed for this study was found to be reliable. It measured not just
the experience of shame but also appreciation of others differential treatment
(please see Chapter 10, section 10.6iii and Appendix C, sections C.l and C.6).
The positive items were simply reverse scored in this study but it would be
interesting to develop this distinction further in future. The unusual
distribution of shame by distress scores and its implications in statistical
testing has been discussed previously (please see Chapter 11, section 11.2ii).
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In itself this suggests that shame was an important problem but to just a
minority of individuals. This concords with the results for social phobia
(please see Chapter 15, sections 15. 4iv and 15.7iv) and the qualitative
findings (please see Chapter 16, section 16.2iii).
18.6v: Recurrence fear
The adapted recurrence fear scale was found to be acceptable to patients and
to have good re-test and internal reliability (Appendix C, section C.l and
Chapter 6, section 6.8iii). Compared to the very frightening and negative
beliefs about recurrence reported in qualitative interviews (please see Chapter
16, section 16.4), the meaning of items in the recurrence fear questionnaire
seem a bit diluted. Most of the questionnaire items address non-specific
health concerns. Therefore its face validity as a fear of stroke recurrence
measure is implicit not explicit. However, this was probably ideal because
responses to the most direct item ('I worry about my stroke returning') seemed
to be confounded by coping (please see Chapter 10, section 10.7iii). Also,
participants reported such varying and idiosyncratic recurrence fears
qualitatively (please see Chapter 16, section 16.4i) that a scale that included
them all would run the risk of heightening participants' overall fear and of
producing floor effects.
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18.8: Summary of methodological issues
The main limitation of the study is considered to be the representative-ness of
the sample. Unfortunately, the sample was biased towards those with less
severe disability that is likely to be due to the exclusion of patients with
aphasia and severe cognitive impairment. Methods that allow the
psychological assessment of aphasic patients need to be developed.
Ideally the interviewer would have been 'blinded' to the hypotheses, although
I suspect hypotheses would be obvious to anyone trained to collect
psychological data. Biases of social desirability and denial have been
discussed and probably led to some slight inaccuracies regarding specific
items of certain measures.
Methodological issues regarding the measurement of emotional distress and
disorder have been highlighted. However, the general correspondence found
between these measures strengthens the findings of the study. Issues of
confounding between disability measures and self-evaluative belief measures
have been discussed. However, because both the disability and the self-
evaluative measures were somewhat confounded with distress, bias towards a
type II versus a type I error regarding the main hypotheses is likely to be
balanced out.
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19.1: Support for the main hypotheses in relation to cognitive theories
Cross sectional findings of independent associations between certain negative beliefs
and distress offers support to the first main hypothesis that:
'A relationship between beliefs and emotional distress would be found at an initial
point in time (baseline) and a later point in time (follow-up)'
This supports Beck's proposition that cognition has a primary place in emotional
distress.
The results for the predictive analyses only weakly support the second main
hypothesis that:
'Beliefs found at baseline would predict emotional distress at follow-up'
although alternative more supportive interpretations in light of multi-colinearity and
the lack of variation in distress across time have been discussed (please see Chapter
14, section 14.6 and Chapter 18, section 18.2). The finding that acceptance of
disability and causal controllability predicted follow-up distress suggests that they
represent something with long-term rather than simply transient meaning to distress.
The finding that causal controllability was predictive of variation in distress across
time, goes some way to suggest that positive beliefs in the controllability of
perceived cause plays a protective role against distress following stroke.
Although, Beck's (1987) theory does not claim causality (please see Chapter 1,
section 1.7) it does suggest that underlying negative schemas of core beliefs
contribute to the build-up and maintenance of emotional disorder via dysfunctional
thinking processes. The weak support for the second main hypothesis could be
cautiously interpreted as having relevance to this process. Ultimately, to test the role
of cognition in the build-up and maintenance of emotional disorder, negative
schemas rather than their products (negative beliefs), would need to be measured
and tested in relation to the onset and variable course of emotional disorder (Haaga
et al., 1991).
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The operation of positive beliefs is not yet discussed in depth in cognitive theories of
emotional disorder (Gillham and Seligman, 1999). The protective function of causal
controllability reflected in this study actually provides a better theoretical match to
Kelley's (1971) suggestion that well-adjusted individuals tend to bias their causal
analysis to things perceived as controllable. However, the mean causal
controllability score was low, suggesting that most un-distressed and distressed
participants alike lacked this protective sense that their causal factors were being
adequately controlled.
19.2: General comparison to past research
Past quantitative research (reviewed in Chapter 2), has provided support for
associations between most of the belief variables and distress following stroke apart
from causal controllability, acceptance of disability and recurrence fear, although
mainly in univariate analyses (Ellis-Hill, 1998; Larner and Sampson, 2000;
Morrison and Johnston, 1999; Morrison et al.; Thompson, 1991; Vine, 2003).
Qualitative research has also highlighted the possibility that the self-evaluative
belief variables and recurrence fear may be reported in stroke patients' descriptions
of their experiences (please see Chapter 2, secions 2.3iii, 2.3v and 2.4vi). This study
has extended previous findings by investigating the relative contributions of these
variables to distress while controlling for key background factors. Also by
combining the main quantitative study with simultaneous open-ended exploration of
the beliefs amongst patients with emotional disorder.
The theoretical and empirical relevance of specific background and belief variables
studied will be discussed in following sections. At a general level, the results
support the general thesis that it is important to understand stroke patients' beliefs
about 'the effects of stroke' as well as about the illness 'stroke' (please see Chapter
2, section 2.1). At present, the dominant theoretical and empirical models in health
psychology focus on illness and illness concepts (Petrie and Weinman, 1997).
Understanding of emotional distress amongst other disabled medical populations
may also be furthered by clarification regarding the assessment of beliefs about the
disabling aspects of the condition as well as about the underlying illness.
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19.3: Theoretical and empirical discussion of background variables
Demographic variables- age, gender and deprivation
Examination of inter-correlative relationships (please see Appendix G, section G. 1
and G.2), suggests that younger participants were less disabled and reported a
greater sense of personal control regarding recovery, which may be explained by
age-related potential for recovery. Younger participants were also more likely to
report a pre-stroke history of depression. This makes sense in light of evidence
suggesting depression may be a risk factor for stroke (please see Chapter 2, section
2.2iii). They were also more likely to ask 'Why me?' yet report having found a
positive meaning in their experience. These results correspond with 'just world
theory' and past research (Thompson, 1991). As discussed, the search for meaning
may largely depend on perceptions of the injustice and unexpectedness of an event
(please see Chapter 2, section 2.2ix and 2.2xi).
A minority of younger participants appeared more likely to experience certain rarer
symptoms of distress. Younger participants were more likely to report trauma type
symptoms of numbing or re-living (please see Chapter 15, section 15.7), and the
belief that they were actually experiencing mini strokes (please see Chapter 16,
section 16.4iii), than older participants. Tentatively, these findings complement the
greater tendency to ask 'Why me?' amongst younger participants and reflects a
sense of mental unprepared-ness. Major depression was more common amongst
younger participants at follow-up. This may be explained by the experience of
severe financial difficulties and broken relationships for those two younger
participants who developed this disorder over time (please see Chapter 15, section
15.6). Overall, while some young stroke patients appear to do very well physically
and mentally a few seem to fare particularly badly. These speculations regarding
possible relationships between age and distress could benefit from age-stratified
future research.
Female gender and emotional distress and disorders were found to associate.
Interesting, a gender bias in the cognitive appraisal of'stroke' and 'its effect' was
not apparent. Similarly to past qualitative research (Anderson, 1992; Pound et al.,
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1998), some female participants did report strong concern about their lost housewife
roles; however equally some male participants emphasised lost roles such as driving
just as much (please see Chapter 16, section 16.2i). Gender differences in distress
may be partly attributable to mediation by lower levels of social support and ability
to perform extended activities of daily living (please see Appendix G, sections G. 1
and G.2); although gender overwhelmed the latter in the baseline 'univariate'
regression analysis (please see Chapter 11, section 11.4iii). Female participants
were twice as likely to live alone than male participants. Depressed female
participants who lived alone quite often reported loneliness (please see Appendix H,
section H.lii). Tentatively, these interpersonal factors may be involved in the
gender difference observed and this could be addressed more rigorously in future
research.
The results of this study suggest that deprivation is unrelated to distress levels
following stroke, which may seem surprising given the well-known lawfully graded
relationships that exist between deprivation and both depressive symptoms and ill
health (please see Stansfield et ah, 2003 for a review). However, the strong level of
association between ill health and depressive symptoms across levels of deprivation
is not in itself much reduced by consideration of other factors associated with
deprivation (Stansfeld et al., 2003). Caution is required in extrapolating from this
epidemiological evidence that tends to be based on middle-aged rather than older
population. At face value, this evidence supports the present finding that once the
population of individuals who have actually had strokes is selected, material
circumstances appear of little relevance to distress. However, an important
exception to the rule may be younger patients with pressing financial commitments
who appear to be very poorly served by insurance/ social security systems (please
see Chapter 15, section 15.6).
Social support
The qualitative data did suggest that a few participants experienced degrees of
loneliness, and so the concept of social support may have been relevant to their
distress despite the lack of a statistically significant correlation for the whole group.
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The social support variable essentially measures whether participants believe loved
ones are supportive or whether they feel let down by them. The qualitative findings
suggest that the reverse may be important; in other words, participants expressed
concern not to let their loved ones down. They emphasised that they wanted to 'be
there' for their children and grandchildren in emotional and practical ways. More
distressed participants expressed concern that they were not, or may not be in future.
Concern about being a burden to loved ones also associated with distress in the
qualitative interviews.
Pre-stroke history ofdepression
The strong relationship between previous and subsequent episodes of depression is
well-established and well-recognised amongst other populations (see for example,
Coyne et al., 1999). Interestingly, perceptions of selective incidence ('Why me?')
were fairly uncommon and inconsistently associated with levels of distress
following stroke. However this sense of personal injustice was one of only two
variables with which a pre-stroke history of depression was found to statistically
significantly associate (the other being younger age). In qualitative interviews
participants who reported a sense of injustice, also emphasised having been dealt
quite profound difficulties in life (for example, a murdered husband, an abusive
childhood, or multiple serious illnesses at a young age). In light of these
considerations the relationship between a pre-stroke history of depression and
distress following stroke does seem particularly unjust, but has practical implications
(please see Chapter 20, section 20.3vi).
Stroke severity and disability
The findings of this study are fairly consistent with past research (please see Chapter
1, section 1.6iii), in that stroke severity and, or, disability were associated with
distress in some analyses but not others. Overall, the results strongly support a
relationship between subjective beliefs about stroke-related changed ability and self-
evaluation but only weakly support a relationship between distress and disability as
measured in this study.
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19.4: Theoretical and empirical discussion of beliefs in distress following stroke
19.4i: Discussion ofjustice and meaning in having a stroke
The results provide support for the theory that a sense of injustice in one's fate
('Why me?) and conversely the finding of positive meaning are related to distress
However the results for 'Why me?; and 'Found meaning?' were inconsistent. Only
'Found meaning?' at baseline remained in the regression models to suggest an
independent relationship with distress. However, as discussed these variables may
be particularly relevant to a subset of distressed patients- younger patients (please
see section 19.3), those who believe they have already experienced a high level of
misfortune in life (please see Appendix H, H.2i), or those with a pre-stroke history
of depression (please see section 19.3). These results concur with just world
theories and past research findings (please see Chapter 2, page 42 for the review).
19.4H: Discussion of identity and acceptance ofdisability
The cross-sectional findings strongly support the relationship between these self-
evaluative/subjective disability variables and distress. Particularly strong and
independent associations between these variables and distress were found at follow-
up and acceptance of disability was found to be predictive of distress across time.
These findings were corroborated by the qualitative results (please see Chapter 17,
section 17.8) and the structured clinical interview results for depressive disorder
(please see Chapter 15, section 15.3). In contrast to the conclusions of past
qualitative research (please see Chapter 2, section 2.3v) the results do not support a
link between descriptions of'body failure' and universal identity disruption.
A lot of variation in reports of identity change was found in both the quantitative and
qualitative results. Negative identity change sometimes appeared to be painfully
conscious and related to self-recriminating attitudes and concern about reliance on or
burdening others in the qualitative interviews. These results for distressed
participants concur with cognitive theory that emphasises negative self-evaluations
in distress and the concept of'spread' from Dembo et al.'s (1956) acceptance of
disability theory (please see Chapter 2, section 2.3ii). The qualitative results also
support acceptance of disability theory concepts and immunising theories of
successful ageing as relevant to some participants who were not depressed or
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anxious. These participants appeared to be able to stoically disregard, devalue or
accept the effects of their stroke.
19.4iii: Discussion ofsocial shame andfear offalling with reference to the results
for 'agoraphobia' and 'social phobia'
The findings of this study support previous research (please see Chapter 2, section
2.3v) by demonstrating a univariate association between shame and distress. High
levels of shame were only found amongst a minority of stroke patients. High levels
of fear of falling were fairly common. Both shame and fears of falling were
reported in the qualitative interviews, particularly by participants with 'agoraphobia'
and 'social phobia'. Some participants emphasised that they were particularly
concerned about their disability because their social circle was predominantly
young; however, the findings are not entirely consistent with Pound et al. (1998)
who suggest shame is not a problem to older adults.
Statistically the measures of shame and fear of falling were associated with
diagnoses of 'agoraphobia' and 'social phobia'. The structured clinical interview
results also highlighted that these stroke-specific fears resulted in avoidance. These
findings support the theoretical concept of 'excess disability' (Laidlaw et al., 2003)
as an explanation for how negative beliefs and distress can partially account for low
levels of social participation amongst some stroke patients.
Opinions regarding the seriousness and/or the reasonableness of specific anxiety
disorders and symptoms amongst stroke patients are conflicting (please see Chapter
1, section 1.4i). The exploratory results question any assumption that every patient
who meets DSMIV criteria for agoraphobia has got a disabling psychological
problem. A third of participants 'with' agoraphobia at baseline and half at follow-up
reported that they did not mind staying in. This could be interpreted as passive
acceptance, or, more positively, as successful adaptation as these participants
seemed content to restrict their goals to their family and home. Criteria that include
a corollary of related distress and dissatisfaction might be more appropriate for use
with this population.
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DSMIV excludes patients who fear the social impact of a medical condition from the
diagnosis of social phobia Participants who were considered to have a significant
problem with social shame/fear in this study were generally avoidant of the social
situations they believed would cause embarrassment and yet dissatisfied with this.
Some could not report whether they experienced physiological symptoms when
facing these situations because they had been completely avoidant. They were also
unlikely to recognise that their social fears as 'excessive or unreasonable'.
It is not possible to verify the social reality of reported experience, however as
discussed (please see Chapter 15, section 15.4iv), the stroke-deficits participants
found embarrassing were real. Therefore, 'shame' may be a more appropriate term
than 'fear', because participants seemed to feel more or less 'marked out' rather than
in danger of 'being found out'. It seems inappropriate that their negative social
beliefs, feelings and avoidance are dismissed as not clinically significant in DSMIV.
However, it also seems inappropriate to conclude that it is 'most judicious to apply
the diagnosis of social phobia to these persons' as has been with spasmodic
torticollis (Gundel et al., 2001) as this does not account for the stigmatising
experience participants reported.
As discussed (please see Chapter 2, section 2.), stigma has to be perceived for it to
become distressing. In addition to reports of negative experiences, participants who
were considered to have a problem with stroke-related shame and avoidance also
seemed to judge themselves harshly and highly value others actual negative
reactions, or, be bias to perceiving others differential reactions as negative (i.e. as
'pity' not 'kindness'). Although the beliefs and avoidances of these patients did not
seem entirely 'excessive or unreasonable' the negative bias involved in their
thinking could be amenable to change and assertive strategies could be learnt to cope
with actual stigma (Newell and Clark, 2000). Therefore it would seem useful to
develop criteria based on modified DSMIV criteria in order to identify patients who
may be described as having problematic stroke-related shame and social avoidance.
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19.4iv: Discussion ofbeliefs in recoveryfrom stroke
It was surprising that locus of control was only weakly and inconsistently associated
with distress. Similarly, that although confidence in recovery was moderately
associated with distress at the univariate level it was not in the multivariate analyses.
These findings are inconsistent with past research that, at face value, suggests that
these variables are actually predictive of distress across time (Morrison and
Johnston, 1999; Morrison et al., 2000). However, as discussed, these results may
have been confounded by the different timing of the measurement of distress and
these belief variables (please see Chapter 2, section 2.4i and 2.4iii).
It is notable that recovery locus of control scores reported by patients in this study
indicated a high level of internality, or personal sense of control regarding recovery.
Also, the results suggest that participants felt highly confident about making a good
recovery, particularly at baseline. Confidence in recovery scores were found to
statistically significantly decrease across time. Bach-Y-Rita & Bach-Y-Rita (1990)
suggest therapists are often taught to be conservative and avoid raising false
expectation. However, it is argued that unrealistically high expectations are an
important emotionally protective part of early adjustment (Holbrook, 1983). The
results suggest the operation of the latter position amongst this sample of stroke
patients. Despite the drop in confidence in recovery scores from high to less high
levels across time, they remained inversely associated with distress at follow-up.
This suggests that in most cases these patients' tendency towards high expectations
initially were indeed emotionally beneficial.
Quite a few participants actually spontaneously suggested that their earlier optimism
had been unrealistic, and that they 'really' knew this deep down all long but
preferred to face it gradually, when they were responding to the confidence in
recovery measure at follow-up They actually commented they were glad their
therapists had not forced them to come to terms with the possibility of a limited
recovery too soon. Therefore, the therapists involved with these patients may have
been particularly encouraging in their orientation. Also, it has been shown that
recovery locus of control is very amenable to modification (Johnston et al., 2000). It
is plausible then that therapists working with these patients may have also been
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particularly successful at nurturing internal orientation to recovery. If this is the
case, then these positive clinical relationships may not be accounted for by the
statistical findings.
19.4v: Discussion offear of- and beliefs in control of- recurrent stroke with
reference to the results for 'PTSD'
The results support and extend past findings that fear of recurrent stroke is
emotionally involving (please see Chapter 2, section 2.4v). An independent
statistically significant association between the recurrence fear measure and distress
was found both initially and at follow-up. The qualitative results provided
description of the nature (for example, fear of severe disability from a further stroke)
and origins (for example, family history or observation of other patients), of
recurrence fears. Theoretically these findings concur with cognitive theory
predictions (Clark and Beck, 1988), that distress is heightened by-overestimation of
severity, under-estimations of resources to deal with threat and over-estimation of
probability.
With hindsight it would have been useful to systematically elicit patients'
estimations of the likelihood of recurrence. One participant, who did spontaneously
estimate his risk, thought he had a fifty-fifty chance and another thought it was
'more than likely'. In addition a few participants reported extreme fears of
recurrence involving interpretation of physical symptoms. A couple reported
sometimes getting very anxious because a headache may be the start of a stroke and
a couple actually reported believing they had been experiencing multiple tiny
strokes. Interestingly, these beliefs and anxious symptoms were generally reported
in the PTSD interview and not in the panic disorder interview. Although the criteria
for PTSD did not provide an ideal match with reported experience (primarily
because distress was attached to future recurrence beliefs not the past event of the
stroke they had already had), it did usefully help to identify these extreme cases.
As discussed (please see Chapter 18, section 18.7v) the fatalistic and naive beliefs
for example ('Nothing can be done', 'Should I be hovering?') reported in qualitative
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interviews indicated an even more extreme sense of low controllability than the
quantitative results regarding control over causal attributions. This may be because
'stroke' needs to be conceptualised as both underlying/distal causal factors
('smoking', 'blood pressure', 'worry') and triggers ('fate', 'no reason', 'over¬
exertion').
Causal controllability ratings were generally low. However, higher causal
controllability scores at baseline were found to protective against distress across
time and the theoretical orientation of this finding has been discussed (please see
section 19.1). Sadly, the more detailed results for causal attributions highlights that
often those factors rated as most responsible are also rated as least controllable (in
particular smoking, worry and depressing experiences), please see Appendix F,
section F.2 for further details. A few depressed participants did raise strong
concerns about not being able to quit smoking in the qualitative interview and we
know that enacting this behavioural change is very difficult (Irvin and Brandon,
2000).
The findings of this study raise questions about whether interventions can be devised
to increase the majority of patients' sense of causal controllability. We know that
information provision alone does not improve mood in stroke patients (Forster et al.,
2001). However, interventions may need to address much more than knowledge to
tackle complex addictive behaviours (physical dependency, and idiosyncratic control
beliefs such as self-efficacy and locus of control). A greater sense of control may be
encouraged by assessing and addressing some of the more nai've recurrence fear
beliefs highlighted in this study, or, by nurturing the rare positive beliefs regarding
medical treatment of blood pressure.
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22.1: Forward
The thesis was inspired by the plausibility of cognitive therapy to facilitate
emotional adjustment to distress following stroke. Cognitive theories of distress and
emotional adaptation to illness and disability theories were used to develop this
study. Associations between negative beliefs in 'stroke' and 'its effects' and
emotional distress and disorder amongst stroke patients were investigated using a
mainly quantitative but also qualitative approach. The first main hypothesis that:
A relationship between beliefs and emotional distress would be found at
an initial point in time (baseline) and at a later point in time (follow-up)
was strongly supported (please see Chapter 11, section 11.4 and Chapter 13, section
13.4). The second main hypothesis that:
Beliefs found at baseline would predict emotional distress at follow-up
was also supported but less definitively (please see Chapter 14, section 14.6 and
Chapter 18, section 18.2).
The main quantitative findings have been discussed in relation to the specific
hypotheses (please see Chapter 11, section 11.5; Chapter 13, section 13.5; Chapter
14, section 14.6). The findings of the qualitative interviews have been summarised
in relation to diagnoses of depression/GAD. The main findings of the quantitative,
structured clinical interview and qualitative study have been summarised and
compared. Methodological issues have been discussed (Chapter 18) and the results
have been discussed in comparison to past research and relevant theory (Chapter
19). In this final chapter, I will highlight what I consider to be the most key findings
and make suggestions regarding their potential implications for future research or
interventions.
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20.2: Key findings and their implications
20.2i: The nature ofemotional distress following stroke
Descriptive results for emotional distress and disorder support the position that
anxiety is important as well as depression following stroke (House 1996; Johnston,
1991). Anxiety disorder and symptoms were as common as depressive disorder and
symptoms. There was much overlap between these measures, particularly
generalised anxiety disorder, depressive disorder and the continuous measure of
emotional distress. These results support the use of the distress construct as the
main subject of study in this thesis.
Nonetheless in addition to worry, the nature of anxiety tended to be characterised by
specific fear and avoidance (please see section 20.2iv) while panic symptoms were
rare. This supports and extends previous findings from community studies of older
adults and stroke patients (Burvill et al., Flint, 1994; Kay, 1988; Sharpe et al., 1991).
A mixed approach to the measurement of emotional distress that used both a
continuous measure and criteria for emotional disorders highlighted the preceding
issues. The qualitative finding that participants often felt 'frustrated' or 'annoyed'
suggests another relevant emotional dimension to address in future research.
20.2ii: Beliefs in 'stroke ' and 'its effects' and their association with- andprediction
of- distress following stroke
I think it is fair to conclude that most beliefs in 'stroke' and 'its effects' studied were
related to distress following stroke to some extent. The independence of
associations found between distress and negative self-evaluation and recurrence fear
suggests these are key beliefs relevant to stroke patients' distressed reactions. It
seems fair to cautiously conclude that a lack of certain more stoical beliefs
(acceptance of disability and causal controllability), appear meaningfully related to
distress across time.
These quantitative findings were further supported and elaborated by the structured
clinical interview and qualitative study.
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20.2iii: Negative self-evaluations following stroke
Consistent with cognitive theory, all three methods of exploring distress emphasised
associations with a negative view of self. The quantitative results suggested that
negative self-evaluation, particularly an inability to accept reduced capacity and to
see oneself in more negative terms was related to distress. Patients meeting criteria
for depressive disorder often described themselves as 'useless' and their self-
recriminating beliefs about what they 'should' be doing, and aversion to feelings of
reliance on- or being a burden to- others was evident in the qualitative interview. In
contrast, some participants who were not depressed or anxious appeared to stoically
disregard, devalue or accept lost activities. These results concur with 'immunising'
theories of successful ageing (Brandstanter, 1999) and acceptance of disability
theory (Dembo et al., 1956). These beliefs appear to be tapping something
fundamental to the person. Therefore, cognitive therapy that aims to address
underlying negative assumptions and values and core beliefs maybe of benefit.
20.2iv: Self-confidence and confidence in recovery
Stroke patients often report a loss of confidence following stroke. More specifically
convergent lines of investigation highlighted that fears of falling and shame were
distressing to a sub-set of patients and involved phobic avoidance. These issues may
be regarded as 'excess disability' (Laidlaw et al., 2003). If stroke rehabilitation is to
meet its aim to promote social participation, these issues merit consideration.
Rehabilitation patients are often reported to be unrealistically optimistic about
recovery. These patients were very confident about their recovery initially, but this
decreased over time. If anything their initial confidence appeared to be emotionally
beneficial. Locus of control was inconsistently statistically associated with distress.
However, patients reported notably high levels of internal control. It may be that the
therapists involved with these patients had nurtured this and that the statistical
results fail to reflect the benefit of their positive clinical approach.
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20.2v: Fear of- and beliefs in control of- recurrent stroke
All patients in this sample knew that they may have another stroke and the
recurrence fear measure was strongly related to distress. Varied types of recurrence
fears were reported from concern about over-exertion, fear of severe dependency,
and very occasionally catastrophic beliefs that multiple tiny strokes were regularly
experienced. Further research is required to investigate whether there is a general
tendency to over-estimate the likelihood of recurrence, and to what extent.
Belief in the controllability of risk factors tended to be low. Certain risk factors
were regarded as more potent than others. A few particularly depressed and anxious
participants reported distress about trying to control risk, particularly smoking.
In contrast, a greater initial sense of causal controllability was shown to be
independently protective against distress across time. This finding concurs with
Kelley's (1971) attributional theory of control. Information provision, such as
leaflets about stroke and risk factors, appears insufficient to reduce distress (Forster
et al., 2001). However, interventions that actually address patients' idiosyncratic
fears and misconceptions about recurrence and empower a sense of causal control
may be beneficial.
20.2vi: Qualifications to a cognitive explanation for distress following stroke: A pre¬
history ofdepression and initial levels ofdistress
A history of depression in life prior to stroke associated with distress at baseline, at
follow-up and was predictive of distress across time. These results are unsurprising
in light of research with other populations (Coyne et al., 1999; Hammen, 1997).
Inter-relationships between a pre-stroke history of depression and other factors (age
and 'Why me?') have been discussed, are theoretically interesting and highlight the
injustice of its association with subsequent distress (please see Chapter 19, section
19.3). Unfortunately, a pre-stroke history of depression is un-modifiable. Its
pervasive influence, together with the influence of prior distress on subsequent
distress, qualifies support for an explanation of distress following stroke in terms of
the beliefs in 'stroke' and 'its effects' that were studied.
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These sober findings have practical implications. The inclusion of- and the quality
and reporting of assessments for- a pre-stroke history of emotional disorder has been
inconsistent in stroke research to date (Spencer et al., 1997). The importance of
controlling for this issue in future research is underlined, particularly because it may
actually increase the risk of stroke occurrence (please see Chapter 2, section 2.2iii).
Influences regarding an individual's emotional state immediately pre-stroke may
well be ongoing after stroke. This could prove challenging to therapeutic efforts and
should be particularly controlled for in intervention studies. In clinical practice,
knowledge of pre-stroke history of depression may prove advantageous in the
identification of patients most vulnerable to high levels of distress both initially and
in subsequent months.
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20.3: Concluding comments
A high prevalence of emotional distress and disorder was found at both an initial-
and later-point in time following stroke. Given the reality of physical and functional
losses following stroke, commonsense suggests that this is 'understandable'.
Nonetheless, participants emotional responses showed much variation, that was only
weakly associated with the variation in stroke severity and measures of disability.
Stoical reasoning suggests that:
"Lameness interferes with the limb, not with one's faculty of choice. Say this at
each thing that happens to you, since you will find it interferes with something else,
not with you."
Epictetus, quoted p.453 in Moorey, 1996
and modern cognitive theory emphasises negative beliefs about the self, one's
position in the world and one's future prospects in emotionally distressed states
(Haaga et al., 1991). The results support a relationship between distress and beliefs
about 'stroke' and 'its effects', qualified by the pervasive influence of a pre-stroke
history of depression and initial distress levels across time. Particularly strong
relationships between distress and self-devaluing beliefs regarding the effects of
stroke, and fear of the possibility and nature of future strokes were found. A
positive sense of control over causal factors appeared protective against distress
across time. In conclusion, this study provides qualified support for cognitive
explanations of distress amongst stroke patients. A cognitive therapeutic approach
that addresses, the scope and precipitants of beliefs identified in this study may help
promote emotional adaptation following stroke.
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appropriate. A version of thisform is available on discfrom the Secretary of the LREC.
It is essential that this form is completed fully and sent with relevant enclosures. You should not
simply refer to the protocol but complete the form with the information requested. Please refer to
the accompanying Guidance Notes when completing the form and complete the checklist before
sending. Where a question is not applicable it is important to make this clear and not to leave it blank.
It is important that the language used in this application is clear and understandable to lay
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Yes/No/Not applicable options.
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Full protocol (seventeen copies) Yes
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Research subject consent form (seventeen copies) Yes
Research subject information sheet (seventeen copies) Yes
Advertisement for research subjects (seventeen copies)
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SECTION 1 Details of applicant(s)
1. Short title of project:
The psychological impact of stroke.
Full title:
Perceived health status and self concept change as predictors of emotional distress following
stroke.








Present appointment of applicant:
Psychiatry MRC PhD student
Qualifications:
Psychology MA Hons & Health Psychology MSc
Address:
Work address:
Department of Psychiatry/ University of Edinburgh/ 2nd fl, Kennedy Tower/








3F2, 27 Stewart terrace/ Georgie/ Edinburgh/ EH!! 1UW




3 Please give an approximate figure for the number of trials/studies in which the principal
researcher has been involved over the past year
Two
4. Names, titles and qualifications of other local researchers working on this project
Supervisors:
Dr Michael Sharpe, MA,MB,MRCP,MRCPSYCH, Senior Lecturer in Psychological Medicine,
University of Edinburgh. Honorary Consultant Psychiatrist LUHT and LPCT.
Dr Debbie Tinson, M.appSci.PhD (Consultant Clinical Psychologist), Lothian Primary Care NHS
Trust.
Also:
Dr Martin Dennis, MBBS,FRCP,MD, Reader in Stroke Medicine and Consultant physician LUHT
5. Who is sponsoring the study?
Contact name:









6. Drug Company Reference Number




Please give full details where applicable of:
a) Payment to subjects
N/A
b) Payment to Trust/practice/research funds, etc. (specify institution(s))
N/A
c) Personal payment or personal benefit to researcher
N/A
Is payment:
i) A block grant Yes
ii) Based on the number of research subjects recruited? No
If yes, how much per patient:
d) Details of other benefits, e.g. equipment
N/A
e) Details of NHS Trusts and hospitals/facilities to be used
None
f) Will the costs incurred by the institution be
covered by the payment? N/A
8. What other researchers are/do you intend to be involved in this project? (Details of
researchers added subsequently must be notified to the LREC)
Please use the form attached at Annexe C
Professor Mick Power, BSc, D Phil, MSc, Professor of Clinical Psychology.
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SECTION 2 Details of project
This section must be completed fully. A copy of the protocol should be enclosed with the application
form, but it is not sufficient to complete questions by referring to the protocol.
9. Aims and objectives of project (Maximum. 250 words)
AIMS:
1) Study a cohort of stroke survivors with the aim of identifying cognitions relating to their
psychological understanding of stroke and self concept change related to the effects of
stroke (disability acceptance, interpersonal shame and identity change ).
2) Investigate the relative contribution of these cognitions to emotional distress over time.
3) Combine data from interviews with depressed participants and previous questionnaires to
develop a stroke specific cognitions scale addressing their 'psychological understanding of
stroke' and 'self concept'.
In order to study the relative importance of these cognitive variables other potential predictors of
depression (social support, social integration, life events, prior history of depression) will be
controlled for.
HYPOTHESES:
1. Emotional distress is associated with
more negative psychological understanding of stroke (stroke representations)
more negative self concept related to the effects of stroke
2. Anxiety will be associated specifically with stroke fear and less perceived control
3. Depression will be associated specifically with negative self-concept
4. Psychological variables at 1 month will predict distress at 6 months
10. Scientific background of study (Maximum. 250 words)
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1. Background
Patients often develop long term distress after stroke. Indeed a 20% prevalence was found
amongst stroke patients in Lothian (O'Rourke, 1996). Understanding the causes of stroke
patients' distress will aid development of helpful interventions.
Biological predictors of post stroke depression, such as lesion laterality have been revealed as
poor predictors of post stroke depression (Carson et al, in press). Meanwhile there has been
little research investigating psychosocial predictors of depression. As stroke survivors are
faced with significant loss, life threat arid residual disabilities, it does seem likely that negative
thinking may produce subsequent distress.
Some promising results have been found. Changes in stroke survivors sense of identity and
perceptions of social devaluation were found to associate with distress by Ellis-Hill (1998) and
Vine (2000) respectively. Stroke survivors who self-blamed or who asked 'Why me?' were
found to be more depressed than others (Thompson, 1991). However, attributions of physical
causes and confidence in recovery have been found to negatively correlate with distress
(Thompson, 1991, Morrison, 1999).
However these studies have generally been conducted with small samples. There is now a
need for more rigorous and wide ranging studies in which various psychological factors are set
against other known predictors of depression in order to assess their relative importance
11. Brief outline of project including outcome measures (Maximum. 250 words)
Participants
150 consecutive stroke admissions to the Western General who meet the inclusion criteria.
The first 15 participants who are found to have major depression, and similarly aged non-
depressed participants will also be given a semi-structured interview. This qualitative data will
undergo content analysis and be used to develop a 'stroke specific cognitions questionnaire'.
This questionnaire will be administered by post.
Measures
Structured interviews will consist of verbal administration of various scales which measure the
following variables (please see protocol for further information)
Emotional distress (as a total score and separate anxiety and depression sub-scores)
Anxiety and depression as clinical diagnoses.
Psychological Understanding of stroke (beliefs in causes, acceptance of stroke, control and
confidence over recovery and fear of recurrence).
Self-concept (identity change, disability acceptance and interpersonal shame).
Non-psychological factors (disability, prior depressive episodes, recent life events: and social
support).
The semi-structured interviews will be used to elicit depressed patients key cognitions relating
to everyday problems, understanding of stroke and beliefs in self concept change due to the
effects of stroke.
Procedure
Once consent obtained, participants will receive two structured interviews. The first in hospital
and the second at home six months later. They will be carried out in private and last
approximately 1 % hours.
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12. Proposed start date and duration of project
Start: July 2000
Duration: 2 years
13. Study design (e.g. Randomised Controlled Trial, cohort, case control, epidemiological analysis)
Prospective cohort study
14. Size of the study (including controls)
150
Will the study involve:
(a) Human Subjects Yes
i) How many patients will be recruited?
150
ii) How many controls will be recruited?
N/A
iii) What is the primary end point?
Prediction of emotional distress by cognitive factors
iv) How was the size of the study determined?
A precise power calculation proved difficult to make. However, previous work with stroke
patients in Lothian and Bristol suggests that a sample of this size is sufficient for the questions
being addressed.
v) What is the statistical power of the study?
Given results of previous research, this study should give medium effect sizes.
(b) Patient Records Yes
i) How many records will be examined?
150
ii) How many control records will be examined?
Appendix A: Lothian Research Ethics Committee Application Form - February 1998
viii
N/A
iii) What is the primary end point?
As before
iv) How was the size of the study determined?
As before
v) What is the statistical power of the study?
As before
15. Scientific critique
Has the protocol been subject to scientific critique? If so, please give the following information:
If the critique formed part of the process of obtaining funding, please give the name and address of the
funding organisation:
Medical Research Council/ 20 Park Crescent/ LONDON/ W1N 4AL
If the critique took place as part of an internal process, please give brief details:
If you are in possession of any referees' or other scientific critique reports relevant to your
proposed research, please forward copies with your application form.
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SECTION 3 Recruitment of subjects
16. Local Recruitment of Subjects
a) How many subjects are being studied within Lothian?
150
b) Are any of these subjects involved in existing research
or have been involved in any recent research in the
last six months? Yes
Ifyes, please justify their use in this project
Some patients may be participating in the Lothian FOOD trial
This study addresses different research questions and entails only interviews.
c) Will any of the subjects involved be in a dependent
relationship with the researcher? No
Ifyes, please ensure you comply with local recruitment arrangements
d) Will any of the subjects involved be medical students? No
Ifyes, please obtain signed agreement ofthe Dean ofthe Faculty ofMedicine:
Signature the of Dean of the Faculty of Medicine
or equivalent if medical students are research subjects:
.N/A
17. How will the subjects in the study be:
a) selected?
All consecutive admissions to the Western General Hospital, with a confirmed stroke, who meet
the inclusion criteria will be approached until the number of required participants is met.
b) recruited?
Once the permission of the responsible medical consultant has been obtained patients will be
asked by ward staff if they are interested in hearing more about the study. Those interested will
then be introduced to the researcher by the ward staff and given the information sheet. They
will be given a day or so to consider their participation. Interviewing will only proceed if written
consent is obtained
c) what inclusion criteria will be used?
Participants must be aged over 16 years old, be able to give consent and understand and
respond to the questions.
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Only patients who: have already survived three weeks after their stroke, who are judged
medically stable and likely to survive throughout the duration of the study will be considered.
d) what exclusion criteria will be used?
The medical staffs' clinical judgement will be used to assess whether patients' are too unwell
because of their stroke or any other life threatening disease to take part.
Severe cognitive impairment. This will be operationalised by a cut-off score on the Mini Mental
State Exam (MMSE) which forms part of patients' routine neurological assessment.
Aphasia. This will be operationalised as a below cut-off score on the Frenchay Aphasia
Screening Test (FAST) which is a standard screening device for verbal comprehension and
production.





c) what inclusion criteria will be used?
N/A
d) what exclusion criteria will be used?
N/A
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SECTION 4 Consent
19. Is written consent to be obtained? Yes
Ifyes, please attach a copy of the consentform to be used.
Ifno written consent is to be obtained, pleasejustify.
20. How long will the subject have to decide whether to take part in the study?
If less than 24 hours pleasejustify.
At least 24 hours
21. Please attach a copy of the written information sheet or letter to be given to the subject.
(See Guidelines page 3 and Appendix A.)
Ifno Information Sheet is to be given, please justify.
22. Have any special arrangements been made for subjects
for whom English is not a first language? No
Ifyes, give details.
Ifno, pleasejustify.
Participants must be able to understand the consent giving procedure, and understand and
respond to the questions. Participants do not need to have English as their first language.
However, it is impractical to translate all the questionnaires, and so those with a poor command
of English will be excluded.
23. Will any of the subjects or controls be from one of the following vulnerable groups?
Children under 16
People with learning difficulties
Unconscious or severely ill
Other vulnerable groups e.g. mental illness, dementia
No
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Ifyes, please specify andjustify:
24. What special arrangements have been made to deal with the issues of consent for the
subjects above? (Please see Guidelines.)
N/A
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SECTION 5 Details of interventions
25. Does the study involve the use of a new medicinal product
or medical device, or the use of an existing product outside
the terms of its product licence? (Please see Guidelines.) No
Ifyes, please complete Annexe A ofthe Application Form.
26. Will any additional diagnostic tests using ionising radiation
(radioactive materials or x-rays be administered? No
(NB Please ensure information in Question 17 includes exclusion criteria with regard to ionising
radiation if appropriate.)
Ifyes, please complete Annexe B ofthe Application Form.
27. Please list those procedures in the study to which subjects will be exposed indicating those
which will be part of normal care and those that will be additional (e.g. taking more samples
than would otherwise be necessary). Please also indicate where treatment is withheld as a
result of taking part in the project.
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SECTION 6 Risks and ethical problems
28. Are there any potential hazards? No
Ifyes, please give details, and give the likelihood and details ofprecautions taken to meet them,
and arrangements to deal with adverse events.
29. Is this study likely to cause any discomfort or distress? No
Ifyes, please give details andjustify.
If interviews become burdensome or tiring the patient will have the opportunity to defer completion or
to terminate.
30. Safety Requirements
a) Medical support and other facilities available:
b) Local emergency contact details:
Supervisors of project:
Dr Michael Sharpe and Dr Debbie Tinson, who are a consultant psychiatrist and a consultant
clinical psychologist respectively.
c) Local independent adviser details:
Dr Anne Tait, consultant psychiatrist at the Western General Hospital.
d) If you are going to administer drugs what arrangements have
you made to store, code and administer them? (See Annexe A)
Signature of Hospital Pharmaceutical Officer:
e) Are you going to administer radioactive materials? (See Annexe B) No
i) If yes, do you have an ARSAC certificate for
this particular research study? ' NA
ii) Have you informed the Radiation Protection Adviser? NA
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Signature of Radiation Protection Adviser:
31. What particular ethical problems or considerations do you consider to be important or
difficult with the proposed study?
Please give details.
It is recognised that stroke patients are often highly emotional and so care will be taken to
ensure their emotional comfort during interviews. Any patient who seems to be getting
distressed and/ or tired during participation will be asked of he/ she would like a break or would
like to re-schedule the interview.
Dr Michael Sharpe and/ or Dr Debbie Tinson will be available on the telephone during all
interviews in the unlikely event that a participant may react with great distress to being
questioned.
32. Will information be given to the patient's General Practitioner? Yes
Please note: permission should always be sought from research subjects before doing this.
Ifyes, please enclose an information sheet/letterfor the GP.
Ifno, please justify:
33. If the study is on hospital patients, will permission of all consultants
whose patients are involved in this research be sought? Yes
Ifno, please justify:
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SECTION 7 Compensation and confidentiality
Product liability and consumer protection legislation make the supplier and producer (manufacturer)
or any person changing the nature ofa substance, e.g. by dilution, strictly liable for any harm resulting
from a consumer's (subject or patient) use ofa licensedproduct.
34. Have arrangements been made to provide indemnity and/or compensation in the
event of a claim by, or on behalf of, a subject for non negligent harm?
(Please indicate N/A ifnot applicable)
N/A
Ifyes, please give details ofcompensation arrangements with this application.
N/A
For pharmaceutical company sponsored research, the company should confirm that it will abide
by the most recent ABPI guidelines (Manual V. 14.1.1)
35. In cases of equipment or medical devices, have appropriate arrangements been made with
the manufacturer to provide indemnity?
(Please indicate N/A ifnot applicable) N/A
Ifyes, please give details and enclose a copy ofthe relevant correspondence with this application.
NA
36. Will the study include the use of any of the following?
Audio/video recording Yes
Observation of patients No
Ifyes to either:
i) How are confidentiality and anonymity to be ensured?
Tapes will be labelled with a code and not with patients' names.
Tapes will be transported in locked briefcase and stored in locked filling cabinet in The Kennedy
Tower at The Royal Edinburgh Hospital.
Transcription of tapes will proceed ASAP after interview. Tapes will be destroyed by blanking
out labels and cutting tape.
ii) What arrangements have been made to obtain consent for these procedures?
Item four of the consent form specifies consent to interview being tape recorded. Additionally
participants verbal consent will be checked before switching on tape recorder immediately prior
to interview and their wishes will be strictly abided.
37. Will medical records be examined by research worker(s)
outside the employment of the NHS? No
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(In addition to contract with the MRC, I have honorary contracts with The Lothian University
Hospitals NHS Trust and Lothian Primary Care NHS trust).
Ifyes, please see Guidelines.
38. What steps will be taken to safeguard confidentiality of personal records?
All personal records will be labelled with a code and not with patients' names, these will be re-
coded on entry to computer.
Interview records will be transported in locked briefcase and stored in locked filling cabinet in
The Kennedy Tower at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital.
Data entry will proceed ASAP after interview and then interview manuscripts will have labels
blanked out.
39. What steps will be taken to safeguard the information relating to specimens and the
specimens themselves?
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SECTION 8 Management Details
40. Confidentiality
a) Can this project be included in the NRR Yes
b) If NO Should the Project remain confidential to the Yes No
host Trust until after its completion Date ?
41. Is this research carried out as part of a: Undergraduate Degree?
Postgraduate Degree? Yes
If YES which one?
PhD
42. Is the host Trust the Lead Institution for this project ? No
If No, please indicate Lead Institute
University of Edinburgh
43. Will the proposed project involve support departments,

































44. Who has vetted the contract? Commercial Development Unit (CDU)
University equivalent(UnivEd)
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Not Applicable
SECTION 9 NHS Resource Implications/Costs
45. Time Resources
a) Host Trust Staff involved in execution of project
Name Grade of Staff Hours on project per week Funded by
projects
Please estimate as accurately as
possible, you should include hours









b) Additional time invested in project





a) Is your study likely to incur excess treatment costs No
b) Additional Hospital Costs
Location of research Additional resource implication per patient












c) Could this activity be carried out within a Clinical Research Facility, with
centralised research nursing, tracking and administration. ? No
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47. What additional Investigations are involved per patient ? (Please discuss the
NHS resources needed with the relevant departments and obtain their agreement)
None
NOTE FOR SIGNATORIES
IF YOU ARE UNSURE AS TO WHETHER THIS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOUR
CLINICAL DIRECTOR/ HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, THEN PLEASE DISCUSS WITH THEM
BEFORE SIGNING.
(a) Nursing
Grade of staff & Hours involved
Description of activities involved
Additional no. of contracts
Funded from grant Yes No
Agreed by Director of Nursing/Deputy or Department contact (as per local arrangements):
Signature: Designation:
Date:
(b) PROFESSIONS ALLIED TO MEDICINE (PAMS e.g. Occupational Therapists, Speech
Therapists, Physiotherapists, Dieticians, Chiropodists)
Grade of staff & Hours involved
Description of activities involved
Additional no. of contracts
Funded from grant Yes No
Agreed by Head of Department/Deputy or Department contact (as per local arrangements):
Signature: Designation:
Date
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(c) Pharmaceutical Implications
Name of investigation drugs
Summary of dosing protocol
Additional cost of drug therapy
Additional dispensing requirements and
storage & costs







Funded from grant Yes No






Funded from grant Yes No
Agreed by Clinical Director/Deputy or Department contact (as per local arrangements):
Signature: Designation:
Date:
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(f) High cost consumables
e.g. Hickman lines - number per patient
platinum coils - number per patient
Agreed by Clinical Director/Business Manager or Deputy:
Signature: Designation:
Date:
(g) ECG/ Exercise Testing/ Lung Function Test
Number per patient








Purchased specifically for study Description Cost
Additional use of existing equipment
frequency of additional use
49. What Space is Used
Location/room no
Ad hoc use of rooms on ward as avaiable for
interviews
% R&D Externally funded
Yes No
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50. What Administration support is involved
Secretarial (Grade of Staff) Hours per week on R&D
None
Medical Records No. of case notes
Please state the number of case notes to be retrieved as part of this These will be reviewed but it
study? is anticipated most will be
available on the ward when
required. A few may need to
be retrieved from records
PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOU COMPLETE THE CHECKLIST ON THE FRONT
COVER OF THE APPLICATION FORM AND ENCLOSE ALL RELEVANT
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS.




The information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief and I
take full responsibility for it.
I understand it is my responsibility to obtain management approval where appropriate
from the relevant NHS body before the project takes place.
I agree to supply interim and final reports on the pro forma provided, and to advise my
sponsor, the LREC from which approval was granted for this proposal and any other
researchers taking part in the project of any adverse or unexpected events that may
occur during this project.
Signature of Principal Researcher:
Date:
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Annexe C 1 Local Researchers
OTHER RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY
Please provide the name and contact details of other researchers involved in this study. Please
include your own name and centre if you are also a local researcher.
(Please copy and complete this pagefor each researcher. You must inform the LREC Administrator by



















Please retain a blank copy of this form, complete it and send to the LREC Administrator
whenever other local researchers become involved in the future.
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Annexe C 2 Local Researchers
OTHER RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY
Please provide the name and contact details of other researchers involved in this study. Please
include your own name and centre if you are also a local researcher.
(Please copy and complete this pagefor each researcher. You must inform the LREC Administrator by



















Please retain a blank copy of this form, complete it and send to the LREC Administrator
whenever other local researchers become involved in the future.
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Annexe C 3 Local Researchers
OTHER RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY
Please provide the name and contact details of other researchers involved in this study. Please
include your own name and centre if you are also a local researcher.
(Please copy and complete this pagefor each researcher. You must inform the LREC Administrator by


















Please retain a blank copy of this form, complete it and send to the LREC Administrator
whenever other local researchers become involved in the future.
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Annexe C 4 Local Researchers
OTHER RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY
Please provide the name and contact details of other researchers involved in this study. Please
include your own name and centre if you are also a local researcher.
(Please copy and complete this page for each researcher. You must inform the LREC Administrator by





Department of Clinical Neurosciences,













Please retain a blank copy of this form, complete it and send to the LREC Administrator
whenever other local researchers become involved in the future.
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Annexe C 5 Local Researchers
OTHER RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY
Please provide the name and contact details of other researchers involved in this study. Please
include your own name and centre if you are also a local researcher.
(Please copy and complete this page for each researcher. You must inform the LREC Administrator by



















Please retain a blank copy of this form, complete it and send to the LREC Administrator
whenever other local researchers become involved in the future.
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B.l: Consultant information sheet
CONSULTANT INFORMATION SHEET FOR
THE IMPACT OF STROKE STUDY
About the researcher
My name is Ellen Townend and I am a PhD student, supervised by Dr Michael
Sharpe (Consultant psychiatrist) and Dr Debbie Tinson (Clinical psychologist).
My research is funded by the UK Medical Research Council.
About the research
The research is concerned with psychological prediction of distress following
stroke. Understanding of this should inform the development of psychological
interventions. The study aims to assess the impact factors concerning: how
patients understand their stroke (stroke representations) and how they see
themselves (self- concept) in light of the effects of their stroke.
What is required of participants
Participants will be invited to take part in an interview at 1 month (in hospital or
at home) and at 6 months (at home). These interviews will consist of verbal
administration of scales relating to their emotional distress, psychological
understanding of stroke and self concept. Interviews should last about 1 Vi hours;
however if a patient is finding the interview tiring or burdensome another
appointment can be made to finish it. The first 15 participants who have major
depressive disorder on the SCID will also be interviewed in a more open ended
manner about their recent stroke experiences. Finally participants will be mailed
a questionnaire developed from data collected during these interviews.
Ethical considerations
Strict adherence to patient confidentiality and anonymity will be followed at all
times. Lothian's Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology Research Ethics Sub-
Committee have reviewed this study.
I will enquire whether you have any reservations about patients' suitability before
I ask a member of ward staff to introduce me to patients to ask if they would be
willing to take part.
If I encounter a patient who is extremely distressed I will inform the relevant
clinical staff.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any queries about the research:
Tel: 0131 6507 email: E.L.Townend@sms.ed.ac.uk
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You are being invited to take part in a research study. It is important for you to
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve before you
decide whether to take part. Please take time to read the following information
carefully. Please ask if there is anything you are not clear about, and feel free to
discuss it with family and friends.
Why are we asking for your help?
We know a great deal about the physical impact of stroke, however much less is
known about the psychological impact. A better understanding of this should
lead to better ways of helping people who have had a stroke. This study will
involve interviewing people who have had a stroke soon after the stroke and
again 6 months later.
Why have I been chosen?
Everybody coming into this hospital with a stroke who is well enough is being
asked to take part. We intend to interview about a hundred patients.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether you want to take part. If you do decide to take
part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a
consent form. If you decide to take part you are free to withdraw at any time and
without giving a reason. This will not affect the treatment you receive.
Who is involved with the study?
Ellen Townend, a research psychologist, is carrying out the research interviews.
She is supervised by Dr Michael Sharpe who is a consultant psychiatrist and Dr
Debbie Tinson who is a consultant clinical psychologist. The UK Medical
Research Council funds the study.
What is involved for me if I take part?
Ellen will visit you in hospital at a time that is good for you, and interview you in
private about your experience of stroke. We are particularly interested in your
thoughts about your health, how you feel about yourself and how your life has
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changed because of the stroke. This interview should take between one and two
hours. If you are finding the interview tiring she will stop, and make another
appointment to finish it.
Ellen would then like to contact you again in 6 months time to invite you to
participate in a second interview. This time it would take place in your own
home. Taking part in the first interview does not mean that you have to take part
in the second interview.
Who will have access to the information that I provide?
All information, which is collected, about you during the course of the research
will be kept strictly confidential and will be stored with your name and address
removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. We need to inform your GP
that you are taking part in the study. Access to information you give is limited to
Ellen Townend, and her supervisors. The only exception to this is if the
interviews reveal information that is important to your medical care. In that case
we need to ensure that the doctor looking after you is aware of this.
Who has reviewed the study?
Lothian's Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology Research Ethics Sub-Committee
have reviewed this study.
Who to contact for further information
Please feel free to contact Ellen Townend for information about this study at any
time during your participation by phoning 0131 5376507. A brief summary of
the overall results will be made available by the summer of 2002. You are very
welcome to contact Ellen to obtain a copy at this time.
If you would like impartial advice about whether to take part in this research
from a doctor who is not involved with this study you may contact Dr Anne Tait,
consultant psychiatrist at the Western General Hospital, Edinburgh (Tel: 0131
537 2855).
What do I do now?
You may like to discuss the project with others. Ellen will visit again in the next
couple of days to see if you would like to take part.
Thank you for your time and consideration.





Title of Project: Impact of stroke study





Please initial each box:
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
at any time, without giving any reason, and without my medical care or
legal rights being affected.
3. I understand that sections of my medical notes relevant to the project may
be looked at by the researcher and I give permission for her to have access to
these notes.
4. I consent to my interview being tape recorded.
5. I give permission for Ellen Townend to phone me in seven months time to
enquire whether I would like to be interviewed a second time, and I understand
that taking part in the first interview does NOT mean I have to take part in the second.
6. I agree to take part in the above study.
Name of Patient Date Signature
Researcher Date Signature
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B.4: G.P. introduction letter
Date: --/ —/
Ellen Townend






Impact of stroke study
I would like to let you know that your patient:
Mr / Mrs (DOB: )
took part in an interview for the above study on:
I am conducting this study as a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh. While we know a
great deal about the physical impact of stroke, much less is known about the psychological
impact. A better understanding of psychological predictors of emotional distress should
provide valuable information regarding the development of future interventions.
Participants will be invited for a further interview at six-month follow-up. Your patient has
agreed that I may contact him/ her at this time to invite him/ her for a further interview.
However, I will write to you nearer the time, so that you may decline his/ her consent if you
believe it is inappropriate. Meanwhile, I would like to thank you for your time and if you
require any further information please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours sincerely,
Ellen Townend (MRC PhD student)
ENC: Patient information sheet for the impact of stroke study
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B.5: GP letter about second interview
Ellen Townend






Re: Patient's name and DOB
Your patient took part in an interview for 'The Impact of Stroke' study in __ last year. S/he
also consented to contact to discuss arranging a follow-up visit. I appreciate that you are very
busy and so please only reply if it is inappropriate to contact your patient about participating,
because she has died, or, is too severely physically ill to take part at the moment. If I do not
hear from you within the next 2 weeks, I will assume that there is not a problem like this at
present. I've enclosed a copy of the information sheet for the study and please do not hesitate
to contact me if you would like more information.
Thank you very much for your time and consideration,
Yours sincerely,
Ellen Townend (PhD student)




can not participate in his/ her follow-up interview for "The impact of stroke study" because:
Please explain reason:
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B.6: Patient invitation to second interview
Date: --/ —/
Ellen Townend






Thank you once again for the time you gave to be interviewed for the 'Impact of stroke' study
last .
It is now time for your follow-up interview and I would like to come and see you at a time that
is suitable for you. I'll give you a ring shortly so we can discuss whether you would like to
make an appointment.
Meanwhile thank you for your invaluable contribution so far,
All best wishes,
Ellen Townend (PhD student)





C.l Development of measures during piloting xl
Table CI Shame pilot data xl
Table C2 Recurrence fear pilot data xli
C.2 Exploratory factor analyses for main study xliii
Table C3 Factor structure for the acceptance ofdisability xliii
measure at baseline
Table C4 Factor structure ofthe 'Before I had my stroke' items xliv
from the identity change measure at baseline
Table C5 Factor structure ofthe 'Now Fve had my stroke' items xlv
from the identity change measure at baseline
Table C6 Factor structure ofthe shame measure at baseline xlvi
Table C7 Factor structure ofthe fear ofrecurrence measure at xlvii
baseline
Table C8 Factor structure ofthe 'Before I had my stroke' items xlviii
from the identity change measure atfollow-up
Table C9 Factor structure ofthe 'Now Fve had my stroke' items xlix
from the identity change measure atfollow-up
Table CIO Factor structure of the shame measure atfollow-up 1
Table CI 1 Factor structure ofthe fear ofrecurrence measure at li
follow-up
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C.l: Development of measures during piloting
Table CI: Shame pilot data
Piloted item
1. Since my stroke, I think others
sometimes see me as inadequate as a
person.
2. Since my stroke, I sometimes feel
















Compared to 'Other as Shamer'
scale, all items appeared
acceptable
3. Since my stroke, I get embarrassed .22
that others must think I've lost control
over my feelings.
4. Since my stroke I sometimes feel .22
useless because others have to make
allowances for me.
.94** Brought up emotionalism issues
but this was not considered to
invalidate item
.73** Appeared particularly pertinent
to depressed participants
5. Since my stroke, the way others fuss .15 .62**
about me sometimes gets irritating.
6. Since my stroke, I sometimes get .39 .75**
embarrassed about the way I must appear
to others.
7. Since my stroke, I sometimes get .31
upset because others treat me as if I'm
less intelligent.
8. Since my stroke, I find it comforting .23
that others are protective towards me. 1
9. Since my stroke, I've found it nice .47*
that others make allowances for me. 1
.96**
.94** This does not seem to be
evaluated positively by anyone
.96**
10. Since my stroke, people have acted .46* 1.0**
as if I'm just as intelligent as I was
before. 1
* p<.05 **p<.01
' Reverse scored items
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Tabled: Recurrence fear pilot data
Piloted item Association Test-retest Comments about Decision to
with HADs score suitability of item retain item
distress
(N = 27) (N = 15)
1. I think about my
health often.
.23 .85 * Often comments like
'Wouldn't you?' or
'Wouldn't you at my age?'
made - appears too self-
evident to be discriminatory.
2. I am bothered by
the uncertainty of my
health.
.48* .71* Good association and retest YES
3. I think about my
health now more than
before I had my stroke.
.51* .42 Good association, Test-




4. I worry no more
about my health than
other people worry
about their health.
.21 -.76 * Often had to explain
meaning of'no more' and
low association with HADs
5. I feel that there is
no need to worry about
my future health.
.32 .10 Ambiguous wording - does
'no need to worry' mean
one believes there is not any
call for concern or worry is
pointless. Also low retest
score




.36 * .57 * Good association and retest
score
YES
7. Compared to other
persons who have had
a stroke, I feel that I
worry less than they do
about health concerns.
.44 * .77 * Good association and retest
score
YES
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9. Just prior to
having tests like blood
pressure done, I
become uneasy.
.23 .63 Some agree but some
commented that they are
uneasy because they haven't
had tests or find tests
reassuring, so would
produce ambiguous data
10. I think no more .16
about my health
presently than I did
before I had my stroke.
-.65 Often had to explain
meaning - seemed confused
by double negative and low
association HADs
11. I would like to .003
feel more certain about
my health.
.74 * Often made comment 'Of
course - wouldn't everyone
like to feel more certain
about their health' and low
association HADs
12. Because of my .42 * .83
physical health, my
future is of concern to
me.





.28 -.30 Good validity could maybe
improve reliability by








14. When I think
about my future health,
1 feel some uneasiness.
.70 .83 Good association and retest
score
YES
15. I get symptoms .30
that remind me of
having my stroke.
. 12 Caused a lot of confusion -
did 'symptoms' refer to
present difficulties or the
experience of having a
stroke, also very low retest
score
16. I do not feel





Good association and retest
scores. However, often had
to rephrase as '... when I
hear information about
strokes' for those who could
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C.2: Exploratory factor analysis for main study
Table C3: Factor structure for the acceptance of disability measure at baseline 1
Factors Suggested name of
II factor
Item 1: I have a hard time adjusting to .86
the limitations of my stroke.
Item 2: Because of the effects of my .82
stroke, I miss the things I like to do
most.
Item 3: The effects of my stroke make .80
me feel useless at times.
Item 4: The effects of my stroke make
me more dependent on others than I
want to be.
Item 6: The effects of my stroke make
me feel inadequate.
Item 5: The effects of my stroke make
me a burden on my family and friends.
Item 7: I will never be self-sufficient
enough to make me happy.
Item 8: I think people are often
uncomfortable being around me












Percentage of variance explained by
each factor 35 15
Only values above .40 are reported
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Table C4: Factor structure of the 'Before I had my stroke' items from the
negative identity change measure at baseline 1
Factors
II III IV
Suggested name of factor
Item 3: In control .60 .45
Item 8: Confident .54 .44
Item 14: Independent .76
Item 15: Capable .83
Item 16: Active .58
Item 17: Co-operative .49
Item 1: Bored .41 .61
Item 2: Unhappy .64
Item 4: Worried .56
Item 5: Dissatisfied .66
Item 10: Worthless .66
Item 18: Withdrawn .52 .42
Item 11: Aggressive .77
Item 12: Irritable .71
Item 20: Patient .69 .44
Item 13: Caring .73
Item 19: Friendly .53
Item 6: Attractive .62
Item 7: Hopeful .47
Item 9: Stable -.62
Percentage of variance






Only values above .40 are reported
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Table C5: Factor structure of the 'Now I've had my stroke' items from the
negative identity change measure at baseline 1
Factors
II III IV V VI
Suggested name of
factor
Item 1: Bored .63
Item 2: Unhappy .62 .45
Item 3: In control .70
Item 8: Confident .63 .51
Item 14: Independent .79
Item 15: Capable .82
Item 16: Active .64
Item 7: Hopeful .52
Item 9: Stable .52
Item 10: Worthless .56
Item 17: Co-operative .70
Item 19: Friendly .69
Item 4: Worried .72
Item 5: Dissatisfied .49
























explained by each factor 29 10 8 6 6 5
Only values above .40 are reported
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Item 3: I get embarrassed that others
must think I've lost control over my
feelings
Item 4: I sometimes feel useless
because others have to make
allowances for me
Item 5: the way others fuss about me
sometimes gets irritating
Item 6: I sometimes get embarrassed
about the way I must appear to others
Item 1: I think others sometimes see
me as inadequate as a person
Item 2: I sometimes feel that others
see me as not measuring up to them
Item 7: I sometimes get upset because
others treat me as if I'm unintelligent
Item 10: people have acted as if I'm
just as intelligent as I was before
Item 8: I find it comforting that others
are protective towards me
Item 9: I've found it nice that others




















Percentage of variance explained by
each factor 37 17 10
Only values above .40 are reported
2 All items begin 'Since my stroke,...'
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Table C7: Factor structure of the fear of recurrence measure at baseline 1
Factors Suggested name of
II factor
Item 1: I am bothered by the .63
uncertainty of my health
Item 4: Compared to other persons .59
who have had a stroke, I feel that I
worry less than they do about health
concerns
Item 5: Because of my physical health, .72
my future is of concern to me
Item 6: I worry about my stroke
returning
Item 7: When I think about my future
health, I feel some uneasiness
Item 2: I think about my health now
more than before I had my stroke
Item 3: I always take my health into
consideration when making future plans
Item 8: I do not feel anxious when I













Percentage of variance explained by
each factor 35 15
Only values above .40 are reported
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Table C8: Factor structure of the 'Before I had my stroke' items from the
negative identity change measure at follow-up
Factors
I II III
Item 3: In control .58
Item 8: Confident .62
Item 13: Caring .56
Item 14: Independent .77
Item 15: Capable .74
Item 16: Active .61
Item 1: Bored .57
Item 11: Aggressive .63
Item 12: Irritable .75
Item 20: Patient .72
Item 4: Worried .78
Item 5: Dissatisfied .72



























explained by each factor 23 11 8
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Table C9: Factor structure of the 'Now I've had my stroke' items from the
negative identity change measure at follow-up
Factors
I II III
Item 1: Bored .56 .48
Item 2: Unhappy .81
Item 4: Worried .64
Item 5: Dissatisfied .75
Item 7: Hopeful .53
Item 8: Confident .63 .44
Item 10: Worthless .60
Item 3: In control .77
Item 14: Independent .83
Item 15: Capable .82
Item 16: Active .71
Item 11: Aggressive .84
Item 12: Irritable .69
Item 18: Withdrawn .48
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Table CIO: Factor structure of the shame measure at follow-up l'2
Factors Suggested names of
I II factor
Item 1: I think others sometimes see .78
me as inadequate as a person
Item 2: I sometimes feel that others .76
see me as not measuring up to them
Item 3: I get embarrassed that others .78
must think I've lost control over my
feelings
Item 4: I sometimes feel useless .78
because others have to make
allowances for me
Item 5: the way others fuss about me .67
sometimes gets irritating
Item 6: I sometimes get embarrassed .88
about the way I must appear to others
Item 7: I sometimes get upset because .80
others treat me as if I'm unintelligent
Item 10: people have acted as if I'm .52
just as intelligent as I was before
Item 8: I find it comforting that others
are protective towards me
Item 9: I've found it nice that others








Percentage of variance explained by
each factor 46 17
1
Only values above .40 are reported
2 All items begin 'Since my stroke,...'
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Table Cll: Factor structure of the fear of recurrence measure at follow-
Factors Suggested name of factor
I II
Item 1: I am bothered by the
uncertainty of my health
.61 .51
Item 2: I think about my health now
more than before I had my stroke
Item 3: I always take my health into






Item 5: Because of my physical health,
my future is of concern to me
.84
Item 4: Compared to other persons .69
who have had a stroke, I feel that I
worry less than they do about health
concerns




about health and the
possibility of stroke
Item 7: When I think about my future
health, I feel some uneasiness
.51 .66
Item 8: I do not feel anxious when I .76
hear information about strokes
Percentage of variance explained by
each factor 41 17
Only values above .40 are reported
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D.l Background/screening information liv
D.2 Definition of 'stroke' lv
D.3 Causal attributions/causal controllability lv
D.4 Definition of'the effects of stroke' lvii
D.5 Recurrence fear lviii
D.6 Fear of falling lviii
D.7 'Why me?' lix
D.8 'Found meaning?' lix
D.9 Confidence in recovery lx
D.10 Recovery locus of control lx
D.l 1 Qualitative 'concerns' questions lxi
D.12 Barthel index lxii
D.13 Nottingham index lxiii
D.14 Structured interview for depression (present status and pre-stroke lxiv
history)
D.15 Screening for anxiety disorders and specific structured interviews lxvi
D.16 Hospital Anxiety Depression scale lxxiv
D.17 Life events lxxv
D.l 8 Social Support lxxvi
D.19 Acceptance of disability lxxviii
D.20 Shame lxxviii
D.21 Identity change lxxix
D.22 Qualitative 'important areas' questions lxxxii
D.23 Example response cue sheet (used for acceptance of disability) lxxxiii




DOB: Gender: GP details:
Post Code: Living situation/relationships:
Stroke severity score: Previous history of stroke;
Hodkinson Mental Test
Age of patient




Date of birth of patient...
Month
Dates of world war II
Name of monarch
Count down from 20 to 1
FAST scoring
1) Riverside comprehension /5
2) Shapes comprehension /5
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D.2: Definition of 'stroke'
First of all, could you describe to me what you understand a stroke is?
(Ifneedprobe) What is it that you think happened inside your body when you had
your stroke?
D.3: Causal attributions/Causal controllability
Have you spent time thinking about a cause of your stroke?
(If Yes) Can you tell me about these?
(Double-check) Sometimes people do have their own ideas or theories but they're
not sure because they're not doctors. I wonder if you're like that as I'm interested in
what you think.
Yes/No (circle one from open-ended questioning)
Checklist
I'm just going to show you a list of causes other people who have had strokes have
mentioned. Could you have a look/As I read them out could you tell me whether
you think any apply to yourself?
If you had to choose the most important reason why you had your stroke out of
what would you choose?
And what would you say is the next most important reason out of
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For each cause:
How controllable would you say your is?
(future probe) OK, from now on/given that now, how controllable would you
say your is?
(funnelling probes) Overall is something that is controllable or is not
controllable?/ Would you say that is something easy or moderate to control?/ Would




D.4: Definition of 'the effects of stroke'
Stroke causes different effects for different people, what are the effects of your
stroke that you have now?
(If need probe) Sometimes one side of the body is paralysed; sometimes it is just
the leg, or a feeling of weakness. Some people have speech or vision problems, or
difficulties with their memory or concentration. What sort of effects do you have
now?
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D.5: Recurrence fear
Now I would like to ask you about your concerns for your health, now that you have
had a stroke, please could you tell me how much you agree or disagree using the
options at the bottom of the page (Give cue card & check understanding)




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
1. I am bothered by the uncertainty of my health. 0 1 2 3 4
2. I think about my health now more than before I
had my stroke.
0 1 2 3 4
3. I always take my health into consideration when
making future plans.
0 1 2 3 4
4. Compared to other persons who have had a
stroke, I feel that I worry less than they do about
health concerns.
4 3 2 1 0
5. Because of my physical health, my future is of
concern to me.
0 1 2 3 4
6. I worry about my stroke returning. 0 1 2 3 4
7. When I think about my future health, I feel
some uneasiness.
0 1 2 3 4
8. I do not feel anxious when I hear information
about strokes.
4 3 2 1 0
D.6: Fear of falling
Have you had a fall since your stroke?
(Ifyes) can you tell me a bit about it?
Yes/ No (circle as appropriate)
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Now I would like to ask you some questions about falls and would like you to tell
me how much you agree or disagree with them as we did before
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
1. If I had a fall I think I'd lose a lot of confidence. 0 1 2 3 4
2. I am not bothered by fears of falling. 4 3 2 1 0
3. I believe a fall would seriously affect my 0 1 2 3 4
recovery.
4. I believe I could cope with a minor fall. 4 3 2 1 0
D.7: 'Why me?'
Have you ever asked yourself 'Why me? Why did I have a stroke?'
Yes/No (circle as appropriate)
If so, how often do you find yourself asking Why me?
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Nearly (circle as appropriate)
all the time
0 12 3 4
D.8: 'Found meaning?'
Have you found any meaning in your experience of having had a stroke?
(Ifneedprobe) Is there anything good that has come out of the whole experience of
having a stroke for you?
Yes/No (circle as appropriate)
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D.9: Confidence in recovery
For the next three questions I would like you to give your answer as a number
between zero and ten using the line shown
Establish that can see both ends ofline on response cue
First of all, on a scale of 0 - 10, how confident are you that you will make a full
recovery from the effects of your stroke?
(Ifneedprobe) If you could let me know how confident you are by giving it as a
mark out of ten, a bit like as if you were giving a mark out of ten for a test of some
sort?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ....9 10
Not at all Extremely
Confident Confident
D.10: Recovery locus of control
Now I would like to ask you about your beliefs in recovery and would like you to tell
me how much you agree or disagree with the statements as we did be 'ore
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
1. How I manage in the future depends on me, not
on what other people do for me.
0 1 2 3 4
2. It's often best to just wait and see what
happens.
4 3 2 1 0
3. It's what I do to help myself that's really going
to make all the difference.
0 1 2 3 4
4. My own efforts are not that important, my
recovery really depends on others.
4 3 2 1 0
5. It's up to me to make sure I make the best
recovery possible under the circumstances.
0 1 2 3 4
6. My own contribution to my recovery doesn't
amount to much.
4 3 2 1 0
7. Getting better now is a matter of my own
determination rather than anything else.
0 1 2 3 4
8. I have little or no control over my progress from
now on.
4 3 2 1 0
9. It doesn't matter how much help you get - in
the end it's your own efforts that count.
0 1 2 3 4
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D.ll: Qualitative 'Concerns' questions
What I'd like to do now is spend a bit of time getting your side of the story
I've asked a lot of questions but now hearing about your own point of view. What
would you say are the main things in life that are concerning to you just now?
Probes to establish main concerns:
We all have things that concern us sometimes, what would you say are the things
which are most bothersome, or a bit concerning to you now?
(If necessary) Some people are concerned about things like health or money, others
are concerned about work or family or things in the news. It can be anything really
I'm just interested in what sort of things in life are an issue to you.
Probes to explore concerns, feelings and beliefs:
So is a concern can you tell me a bit more about that?
That's interesting what is it about that makes it a prime concern at the
moment?
What kind of feelings do you have about ?
How do you feel about ?
What sort of emotional word would you use to describe how makes you feel?
When you're feeling about what goes through your mind about it?
If you could imagine you're in a situation when you're feeling
what sort of things do you think about/what comes to mind?
So what does that do/ What does that make you think? What does that mean?
Summarise and check accuracy ofmain concerns emphasising them as main
concerns in life and then move on to stroke concerns:
OK, so are your main concerns/issues/things that bother you (a bit) in
life at the moment, but now I'd like to ask a different question, what would you say
were your main stroke concerns?
Probes to establish main stroke concerns
When it comes to the stroke and its effects what is the thing that worries you/bothers
you/concerns you the most?
Or if there was one thing about stroke or its effects that you'd say was an issue, or
something that you'd change if you could, what would that be?
Explore main stroke concerns using the similar probes as for main concerns
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D.12: Barthel index
Now if its' OK with you, could I run through the things that you may need some help
with now you've had your stroke
Use questions such as A lot of people have problems with a weak bladder or




0=Needs to be fed
2. Bathing l=Able to wash all over in bath/shower
0=Needs help
3. Grooming l=Totally independent
0=Needs help with personal care
4. Dressing 2=Independent
l=Needs help with some items
0=Unable to do anything without help
5. Bowels 2=No accidents
l=Occasional accidents/help with enema
O=lncontinent
6. Bladder 2=No accidents






2=Independent (on/off dressing and wiping)
l=Needs some help, but can do something alone
0=Dependent/unable to use
3=Totally independent
2=Minor help (verbal or physical but can walk)
l=Major help (one or two people/wheelchair independent)
0=Unable, no sitting balance
3=Independent
2=Walks with the help of one person verbal or physical)
l=Wheelchair independent (including corners)
0=Unable
10. Stairs 2=Independent
l=Needs help (verbal, physical, carry aid)
0=Unable






Get in and out of the car?
Walk over uneven ground?
Cross roads?
Travel on public transport?
Manage to feed yourself?
Manage to make yourself a hot drink?
Take hot drinks from one room to another?
Do the washing up?
Make yourself a hot snack?
Manage your own money when you are out?
Wash small items of clothing?
Do your own shopping?
Do a full clothes wash?




Manage your own garden?
Drive a car?
Not at all/ Alone with difficulty/
With help Alone easily
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D.14: Structured interview for depression (Present status and pre-stroke
history)
Five or more of the following criteria must: have been present during the same 2 week period; represent a change
from previous functioning; and be coded three.
At least one must be or 2.
Scoring: ? = unsure, 1 = no, 2 = Borderline, 3 = definitely yes.
N.B. First conduct interview for how participant has been feeling over last two weeks (Now) then repeat for
any time in life (Before).
Scoring
1. Depressed most of the day nearly every day. N ? 1 2 3
o Have you been feeling down or low over the last two weeks? B ? 1 2 3
o Has that been most of the time or just some of the time?
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all activities of the N ? 1 2 3
day, nearly every day.
B ? 1 2 3
o Right and has there been a change in the things you enjoy
doing or activities you take pleasure in?
(Well, for example, quite a lot of people
enjoy watching sport or soap operas on T.V.).
o And is that because you can't do that now or is it because
you feel you just can't be bothered?
o What about stuff that you can still do but just don't?
3. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (may be N ? 1 2 3
delusional) nearly every day, not merely self-reproach about being sick. N.B.
code 1 or 2 if only Low self Esteem. B ? 1 2 3
o And how have you been feeling about yourself as a person
lately?
o How's your self-esteem been?
o When you're feeling bad about yourself would you say that you feel
worthless?
4. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying). N ? 1 2 3
Recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a
specific plan for committing suicide. N.B. code 1 for self-mutilation without B ? 1 2 3
suicidal intent.
o I can see you've had a difficult time, have things ever seemed so bad
you've thought you would be better off dead?
o Have you been thinking about death a lot?
o Has that ever gone further than a thought?
o So have things been so bad that you've thought about ending it all?
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5. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day (particularly look for early
awakening).
o Have you experienced a change in your sleeping patterns?





6. a) Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others N
not merely subjective feelings of restlessness/being slowed down).
B
o Have you ever been particularly fidgety or feeling extremely
restless? or,
o Have you ever been feeling extremely slowed down to such
an extent it's difficult to make yourself move?
1 2 3
1 2 3
b) Was there psychomotor agitation/retardation during the interview? N ? 1 2 3
B ? 1 2 3
7. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day.
o And how have your energy levels been lately?
o Has that been most of the time or just some of the time?
N ? 1 2 3
B ? 1 2 3
8. Significant weight loss when not dieting, or weight gain (a change of more
than 5% in 1 month) or Decrease/Increase in appetite nearly every day.
o How has your appetite been compared to normal?
N
B
9. Diminished ability to think or concentrate or indecisiveness nearly every day.
o Have you been having any difficulties thinking or
concentrating lately?
(just about small every day things)
N ? 1 2 3
B ? 1 2 3
o Again has that been just some of the time or all of the time?
Note: I changed ordering ofquestions to avoid ending with suicide questions
Do you receive any medication from the doctor like anti-depressants or sleeping
pills?
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D.15: Screening for Anxiety disorders and specific structured interviews
Explore any 'Yes' response with appropriate further questioning (I used loose sheets
for' pages 4 tolO' which were used as appropriate)
Yes No
Panic Disorder
Have you ever had a panic attack, suddenly felt extremely frightened
or anxious or suddenly developed a lot of physical symptoms?
PAGES
4 & 5
If Yes, Have these attacks ever come on completely out of
the blue/in situations when you didn't expect to be nervous or
uncomfortable?
If unclear, How many of these kinds of attacks have you had?
(At least two?)
Agoraphobia without panic disorder PAGE
Were you ever afraid of going out of the house alone, being alone,
being in a crowd, queuing up or travelling on buses or trains?
6
Social phobia PAGE
Is there anything that you have been afraid to do, or felt uncomfortable
doing in front of other people, like speaking, eating or writing?
7
PTSD
Sometimes people find having a stroke extremely upsetting and
memories keep coming back in nightmares, flashbacks or thoughts
that you can't get rid of. Has this been happening to you?
PAGES
8 & 9
If no, What about being very upset when you are in a situation that
reminds you of having the stroke?
GAD
In the last six months have you been particularly nervous or anxious?
PAGE
10
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PAGE 4
Panic disorder without agoraphobia
To meet criteria for panic disorder all items must be answered 'Yes' unless
otherwise specified
• So you've experienced a panic attack....
o Evidence of worrying about its implications, or another episode?
Did you worry that there might be something terribly wrong with you, like you
were getting very ill again or going crazy?
Did you worry a lot about having another panic attack? (How long did you
worry? (At least a month?)
Did you do anything differently because of the attacks
(like avoiding certain places?/going out alone?/certain activities like
exercise?)
(What about things like always making sure you are near a bathroom or
exit?).
o Abrupt onset & less than 10 mins to peak?
When was the last one? What did you notice first? Then what?
Did the symptoms come on all of a sudden?
How long did it take from when it began to when it got really bad?
o 4 of these....





Chest pain or pressure?
Feeling nauseous, as if stomach upset or as if going to have diarrhoea?
Dizziness, feel unsteady, or like fainting?
Feeling that things around were unreal or you were detached from things around
or from part of your body?
Fear of going crazy or losing control?
Fear of dying?
Tingling or numbness in parts of your body?
Flushes or chills?
MUST ANSWER 'No'
o Just before you have a panic attack have you ever taken any drugs,
caffeine, diet pills, or other medicines
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Panic disorder with Agoraphobia
See previous page for panic disorder symptoms
Maybe fairly obvious from prior questioning that agoraphobia
accompanies panic disorder, but must answer 'Yes' to these
questions
o Are there situations that make you nervous
because you are afraid that you might have a panic attack?
E.G. Outside home?/In crowds?/In public transport?
o Avoidance/Marked distress/Need for a
companion
Do you avoid these situations?
When you are in one of these situations do you feel very
uncomfortable or like you might have a panic attack?
Do you need someone you know to be with you?
N.B. ONSET QUESTIONS
When did your fear of, discomfort with begin?
How long did it last for?
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PAGE 6
Agoraphobia without Panic Disorder
To meet criteriafor agoraphobia without panic disorder
must answer 'Yes' to both questions...
• So you've been afraid of... going out of the
house alone, being alone, being in a crowd, queuing up or
travelling on buses or trains ...
What were you afraid would happen?
o Do you avoid these situations?
If no, When you are in one of these situations, do you
feel very uncomfortable or like you might have a panic
attack
Do you need someone you know to be with you?
o Just before you begun having these fears, were
you taking any drugs, caffeine, diet pills, or other
medicine?
N.B. ONSET QUESTIONS
When did your fear of, discomfort with begin?
How long did it last for?




To meet criteriafor Social Phobia must answer 'Yes' to all
items...
• So you have been afraid or, have felt uncomfortable
speaking, eating or writing .... in front of other
people?
Tell me about it?
What were you afraid would happen when ?
o Do you always feel anxious when you are confronted
with ...phobic stimulus...?
o Did you think that you were more afraid of ...phobic
stimulus... than you should have been (or than made
sense)?
o Do you go out of your way to avoid ...phobic
stimulus...?
If no, How hard is it for you to ?
DISTRESS/IMPAIRMENT (must be judged significant)
o How much does having this fear interfere with your
life?
ALSO,
o How much has the fact that you have this fear bother
you?
o Just before you begun having these fears, were you
taking any drugs, caffeine, diet pills, or other medicine?
N.B. ONSET QUESTIONS
When did your fear of, discomfort with begin?
How long did it last for?




To meet criteriafor PTSD some aspects ofeach item must be answered
'Yes'
• So you've been extremely upset by the stroke by...
memories that keep coming back in nightmares, flashbacks or thoughts
that you can't get rid of ...
• Or, you get very upset when you are in a situation
that reminds you of having the stroke...
o ONE or more of the following specific ways that
this may have had an affect
Did you think about having your stroke when you didn't want to or did
thoughts about it come to you suddenly when you didn't want them to?
What about having dreams about having your stroke?
What about finding yourself acting or feeling as if you were back in the
situation?
What about getting very upset when something reminded you of having
the stroke?
What about having physical symptoms like breaking out in a sweat,
breathing heavily or irregularly, or your heart pounding or racing?
o THREE or more of the following avoidances
Have you made a special effort to avoid thinking about
or talking about what happened?
Do you try and avoid thinking about it, or having conversations about it.
Have you stayed away from things or people that reminded you of it?
Have you been unable to remember some important part of what
happened?
Have you been much less interested in doing things that used to be
important to you, like seeing friends, reading books, or watching T.V?
Have you felt distant or cut of from others?
Have you felt 'numb' or like you no longer have strong feelings about
anything or loving feelings for anyone?
Have you noticed a change in the way you think about or plan for the
future?
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o TWO of the following arousal items
Have you had trouble sleeping?
Have you been unusually irritable? What about outbursts of
anger?
Have you had trouble concentrating?
Have you been watchful or on guard even when there was no
reason to be?
Have you been jumpy or easily startled, like by sudden noises?
DISTRESS/IMPAIRMENT (must be judged significant)
o How much do these experiences interfere with your
life?
ALSO,
o How much does it bother you that you have these
experiences bother you?
N.B. ONSET QUESTIONS (Symptoms must have lasted
longer than one month)
When did your fear of, discomfort with begin?
How long did it last for?




To meet criteria for GAD, all items must be answered 'Yes'
• So you've been feeling particularly nervous or anxious over
the last six months?
o What do you worry about? (a number of
events or activities)
How much do you worry about ?
o During the last six months would you say that you've
been worrying more days than not?
o Do you find it hard to stop yourself worrying?
o THREE of following symptoms...
Thinking about those times over the last six months when
you've been really anxious...
Do you often feel physically restless - like you can't sit still?
Do you feel keyed up or on edge?
Do you often tire easily?
Do you have trouble concentrating or does your mind go blank?
Are you often irritable?
Are your muscles often tense?
Do you have trouble falling or staying asleep?
DISTRESS/IMPAIRMENT (must be judged significant)
o How much does it bother you that you worry so
much, find it hard to stop or get these symptoms?
o Just before you begun having these fears, were you
taking any drugs, caffeine, diet pills, or other
medicine?
N.B. ONSET QUESTIONS (Symptoms must have lasted
longer than one month)
When did your fear of, discomfort with begin?
How long did it last for?
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D.16: Hospital Anxiety Depression scale
Instructions: Doctors are aware that emotions play an important part in most illnesses. If your doctor
knows about these feelings he or she will be able to help you more. This questionnaire is designed to
help your doctor know how you feel. Read each item and place a firm tick in the box opposite the
reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling in the past week. Don't take too long over
your replies: your immediate reaction to each item will probably be more accurate than a long
thought-out response.
I feel tense or 'wound up':
Most of the time
A lot of the time
Time to time, occasionally
Not at all
I feel as if I am slowed down:
3 Nearly all of the time
2 Very often
1 Sometimes
0 Not at all
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:
Definitely as much 0
Not quite so much 1
Only a little 2
Not at all 3
I get a sort of frightened feeling like





I get a sort of frightened feeling like
something awful is about to happen:
Very definitely and quite badly
Yes, but not too badly
A little, but it doesn't worry me
Not at all
I have lost interest in my appearance:
3 Definitely
2 I don't take as much care as I should
1 I may not take quite as much care
0 I take just as much care as ever
I can laugh and see the funny side of I feel restless as if I have to be on the
things: move:
As much as I always could 0 Very much indeed
Not quite so much now 1 Quite a lot
Definitely not so much now 2 Not very much
Not at all 3 Not at all
Worrying thoughts go through my mind:
A great deal of the time
A lot of the time
From time to time but not too often
Only occasionally
I look forward with enjoyment to
things:
3 A much as I every did
2 Rather less than I used to
1 Definitely less than I used to
0 Hardly at all
I feel cheerful: I get sudden feelings of panic:
Not at all 3 Very often indeed
Not often 2 Quite often
Sometimes
Most of the time
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D.17: Life Events
Have any of the following events or problems happened to you during the last 6
months? Please tick the box corresponding to the month in which any event
happened or began.
Use cues such as before Christmas or after Easter
Months (label as appropriate)
You yourself suffered a serious illness,
injury or an assault.
A serious illness, injury or assault happened
to a close relative
Your parent, child or spouse died
A close family friend or another relative
(aunt, cousin, grandparent) died.
You had a separation due to marital
difficulties.
You broke off a steady relationship.
You had a serious problem with a close
friend, neighbour or relative.
You became unemployed or you were
seeking work unsuccessfully for more than
one month.
You were sacked from your job.
You had a major financial crisis.
You had problems with the police and a
court appearance.
Something you valued was lost or stolen.
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D.18: Social support
People sometimes look to others for companionship, assistance, or other types of
support. How often is each of the following kinds of support available to you if you
need it?
Please let me know how often each type of support is available to you
None A Some Most All
of the little of the of the of the
time of the time time time
time
1. Someone to help you if you were confined to 0 12 3 4
bed
2. Someone you can count on to listen to you 0 12 3 4
when you need to talk
3. Someone to give you good advice about a crisis. 0 12 3 4
4. Someone to take you to the doctor if you 0 12 3 4
needed it.
5. Someone who shows you love and affection. 0 12 3 4
6. Someone to have a good time with. 0 12 3 4
7. Someone to give you information to help you 0 12 3 4
understand a situation.
8. Someone to confide in or talk to about yourself 0 12 3 4
or your problems
9. Someone who hugs you. 0 12 3 4
10. Someone to get together with for relaxation. 0 12 3 4
11. Someone to prepare your meals if you were 0 12 3 4
unable to do it yourself.
12. Someone whose advice you really want. 0 12 3 4
13. Someone to do things with to help you get 0 12 3 4
your mind off things.
14. Someone to help with daily chores if you were 0 12 3 4
sick.
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None A Some Most All
of the little of the of the of the
time of the time time time
time
15. Someone to share your most private worries 0 12 3 4
and fears with.
16. Someone to turn to for suggestions about how 0 12 3 4
to deal with a personal problem.
17. Someone to do something enjoyable with. 0 12 3 4
18. Someone who understands your problems. 0 12 3 4
19. Someone to love and make you feel wanted. 0 12 3 4
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D.19: Acceptance of disability
Now I'd like to read some statements about whether having had a stroke has changed
the way you think about life. I'll read them as if I'm you. Please would you tell me
how much you agree or disagree with the statements as we did before
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
1. I have had a hard time adjusting to the
limitations of my stroke.
4 3 2 1 0
2. Because of the effects of my stroke, I miss the
things I like to do most.
4 3 2 1 0
3. The effects of my stroke make me feel useless
at times.
4 3 2 1 0
4. The effects of my stroke make me more
dependent on others than I want to be.
4 3 2 1 0
5. The effects of my stroke make me a burden on
my family and friends.
4 3 2 1 0
6. The effects of my stroke make me feel
inadequate.
4 3 2 1 0
7. I will never be self-sufficient enough to make
me happy.
4 3 2 1 0
8. I think people are often uncomfortable being
around me because of the effects of my stroke
4 3 2 1 0
D.20: Shame
These next statements are about how you think other people see you now
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
1. Since my stroke, I think others sometimes see me
as inadequate as a person.
0 1 2 3 4
2. Since my stroke, I sometimes feel that others see
me as not measuring up to them.
0 1 2 3 4
3. Since my stroke, I get embarrassed that others
must think I've lost control over my feelings.
0 1 2 3 4




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
4. Since my stroke I sometimes feel useless because
others have to make allowances for me.
0 1 2 3 4
5. Since my stroke, the way others fuss about me
sometimes gets irritating.
0 1 2 3 4
6. Since my stroke, I sometimes get embarrassed
about the way I must appear to others.
0 1 2 3 4
7. Since my stroke, I sometimes get upset because
others treat me as if I'm less intelligent.
0 1 2 3 4
8. Since my stroke, I find it comforting that others
are protective towards me.
4 3 2 1 0
9. Since my stroke, I've found it nice that others
make allowances for me.
4 3 2 I 0
10. Since my stroke, people have acted as if I'm
just as intelligent as I was before.
4 3 2 1 0
D.21: Negative identity change
Now I would like to ask you about the way you would describe yourself before you
had your stroke as compared to now. So I'm going use to use a list of adjectives and




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
la. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
bored.
4 3 2 1 0
lb. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as bored.
4 3 2 1 0
2a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
unhappy.
4 3 2 1 0
2b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as unhappy.
4 3 2 1 0




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
3a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as in
control.
0 1 2 3 4
3b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as in control.
0 1 2 3 4
4a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
worried.
4 3 2 1 0
4b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as worried.
4 3 2 1 0
5a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
dissatisfied.
4 3 2 1 0
5b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as dissatisfied.
4 3 2 1 0
6a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
attractive.
0 3 2 1 0
6b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as attractive.
0 3 2 1 0
7a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
hopeful.
0 3 2 1 0
7b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as hopeful.
0 3 2 1 0
8a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
confident.
0 1 2 3 4
8b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as confident.
0 1 2 3 4
9a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
stable.
0 1 2 3 4
9b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as stable.
0 1 2 3 4
10a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
worthless.
4 3 2 1 0




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
10b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as worthless.
4 3 2 1 0
11a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
aggressive.
4 3 2 1 0
1 lb. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as aggressive.
4 3 2 1 0
12a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
irritable.
4 3 2 1 0
12b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as irritable.
4 3 2 1 0
13a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
caring.
0 1 2 3 4
13b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as caring.
0 1 2 3 4
14a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
independent.
0 1 2 3 4
14b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as independent.
0 1 2 3 4
15a. Before my stroke, I would describe myself as
capable.
0 1 2 3 4
15b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as capable.
0 1 2 3 4
16a. Before I had my stroke, I would describe
myself as active.
0 1 2 3 4
16b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as active.
0 1 2 3 4
17a. Before I had my stroke, I would describe
myself as co-operative.
0 1 2 3 4
17b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as co-operative.
0 1 2 3 4




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
18a. Before I had my stroke, I would describe
myself as withdrawn.
4 3 2 1 0
18b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as withdrawn.
4 3 2 1 0
19a. Before I had my stroke, I would describe
myself as friendly.
0 1 2 3 4
19b. Now I have had my stroke, I would describe
myself as friendly
0 1 2 3 4
20a. Before I had my stroke, I would describe
myself as patient.
0 1 2 3 4
20a. Before I had my stroke, I would describe
myself as patient.
0 1 2 3 4
D.22: Qualitative 'important areas' questions
Finally I'd like to ask for your own opinion one last time I'm interested in the things
or areas of your life before the stroke that were most important to you?
(Probe) Sometimes the most important things people mention are the things they
care about most, sometimes they mention what they enjoy most or what they are
most proud of....
Which is the most important to you?/ Which is the least important of the three?
For each important thing/area:
Has your role as /your enjoyment of /your relationship with
changed since the stroke? How? Can you tell me about that?
How do you feel now knowing that is limited/can't do ?
What does that do?/ What goes through your mind when you think about ?
Summarise what participant has said, check accuracy, emphasise something positive
or how helpful it has been to hear about problems
Final check whether would like to ask questions and thank for participation
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D.23: Example response cue sheet (used for acceptance of disability)
These statements are about the way you think having had a stroke has
changed your life...
1. I have had a hard time adjusting to the limitations of my stroke.
2. Because of the effects of my stroke, I miss the things I like to do
most.
3. The effects of my stroke make me feel useless at times.
4. The effects of my stroke make me more dependent on others than I
want to be.
5. The effects of my stroke make me a burden on my family and
friends.
6. The effects of my stroke make me feel inadequate.
7. I will never be self-sufficient enough to make me happy.
8. I think people are often uncomfortable being around me because of
the effects of my stroke.
Strongly Strongly
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
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El: Histograms of background variables at baseline
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E2: Histograms of belief variables at baseline
Baseline: Causal controllability
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E4: Histograms of belief variables at follow-up
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Follow-up: Recovery locus of control
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E5: Scatter-plots of distress by background variables at baseline
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E6: Scatter-plots of distress by belief variables at baseline
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E7: Scatter-plots of distress by background variables at follow-up
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E10: Scatter-plots of follow-up distress by baseline belief variables
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F.l: The difference between 'stroke' and 'its' effects'
Participants were asked to report their understanding of the terms 'stroke' and 'its'
effects' to further investigate the importance of this distinction for theory
development and questionnaire design in stroke. As expected from piloting this
distinction was confirmed. The following more detailed report is provided for
readers intrinsically interested in the way participants used these terms and the
issues they raised.
F.li: 'Stroke'
When first asked to describe 'stroke' at baseline participants sometimes said they
were not sure or they described symptoms experienced at onset, or, gave contextual
information surrounding the event of their stroke. A few participants' descriptions
were emotive, for example 'frightening'. A seventy-seven year old female
participants' account illustrates elements of symptoms, context and fear for the
future:
'Dounnae ken, I've no idea, you just go useless. It came on awful sudden in the
toilet. I just hope I don't get anymore'
Even, with prompting to describe what they thought was going on inside, eleven
participants (11/ 89; 12%) did not.
However the majority of participants (77/ 89: 87%) gave a medical definition of
'stroke', usually with reference to the brain. The accuracy of accounts varied. Over
half of participants (48/ 89; 54%) gave a fairly clean-cut accurate medical definition
of a stroke, for example, a ninety-year old male participant said:
'It's a stoppage of blood to the brain which causes paralysis in certain regions'
Other participants (33/89; 33%) tended to define their stroke medically but with less
confidence or accuracy, for example, a seventy-four year old man said:
'I haven't the foggiest... It must be something to do with the brain. It's been
explained it's like a motorway, the right of the brain controls the left. Actually to be
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honest I'm not sure if the left controls the right but I know the left side of the body is
affected.'
When I interviewed participants at follow-up I had a transcript of their descriptions
of stroke at baseline with me. I found that I recorded very little further information
at follow-up as their explanations were nearly always the same. However, while the
proportion of participants offering a clear accurate medical description of stroke was
similar (43/ 81; 53%) a slightly lower proportion offered a 'patchy' medical account
(21/ 81; 26%) and the proportion of people who were unable to describe what had
gone on inside was higher (17/ 89; 21%).
It is possible that participants in this study tended to have more medical knowledge
of stroke than is typical. They were cared for in a University specialist stroke unit
and the approximately two thirds were interviewed for a clinical registrars' project
regarding diagnosis of stroke. They may well have been provided with more
information than other patients treated elsewhere.
F.lii: 'The effects ofstroke'
At baseline, six participants (6/ 89; 7%) reported they no longer felt they had any
real effects of their stroke remaining. Other participants described effects that could
be broadly classified into as physical, memory, visual or emotional.
Most participants (74/ 89; 83%) reported at least one physical effect of stroke.
Paralysis or weakness of limbs, or functional effects, for example difficulty walking,
dressing and eating, were mentioned often. General tiredness or finding one tired
more easily was mentioned fairly often, and this may have an emotional element as
well as a physical one. Problems with weaker speech or bladder control were both
mentioned by three participants respectively. Other disabling physical effects such
as hearing loss, pain, swallowing difficulty and breathlessness were mentioned once
or twice.
About a third of participants reported memory problems (30/ 89; 34%). Most
commonly participants reported that they were more forgetful or found their
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everyday memory less 'sharp' or 'clear'. Problems with finding words or with
concentration were mentioned fairly often and one participant reported finding it
harder to make decisions. Memory problems were not emphasised in the standard
disability measures used in the main study. However, the finding that they were
often spontaneously mentioned suggests that they were issues that participants
themselves considered important.
Quite a few participants (12/ 89; 14%) reported visual problems or related functional
consequences such as reading or walking outside. Most commonly these
participants reported difficulty seeing to one side. Other visual problems included
less clear vision, seeing double, judging distance, sense of direction and seeing 2D.
Similarly to memory problems, visual difficulties following stroke are rarely
emphasised as stroke outcomes in the literature. However, the finding that they
were often spontaneously mentioned suggests that they were issues that participants
themselves considered important.
A quarter of participants (22/ 89; 25%) reported emotional effects. Participants most
often described a loss of 'confidence' of varying degrees from 'a bit' to feeling
'overwhelmed'. They often mentioned being unconfident to go out and about. A
few participants reported a loss of control over their emotions, for example being
weepy or having mood swings. A few reported frustration regarding their situation
and a few worry or concern for the future. One participant actually reported a
positive emotional effect of pride in having coped. The spontaneous reporting of
emotional problems supports the contention that these are important issues to many
patients following stroke. Also the common use of the term Tack of confidence'
suggests that this would be a meaningful term to use when discussing emotional
issues with stroke patients.
Compared to baseline, at follow-up, a higher number of participants reported they
felt they no longer experienced any effects of stroke (11/81; 14%). However,
similar proportions of participants reported physical effects (66/ 81; 82%) and visual
problems (12/81; 15%) as had at baseline. Memory difficulties were now
spontaneously reported as 'effects of stroke' less often (16/81; 20%) as were
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emotional effects (16/81; 20%). The content of participants' descriptions of effects
were similar at follow-up.
F.2: Additional information for causal attributions and causal controllability
As discussed previously (please see Chapter 6, section 6.6i) causal attributions are
not always spontaneously reported with ease during piloting. This was similar
during the main data collection, for example, when first asked about causes at
baseline, about one in five participants (20/ 89; 22%) started off by saying they had
'no idea'. Some participants (15/ 89; 17%) commented that they felt they should not
have had a stroke because they were too healthy and a few (7/ 89; 8%) that they
were surprised because they too happy, or not stressed. However, once the checklist
was used, the majority of participants (84/ 89; 94%) did make at least one causal
attribution.
To be able to estimate causal controllability, participants were asked to report all
their causal attributions, their perceptions of control over each, and to rate them in
order from 'most' to 'least' responsible for their stroke. The mean number of causes
reported at baseline was 2.46 (SD=.91) with a median of three and range from 0-5.
Similar results were found at follow-up: on average 2.68 (SD=.79) causes were
reported, and the median and range was the same.
Causes reported by participants were collapsed into fifteen types, in four groups,
based on divisions related to objective modifiability discussed in Chapter 2, section
2.2iii. Participants were about twice as likely to report a modifiable medical risk
factor (65 at baseline and follow-up) than unmodifiable medical, behavioural or
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psycho-social risk factors (between 29 and 38 at baseline and between 35 and 38 at
follow-up).
Given that ratings could range from 0-4, with 2 being the midpoint, participants'
concurred with established opinion in that un-modifiable medical risk factors (old
age and family history) were rated as particularly difficult to control (Mean=.44
(SD=.74)baseiine and Mean=.50 (SD=.74)f0ii0w-up)- It was typically moderate for
modifiable medical risk factors (Mean=.1.98 (SD=.92)baSeiine and Mean=2.19
(SD=.93)foii0w-up) and just below moderate for behavioural risk factors (Mean=1.60
(SD=1.17)baseiine and Mean=1.82 (SD=1.17)f0iiow-up)- Participants diverged from the
established opinion by reporting psycho-social risk factors and they tended to report
believing this to be just less than moderately controllable (Mean=1.69
(SD=.97)baseiine and Mean= 1.86 (SD=1.05)fOiiOw-up)- So the general picture for
perceived controllability is negative overall, with little variation between the types
of risk factors.
Most interesting differences were found by looking at individual risk factors and
correspondent causal controllability. Frequency with which specific causes were
reported, relative frequency with which each was rated as being the 'most'
responsible cause for stroke and specific rates of controllability are reported in Table
F.l for baseline and in Table F.2 for follow-up.
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Table F.l: Frequency with which risk factors were reported at baseline, relative frequency of
'Most responsible' ratings and average controllability scores for each type of risk factor




(Possible range of 0 -4)
Number Percent Number Percent Mean SD
Unmodifiable Medical risk
factors
Old age 18 20% 7 39% .17 .38
Family History 13 15% 1 8% .77 .93
Modifiable Medical risk
factors
High blood pressure 39 44% 18 46% 2.18 .82
Other illness 4 21 24% 8 38% 1.48 .98
Medical treatment5 15 17% 6 40% 1.47 1.19
Cholesterol 10 11% 1 10% 2.00 .94
Diabetes 6 7% 1 17% 2.50 .55
Behavioural risk factors
Smoking 23 26% 14 61% 1.35 1.27
Under exercise 8 9% 2 25% 1.56 .93
Overweight 7 8% 4 57% 1.86 1.34
Reckless lifestyle in youth 6 5 6% 1 20% 2.40 .55
Psycho-social riskfactors
Depressing experience 7 15 17% 9 60% 1.53 .92
Worry8 11 12% 6 55% 1.15 .60
Overdoing it9 11 12% 3 27% 2.36 .81
Hard life 10 5 6% 2 40% 1.40 1.52
Frequency percentages were based on the total sample (N = 89)
2 Frequency ratings of 'Most responsible' were calculated using the number of participants who reported the appropriate risk
factor
3
Controllability mean scores were calculated using the number of participants who reported the appropriate risk factor
4 Other illness' consisted of heart disease, heart attacks, prior strokes and migraine
5 Medical treatment' consisted of general anaesthetic, angina medication, deep vein thrombosis medication, warfarin, the
contraceptive pill and a change in tablets
6 A few participants clearly stated that they had lived healthy lifestyles just prior to the stroke but held smoking and heavy
drinking in their youth and middle age as a cause of their present stroke
7
Participants who reported bereavement, sadness or depression, may have used the 'stress' response on the checklist, but I
felt their open-ended responses were better captured by 'Depressing experience'
8 Checklist responses of'Tension', 'Anxiety' and 'Worry' were collapsed into "Worry'
9 A few participants used the 'Overwork' response, but those not in employment sometimes used the checklist 'Stress' or
'Over-involvement' response, so these were collapsed into 'Overdoing it' which I felt better reflected their open-ended
responses
10 A few participants clearly stated that they held difficulties long in the past, such as a difficult childhood or marriage to be a
cause of their present stroke
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On the positive side, at baseline and follow-up, high blood pressure was the most
frequently recognised risk factor. Approximately half of participants understood
that high blood pressure was a risk factor and tended to rate this as moderately
controllable. Also a few extra participants reported cholesterol as a risk factor by
follow-up and a higher controllability rating was found. Also, although ratings for
depressing experiences and worry tended to be on the difficult side, participants
often felt that overdoing it was something that they could more easily control.
Smoking was the second most frequently cited risk factor. Most participants who
recognised that smoking was a risk rated it as most responsible at both points in
time. Depressing experience and worry were also often reported as most
responsible. After, unmodifiable medical risk factors, smoking and worry at
baseline, and smoking and depressing experience at follow-up were the risk factors
rated as least controllable. These results do not concur with established opinion
(please see section 2.2iii). However they parallel the qualitative interview findings
in which some of the most anxious and depressed participants reported concern
about smoking, and difficulties with support for cessation (please see Chapter 16,
section 16.4iv).
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Table F.2: Frequency with which risk factors were reported at follow-up, relative frequency of
'Most responsible' ratings and average controllability scores for each type of risk factor
Frequency 1 Relative frequency of Controllability scores 3
'Most responsible' (Possible range of 0 -4)
ratings2
Number Percent Number Percent Mean SD
Unmodifiable Medical risk
factors
Old age 23 28% 7 32% .39 .78
Family History 15 16% 4 27% .60 .63
Modifiable Medical risk
factors
High blood pressure 42 52% 20 48% 2.29 .83
Other illness 4 17 21% 8 47% 1.88 .93
Medical treatment5 9 11% 4 40% 2.11 1.36
Cholesterol 15 19% 2 13% 2.27 .88
Diabetes 9 11% 0 - 2.44 1.13
Behavioural risk factors
Smoking 21 26% 13 62% 1.48 1.17
Under exercise 7 8% 1 14% 2.00 1.15
Overweight 10 12% 3 30% 1.90 1.29
Reckless lifestyle in youth 5 3 4% 2 67% 2.67 1.15
Psycho-social riskfactors
Depressing experience 7 8 10% 4 50% 1.00 .93
Worry 8 14 17% 4 29% 1.57 .64
Overdoing it9 15 19% 7 47% 2.73 .59
Hard life 10 6 7% 0 - 1.50 1.22
Frequency percentages were based on the total sample (N = 89)
2
Frequency ratings of 'Most responsible' were calculated using the number of participants who reported the appropriate risk
factor
3
Controllability mean scores were calculated using the number of participants who reported the appropriate risk factor
4 Other illness' consisted of heart disease, heart attacks, prior strokes and migraine
5 Medical treatment' consisted of general anaesthetic, angina medication, deep vein thrombosis medication, warfarin, the
contraceptive pill and a change in tablets
6 A few participants clearly stated that they had lived healthy lifestyles just prior to the stroke but held smoking and heavy
drinking in their youth and middle age as a cause of their present stroke
7
Participants who reported bereavement, sadness or depression, may have used the 'stress' response on the checklist, but I
felt their open-ended responses were better captured by 'Depressing experience'
8 Checklist responses of'Tension', 'Anxiety' and 'Worry' were collapsed into "Worry'
9 A few participants used the 'Overwork' response, but those not in employment sometimes used the checklist 'Stress' or
'Over-involvement' response, so these were collapsed into 'Overdoing it' which I felt better reflected their open-ended
responses
10 A few participants clearly stated that they held difficulties long in the past, such as a difficult childhood or marriage to be a
cause of their present stroke
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Table F.3: Demographic and cognitive ability data for the eighty-one
participants at follow-up





Female 1 34 (42%)
Age
Age in years2 72.87 (11.32) 72 32 - 91
^ 52 years 1 5 (6%)
51-62 years1 8 (12%)
61-72 years1 25(31%)
71-82 years1 31 (38%)
81-92 years1 12 (15%)
>85 years 1 5 (6%)
'Younger' participants < 65 years 1 21 (25%)
'Older' participants > 65 years 1 62 (75%)
Social economic status
Carstairs index scores 3.57 (1.59)
Deprivation category 1 or 2 1
Deprivation category 3 or 4 or 5 1







Owns home 1 54 (67%)
Living situation
Living alone 1 32 (37%)
Living with spouse 1 42 (52%)
Living with son, daughter or sibling 1 9 (13%)
Cognitive status
Hodkinson scores 9.53 (.65)
' Number and percentage of participants 2 Mean and standard deviation of scores
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Table F.4: Demographic and disability status, emotional disorders and
symptoms for participants in the qualitative analysis and the total sample
Participants in the Total sample of
qualitative analysis participants (N = 89)
(N = 60)
Gender 1 27 females (45%) 36 females (40%)
Age in years 2 70.97 (10.01) 70.13 (11.29)
Carstairs (1991) deprivation
category scores 2
3.49 (1.58) 3.59 (1.54)
Previous history of stroke 15 (25%) 20 (23%)
Barthel scores 18.17 (2.55) 18.27 (2.83)
SCID diagnosis of depression1 21 (35%) 29 (33%)
SCID diagnosis of Major
depression 1
12 (20%) 14 (16%)
SCID diagnosis of Minor
depression 1
9 (15%) 15 (17%)
SCID diagnosis of an anxiety
disorder 1
22 (37%) 31 (35%)
SCID diagnosis of
Generalised anxiety disorder 1
7 (12%) 12 (14%)
SCID diagnosis of
Agoraphobia 1
12 (20%) 19 (21%)
SCID diagnosis of Social
Phobia 1
7 (12%) 10 (11%)
HADS total scores 2 9.08 (6.35) 9.13 (6.16)
HADS depression scores 2 4.53 (3.19) 4.54 (3.60)
HADS anxiety scores 2 4.52 (3.19) 4.57 (3.18)
1 Number and percentage of participants 2 Mean and standard deviation of scores
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F.4: Dichotomising participants into groups of 'higher' and 'lower' levels of
disability
I wanted to be able to split participants into groups of higher and lower levels of
disability for the purpose of exploratory non-parametric comparisons between those
with and without diagnoses of emotional disorder. Ideally I wanted to be able to
avoid making all these comparisons twice with groups based on both a Barthel index
and a Nottingham index cut-off. I considered combining both measures and using
the median score as a cut-off, however I was advised against this as the resultant
distribution was bimodal (Graham, 2002; personal communication). Therefore the
distributions of both were examined simultaneously for a single cut-off point that
represented a good compromise between the information they provided.












Nottingham extended ADL index
20 25
As shown in Figure F.l, at baseline the Nottingham index median score of fifteen
was less than ideal as a cut-off as it clumped a group of participants with full Barthel
scores in with those with low Barthel scores. The Barthel median score of twenty
was considered less than ideal as a cut-off as it clumped some participants with high
Nottingham scores and fairly high Barthel scores in with those who had both low
Nottingham and Barthel scores.
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As can be seen, a cut-off point of 10 on the Nottingham index seemed to produce a
fairly good compromise for this baseline data. All participants who scored above
this cut-off on the Nottingham index also scored highly on the Barthel index.
Whereas participants who scored less than this on the Nottingham index tended to
achieve less than average scores on the Barthel index. Using this cut-off point, fifty-
six participants (63%) were classed as having 'lower' levels of disability and thirty-
three participants (37%) were classed as having 'higher' levels of disability.
F.2: Scatterplot of disability indices at follow-
Barthel index median = 20
10 15
Nottingham extended ADL index
As can be seen in Figure F.2, at follow-up, both Barthel and Nottingham median
scores were again unsuitable as cut-off points for categorisation of 'lower' and
'higher' disability levels for the same reasons as before. A score of ten on the
Nottingham index again appeared to provide a reasonable cut-off point. This
categorised participants into those with high Barthel and moderate to high
Nottingham scores ('lower' disability) and into those with variable Barthel scores
and relatively lower Nottingham scores ('higher' disability).
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Therefore participants were divided into groups of higher and lower levels of
disability using a cut-off of ten on the Nottingham index for the purpose of
exploratory non-parametric comparisons between those with and without diagnoses
of emotional disorder in Chapter 9.
F.5: Description of fear of falling
At baseline the mean fear of falling score was 6.92 (SD = 2.89, Median = 7, Range
= 0-13). Given a mid-point of eight out of sixteen, these statistics indicate that
participants tended not to be highly afraid of falling. However, over a quarter of
participants scores (25/ 89; 28%) were between nine and thirteen indicating above
moderate to high fear. Very few participants gave very low scores, suggesting that
most participants could not be regarded as lacking any fear.
Sometimes participants made 'Where?' type queries regarding item 1, because
apparently, a fall outside would be more likely to set confidence levels back.
Likewise, item 3, led to 'How bad?' type queries because a 'serious' fall,
particularly one involving an injury, would be more likely to affect recovery. These
comments cast some doubt on the interpretation of these items amongst participants
and suggest ways of making improvements to the validity and hopefully the
reliability of the measure in future. Nevertheless, the internal reliability of this
measure at baseline was high (a = .79). Factor analysis produced a solution ofjust
one factor that accounted for 61% of the variance in scores, and loadings between
.63 and .86 for each item.
Participants were also asked to report on actual experiences of falls and just over a
third (31/ 89; 35%) indicated they had fallen. Some participants described the
experience as frightening and something that had caused a lack of confidence. Often
they said they had felt foolish or embarrassed by the fall, and a couple described
feeling angry at finding themselves helpless. Not being properly dressed, needing
help to rise, or the idea of falling outside were often talked about as particularly
embarrassing.
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However, some participants seemed to discount their fall by blaming it on something
easily avoidable (lush grass, a bad pavement, wine or being too 'pig-headed' to
accept a wheelchair). Others reported they had simply learnt to be more careful. For
one man, the manner his nurse dealt with the situation suggests a relationship
between being able to rise and confidence:
'I turned around quickly to catch the nurse's attention and fell on the bed. The nurse
made me get up myself, which was good. She just told me what to do and so gave
me my confidence back'
Also some participants who hadn't fallen, still reported the fear that they may.
Often these participants reported having been frightened by a stumble, or a near
miss. A couple of participants who were still in hospital reported feeling dependent
on the staff for confidence and that they would be devastated if they ever did fall.
Participants at home reported a similar pre-empting of a confidence loss, for
example a sixty-year old man said:
'If I fell I think I'd be going backwards not forwards with confidence'
Overall, slightly higher mean fears of falling scores were found for participants who
had experienced a fall (Mean = 7.48, SD = 2.92) than for those who had not (Mean =
6.62, SD = 2.86). However, this difference was not found to be significant, t = -
1.35, p<.10.
Descriptive statistics for fears of falling at follow-up were very similar to baseline:
Mean = 6.52 (SD = 2.79) Median = 6, Range = 4-14, and the slight decrease in the
mean score across time was not significant, t = 1.11, n.s. However, in contrast to
baseline, the distribution of scores was now slightly positively skewed, suggesting a
tendency to the lower end of the spectrum. In line with this shift, scores above the
mid point were only found for eleven participants (11/81; 14%) equally half the
proportion found at baseline.
The proportion of participants (34/ 81; 44%) who reported that they had experienced
a fall was higher now than it had been at baseline (31/ 89; 35%). However, only just
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over half of participants who reported a fall at baseline (18/ 34; 53%) also reported a
fall at follow-up. This suggests that some participants no longer remembered having
a fall or now discounted them. In itself this lack of consistency in reporting across
time suggests that the actual experience of a fall may not always result in fear
development. A comparison between participants who said they had fallen at
follow-up (Mean = 6.62, SD = 2.72) and those who did not (Mean = 6.45, SD =
2.72) found no significant difference in scores, t = -.27, n.s.
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G.3: Spearman correlations between independent variables and distress
G.3i: Spearman correlations between baseline variables and baseline distress
As can be seen, these non-parametric results for the belief variables were extremely
similar, in terms of the size and significance of correlations to those obtained using
Pearson correlations (Chapter 13, section 11.3i, Table 11.1).
Table G.3: Univariate correlations between baseline belief variables and
distress relating to specific hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 using Spearman correlations
(N = 89)
Distress (Global HADs p value
scores)
Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Causal controllability -.27 .012*
'Why me?' .17 .117
'Found meaning?' -.24 .024*
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative
selfevaluations
Acceptance of disability -.62 .0001***
Identity change .61 .0001***
**Shame .31 .003
Hypotheses 3: Beliefs in recovery and
recurrence
Recovery locus of control -.22 .037*
Confidence in recovery -.41 .0001***
Recurrence fear .51 .0001***
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Table G.4: Univariate correlations between baseline background variables and
distress and using Spearman correlations (N = 89 unless indicated otherwise)
Distress (Global HADs p value
scores)
Demographic data
Age (in years) .03 ..812
Gender .23 .028*
Deprivation: Carstairs index .003 .981
Other background variables
Stroke severity 1 .13 .239
Disability: Barthel index -.30 .032*
Disability: Nottingham index -.38 .006**
Social support -.12 .253
Life events .14 .030*
Pre-stroke history of depression .29 .005**
1 Stroke severity data was missing for four participants; therefore this whole analysis is based on
eighty-five rather than eighty-nine participants
As seen in Table G.4, the pattern of results for the background variables using
Spearman's Rho was generally similar to those found using Pearson correlation
(Chapter 11, section 11.3ii, Table 11.3). However, a drop in the size and
significance of the association between a pre-stroke history of depression and
distress was seen. The trend towards statistical significance for an association
between stroke severity scores and distress was lost. Also a statistically significant,
if low, association with Barthel index disability was found with the non-parametric
method.
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G.3U: Spearman correlations between follow-up variables andfollow-up distress
Table G.5: Associations between follow-up belief variables and distress relating





Specific hypothesis 1: Negative attributions
Causal controllability -.37 .001***
'Why me?' .25 .024*
'Found meaning?' -.06 .580
Specific hypothesis 2: Negative
self-evaluations
Acceptance of disability -.74 .0001***
Negative identity change .78 .0001***
Shame .58 .0001***
Hypotheses 3: Negative beliefs in recovery
and recurrence
Recovery locus of control 1





1 Eleven participants believed they had now fully recovered. They could not be assessed for locus of control so this
correlation was based on just seventy participants. They were scored as fully confident in recovery and included in this
correlation calculation.
These non-parametric results were extremely similar, in terms of the size and
significance of correlations to those obtained with the Pearson method (Chapter 13,
Table 13.1). However, the association between recovery locus of control and
distress did begin to approach a statistically significant level using Spearman's (rho
= .23, p = .058).
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Table G.6: Associations between follow-up background variables and distress
using Spearman correlations (N = 81, unless indicated otherwise)
Distress (Global HADs p value
scores)
Demographic data
Age (in years) -.03 .780
Gender .27 .017*
Deprivation: Carstairs index -.01 .933
Other background variables
Stroke severity 1 .15 .190
Disability: Barthel index -.23 .041*
Disability: Nottingham index -.30 .008**
Social support -.13 .249
Life events -.07 .564
Pre-stroke history of depression .36 .001***
1
Stroke severity scores were missing for three of the participants seen at follow-up, and so this
correlation was based on just seventy-eight participants
As seen in Table G.6, the pattern of results for the background variables using
Spearman's Rho was generally similar to those found using Pearson correlation
(Chapter 13, section 13.3ii, Table 13.3) However, a smaller and statistically non¬
significant correlation between stroke severity and distress was found. Conversely,
a larger and statistically significant correlation between basic disability measured by
the Barthel index and distress was found with this non-parametric method.
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G.3iii Spearman correlations between baseline variables andfollow-up distress
Table G.7: Associations between baseline belief variables and follow-up distress
relating to specific hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 using Spearman correlations (N = 81)
Distress (Global HADs p value
scores)









Specific hypothesis 3: Negative beliefs in
recovery and recurrence
Recovery locus of control -.08 .467
Confidence in recovery -.38 .001***
Recurrence fear .34 .002**
As can shown in Table G.7, results for baseline beliefs and follow-up distress found
with the non-parametric method were extremely similar in terms of size and
significance as results found with Pearson correlations (please see Chapter 14, Table
14.1). However, a slightly larger and more statistically significant correlation
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As seen in Table G.8, a statistically significant association between stroke severity
and distress was not found with the non-parametric method whereas, a statistically
significant association for the Nottingham index was. These results are the reverse
of findings with the Pearson correlation method (please see Chapter 14, Table 14.3)
Correlations of very similar size and significance were found for the other variables
using Spearman's Rho.
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Table G.8: Associations between baseline background variables and follow-up





Age (in years) -.03 .780
Gender .27 .017*
Deprivation: Carstairs index .01 .933
Other background variables
Stroke severity 1 .15 .190
Disability: Barthel index -.16 .148
Disability: Nottingham index -.24 .032*
Social support -.13 .249
Life events .17 .120
Pre-stroke history of depression .36 .001***
Stroke severity scores were only available for seventy-eight participants seen at follow-up
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G.4: Comparison between HADs scores and SCID diagnostic categories
G.4: Supplementary purpose ofthe SCID and comparison between HADs scores
and SCID categories
The relationship between categorical diagnoses of emotional disorder SCID
categories) and the continuous measure of distress (HADs scores) was considered a
useful supplement to this study. The main study investigated relationships between
continuous measures of beliefs and the HADs continuous measure of distress.
However, the structured clinical interview study involved the exploration of beliefs
within diagnostic categories of emotional disorder, and the qualitative study
compared patients' own reported concerns on the basis of having being found to
have depression or GAD according to the SCID. Therefore study of concurrent
validity between HADs scores and SCID diagnostic categories provides a useful link
between the three studies, and informs the validity of comparisons between results
across the different sets of data.
In addition, the HADs is often used as a screening tool in clinical practice and other
academics and clinicians had expressed interest in comparison between the HADs
and SCID at presentations during my studentship.
In stroke, there are certain issues that have been suggested as possible confounders
in the assessment of depression. Expert opinion generally suggests that
emotionalism or aprosody should not bias self-report but may lead to over-
estimations by the observed method (Spencer et al., 1997). However, Gordon et al
(1997) suggest aprosody could lead to an underestimation if regarded as
nonchalance or indifference. As discussed (please see Chapter 1, section 1.4;
Chapter 18, section 18.4) some experts suggest that some stroke patients may deny
or be unaware of their emotional state, and this may lead to under-estimation in self-
report assessment (Spencer et ah, 1997).
The structured interview method may overcome issues of awareness/denial better
than self-report questionnaires. Kishi et al (1996) used observed as well as
acknowledged low mood to assess depression, one in five considered to have major
and one in four considered to have minor depression denied low mood. Ten of
eighty-five stroke patients who denied low mood could still be diagnosed as
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depressed using a standard clinical interview for DSMIII (Fedoroff et al., 1991).
The authors concluded that denial was rare and partial as symptoms such as
worthlessness were more readily acknowledged. By conducting the SCID and using
the FIADs I could develop my own ideas regarding this issue of emotional
awareness.
G.4U: Comparison between HADs scores and SCID diagnostic categories at
baseline
Mean HADs depression scores were related to SCID diagnoses of depression in a
'dose-dependent' theoretically meaningful fashion, please see Table G9. A similar
pattern of results were also found for mean anxiety and distress scores. A
MANOVA analysis of HADs scores by depression diagnoses produced statistically
significant main effects:
HADs depression by SCID depression diagnoses: F(86, 2) = 66.03, p<.0001
HADs anxiety by SCID depression diagnoses: F(86, 2) = 28.13, p<.0001
HADs distress by SCID depression diagnoses: F(86, 2) = 66.15, p<.0001
Post hoc Tukey testing found all pair-wise comparisons to be highly significant. So
overall a good correspondence between categorical diagnoses of depression and. the
continuous measure was found.
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As shown in Table G9, mean HADs scores amongst participants with GAD were
relatively high. Mean HADs anxiety, depression and distress scores were all found
to be statistically higher amongst participants diagnosed with GAD using
MANOVA:
HADs depression by SCID diagnosis of GAD: F(87, 1) = 66.03, p<.0001
HADs anxiety by SCID diagnosis of GAD: F(87, 1) = 28.13, p<.0001
HADs distress by SCID diagnosis of GAD: F(87, 1) = 66.15, p<.0001
HADs scores for those with agoraphobia and social phobia tended to be lower than
those found for GAD. However, they were higher than HADs scores for participants
without agoraphobia or social phobia (please see Table G9). This actually makes
good theoretical sense as these diagnoses are specific to certain domains, while
GAD involves persistently high anxiety. Mean HADs scores were found to be
statistically higher amongst participants with agoraphobia in a MANOVA:
HADs depression by SCID diagnosis of agoraphobia: F(87, 1) = 9.55, p<.005
HADs anxiety by SCID diagnosis of agoraphobia: F(87, 1) = 7.09, p<.01
HADs distress by SCID diagnosis of agoraphobia: F(87, 1) = 10.09, p<.005
The analyses of HADs scores by social phobia produced weaker results. Only mean
anxiety scores were found to be higher amongst participants with social phobia at a
statistically significant level.
HADs depression by SCID diagnosis of social phobia: F(87, 1) = .887, n.s.
HADs anxiety by SCID diagnosis of social phobia: F(87, 1) = 3.73, p<.05
HADs distress by SCID diagnosis of social phobia: F(87, 1) = 2.25, p<.10
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G.4iii: Comparison between HADs scores and SCID diagnostic categories at
follow-up
As at baseline mean HADs depression, anxiety and distress scores were related to
SCID diagnoses of depression in a theoretically meaningful way (please see Table
G2). MANOVA analysis of HADs scores by depression diagnoses produced highly
statistically significant main effects, and all pair-wise comparisons were statistically
significant with Tukey tests.
HADs depression by SCID depression diagnoses: F(78, 2) = 76.99, p<.0001
HADs anxiety by SCID depression diagnoses: F(78, 2) = 27.89, p<.0001
HADs distress by SCID depression diagnoses: F(78, 2) = 65.31, p<.0001
As shown in Table G2, HADs mean scores (depression, anxiety and distress) were
approximately twice as high for participants with anxiety diagnoses (GAD,
agoraphobia or social phobia). All these differences were found to be highly
significant using MANOVA, and the F values for these analyses are illustrated in
Table Gil. Overall, the correspondence between anxiety diagnoses and HADs
scores was very good and even stronger than that found at baseline.
Table Gil: F values and statistical significance levels for the MANOVA results
for anxiety diagnoses by HADs scores at follow-up 1
HADs depression HADs anxiety HADs distress
GAD 31.13 *** 51.47 *** 52.84 ***
Agoraphobia 16.98 *** 19.19 *** 22.30 ***
Social Phobia 7.89 * 16.44 *** 14.03 ***
Please see Table G10 for mean scores and numbers of participants meeting these diagnoses
* significant at p<.01 *** significant at p<.0001
G.4iv: Comment on the comparison between HADs scores and SCID diagnostic
categories
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In general HADs scores reported in this study were notably low. Most participants
with major depression and/or GAD would have been captured using standard
published cut-offs for 'possible caseness' (7/8) for the HADs. However, participants
with minor depression, agoraphobia and social phobia reported lower scores and so a
lower cut-off point would be required for them. This echoes O'Rourke et al.'s
(1998) finding that a cut-off of 6/7 may be appropriate with this population. But, as
the HADs was not intended as a tool for categorisation it does not affect its validity
as the continuous measure.
A 'dose-dependent' relationship was found between mean HADs across depression
subtypes, and across participants with GAD, participants with a specific anxiety
disorder, and participants not diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. These findings
make good theoretical and statistical sense. Overall, a good correspondence
between HADs scores and SCID diagnoses of anxiety and depression was found,
particularly at follow-up. These findings serve to cross-validate the HADs and the
SCID diagnoses. Results using the HADs can be taken to reasonably capture the
essence of the emotional disorders, and vice versa.
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H.l: Main theme 4- They're OK, I'm OK or not.
Codes relating to 'They're OK, I'm OK or not' are outlined on the following page.
These are organised into a sub-theme concerning family (to the left of the page) and
into a sub-theme concerning partners and social others (to the right). Separate codes
for children and grandchildren (family) as compared to partners seemed justified as
family was relevant to most participants, but partners to only approximately half and
community to a smaller subset again. However, there was much crossover between
codes for partners and the family in general. Therefore, the groupings of codes into
broad sub-themes within this main theme are less strong than in previous sections.
H.li: They OK, I'm OK, or not sub-theme 1- Family concerns
An overwhelming majority of participants (48/ 60; 80%) reported that they're family
was an important area in their lives. Over half of participants (35/ 60; 58%) reported
that they're main concern in life was their family, making this the most commonly
reported main concern throughout the qualitative interviews. However, actual
specific family problems were only reported by some. It was as if most participants
concern was pre-emptive, and could be described as parental love better than
concern or worry. For example, a female participant said:
'My concern just is that nothing ever happens to them.' f75, 68yrs
Twenty - four participants made statements like:
'As long as they're alright, I'm alright' m37, 71yrs; m55, 66yrs
or similar statements echoing the sentiment that they needed to know their children
and grandchildren were 'OK' 'happy' 'well' or problem free, and that by doing so
they were too. The link between participants families emotional well-being and
their own was often so intrinsic that it defied further explanation, for example one
man said:
'Why are they important? They are my wife and family, my sons and daughters.'
m64, 74yrs
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Many participants appeared proud simply because they had children and
grandchildren. Often they would demonstrate this by listing the number and order
of sons and daughters, by describing the ages and gender of grandchildren and great
grand children, or by using photographs. Some explicitly stated their pride for
example one great grandfather said:
'I have three great grandchildren, eight years, six years and four years that I keep in
touch with and love and respect.. .that I have them that please me enormously. I am
proud to say that I have great grandchildren.' m35, 84yrs
Many participants described their children and grandchildren in glowing terms such
as 'Great' or 'Wonderful'. Often they reported pride in off - springs achievements.
A few expressed feeling pleased that their children had happy marriages or that they
were good moral people, for example:
'I couldnnae get a better family. They've never been in trouble and don't drink and
don't bother with drugs, which is a great thing these days.' m41, 69yrs
Others reported pride in children and grandchildren who had been to University or
who were successful in their careers. A few participants appeared taken with how
interesting their grandchildren were, for example:
'My granddaughters are just another generation. They use the internet and videos. I
just think it's amazing to see how evolution is evolving. When I was there age there
was no such thing as a computer' m66, 65yrs
Often participants appeared to be charmed by the 'cheekiness' or 'mischievousness'
of young grandchildren. For example a female participant described her grandson as
a 'beautiful terror' and one man said:
'If I couldn't get anything else, as long as I can get the two little menaces running in
the door I'm OK' m66, 62yrs.
Often they reported grandchildren provided 'fun' 'happiness' or 'joy'.
Twenty-six participants reported how caring their family was and often that this
made them feel positive. Often they emphasised the effort their family had made to
visit them in hospital especially when they had busy lives or long distances to travel.
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Children were particularly mentioned in this context, while the youngest male
participant reported being pleased his twelve brothers and sisters had hired a mini
bus to visit from Glasgow. A few older participants reported pleasure from caring
young grandchildren, for example, one man's grandson had brought a jigsaw to
hospital because he understood his Granddad couldn't play football. A female
participant described feeling 'nice' because her grandchildren no longer fought in
her company, that her granddaughter had been helping in the house and said:
'They're watching their Grandma now' f74, 64yrs
Many reported appreciating a child or daughter in law helping in practical ways by
doing the shopping either for themselves or for their spouses when they were in
hospital. Often participants expressed feeling pleased that their family were there
for them emotionally. For example one female participant said:
'It makes you realise how much they do love you - you see it open. I've always
know that deep down but you can actually see it.. .It makes me feel good' f52,
57yrs
Twenty - eight participants reported that their experience with their family was
unchanged or had become even closer since their stroke. Of the few who reported
that they had been brought closer together, one man reported:
'If anything the stroke has brought us closer together through their concern.
Everyone was concerned and interested in my welfare.. .It makes me feel good and
have nice thoughts.' m70, 65yrs
The security some felt in their families' care was evident, as they had always
expected they would rally round in such an event. But the clearest message seemed
to be that for most the direction of positive aspects of family was about participants'
own continued concern for, or interest or pleasure in, their children and
grandchildren. For example, in reference to her grandson, a female participant said:
'Nothing has changed, he's still just as caring as before and still makes me feel
great'
f77, 73yrs
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In general when asked about change in concerns for, or the importance of family,
participants expressed lack of change very briefly by saying 'nothing' had changed
or that 'everything was still the same or 'just the same'.
Seventeen participants reported various specific problems or losses within the
family. Often participants were concerned about a parent, sibling, child or
grandchild who was ill, had died, or suffered a particular difficulty. A few
participants concerns about others with deteriorating health, seemed exacerbated
because they were far away or the stroke prevented visiting. However one female
participant actually reported that the stroke had made her Fathers' death in london
'lighter' as she was 'forced to let go'. In contrast, another participant was very
depressed and his grief for his sister challenged his normal orientation to being able
to help others:
'When you're the oldest and you see your young sister die you think "What's going
on here?" The world seems unfair, some get nothing and some get everything. It
takes all types to make this world, it's a big bad world' m55, 66yrs
A few participants began by reporting concern about a child's who had been ill, for
example with cancer but went on to report that at present they felt relief or pride as
they had recovered. Others explained that they had some concern for a grandchild
with a mild disability for example one man described his feelings for his grandson
who needed retalin for hyperactivity as 'not a worry but a wee concern'. A couple
of others described feeling 'helpless' about grandchildren who were very seriously
ill, for example with a heart condition, and about the strain on their own children. A
couple of participants' concerns for their sons' well-being were tinged with
disappointment in their lifestyles. One mans' only concern in life was that one of
his sons took hash, didn't look after himself and was in a rocky relationship.
Another participants' alcoholic son caused her great anxiety and disappointment:
'I think about how he travelled to Hong Kong, got degrees and used to earn
thousands.. .He should have a lovely job and now I've got him back an alcoholic and
living on the dole.' f74, 64yrs
Ten participants expressed more direct irritation or hurt about a family members'
behaviour. A few participants expressed annoyance at their families'
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overprotection: either their nagging to stop smoking or eat more healthily, or not
allowing them to over exert themselves or go out. This was expressed humouredly
by an eighty year old lady whose Doctor had given her sons permission to protect
her for a month:
'I could throw something at them.. .all my life I've told them what to do and now
they're allowed to do it' f27, 80yrs
Two participants reported being annoyed and hurt by a daughter who was 'Not
bothered'. For one, this was balanced as his sons who did care but for the other this
seemed to compound her fear of loneliness. Other problems mentioned were being
patronised by relatives since the stroke, borrowing money that couldn't be repaid,
and a 'drama queen' granddaughter who brought a lot of agro into the household.
Concern to be able to 'Be there' for others, especially the family was expressed by
twenty-six participants. Some expressed this positively as they felt able to offer
practical or emotional support or both. For example, when talking about his
children, an eighty-year-old man said:
'If they need anything, for example advice or money, we would feel only too happy
to help. It's all really around the family, especially in your twilight years.' m58,
80yrs
Another participant reported holding his grandchildren 's confidences in him as very
dear and demonstrated this by describing their various travels around the world,
career decisions and relationships in depth. A female participant reported that the
most important thing in her life was to be able make her family laugh and that she
was still 'as funny as ever'. Another participant believed that teaching children to
love nature would ensure they became good people. She described experiencing a
'lovely feeling of deja vu' by taking her grandchildren to the Botanic gardens and
the seaside, like she had with her own. A female participant who had been
wheelchair bound for years before the stroke described feeling 'useful' because her
husband still depended on her for some things, like memory:
'I'm his walking diary- well, not walking, I sit in the chair and say "What time you
meeting so and so?"...' D9, 76yrs
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However, some participants expressed negative feelings about not being able to 'Be
there' for loved ones or worry about not being able to in future. As discussed earlier
(please see chapter 16, section 16.2) the inability to carry out roles such as driving
others concerned some, particularly depressed participants. A depressed female
participant strong fear of not being there for her family if she died has also been
described (please see Chapter 16, section 16.4).
A few other participants reported some concern about a family member who was
dependent on them in some way. For example, a female participant reported having
become concerned about the future living situation of her 'retarded' brother since
her stroke.
A couple of depressed females' concerns about being there for others since their
stroke were quite complex. The youngest female participant was single but had
close friends whose children she child minded while they were at work. Although
she still managed this successfully and had even informally taken on another girl in
her street who seemed neglected by her own mother, she was self depreciative. She
described herself as 'putting on a brave face' to prevent her friends worrying and
kept comparing herself negatively to the past when she also ran a boys' brigade and
Sunday school too:
'I just never used to be like this' f21. 47yrs
Another relatively young depressed participant's comments indicated some
contradiction within her love for her family. On the positive side, she described
herself and her home as having been the 'central pin' since her Mother's premature
death and that she 'got that love back' particularly since her stroke. However, she
was the only participant to describe having some emotional difficulty in her
relationship with her grandchildren:
'I feel that I put out all the love out on my grandchildren and they weren't coming to
see me. My son hadn't told them and so they've been up every Saturday since. I
feel that I just can't be bothered but love them just as much.' f52, 57yrs
Appendix H: Supplementary qualitative results
cxli
Against this she appeared to be extremely bothered about her practical responsibility
towards her families livelihoods due to her important role in the family business
(please see Section H.2iii).
Twenty-one participants expressed some level of concern over burdening their
family. A few reported having felt sorry about causing their children or spouse's to
worry while they were ill in hospital, for example one participant said:
' When I saw all their anxious faces I thought what a shame' f75, 68yrs
The bereaved depressed man described earlier was particularly concerned about
causing any further emotional upheaval to his already suffering older sister and so
had kept his stroke from her:
'I didn't want her to know I'd had one because our younger sister had just died and a
few months ago her daughter took an overdose. I didn't want her to be worried
about me as it may have made her go backwards about her own stroke.' m55, 66yrs
Others reported feeling some guilt about the practical help they received. This
ranged from shopping, housework, and cooking to administering medicine and
helping with bathing. A couple of participants worried about the strain on their
husbands (please see later). A few felt it was 'unfair' that children should have to be
involved in their personal care and one lady described feeling embarrassed.
A few participants voiced concern about becoming a burden in future and two older
participants had decided to seek residential care to avoid this. One participant
wanted to stop inconveniencing her daughter in law whenever she had a crisis and
the other wanted to:
'Relieve my son and daughter from worrying about me, I just don't want them to
worry.' m68, 88yrs
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A participant who had looked after his aphasic wife for years reported concern not to
similarly burden his son
'She used to hit you when she couldn't say what she wanted. I used to say to myself
"If she dies now I'd be quite pleased". I was very tied down. I couldn't imagine
C [son] doing it, to have to do it.' ml6, 72yrs
Depressed participants seemed to be particularly averse to being a burden and
seemed to think that they should care rather than be cared for. This was reflected by
the strong concern of a depressed man in hospital who thought he would need help
from his five children when discharged:
I'd hate to think their life was looking after their old man...It's me who should be
looking after them' m64, 74yrs
In contrast, another participant who was not at all depressed, whose daughter's only
relationship seemed to be as her companion and carer, reported relatively less
concern:
'I do think about leaving her on her own as she doesnnae get out anywhere but she
seems quite content the now' f47, 82yrs
Other depressed participants talked in terms of burden without evidence that they
were actually causing any imposition. For example, one depressed man seemed to
fear being a burden because he himself was no longer able to help:
' I'm concerned not to be a burden to the family in connection to the car' m34,
76yrs
The concerns of depressed participants not to burden others was very similar to the
sort of self reproach reflected in their concerns about not being able to carry out
family roles discussed previously (please see Chapter 16, section 16.2i).
H.lii: They OK, I'm OK, or not sub-theme 2- Partners and social contacts
Over half of participants who were in a relationship (17/ 29; 56%) indicated some
level of appreciation of the companionship they gained. The extent to which life
was shared by many couples was reflected by the plural ('we', 'our' or 'us') when
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asked about personal concerns. Many emphasised the importance of the length of
their marriages as a worthwhile achievement, although a few mentioned they had
had their 'ups and Downs'. Often marriages seemed to provide familiarity and
comfort, for example:
'We've been married fifty years: you kind of get used to each other' f39, 76yrs
Others described themselves as entirely compatible, used terms such as being 'like
hand and glove' and reported making each other happy. A few expressed outright
admiration for their partner as a husband or wife, for their attributes as a parent, or
person generally, for example one lady described her husband as:
'Excellent, he's my world' f22, 68yrs
A seventy-two male participant described having recently become involved in a
courtship and one of the oldest participants had got engaged to his live in partner
while in hospital:
'I've known C for eleven years now, so decided to make an honest woman of
her!' m35,84yrs
Appreciation for a partner was often reported as something that remained positive.
However, approximately half of participants who were in a relationship (14/ 29:
48%t reported concern for their spouse's health. Often health appeared to be a
shared preoccupation, for example:
'I worry about him and he worries about me' f42, 70yrs
Some participants appeared more concerned about a spouses' health than their own,
particularly when they were seriously disabled or chronically ill. Despite being
wheelchair bound and hospitalised himself, one participant cited his wife's suffering
from various chronic illnesses and a severe stroke as his main concerns in life:
'It makes me feel helpless, I try and do what I can but nothing will take away the
pain'
m41, 69yrs
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Another man described his wife's health as 'my worry for the last twenty years' and
one reported sadness in relation to his wife who was in long term hospital care.
Various participants reported having developed concern for their spouse's welfare as
a result of stroke. One female participant, who was cared for by her husband, was
concerned he might hurt himself lifting her, and another that her husband would fall
asleep at the wheel through tiredness. Some spouses were concerned their wives
could experience something similar to stroke although a few went on to report that at
least they could be thankful they had good health for now. Concern about whether
partners could cope practically if something even more serious happened to them
was also reported, for example:
'The worry is if I died before my wife, would she be able to look after herself?'
m58, 80yrs
Two female participants reported fearing how they themselves would cope if their
husbands died or had a stroke, for example:
'If he had one, how would it affect my quality of life, mine as well as his?'
f52, 57yrs
Finally, concern for the emotional well-being of a spouse was brought up by a few
participants. One wife was concerned about her husband because he had Meniere's
disease and was afraid to go out, and two husbands voiced concern that their stroke
may exacerbate their wives tendency to worry or get depression, for example:
'She's a bit of a worrier. I always have to try and not give her things to worry about,
I try and hide things so she doesn't invent reasons to send me to hospital.'
m33, 66yrs
The importance of friendship was emphasised in various ways by some participants.
Its' centrality in life was more often explicitly emphasised by female participants,
for example:
'I suppose it's been what my life is all about.. .1 like a personal relationship, I prefer
relationships which are close and personal' f49, 60yrs
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while a housebound participant described gaining satisfaction from being able 'to
lift' troubled friends by listening to their problems on the phone. Meanwhile other
participants often described having friendships as 'nice'.
The way some participants talked about their social circle seemed to reflect an
important aspect to their own esteem or identity. A few participants pointed out that
they felt popular because they had a lot of friends. Others reported membership of a
rotary club or the Masons as important to them. A couple of men still attended golf
or rugby clubs although they no longer played. Others maintained contact with their
Second World War army corps either by official membership or personal contacts.
An eighty-three-year old man was pleased that his poem had just been published that
was called 'Reflections' and remembered 'with pride' his friends who had died
'Across a vale of years'.
A few participants reported the importance of their social lives. A wide range of
leisure activities (please see Chapter 16, section 16.2i) were reported and these were
often shared pursuits with partners. Social pursuits were described as enjoyable or
fun and as providing happiness. This was still positive for participants able to
socialise as before. For example, one participant emphasised the importance of her
weekly taxi ride to bridge:
'I've jolly good friends and love bridge, otherwise life would be awful...I enjoy the
game and the social side.. .It makes me feel fine' f40, 80yrs
Some participants reported a change in their social lives following stroke. Often
they reported being pleased that friends cared enough to come and see them but that
they hoped to get back to socialising. Some participants reported sadness because
they missed going out and socialising through leisure pursuits while others social
lives were hindered by feelings of shame as much as by their physical disability
(please see Chapter 16, section 16.2i).
Fifteen participants' accounts portrayed feelings of social isolation or loneliness, or
both. Participants who reported a sense of 'isolation' or being 'stuck here' tended to
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do so in relation to the restriction imposed by stroke or another disability, and they
were often depressed. Depressed participants tended to provide starker descriptions
of feeling cut off from the outside world. For example, a participant who was not
depressed explained:
'The friendship hasn't changed, but I don't enjoy the phone as much' m43, 60yrs
Whereas a depressed man described being housebound as making him feel:
'Confined, enclosed, frustrated, I just want to get up and get out' m34, 76yrs
A couple of depressed participants reported finding temporary separation from loved
ones difficult. One described feeling lonely when her husband was at work. A
participant in hospital reported missing seeing his family to know they were OK 'at
all times' and used a poignant metaphor to describe trying not to think about it:
'If you thought about them all the time you'd be a cripple' m64, 74yrs
Some participants' reports of loneliness portrayed a sense that they had few people
to socialise with, or who cared for them. The root and subsequent meaning of
loneliness varied. One depressed married participant reported that her only
enjoyment in life was occasional trips to the bingo with one sister. Her main
concern in life was bereavement for her other sister and mother whom she used to go
to Bingo with more regularly and she missed them 'terribly'. Another depressed
married participant was very concerned that her husband was the only person she
had to physically look after her because she felt the rest of her family 'wouldn't be
bothered'. A divorced man, reported concern to be able to keep being able to
appreciate 'nice looking lassies' and have company on nights out as:
'Sometimes you have loneliness, when you come in and there's naebody to talk to,
I'm like a couch potatoe. I mean that I like their company and say I'm too old but
still like looking and that's that' m54 62yrs
Other lonely participants tended to be depressed and female and either unmarried or
widowed. A young participant reported being unmarried because she had looked
after her Grandmother. Since her death she had developed depression been put on
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anti-depressants and now felt she had no real family who could care for her the
same. A couple of unmarried older participants reported feeling they had no one
more since they were 'stuck' in doors. Meanwhile a couple of recently widowed
participants reported missing having someone to talk to, for example one said she
felt 'a bit out' during the day and:
'When I'm sitting at night and have no one to talk to I just feel like greeting. He had
no family and I've no family either...' f50, 71yrs
Within a broader social horizon, getting away to other places on outings or on
holiday was brought up as an issue by some participants. In contrast to how being
unable to do more regular day to day activities were generally reported as immediate
concerns (please see Chapter 16 section 16.2i), 'Going places' tended to come up in
the important areas of life part of interviews. Some participants described the
benefits of foreign weather and relaxation as enjoyable. Often outings or holidays
were valued as family pursuits, especially if they involved visiting family who had
emigrated to Ireland, England or Canada. For two men annual holidays without
their wives were so they could spend time with a close male friend.
The meanings of stroke varied in relation to going places. Although no one had
been far afield since the stroke participants generally still talked confidently about
themselves as people who did these things, or even reported 'no change' when
realistically they would not be able to at present. Some did speak about how the
stroke may affect their ability to travel abroad in future either due to physical
difficulties or 'sky high' insurance and a few participants reported holidays were
something they would miss if they were not able to go again. Only three participants
expressed disappointment at not being able to go places at present, two of whom
were depressed. A depressed participant's stroke had confirmed his inability to go
caravanning and he described this as something he missed. A depressed female
participant described feeling 'terrible' and desperate to get home due to leg pain on a
weekend drive with her husband.
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Of everybody, travel was an over-riding interest of one man who was housebound
following stroke, but who was remarkably upbeat rather than depressed:
'I feel that I could still travel but not far: Germany but not Australia. Twenty-two
hours on the plane may be against Doctors orders, Ha,Ha!.. .1 didn't let the first
stroke bother me and think this one will go the same way' m35, 84yrs
His main concerns in life were cancellation of his family holiday to Thailand and
frustration at not being able to fulfil his 'fresh air fiend' weekend outings. However,
he appeared both confident in recovery and able to maintain his esteem as a 'great
traveller' by his enthusiasm for what he had done previously as he talked very
positively and in depth about his travels (including five trips to Russia).
Finally negative issues concerning their neighbourhood were brought up by six
participants. Inconsiderate neighbours were mentioned by a few, for example, one
man's only family concern was his sister had cut short her visit from Canada as she
was 'sickened' by his drunk swearing neighbours. Other participants brought up the
issue of crime in their neighbourhood. Teenage children playing football threatened
two participants. One reported strong annoyance and worry that the Tittle darlings'
might smash her window. The other feared getting knocked at the bottom of her
stairwell herself. She had had a close miss and they had already smashed the glass
door countless times. Both expressed annoyance that teenagers weren't supervised
to go and play out of harms way and expressed worry about the consequences.
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H.2: Main theme 5- Maintaining way of living or thinking, or making changes
Codes related to this last main theme are illustrated on the following page. This was
a complex theme that addressed either meaning in life issues or life transitions that
were very relevant to a minority of participants, or more general issues in life such
as retirement, non-stroke health concerns, or money. Broadly this theme qualifies
the more stroke related first three main themes because it demonstrates concerns or
pre-occupations outside the stroke domain. However, the first sub-theme was the
exception to the rule.
H.2i: Maintaining way ofliving or thinking, or making changes sub-theme 1- It's a
bad world but it's nice to be nice
For five participants a strong obsession or religious/moral orientation permeated
their responses throughout the qualitative interviews. One female participant's work
had dominated her life prior to stroke. She had depression/GAD and her conflicts
about work will be discussed later. A relatively young man appeared to be obsessed
with the lottery. Although he was unable to work and quite dysarthric with a slight
limp, the concerns he reported were related to his feelings when his numbers don't
come up. He reported his dreams of what he plans to do with the money as the most
important area of his life. One female participant emphasised the importance of
cleanliness in the home and of the body, and her feelings were so strong that it was
like a religion. She did not have depression/GAD but her house was spotless. Her
concern about the possibility of a severe stroke was centred around ideas of a 'frail
body' and 'disgusting' house and she gave this description of her feelings:
'It's an inner feeling, just seeing myself in that condition and the house like that'
f51, 69yrs
One man, who was not at all depressed, explained that he was a son of a missionary
and that his Christian role was the most important part of his life, for example:
'Faith means everything to me' m38, 60yrs
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Main theme 5: Maintaining way of living or thinking, or making changes
It's a bad world....but it's
nice to be nice
LO Life orientation
Emphasis on having a religious
faith, or general orientation to
people and doing good, or some
other strong theme that colours
everything, like a strong belief
in cleanliness.
WM? Why me?
Wanting to be able to
understand why the stroke
happened in terms ofjustice, or
feelings that it is undeserved
and so pitying oneself.
EP Empathy/ pity
How one's own experience has
given insight into or lead to
thinking about someone else's
experience, or, pity for those




General comments about the




The different meanings of work
for those who worked up until
their stroke from a livelihood,
to companionship, occupation
(versus boredom) pride and
sense of normalcy.
WS Warning sign
Stroke as a warning that need to
take care, slow down, beneficial
reassessment of self and health
R Retiring
Regrets, or concerns about
having retired, or having to,
versus, positive feelings. Or
just comments that life has
changed now he/she isn't
working.
HC Health Concerns
Restrictions from or concerns
about other, non-stroke problems
like arthritis.
(Also, 3 females have other
serious health issues: f25 has
breast cancer, f39 mobility issues
from a spinal tumour, f46
acquired blindness)
IW I worked
Comments that emphasise the
importance of having worked for
a living, feelings of pride in their
career, or comments suggesting
the idea of'work' or 'working'





desire for more, debts,
annoyance at council tax rates
BC Being comfortable
Importance of being able to feel
financially able to meet needs
and wants
PFF Provided for family
Comfort in the knowledge he/ she
will have provided for those he/
she will leave behind
Getting/ staving at home
GH Getting home
Hospital as a state of limbo, a
different world, concerns about




home in relation to self
following stroke and family
needs
GC Going into care
Feelings about leaving one's
home, lifelong possessions and
area. The thought of going into a
home and fears of neglect and
loss of self.
Getting old and to the end of
life
GO Growing old
A realisation or a refocused
awareness of ideas of growing
old, thoughts about old age and
the eventuality of death
DF Dependency in future
Fears about increasing
dependency in future and
feelings about what this would
be like
WLD Wanting to live or die
Positive versus negative
motivations for living longer
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Another man explained his more secular philosophy in equal depth. His mother had
been an orphan but her life changed for the better when she was adopted. From this
he reasoned that it is 'nice to be nice' and that it was important to care about the less
fortunate in life. In contrast he was depressed and had GAD. The difference
between these two men was striking. The very religious man believed he was able
to fulfil his Christian role in life. He described his academic talent and career as a
'gift' from God and believed he had contributed very positively to the world. He
felt that his very mild stroke had given him 'insight' and allowed him to further
develop his 'sympathy' for the more disabled.
In contrast, the other man reported that his stroke had frustrated his ability to fulfil
what he described as his 'chicken-heartedness'. His main occupation had been
fishing and he enjoyed the pleasure of surprising passer-bys by giving them his
catch, but he could no longer do this. He talked with empathy but also sadness
about the young and very disabled patients he had seen in hospital:
'I feel sorry for them, especially if they don't drink...I won't like anyone to have a
stroke, not even my worst enemy' m55, 66yrs
Three other participants reported developing empathy for the more disabled, and of
these two others were depressed. Therefore, while a positive value, empathy was
more common amongst those who were depressed than amongst those who were
not. Having a strong life orientation was not associated with depression/GAD, but
feeling that one was no longer able to fulfil such beliefs gave them did seem to be.
Eight participants questioned 'Why me?' during qualitative interviews and they
were all participants with depression/GAD. Their sense of injustice for some
seemed to stem from the feeling that they had already suffered a disproportionate
degree of misfortune in life. For example one participant felt it was unjust because
she was already blind, another because her husband had been murdered, and another
because she had had to cope with first one then her second husband dying from a
devastating illness. The youngest male participant's sense of injustice has already
been described (please see Chapter 15, section 15.4v).
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H.2U: Maintaining way ofliving or thinking, or making changes: sub-theme 2-
Keepinz healthy
Six participants emphasised their appreciation of good health following mild strokes.
None of these participants had depression/GAD. Four participants talked about their
stroke as a warning sign to take better care of their health for example:
I've looked around and seen worse problems. I feel quite lucky-I've had a little
yellow card' m38, 60yrs
Similarly none of these participants had depression/GAD. In contrast, almost a third
of participants overall reported additional health problems other than stroke,
amongst which were cancer, arthritis, heart attacks, angina and gout. Eight out of
eighteen participants who reported concern about addition health problems had
depression/GAD.
H.2iii: Maintaining way ofliving or thinking, or making changes sub-theme 3- Work
Work was a very complex theme. As may be expected younger participants were
typically concerned about not working. For one participant work seemed to
represent her main orientation in life and was now her main over-riding. She ran her
family business and reported feeling desperate to get back to work. She was very
upset about friends who had criticised her determination to get back to work, for not
putting her family first or spending time with her grandchildren. However, she said:
'They'd say your health and then you're your family and then work. But your
family goes into your work. It quite annoys me that they just seem to think I'm
more concerned about work than my family but there is the livelihood of five in our
family and I run the financial side!' f52, 57yrs
At other times she reported feeling her husband always wanted more of her time
than she could give. She appeared to be overwhelmed by her different roles and by
others expectations of her and she was depressed. The two youngest male
participants were not so concerned about their jobs per se. but one described
thinking that getting back to work may help him feel more normal. The other had
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been in a 'therapeutic' job designed to help rehabilitate people who had serious
mental health problems. He described this as a 'wee hope' for the future, which he
wanted to get back to. In contrast, a few participants who were about sixty-years-
old actually welcomed the freedom that may come with the possibility of early
retirement, although one was slightly concerned he may be bored.
Some retired participants had contributed in voluntary work, which they had enjoyed
and now missed. Others reported that they had not wanted to retire. A few
depressed older participants reported that they had really loved their jobs and missed
them despite having been retired for quite a few years. A couple of these
participants blamed their bad health on retirement, for example:
'I was never right since I stopped working. Maybe it was my chest or maybe the
smoking. It makes me sad that I stopped working but I had to at seventy-one'
f77, 73yrs
A couple of participants also emphasised that they only stopped working because
they had to. Two depressed participants reported that it was the 'fact that it has been
taken out my control' about their retirement either due to this stroke or from
reaching retirement age years before. Others reported feeling very proud of the
careers they'd had and still being able to gain a sense of satisfaction from knowing
how hard they worked or what they achieved. Some emphasised the positive side of
retirement and the opportunities it gave for a well deserved rest from work and the
freedom to enjoy pleasure and leisure pursuits:
'After forty-odd years of hard work I felt I deserved to take things easy and just do
things I wanted when I wanted to' f73, 74yrs
Therefore work and retirement were complex issues with a range of different
positive and negative meanings. Work issues did not discriminate between
participants with/without depression/GAD, but its central importance to certain
participants with depression/GAD has been highlighted.
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H.2iv: Maintaining way ofliving or thinking, or making changes sub-theme 4-
Money helps
Altogether twenty-five participants reported either positive or negative money
issues, such as feeling comfortable financially, or, that they were 'OK but' could do
with more to help find a bit left after paying bills. Some emphasised feeling secure
that they had provided for their children and were not going to leave any debts
behind. A few were concerned about paying for their own care if they became very
frail and had to go into a home. It was quite sad that these participants all seemed
quite well-off but that their awareness that people are now asked to make a
contribution to residential care had lead them to believe they would not be allowed
to retain any wealth.
However, although money was frequently mentioned it was rarely mentioned as a
strong concern and did not associate with diagnoses of depression/GAD. The
exception was one participant who had depression/GAD who had paid for a big
family holiday after one of her daughter's husband died. She had done this on credit
and was struggling with keeping up payments and in a dilemma about confiding in
her family. She also emphasised concern about this debt during the GAD interview.
Other serious financial problems developed for two young participants during the
course of the study (please see Chapter 15, section 15.6).
H.2v: Maintaining way ofliving or thinking, or making changes sub-theme 5-
Gettins/ stayins at home
Seven participants reported finding/having found hospital aversive and four of them
had depression/GAD. Three who were still in hospital were concerned that that they
would improve sufficiently to get home. Four who had got home emphasised not
wanting to have to go back. Different negative aspects of hospital life were
emphasised from missing the family to feelings of being trapped or the monotony of
the daily routine.
Two participants who had recently moved into smaller homes both reported some
regret. One had moved from a 'beautiful big Victorian house' because he thought it
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may become burdensome as he got older, but he missed it. The other had moved
from a two-bed to a one-bed council flat because he felt it was greedy to keep a
spare room, but he was now worried that his son may split with his girlfriend and
regretted letting it go. In contrast, another man wished he had sold his massive
property years before. He was quite stressed about the up-keep of it and reported
not having the energy to clear everything out and find somewhere smaller.
Seven participants reported having given the possibility of residential care some
consideration. Interestingly only one of them had depression/GAD. She was one of
two who were seriously considering residential care. They reported 'regret' about
leaving their sheltered housing accommodation but feeling that the move into more
supported care would relieve them from worrying about burdening their children.
For one participant the concern was partly about what would happen if her money
ran out, but also the fact that she wished to die before she became that dependent
(please see Chapter 15, section 15.3). For the others their concern was to fight their
disability and prevent having to give in to residential care.
H.2vi: Maintaining way ofliving or thinking, or making changes sub-theme 6-
Gettins old and to the end of life
Ten participants reported that the experience of stroke had enforced upon them a
sense of mortality and the realisation that they were growing old and would one day
die. One man spoke about getting ready to go with 'regret' but feeling ready for it:
'I lost my last friend this year, it's almost as if a bit of myself died. ..I'm winding up
my life but realise that the time has come to do that' m68, 88yrs
Another older man reported that things 'get watered down' in old age. Other
participants who talked about fearing old age tended to be in their sixties and early
seventies. All but one did not have depression/GAD. They reported still having
some quality of life; however, they had begun to have concerns about what life may
be like given 'future deterioration'. Twelve participants particularly emphasised that
they would not like to be entirely dependent in future and this theme overlapped
with fear of a severe stroke (please see Chapter 16, section 16.4i).
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Altogether, across all these themes and the fear of recurrent stroke first sub-theme,
seven participants, four of whom had depression/GAD, spoke explicitly about their
motivation for wanting to live or die. As described previously one female
participant reported being 'happy to go'. In contrast, as described in Chapter 16
section 16.4ii, one very depressed young participant reported that at least if she died
she would be released from her extreme fears of recurrent stroke. As described in
Chapter 16, section 16.4i, ope participant reported the fear of death from a recurrent
stroke because she felt her family could not cope without her. The depressed
participant described in section H.2i as wanting to help others, reported a similar
position. He was worried about no longer 'being there' to see that his grandchildren
were 'OK'. Finally another two participants reported wanting to be able to see their
grandchildren grow up a bit. Therefore grandchildren seemed to represent a prime
motivation to stay alive. However, participants with depression/GAD tended to
emphasise worry about their grandchildren's well-being in the event of their own
deaths. In contrast, participants without depression/GAD wanted to live to be able
to enjoy their grandchildren.
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